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Introduction
1 NECESSITY AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THE INCLUSION OF A CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE IN ICC PROCEEDINGS
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the world’s first international per-
manent court with jurisdiction to judge individuals for crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.
The Rome Statute1 is a pioneering international treaty as it also provides
for the participation of victims throughout the proceedings, not only as
witnesses of the defence or the prosecution, but also as participants in judicial
proceedings. Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute is the central provision related
to victims’ participation.2 It states
“(…) where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceed-
ings determined to be appropriate by the Court (…)” (emphasis added).
Another novelty from this international tribunal is that victims of crimes within
its jurisdiction are entitled to receive reparations, either individually or collect-
ively. Pursuant to Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute, the “Court may make an
order directly against a convicted person (…) or in respect of victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”.
Moreover, pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Statute, the “Court shall take
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-
being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses” having regard to all
relevant factors, including “age, gender (…) health, and the nature of the crime,
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), original document is A/
CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, UN Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544, p. 3. The treaty was
corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May
2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. Amendments to article 8 reproduce the text
contained in depositary notification C.N.651.2010 Treaties-6, while the amendments regard-
ing articles 8 bis, 15 bis and 15 ter replicate the text contained in depositary notification
C.N.651.2010 Treaties-8; both depositary communications are dated 29 November 2010.
The Rome Statute is available at: < http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-
4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf > accessed 2 April 2013.
2 See also Articles 15(3) and 19(3) of the Rome Statute, which refer to other manners of
victims’ participation in the initial stages of ICC proceedings (authorisation to open an
investigation and jurisdiction and admissibility proceedings).
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in particular…where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence
against children” (emphasis added).
These provisions are innovative and an advance in international criminal
law, which goes, unlike the predecessors of the ICC, beyond the purely retribut-
ive nature of judicial proceedings, and includes a restorative mandate, that
encompasses the possibility for victims to express their views in international
criminal trials as well as the possibility to receive reparations for the harms
suffered. However, the advances made with the adoption of the Rome Statute
need to be applied to concrete situations currently investigated by the ICC’s
Prosecutor and in particular cases against accused persons.
In order to fulfil this pioneering mandate of the ICC, relevant expertise in
these innovative features is required within the ICC.3 Accordingly, Articles
36(8)(b), 42(9) and 44(2) of the Rome Statute provide that the ICC should have
judges, advisers and staff members with legal expertise on specific issues,
including among others, violence against children.
As regards child victims and witnesses, the Rome Statute’s legal framework
clearly compels the ICC to consider their needs in international criminal pro-
ceedings. The Preamble of the Rome Statute explicitly refers to children as
victims of the most serious crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction and calls to
end impunity for these crimes. Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute provides that
in order to protect victims and witnesses, their age and also whether the crime
involves violence against children, should be, among other factors, considered.
Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), which directly relates
to Article 68 of the Statute, provides:
“A Chamber in making any direction or order, and other organs of the Court in
performing their functions under the Statute or the Rules, shall take into account the
needs of all victims and witnesses in accordance with article 68, in particular,
children, elderly persons, persons with disabilities and victims of sexual or gender
violence.” (emphasis added)
These legal provisions reflect that, although a criminal court with clear penal
mandate, the ICC also has the obligation to respect, as a minimum, the safety
and well-being of victims and witnesses, particularly those who are most
vulnerable, such as children. It also reflects the developments in human rights
law to focus on children in judicial proceedings, both at the international and
national level.4
3 See the Statement by Ms Eva Boenders, Caucus on Children’s Rights in the ICC, 16 June 1998,
ICC Preparatory Works, available at < http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/61113c/ >
(accessed 4 April 2013).
4 For example UNICEF affirmed in a preparatory document for the Rome Conference that
the “legal safeguards recognized in international human rights law, particularly the CRC,
should be effectively secured” in the ICC. UNICEF then stated that child witnesses and
victims should benefit from “legal and other appropriate assistance” and that consideration
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In spite of these innovations, the ICC has faced immense challenges when
implementing these legal provisions in its initial cases during its first ten years
of existence. The first case before the ICC, the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo (Lubanga case),5 involves exclusively charges of enlistment, conscription
and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in the hostilities.
This case faced unimaginable difficulties, which could explain why it is still
ongoing after more than seven years since Mr Lubanga’s first appearance
before the judges at The Hague.6 Although the ICC’s Trial Chamber I rendered
a conviction and a sentence in 2012 against Mr Lubanga (after more than three
years since the trial had started),7 to date, appeals on these two decisions are
still pending and reparations for victims of crimes included in the charges
are also still waiting a resolution of the Appeals Chamber and implementation
by the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).
Within this complex first ICC case, children were at the centre of ICC pro-
ceedings, and thus its achievements and failures are a vivid example of the
advances and drawbacks of the ICC’s mandate vis-à-vis children. The prosecu-
tion’s “key witnesses” included ten alleged former child soldiers.8 The victims
authorised to participate in the proceedings, 129 in total, were mainly former
child soldiers and their relatives.9 This case was undoubtedly ground-breaking
as it was the first time that victims of crimes (and particularly child victims)
actively participated in ICC proceedings and had the possibility to request
reparations. However, the experience of this first trial may not be at all positive
as regards the ICC’s fulfilment of its mandate as regards children. Child
witnesses in the Lubanga case were subject to multiple interviews and
should be given to the “special needs of the child”, particularly making reference to the
need to secure a “child-friendly” environment. See: UNICEF and the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court (17 March 1998) ICC Preparatory Works, available at < http://
www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/f0fa26/ > (accessed 4 April 2013) p. 5. Likewise, in the Rome
Conference the Special Representative of the United Nation’s Secretary General on Children
and Armed Conflict at the time also appealed that ICC provisions should be consistent
with international standards, including, among others, the CRC. See: Message from Olara
A. Qtunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to
the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court (17 June 1998), ICC Preparatory Works, available at < http://www.legal-tools.org/en/
doc/ed4ff7/ > (accessed 4 April 2013).
5 ICC-01/04-01/06.




7 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842; Lubanga case ‘Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Rome Statute’
(10 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2901.
8 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 480-481.
9 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 15-17.
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strenuous cross-examinations.10 The first witness to testify in trial, an alleged
former child soldier, recanted and stated in court that he had lied to pro-
secution investigators and ICC judges.11 The defence case was based mostly
on credibility issues surrounding the child witnesses brought by the pro-
secution.12 In its conviction decision, the Trial Chamber ultimately found that
all child witnesses in the Lubanga case, except for one, were unreliable.13
For those child witnesses who were also victims participating in the proceed-
ings, their participatory status was removed as a consequence of their contra-
dictory testimonies.14 The Trial Chamber also found that intermediaries had
most likely manipulated these children and possibly committed offences
against the administration of justice.15
Consequently, the Lubanga case demonstrates that the current ICC practice
does not adequately protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being,
dignity and privacy of children interacting with the ICC, either as witnesses
or victims of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 68 of the
Rome Statute. It also raises the issue of whether children should at all testify
in international trials (particularly viva voce in The Hague) and whether the
current victims’ participation system is suitable for child victims who may
want to present their “views and concerns” to ICC judges pursuant to Article
68(3) of the Rome Statute.
However, not investigating crimes committed against children (particularly
when the Prosecutor has received information or evidence that this has
occurred) or excluding children from ICC proceedings (when this is not contrary
to their best interests) is not a legitimate course of action, particularly in light
of Articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute and Rule 86 of the RPE mentioned
above, read in unison with Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, which enshrines
the principle of non-discrimination.16 These legal provisions in fact give the
10 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 479; ‘Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito’, para.
32.
11 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 430.
12 Lubanga case ‘Requête de la Défense aux fins d’arrêt définitif des procédures’ (12 August
2011) ICC-01/04-01/06-2657-tENG-Red.
13 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 479-480.
14 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 484.
15 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 482-483.
16 Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute provides as follows: The application and interpretation
of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human
rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status (emphasis
added).
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legal basis to focus on children as a group requiring special attention by the
ICC, particularly when fulfilling the ICC’s mandate to “protect the safety,
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and
witnesses” pursuant to Article 68 of the Rome Statute.17 As noted by De
Brouwer and Heikkila, even though victims of crime may not have special
rights granted by international human rights treaties, they do have “general
rights” such as the right to privacy and the right to an effective remedy.18
Nonetheless, these provisions are general and “all-purpose”, and enclose
within the same protection umbrella groups as varied and distinct as children,
elderly persons, persons with disabilities and victims of gender and sexual
violence, all of them requiring special protection vis-à-vis their particular needs.
Rule 86 of the RPE refers to the “needs” of victims and witnesses, but does
not set down what these are. However, read together with Article 68 of the
Rome Statute, one can conclude that the “needs” of children should be those
related to the protection of their “safety, physical and psychological well-being,
dignity and privacy”, and not other needs that may be unrelated to the judicial
process.19
While other provisions in the ICC Statute (such as Article 67 on the rights
of the accused) are much clearer and their contents defined more in-depth,20
17 It is important to note, however, that children are not a uniform group, and that within
a children’s rights perspective, other groups should also be taken into consideration (i.e.
girl-child, children with disabilities, indigenous children, etc.). Hence, various perspectives
interrelate, depending on the needs of victims and witnesses, which ultimately are to be
determined on case-by-case basis by the ICC. Only if judges and other organs of the ICC
take into consideration these different, yet intersected needs of victims and witnesses, will
the ICC fulfill its mandate pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE above and the principle of non-
discrimination enshrined in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. See for example, Coalition
on Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations ‘Concerns Regarding the Rights of the Girl-
Child in Armed Conflict Situations’ submissions to the ICC Preparatory Commission Inter-
sessional Meeting, Siracusa, Italy, 31 January to 4 February 2000, available at < http://
www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/e5389c/ > (accessed 4 April 2013).
18 Anne-Marie De Brouwer and Mikaela Heikkila, in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), Inter-
national Criminal Procedure, Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 1338.
19 As noted by Donat-Cattin, the Rome Statute sets a high standard of protection for victims
and witnesses in Article 68 of the Rome Statute and includes children within the group
of vulnerable survivors who are always at risk of re-victimisation. See David Donat-Cattin
in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article
by Article (2nd Edn), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008), p. 1281-1282.
20 For example, the rights of the accused person are clearly spelled out in Article 67 of the
Rome Statute, literally duplicating the rights provided for in the ICCPR and other human
rights instruments. This also is a clear example of the inherent interaction between inter-
national criminal law and international human rights law. See the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entry into force 23 March 1976, article
14; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No 11 and 14(4 November 1950) ETS No 5, article 6;
Organisation of American States, American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose”,
Costa Rica) (22 November 1969), article 8.
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the concept of “needs” of Rule 86 of the RPE needs to be determined by ICC
judges and other organs of the ICC in performing their functions.
In light of this general provisions as regards witnesses and victims, it is
necessary to resort to other applicable law pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome
Statute in order to give more specific substance to the term “needs of witnesses
and victims” and their “safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity
and privacy”, and for the purpose of this research, children, as provided for
in Rule 86 of the RPE. Hence, a comprehensive study of the ICC’s legal frame-
work from a children’s rights perspective is necessary so that interaction of
children as witnesses and victims in ICC proceedings does not compromise
their “safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy”
pursuant to Article 68 of the Rome Statute. For example, when the ICC takes
a decision pertaining to a child witness’s relocation, it could refer to Article 9
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as regards the child’s
separation from his or her parents, Article 12 of the CRC in order to take into
consideration the child witness’s views, among CRC other provisions.
Moreover, as demonstrated in the Lubanga case, measures to protect children
interacting with the ICC, and particularly child witnesses, are not necessarily
in disagreement with the rights of the accused or the right to a fair trial. In
fact, pursuant to Article 68 of the Rome Statute, these measures should not
be prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Additionally, these measures may be necessary to protect the
integrity of a fair trial against the accused person and also to prevent crimes
against the administration of justice that may be committed taking advantage
of the age of young victims and witnesses. As will be further analysed in this
research, measures such as an improved method for screening child witnesses
and measures to preserve their testimonies through time, are not only
necessary pursuant to Article 68 of the Rome Statute, but also in order to
safeguard the rights of the accused to a fair trial pursuant to Article 67 of the
Rome Statute.21
2 AIM OF THE RESEARCH AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Although, as noted above, the legal framework of the ICC contains child-specific
rules, which provide the legal basis for the adoption of child-sensitive measures
21 While victims of crime are only granted indirect protection in human rights conventions,
accused persons are given a prominent place therein. However, the rights of victims to
participate in ICC proceedings and the rights of victims and witnesses to protection do
not violate per se the rights of the accused person. As noted by De Brouwer and Heikkila,
victims’ rights do not justify violations of the accused person’s rights. This is in fact express-
ly provided for in Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. See: Anne-Marie De Brouwer and
Mikaela Heikkila, in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Prin-
ciples and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 1339-1340.
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throughout the entirety of the judicial proceedings, these provisions only offer
a very general legal context. Given their broad spectrum, their implementation
in ICC proceedings may be challenging, especially considering the particularities
of all situations in which the ICC is currently involved and the individual
situation of a child victim or witness interacting with the ICC.22
Consequently, the general ICC provisions (lex generalis) should be applied
and interpreted using other existing international instruments related to
children (lex specialis). This research project identifies these other applicable
sources of law that could be useful in the implementation of children’s rights
within the ICC’s work and gives more specific content to the general ICC
provisions using international instruments that have been adopted in recent
years for the development of children’s rights. It thus intends to progress the
ICC’s practice vis-à-vis child victims and witnesses applying and interpreting
the general ICC provisions taking into account international children’s rights
standards. As will be further analysed in Chapter 3 of this research, pursuant
to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, interpretation and application of the Rome
Statute and other ICC provisions in light of human rights standards is com-
pulsory.
The main research question is:
How should ICC proceedings address the needs of children in accordance with Rule
86 of the RPE, in order to: a) protect the safety, physical and psychological well-
being, dignity and privacy of child victims and witnesses pursuant to Article 68(1)
of the Rome Statute; b) guarantee that the views and concerns of child victims
are taken into consideration as provided for in Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute;
and c) provide reparations to child victims pursuant to Article 75 of the Rome
Statute?
The next sub-questions are answered in the following chapters:
Chapter 1:
– What is the role of children in current armed conflicts and in situations
that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC?
– How do international crimes affect children (as victims and as per-
petrators)?
22 The ICC is currently dealing with 8 situations: Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Darfur (Sudan), Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. Within
these situations, the ICC has 18 pending cases in pre-trial, trial and appeal. For an updated
overview of the cases: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx> accessed 27 February 2013. On 14 May 2013, the
Prosecutor of the ICC received a referral from the Union of the Comoros, “with respect
to the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip”.
See: < http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
Pages/pr926.aspx > accessed 7 August 2013.
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Chapter 2:
– Which are the ICC’s main organs and what are their fundamental functions,
powers and duties and how can they guarantee children’s adequate inter-
action as victims and witnesses with the ICC?
Chapter 3:
– What is the legal framework applicable to the ICC pursuant to Article 21
of the Rome Statute in order to fulfil the ICC’s mandate to address the needs
of children and protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being,
dignity and privacy?
– What other international instruments, not applicable pursuant to Article
21 of the Rome Statute, could still serve as guidance when dealing with
children’s protection in ICC proceedings?
Chapter 4:
– Which crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are child-specific or dis-
proportionately affect children and how have these crimes been defined
in the Rome Statute and international jurisprudence developed thus far?
– How can the definition of these crimes affect the procedural status of
children at the ICC, including their victim’s status pursuant to Rule 85 of
the RPE?
Chapter 5:
– Which are the existing legal framework, practice and jurisprudence of the
ICC as regards victims’ participation, witnesses’ protection and victims’
reparations vis-à-vis internationally recognised children’s rights?
– What challenges does the ICC face in the implementation of internationally
recognised children’s rights in its judicial proceedings and what measures
could be taken to improve or adapt the ICC practice from a children’s rights
perspective?
Chapter 6:
– What are the main conclusions regarding advances, drawbacks and
challenges of the ICC as regards children’s rights?
– Which guidelines could be proposed to the ICC in order to transversally
include a children’s rights perspective in ICC proceedings?
3 THE CONCEPT OF “CHILD VICTIMS AND WITNESSES”
It is important to clarify that throughout this research the concept of “child
victims and witnesses” is used to denote a wide category of individuals who
interact differently with the ICC.
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As will be further analysed in Chapter 3, the CRC gives a clear indication
as to the concept of child, namely someone below the age of 18.23 Thus,
pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE, the CRC and the ICC case law, a child victim
is “someone who experienced (when he or she was under the age of 18)
personal harm, individually or collectively with others, directly or indirectly,
in a variety of different ways such as physical or mental injury, emotional
suffering or economic loss” as a result of the commission of a crime within
the jurisdiction of the ICC.24 Recently, Trial Chamber V has defined “victims”
for the purposes of protection, as “a victim whose identity has been disclosed
to the parties following the Chamber’s preliminary review of his or her applica-
tion and submission of that application to the parties for comments”.25
As will be analysed further in Chapter 5, a victim or witness should be
considered a child at the time of the relevant crimes, and not in relation to
his or her age at the time of his or her interaction with the ICC.
Within the concept of “child victim” there are however different categories
or ways in which children may interact with the ICC. It is important to refer
to them at the outset, in order to clarify the concept of “child victim” in ICC
proceedings.
Firstly, the term “child victims” include individuals who participate in
proceedings pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute.26 As will be further
analysed in Chapter 5, in order to become a victim under this provision,
individuals should apply for participation pursuant to Rule 89(1) of the RPE.
This concept of victims is not limited to direct victims or even immediate
family members.27 Moreover, the latest ICC case law has also opened the
possibility for a collective approach to victims’ participation, and thus the
concept of “child victims” could also include groups of victims, either
exclusively made of individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of
23 The Elements of the Crimes also establish that a “child”, for the purposes of Article 6(e)
is a person under the age of 18 years.
24 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 14; Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008)
ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 90-92; Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor
and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January
2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, paras 31-39.
25 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Ruto and Sang case) ‘Decision
on the supplementary protocol concerning the handling of confidential information concern-
ing victims and contacts of a party with victims’ (12 November 2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-472,
para. 5.
26 As noted by McGonigle Leyh, this is the concept of “victim participant”. See Brianne
McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings,
(Intersentia 2011), 235.
27 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal
Proceedings (Intersentia 2011) 233-234.
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the crimes, or including both adults and children within the same “collective”
approach.28
Secondly, the term child victim also includes victims who make representa-
tions in accordance with Articles 15(3) and 19(3) of the Rome Statute. As will
be further studied in Chapter 5, these representations are not much regulated,
and thus can include individual and collective approaches, as varied and
diverse as an e-mail communication, a video to a fully filled-in application
form.29
Thirdly, the concept of child victim also includes victims who benefit from
reparations, either individually or collectively, as ordered by a Chamber or
implemented by the TFV pursuant to an order of the Chamber or within the
TFV’s assistance mandate.
As regards the concept of “child witness”, it denotes individuals who
witnessed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC when they were under
the age of 18 (at the time of the events), regardless of the age they have when
they testify in court.
The definition of “witness” given by Trial Chamber V in the two cases
pending in the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya situation) could be
helpful to determine this concept for the purposes of the present research:
“(…) a witness is a person whom a party or participant intends to call to testify
during the trial proceedings, provided that such intention has been conveyed to
the non-calling party, either by the calling party including the individual on its
filed witness list, or by the witness informing the non-calling party that he or she
has agreed to be called as another party’s witness, or by any other means that
establish a clear intention on behalf of the calling party to call the individual as
a witness and that this individual has consented thereto.”30
The term thus includes witnesses of the prosecution, the defence, the legal
representatives of victims and the Chamber, as these are all capable to present
evidence in ICC proceedings.
However, for the purpose of protection pursuant to Article 68(1) of the
Statute, and pursuant to Article 54 of the Rome Statute, the interests of
“witnesses” shall be respected from the preliminary proceedings, during the
28 Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October
2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-498. An identical decision was issued in the other case in the Ruto
and Sang case : ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October 2012) ICC-
01/09-01/11-460. For the ease of reference, this research will refer solely to the decision
filed in the Kenyatta and Muthaura case. This decision will be further analysed in Chapter 5.
29 As noted by McGonigle Leyh, this is the concept of “victim claimant”. See Brianne Mc-
Gonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings,
(Intersentia 2011), 235.
30 Ruto and Sang case, ‘Decision on the protocol concerning the handling of confidential
information and contacts of a party with witnesses whom the opposing party intends to
call’ (24 August 2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-449, Annex 1, para. 1.
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investigation phase. Thus, the term “witness” also includes individuals who
are approached by the ICC from the initial stages of the investigation, even
if these individuals do not eventually become “trial witnesses”.
Likewise, “other persons at risk”, which encompasses an even broader
concept that “victims” and “witnesses” are also entitled to protection. Trial
Chamber V of the ICC has also defined this term to include persons at risk
on account of their activities for the Court or on account of the testimony /
statements given by others.31 The same Chamber has recently emphasised
that protection is not only due vis-à-vis victims and witnesses, but also as
regards “other persons who might be at risk as a result of the activities of the
Court”.32 It further determined that “potential witnesses” should be con-
sidered as “other persons at risk”, until they become witnesses in proceed-
ings.33 Family members of witnesses are also considered within this broad
category of “other persons at risk”.34
In many instances children will be both victims and witnesses and thus
have a “dual status”. As will be further analysed in Chapter 5, the rights and
the protection afforded to an individual child may vary depending on his or
her interaction with the ICC. For example, although the ICC judges have thus
far allowed the participation of anonymous victims, there have not been any
anonymous witnesses vis-à-vis the accused persons.
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The main point of departure of this study is the Rome Statute, and pursuant
to Article 21 of this treaty, other applicable law, including ICC provisions found
in the Elements of Crimes, the RPE, the Regulations of the Court (RoC), the
Regulations of the Registry (RoR), and the Regulations of the Trust Fund for
Victims (RTFV). Pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome Statute, other international
instruments on children’s rights, particularly the CRC, are applied in order
to provide child-specific contents to the ICC provisions. Other international
legal sources have been consulted, particularly UN resolutions, regional human
rights case law, as well as other “soft law” instruments, which could be signi-
ficant to ICC proceedings.35
31 Ruto and Sang case, ‘Decision on the protocol concerning the handling of confidential
information and contacts of a party with witnesses whom the opposing party intends to
call’ (24 August 2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-449, Annex 1, para 2.
32 Ruto and Sang case ‘Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction regime’ (5 October
2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-458-AnxA-Corr, para. 44.
33 Ruto and Sang case ‘Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction regime’ (5 October
2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-458-AnxA-Corr, para. 1.
34 Ruto and Sang case ‘Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction regime’ (5 October
2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-458-AnxA-Corr, para.56.
35 The Appeals Chamber at the ICC concluded that “soft law” instruments may be used as
“guidance”. See Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence
12 Introduction
This research also thoroughly analyses the ICC’s practice and jurisprudence
in relation to participation of victims, protection of victims and witnesses and
reparations to victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The date
of 1 April 2013 has been used as cut-off date for consulted ICC case law.
This research does not aim to recapitulate on the extensive and innumerable
sources that are widely available regarding the ICC’s jurisdiction or the situation
of children in armed conflict, particularly the phenomenon of child soldiers.
Although this research does not intend in any way to be an academic research
which comprehensively analyses the social, economical and political effects
of armed conflict on children around the world, it refers to the general
situation of children in armed conflict in Chapter 1 in order to contextualise
the circumstances in which crimes against children are committed and the
role children play in modern armed conflicts.
This research is based mainly on international legal instruments and inter-
national case law. Thus, it does not refer, albeit for some few exceptions, to
legal instruments or practices of national jurisdictions. The legal and
jurisprudential sources on which this study is based were obtained through
extensive and thorough research of legal instruments and digital research of
case law of the international tribunals (namely the ICC, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL) and to an extent, the ad-hoc tribunals). The author, as a
staff member of the ICC, has also applied her own personal experience in ICC
proceedings in the development of this research.36 Furthermore, this study
solely refers to information that is publicly available through the ICC’s website
or other public sources.
This research follows classic legal methodology and is thus limited to the
use of legal texts and case law. It has not thoroughly analysed the wider impact
that ICC proceedings may have according to studies of other disciplines such
as psychology, sociology or anthropology. This, however, is an interesting field
of study that could be developed in the future by a multi-disciplinary group
of researchers and that would undoubtedly contribute to the understanding
of ICC proceedings beyond the legal perspective.
5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This research is divided into 6 chapters.
Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to the role of children in current
armed conflicts, which sets the general context of the situation of children who
against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July
2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, para. 33. The legal status of these “soft law” instruments is
further analysed in Chapter 3.
36 The views expressed in this research are those of the author and in no way reflect those
of the ICC.
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will come to the ICC either as victims or witnesses of crimes within its juris-
diction. It first describes how violence against children has become a weapon
of war in many current armed conflicts. It then analyses the impact that crimes
against children have on their lives and those of their families and commun-
ities. However, it goes beyond the role of children as victims of armed conflict
and analyses the complicated reality of many children that are also perpetrators
of crimes within the context of an armed conflict, particularly the situation
of child soldiers. Finally, this chapter focuses on the significant role that
children could play as participants in the peace and reconciliation process,
including their participation in international justice as well as non-judicial
mechanisms. Chapter 1 thus illustrates that child victims and witnesses are
not simply “vulnerable” individuals. Children appearing before the ICC include
children who may be perpetrators of crimes (albeit not within the ICC’s juris-
diction). Likewise, as a result of armed conflict, children appearing before the
ICC could also be more empowered, mature and independent that children
in other situations. This analysis is important since these multifaceted aspects
of children in armed conflict should be taken into consideration when dealing
with children’s interaction with the ICC in Chapters 5 and 6 of this research.
Chapter 2 is a brief introduction to the ICC, its establishment and its main
organs. This introduction is made through a children’s rights perspective, thus
focusing on how the different organs of the ICC should work in order to fulfil
the ICC’s mandate pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. It is also an important
Chapter to introduce the organisation and structure of the ICC, particularly
since different organs and sections of the ICC are later mentioned and referred
to in Chapters 5 and 6 of this research. Although this Chapter may be super-
fluous for readers with knowledge on the ICC, it could be of value for readers
who, although knowledgeable in children’s rights, may not be acquainted to
the ICC’s structure and functioning.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relevance of other international instruments for
the interpretation and application of ICC provisions in proceedings related to
child victims and witnesses. This Chapter takes as initial point Article 21 of
the Rome Statute, and mainly paragraph 3, which requires ICC judges to inter-
pret and apply the law in accordance with internationally recognised human
rights. As regards children, the logical point of departure is the CRC. The Chap-
ter also refers to other sources of law that, although not applicable law per
se pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome Statute, could serve as guidance for ICC
judges when interpreting the law. Finally, this Chapter analyses international
case law that may be relevant and applicable for child victims and witnesses
before the ICC. In particular, the jurisprudence of the SCSL is analysed regarding
crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of children to participate actively
in the hostilities and crimes of sexual violence. Furthermore, the case law of
the regional human rights courts is studied. Of great significance is the case
law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), particularly in
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relation to reparations. The analysis contained in Chapter 3 thus gives the legal
basis for the use of other international instruments in the following chapters.
Chapter 4 focuses on the substantive law of the ICC. It describes very briefly
the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Chapter then thoroughly describes crimes committed
exclusively against children but also crimes that, although committed against
the general population, have disproportionate effects on child victims. This
analysis is of significance, since children will interact with the ICC when they
are victims or witnesses of crimes within its jurisdiction. Thus, the analysis
of the elements of crimes is necessary to identify who are the child victims
and witnesses at the ICC. For example, in order to establish whether a child
is a victim within the jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE,
an analysis of the elements of the relevant crimes is required. Likewise, in
order to establish the harms suffered in reparations proceedings, an analysis
of the crimes committed against children and the effects that these crimes have
upon them is fundamental. This Chapter is also important to understand the
particular circumstances of child victims and witnesses addressing the ICC,
who may need protective or special measures as a result of the crimes (i.e.
a child witness with a post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of sexual
violence). Thus, although this Chapter analyses the substantive law of the ICC,
it ultimately has significant bearing on the procedural issues discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this research.
Chapter 5 is the pièce de résistance of this research, as it focuses on the three
manners in which children can interact with the ICC: as participating victims,
as witnesses and as beneficiaries of reparations. It analyses the existing legal
framework and practice at the ICC, but also provides examples of how other
applicable law related to children’s rights could be of use in proceedings in
which children interact with the ICC. This Chapter proposes different methods,
standards and good practices that could be adopted in ICC proceedings in order
to take into consideration the needs of child victims and witnesses pursuant
to Rule 86 of the RPE.
Chapter 6 proposes a series of recommendations that could be adopted
in order to guarantee the active participation and reparations of child victims
in ICC proceedings in accordance with international standards in children’s
rights and also pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. The Chapter also proposes
measures that could be taken when children appear as witnesses in proceed-
ings before the ICC, in order to make their experience non-traumatic, but also
in order to guarantee the rights of the accused and a fair trial. The final chapter
also proposes a series of guidelines, which provide specific parameters in order
to fulfil the mandate of the ICC as provided for in Article 68 of the Rome
Statute and Rule 86 of the RPE and pursuant to international children’s rights
standards.
1 Armed conflict and children
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the position of children before the ICC, it is important
to understand the impact that international crimes have upon them. Crimes
within the ICC’s jurisdiction are no ordinary crimes, and often will be massive
or systematic and have serious consequences on the lives of children and their
communities. This Chapter aims to give a general overview of the different
roles that children play in armed conflict and other situations where the ICC
may exercise its jurisdiction: as civilian victims, as participants in hostilities
and also as key players in peace, reconciliation and justice mechanisms. It is
important to acknowledge that many children coming before the ICC will fulfil
these three roles in one way or another. Even though they may seem incompat-
ible, they are all part of the paradox reality of armed conflict and its effect
on children. As noted by Drumbl, any type of labelling or category of child
image, particularly as regards child soldiers, may inordinately simplify the
complex lives and experiences of children.1 Hence, this Chapter will try to
describe the various “images” of children, beyond vulnerable victimhood. It
will describe children as perpetrators of heinous crimes but also as potential
peacemakers in judicial and non-judicial justice mechanisms.
Although children may be resilient and endure extreme situations of armed
conflict, the experiences they surpass may also have an effect on the way they
will interact with the ICC either as participating victims or as witnesses in court.
As will be analysed further below in this research, crimes committed against
children may affect the child’s capacity to trust adults (i.e. including lawyers
and judges), and they may also corrode the child’s moral values (i.e. import-
ance of an oath and telling the truth). Thus, it is important to take this into
account in order to protect the child’s well-being in accordance with Article
68(1) of the Statute, but also to protect the probative value, reliability and
truthfulness of their evidence as witnesses and ultimately protect the fairness
of proceedings at the ICC.
1 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University
Press 2012) 6-7.
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1.2 CHILDREN AS VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND GROSS VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
1.2.1 Violence against children as a method of war
In general, crimes against humanity and genocide can occur in times of peace,
but frequently crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC are committed during
times of war.2 A well-known fact today is that while during World War I the
number of civilian victims rose to 5% of the total war casualties, civilian
victims of armed conflict nowadays represent 90% of the war victims.3 The
distinction between combatants and civilians has thus disappeared from most
modern conflicts and civilians have become the main targets of warfare.
As noted by Kuper, children experience armed conflict differently from
adults. They are often physically, economically, politically and militarily
powerless in armed conflict situations.4 In response to the growing effects
of armed conflict on civilians, and particularly children, the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) decided to appoint an expert on the impact of armed
conflict on children in 1993.5 In her 1996 report, the Special Representative
gave, for the first time, a full view of the unprecedented effects of armed
conflict on children.6 As for the subsequent reports in the years to come, the
office of the Special Representative raised awareness of the situation of children
in armed conflict around the world. For example, in the 2006 report, the Special
Representative stated that at that time over 2 million children had been killed
in armed conflicts around the world, 6 million had become permanently
disabled as a result of an armed conflict and more than 250,000 continued to
be victims of child recruitment in armed conflicts around the world. To date,
little has changed. The 2012 UN Report of the Secretary General on Children
and Armed Conflict denounced that 32 “persistent perpetrators”, that is, parties
that have been listed for grave violations against children for five years or
more, continued to commit crimes against children. Of these “persistent per-
2 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 29.
3 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 24.
4 Jeny Kuper, ‘Children and Armed Conflict: Some Issues of Law and Policy’, in: D. Fottrell
(ed.) Revisiting Children’s Rights: Convention on the Rights of the Child (Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2000) 104-105.
5 UNGA, Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflicts: Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly (20 December 1993) A/RES/48/157. See also: Matthew Happold ‘Child Soldiers
in International Law’ (Manchester 2005) 36-42; Sara Dillon ‘International Children’s Rights’
(Carolina Academic Press 2010) 694-708; Magali Maystre ‘Les Enfants Soldats en Droit
International: Problématiques Contemporaines au Regard du Droit International Humanitaire et
du Droit International Pénal’ (Perspectives Internationales No 30, 2010) 87-89.
6 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 24.
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petrators” seven are government security forces.7 Regrettably, in spite of the
growing awareness of the international community of these crimes, children
continue to be targets of modern armed conflict and are often caught between
being civilian victims but also participants in hostilities.8
Children in situations of armed conflict also suffer from sexual violence
in a manner that is both unprecedented and not incidental. Sexual violence
against children has become a weapon of war used to terrorise the population
and force civilians to flee.9 Children are increasingly at risk of becoming
victims of sexual violence from all armed groups in a conflict, including even
peacekeepers and humanitarian workers.10 Even if sexual violence has
devastating effects on all victims (adults or children, men, women, boys or
girls) the impact of sexual violence on children is more profound and long-
lasting, given the effects it has on their development.11 The long-term effects
of this kind of violence on children are both psychological and physical,
including the sexual transmission of diseases such as HIV-AIDS and unwanted
or forced pregnancies resulting thereof.12
The UN Commission on the Status of Women has denounced that though
all children may be victims of sexual violence, girls, particularly adolescent
girls, are at greater risk of suffering these crimes due to their age and vulnerab-
ility.13 Although boys are also victims of sexual violence,14 this crime affects
girls disproportionately and it is estimated that around the world some half
a million children are “born of war”: resulting from rape, forced pregnancies
and sexual slavery.15 Thus in many cases, sexual violence committed against
7 UNGA/Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (26 April
2012) A/66/782-S/2012/261, para. 221.
8 Jeny Kuper, ‘Children and Armed Conflict: Some Issues of Law and Policy’, in: D. Fottrell
(ed.) Revisiting Children’s Rights: Convention on the Rights of the Child (Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2000) 109. See also: Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of
the Child. (Save the Children 1998) 329.
9 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 94.
10 UN Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu (28 January 2004) E/CN.4/2004/70, 7.
11 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 79.
12 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 77; Anne-Marie De Brouwer, ‘Reparations of Victims
of Sexual Violence: Possibilities at the ICC and at the Trust Fund for Victims and their
Families’ (2007) Leiden Journal of International Law, 207-237.
13 UN Commission on the Status of Women, The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and
Violence Against the Girl Child (12 December 2006) E/CN.6/2007/2, paras 6 and 30.
14 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 77.
15 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Panel on Remedies
and Reparations for Victims of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo to the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (March 2011) available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_Reparations_Report_en.pdf.> accessed 3 September 2013.
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girls also has multiplying effects that surpass generations, affecting also
children born as a result of these crimes.16 These “second generation” children,
as well as their young mothers, suffer rejection and ostracism.17 In addition
to the problems encountered by all children in armed conflict situations, these
children suffer from additional stigma and discrimination, and are often
deprived of fundamental rights such as nationality, family and identity.18
Moreover, as noted by Hall-Martinez, the crime of forced pregnancy inflicts
incomparable harm on the victims by occupying a woman’s body and forcing
her to bear her rapist’s child.19 If, in addition to this, the young age of the
victim is added, forced impregnation could have devastating physical effects
on her body, which might very well be unprepared to bear a child, and also
shattering emotional effects on the victim, who may not have reached maturity
and psychological development to become a parent. Furthermore, they may
have particular health problems resulting from the sexual violence suffered
by their mothers (i.e. HIV/AIDS) as well as psychological problems due to
their mother’s trauma.20
Violence committed against children in situations of armed conflict has
long-lasting effects that taint the lives of child victims often in a permanent
manner. In this regard, the CRC Committee in its General Comment on Violence
Against Children, determined that there are multiple short and long-term
health consequences to violence, all of which are applicable to situations of
armed conflict in which children are often victims of extreme acts of violence.
The CRC Committee mentioned physical health problems (including sexually
transmitted diseases, diarrhoea and malnutrition); cognitive impairment
(including impaired school and work performance); psychological and emo-
tional consequences (such as feelings of rejection and abandonment, impaired
attachment, trauma, fear, anxiety, insecurity and shattered self-esteem); mental
health problems (such as anxiety and depressive disorders, hallucinations,
16 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Save the Children
1998) 340-341.
17 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 92.
18 In some cases, these children born of sexual violence are abandoned, and sometimes even
killed. Many children also suffer from economic hardship, as they and their mothers are
often rejected and may have no access to social benefits and education. See: Charlie Carpen-
ter (coordinator), Protecting Children Born of Sexual Violence and Exploitation in Conflict Zones:
Existing Practice and Knowledge Gaps (National Science Foundation, Ford Institute of Human
Security and University of Pittsburgh, December 2004-March 2005) 4, 10.
19 Kathy Hall-Martinez and Barbara Bedont, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the
International Criminal Court’ (1999) The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 65-86.
20 As noted by Denov, particularly referring to girls who had been victims of sexual violence
in Sierra Leone, these crimes have a profound effect on the mind and body, and scars not
only the body, but also the memory of the victim who may have a long-term sense of
insecurity, whether physical, psychological or socio-economic in nature. See: Myriam Denov,
Wartime Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone (Security Dialogue Vol 37 No 3, September 2006)
327.
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memory disturbances and suicide attempts); and health-risk behaviours (such
as substance abuse and early initiation of sexual behaviour). Secondly the CRC
Committee found that there are developmental and behavioural consequences
(such as school non-attendance and aggressive, antisocial, self-destructive and
interpersonal destructive behaviours) that can lead, inter alia, to deterioration
of relationships, exclusion from school and coming into conflict with the law.21
All these consequences of armed conflict and violence against children,
mounted with the fact that some armed conflicts last for several decades, often
lead to what has been called “second generation” wars, with children who
have lived their entire lives in a situation of armed conflict and violence, and
see it as a permanent way of life.22
This situation of children must not be ignored by the ICC, particularly when
responding to the child victims or witnesses’ needs pursuant to Rule 86 of
the RPE. Moreover, these effects of violence against children should also be
considered when children become means of proof in judicial proceedings, in
which the rights of the accused to a fair trial must be balanced with the duty
to protect these children.
1.2.2 Socioeconomic impact of armed conflict on children
Armed conflict also has particular socioeconomic effects on children, as it often
results in damage or destruction of a society’s social and cultural life (i.e.
schools, health systems), leaving children deprived of their material and
emotional needs.23 During an armed conflict the educational infrastructure
is severely affected, and children may lose years of schooling that will affect
their future development into productive and economically independent
individuals.24 Furthermore, when adult family members are killed or dis-
placed, children may end up assuming leadership roles in communities and
families: girls become “mothers” for younger siblings and boys “fathers”, both
heads of families.25 All of this deprives children of fundamental rights accord-
ing to the CRC: mainly their right to education and their right to rest and
leisure. Likewise, after an armed conflict, many child-headed households may
often lack legal and social protection, and may not be entitled to land, property
21 CRC Committee, General comment No. 13 (2011): The right of the child to freedom from all forms
of violence (18 April 2011) CRC/C/GC/13, para. 14.
22 Peter Warren Singer, Children at War (New York, Pantheon Books, 2005) 43.
23 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 29.
24 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 187.
25 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) Child Victims of Genocide, War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/children_&_the_ICC.
pdf> accessed 7 August 2013.
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and inheritance rights under national law, which leaves children in a situation
of extreme vulnerability.26
Under such economic and social conditions, children’s recruitment often
occurs either “voluntarily” or compulsorily. As will be further analysed in
Chapter 4 of this research, due to these socioeconomic burdens, children’s
recruitment is rarely, if not impossible, voluntarily, as they may join the armed
conflict in order to protect themselves and their families, out of vengeance
for harms suffered by family or community members, or in order to ensure
their daily subsistence.27 At the same time, children recruited in armed groups
often lose their social and family ties, and may become addicted to drugs, all
of which makes their future reintegration into society and economic life com-
plicated.28
The economic and social hardships suffered by children, particularly girls,
also make them extremely vulnerable to sexual exploitation and prostitution.29
As noted above, girls that have suffered from crimes of sexual violence are
often rejected by their families, are not able to marry, and suffer from negative
long-term socioeconomic effects that may impede their future development
and growth both in the family and community spheres.
Though thousands of children die as a direct result of armed conflict, many
others die of diseases related to this state of violence, such as malnutrition
and infectious diseases, diarrheic illnesses, and respiratory infections, all of
which often occur as a result of displacement and the lack of basic health and
sanitary services. During armed conflict, health services and food supplies
are interrupted, leaving many children adrift. Armed conflict also affects
children who suffer from war-related disabilities (both physical and mental).
According to the World Health Organisation, armed conflict is the leading
cause of disabilities in children.30 These hardships are worsened when eco-
nomic sanctions are put into place. Even though humanitarian aid is exempt
from sanctions, the distribution of food, medicines and the proper working
of sanitation and health systems are often affected when sanctions are put in
place, affecting mostly women and children.31
26 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 89. See also: Charlotte Phillips, Child-headed Households: a Feasible Way Forward,
or an Infringement of Children’s Right to Alternative Care? (Leiden University 2011).
27 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 74. See also: Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in Inter-
national Law (Manchester 2005) 11-15.
28 UNGA, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (17 August 2006) A/61/275 para. 12.
29 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 96.
30 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 145.
31 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, paras 128-129.
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1.2.3 Refugee and internally displaced children
In the early 1980’s there were 5.7 million refugees worldwide and by the end
of that decade, the number rose to 14.8 million. In 2006, the number of refugees
rose to up to 20.8 million persons worldwide and an estimated 23.7 million
persons were internally displaced around the world.32 Among the millions
of refugees and internally displaced persons around the world, it is estimated
that 80 per cent are women and children, and at least 50 per cent of them are
children.33
Children are often the first victims of massive displacements, as they are
more vulnerable to diseases such as diarrhoea, malnutrition, and respiratory
infections, all of which increase in situations of overcrowding, lack of food
and poor sanitation.34 Additionally, children who are displaced are at a
greater risk of being victims of crimes, such as sexual violence and recruitment,
due to insecurity and lack of economic and educational opportunities for
children in those camps.35
The general breakdown of all social structures due to massive displacement
of people often entails that States and the community are not in a position
to provide the necessary protection for children without families.36 Even when
children are under the care of both parents, they have little potential to provide
protection and act as role models for their children due to the loss of their
normal livelihoods.37 Some children, those that are unaccompanied and thus
separated from any adult relative,38 are at greater risk, since under many
legal systems they will lack legal capacity to access asylum procedures and
other forms of complementary protection. Moreover, children who have been
displaced and lose contact with their family members also suffer psychological-
ly as they have been separated from the people most important to them, and
often under brutal circumstances.39
For many children their refugee status is also complicated by the fact that
they could have committed international crimes, particularly as a result of
32 United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), Refugees by Numbers (2006) 19.
33 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, paras 26 and 66.
34 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 79.
35 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children
Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups (February 2007), Principle 5.0.
36 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Inter-Agency Guiding Principles for Un-
accompanied and Separated Children (January 2004) 2.
37 UNHCR, Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care (Geneva 1994) 10.
38 ICRC, Inter-Agency Guiding Principles for Unaccompanied and Separated Children (January 2004)
7. See also: Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child.(Save the
Children 1998) 342-344.
39 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child.(Save the Children
1998) 26.
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their voluntary or forced recruitment into armed groups. In accordance with
Article 1(F) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention) none of its provisions shall apply to any person for whom there
are serious reasons to consider that he or she has committed an international
crime.40 In light of this provision, many children could be excluded from the
safeguards provided for in the Refugee Convention based on their participation
in armed conflict. Davison has commented that if it can be discerned that the
child has been forcibly recruited, refugee status could be granted to the child,
albeit any crime he or she could have committed during the recruitment.41
However, it could also be argued that such an exemption would be contrary
to the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, which by no means
provides children this “immunity”. This dilemma does reveal a need to modify
the Refugee Convention in response of the changing nature of armed conflicts
since 1951 when this international treaty was adopted.
1.3 CHILDREN AS PARTICIPANTS IN ARMED CONFLICT
In over three-fourths of the conflicts around the world, children participate
as combatants,42 and are recruited and used in hostilities in at least 86 coun-
tries or territories worldwide.43
But what exactly encompasses children’s participation in armed conflict?
The Rome Statute does not give a very clear definition of this concept, only
making reference to the crimes of conscription, enlistment and use of children
to actively participate in hostilities, without any further detail on what really
is meant by “active participation”. The definition of these crimes will be
analysed in-depth in Chapter 4. However, it is important to mention already
the definition given by the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Asso-
ciated with Armed Groups or Forces (Paris Principles),44 which is a political
document signed by 76 States that provides guidelines on the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of children associated with armed groups.
Although the terms of the Paris Principles may be too broad a definition in
order to decide on the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators of
crimes of child recruitment, they do offer a wider concept that adjusts to the
realities of today’s armed conflicts, in which children participate in countless
40 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, UN Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
41 Ann Davison, ‘Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident’ (2004) Willamette Journal of
International Law and Dispute Resolution, 152. See also: Magali Maystre, Les Enfants Soldats
en Droit International: Problématiques Contemporaines au Regard du Droit International Humanitai-
re et du Droit International Pénal (Perspectives Internationales No 30 2010) 22.
42 Peter Warren Singer, Children at War (New York, Pantheon Books, 2005) 7.
43 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University
Press 2012) 5.
44 Paris Principles.
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roles, from fighting in battles to serving as cooks or domestic servants in
commanders’ quarters.
According to the Paris Principles (which will be further analysed in Chap-
ters 3 and 4 of this research), a “child associated with an armed force or armed
group” is:
‘(…) any person under 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used
by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to
children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for
sexual purposes.’
It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in
hostilities.45
Armed groups and forces recruit children; they are either conscripted
(recruited by force) or enlisted (recruited voluntarily). As noted above, some
experts believe that since several forces including cultural, social, economic
or political pressures, drive children to “voluntarily” enlist, all child recruit-
ment should be considered involuntary.46 However, other scholars have stated
that children should not be regarded as “incompetent” individuals that have
no will and that children’s participation in armed conflict is a coping strategy
that serves a protective psychological function compared to an alternative of
frustration, poverty, hopelessness and learnt hopelessness.47 Although the
“voluntariness” will be analysed further in Chapter 4, it is necessary to deter-
mine at this juncture that, regardless of the nature of the recruitment (either
by force of voluntarily), the child’s involvement with an armed group has
distressing consequences for the child, his or her family and ultimately his
or her community. Furthermore, as will be analysed further in Chapter 4, both
conscription and enlistment are prohibited by the Rome Statute and
consequently, consent should thus not serve as a defence.
But why are children recruited in current armed conflicts? Singer identifies
three main causes to this new warfare trend: a) social disruptions and failure
in development; b) technological improvement in production of lighter and
easier to use weapons; and c) the rise in brutality.48 This author is of the view
that poverty, protection and revenge are some of the most common underlying
45 Paris Principles, principle 2.1.
46 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 38.
47 Angela Veale, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Former Child Soldiers: Contributions from
Psychology’ in Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski (eds.), International Criminal Accountability
and the Rights of Children (The Hague Academic Coalition 2006) 99. See also: Magali Maystre
‘Les Enfants Soldats en Droit International: Problématiques Contemporaines au Regard du Droit
International Humanitaire et du Droit International Pénal’ (Perspectives Internationales No
30 2010) 27-28.
48 Peter Warren Singer, Children at War (New York, Pantheon Books, 2005) 38. See also:
Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law (Manchester 2005) 8-11.
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causes of the “voluntary” recruitment of children.49 Furthermore, Singer also
states that modern small weapons are much easier and lighter to use due to
new technologies and lighter materials used in modern weaponry. Thus, a
child can carry it effortlessly and can learn how to use it within minutes. These
weapons have also become cheaper and widely available, which may explain
why it is estimated that there are currently five hundred million small arms
around the world: one for each twelve persons on the planet.50
Likewise, armed conflicts have become more brutal, and the use of children
turns them into fearless fighters who may often be unaware of the effects of
the crimes they commit. Along this view, the ICRC has affirmed that recruitment
of children is not only a crime against children being recruited, but it also
increases the crimes committed against the civilian population in general, as
children who take part in hostilities not only place their own lives at risk, but
also their immature and impulsive conduct endangers the lives of everyone
around them.51 As a result of this modern warfare trend, adults are no longer
the main recruits in some armed conflicts, and children have become the
primary source of fighters. As stated by the UN Secretary General in the 10th
Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict, the crime of child recruitment
is “migrating” within regions, as rebellious groups move across borders in
search for new child recruits and children are “recycled” from one conflict
to another.52
In light of the above, any effort to demobilise and reintegrate child soldiers
seems as a titanic task. According to the UN, demobilisation programmes aim
to discharge active child combatants from armed forces or groups, whereas
reintegration programmes are the processes by which ex-combatants acquire
civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.53 In general,
all demobilisation and reintegration programmes should take into account
the particular needs of children, and should be organised separately into child-
specific programmes.54 For example, child demobilisation requires taking
into consideration aspects such as: education, recreation, psychological treat-
ment, reunification with their families, etc. However, implementation of these
standards is often problematic. For example, incentives, such as the promise
of money upon presentation of a weapon, which were implemented in some
demobilisation programmes in the past, brought more negative effects than
49 Peter Warren Singer, Children at War (New York, Pantheon Books, 2005) 61-63.
50 Peter Warren Singer, Children at War (New York, Pantheon Books, 2005) 46-47.
51 ICRC, Children in War (July 2004) 2.
52 UNGA/Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (26
October 2006) A/61/529-A/2006/826 para. 4.
53 UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, What is DDR? <http:/
/www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php> accessed 31 August 2012 (webpage no longer available).
54 Geraldine Van Bueren ‘The International Law on the Rights of the Child’ (Save the Children
1998) 348.
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benefits to former child soldiers.55 It also lead to discrimination against girls
who formed part of the same armed groups.56
Another aspect of child recruitment that has its own particularities is that
one committed against girls.57 The reasons for which they join the armed
groups, the potential for their release, and the effects of their experience on
their physical, emotional and social well-being, and the long-term effects on
their social reintegration are all too different from that of boy recruits.58
Although these crimes committed against girls will be further analysed in
Chapter 4, it is important to generally describe the manner in which girls are
recruited by armed groups. For example, many girls are recruited to help
armed groups in domestic chores, such as fetching water or preparing food.
Also, girls are recruited as sexual slaves, and are often “married” to fighters
in ceremonies. Girls face deep-rooted stigmas in their families and commun-
ities, along with traumas resulting from the abuses and harms they have
suffered.59 Moreover, many girls, though initially abducted and raped, later
develop ties with their perpetrators, and create “family units” with them and
the children resulting from rape.60 In many cases, girls have to deal with
residual relationships or feelings for their captors, who are perpetrators of
serious crimes, but also their “husband” and often father of their children.61
What is most paradoxical as regards children associated with armed conflict
is the fact that although victims for some, they are ultimately also perpetrators
of crimes just as serious and grave as those committed against them. Although
pursuant to Article 26 of the Rome Statute, the ICC may not prosecute children,
this does not mean that child perpetrators of crimes should remain absolved
of any criminal or at least moral responsibility.62
55 UNGA/Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (9
February 2005) A/59/695-S/2005/72 paras 138-144.
56 UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, What is DDR? <http:/
/www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php> accessed 31 August 2012 (webpage no longer available).
57 UN Commission on the Status of Women, The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and
Violence Against the Girl Child (12 December 2006) E/CN.6/2007/2, para. 30.
58 Paris Principles, principle 4.
59 UN Commission on the Status of Women, The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and
Violence Against the Girl Child (12 December 2006) E/CN.6/2007/2, para. 32.
60 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children
and Armed Conflict (17 August 2006) A/61/275, para. 13.
61 Paris Principles, principle 7.59.
62 Matthew Happold ‘Child Soldiers in International Law’ (Manchester 2005)141-159; Christina
Clark, ‘Juvenile Justice and Child Soldiering: Trends, Challenges and Dilemmas’, in: Charles
Greenbaum and others (eds), Protection of Children During Armed Political Conflict: A Multi-
disciplinary Perspective (Intersentia 2006) 311-328; Magali Maystre ‘Les Enfants Soldats en Droit
International: Problématiques Contemporaines au Regard du Droit International Humanitaire et
du Droit International Pénal’ (Perspectives Internationales No 30 2010) 135-138.
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Children who perpetrated serious crimes could be prosecuted under
national juvenile criminal systems.63 Where these systems have been estab-
lished in accordance with international human rights standards (such as Article
40 of the CRC), bringing a child to justice could help achieve truth and reconcili-
ation. As commented by Davison, in order to provide some sort of respite for
the victims and the community and to favour children’s reintegration into
society, justice mechanisms should be put in place for child perpetrators.64
However, juvenile criminal systems must take into account the child’s age
and promote his or her reintegration. It should also bear in mind the child’s
role in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation and provide for alternat-
ives to imprisonment, such as foster care, education and vocational pro-
grammes that benefit the child’s reintegration into society.65
However, it could be argued that children under the age of 15 should not
be prosecuted by national criminal jurisdictions due to their inability to consent
to their recruitment. In such instances, particularly when national jurisdictions
are barred from prosecuting young children, other non-judicial justice mechan-
isms could be of significance not only for the child perpetrator of crimes, but
also for their families and communities and ultimately their victims.66
Although these mechanisms could help create a climate of justice and reconcili-
ation, they should also be consistent with international human rights standards
(such as the right to a fair trial) and should be used in a non-discriminatory
manner (i.e. on grounds of sex, race, religion or ethnicity).67
63 For an analysis on the drafting history of Article 26 of the Rome Statute, see: Mark Drumbl,
Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2012) 119-
122.
64 Ann Davison, ‘Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident’ (2004) Willamette Journal of
International Law and Dispute Resolution, 154.
65 See Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford
University Press 2012) 128-133.
66 Nienke Grossman, ‘Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights
Violations’, in: Sara Dillon (ed), International Children’s Rights (Carolina Academic Press
2010) 729. See also: Amnesty International, Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims? (2000)
available at: <http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR50/002/2000/en/049a91ec-dc61-
11dd-bce7-11be3666d687/ior500022000en.html> accessed 7 August 2013.
67 UN, Guidance Note of the Secretary General, UN Approach to Justice for Children (Septem-
ber 2008) 3. See for example the report of Human Rights Watch on the Gacaca courts in
Rwanda, and how these were well below international standards, particular as regards
fair trial. Human Rights Watch ‘Justice Compromised, The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based
Gacaca Courts’ (2011). See also: Institute for War and Peace Reporting ‘Can Traditional Rituals
Bring Justice to Northern Uganda?’ (2007). Available at <http://iwpr.net/report-news/can-
traditional-rituals-bring-justice-northern-uganda> accessed 7 August 2013; Khristopher
Carlson and Dyan Mazurana ‘Accountability for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes by the Lord’s
Resistance Army’ in Sharanjeet Parmar and others (ed) ‘Children and Transitional Justice, Truth-
Telling, Accountability and Reconciliation’ Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and
UNICEF (2010) 236. These authors emphasise how women and girls are often excluded
or given minimal participation in traditional justice mechanisms.
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Most importantly, regardless of whether justice mechanisms are judicial
or non-judicial, children associated with armed groups should not be
marginalised from post-conflict peace and justice efforts. Former child soldiers
are not only defenceless victims or evil children who committed heinous
crimes. They are also children who may have developed important skills and
leadership experience, placing them in a better position of confidence, self-
reliance and maturity vis-à-vis others their age.68 Hence, post-conflict justice
mechanisms (either national or international, judicial or non-judicial) should
take into account the identity transformation between the child and the com-
munity, resulting from the child’s recruitment.69 In this sense, even though
the childhood of former child soldiers should not be denied, their experiences
as members of an armed group must also be taken into consideration, as
regrettably, though they could be children as regards their age, they could
have reached a level of maturity uncommon for others their age as a result
of their recruitment but also lack the innocence of childhood as a result of the
crimes committed against them and the crimes they could have committed
against others.70
1.4 CHILDREN AS KEY PLAYERS IN PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE
MECHANISMS
Armed conflict and violence have an impact on children that is likely to have
long-term adverse consequences for the formation of children’s values, identity,
political beliefs and ability to function as leaders and decision makers in the
future.71 This affirmation may be applicable to many children living in
situations of armed conflict, but also of massive human rights violations, and
particularly in situations where international criminal within the ICC’s juris-
diction are committed. In the case of child soldiers, but also as regards other
children affected by crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, reintegration, peace
and reconciliation mechanisms, including international justice, should be
processes towards civil life in peace. Within these processes, children should
have meaningful roles and children’s access to education, family unity, dig-
68 Angela Veale, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Former Child Soldiers: Contributions from
Psychology’ in Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski (eds), International Criminal Accountability
and the Rights of Children (The Hague Academic Coalition 2006) 100. See also Mark Drumbl,
Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2012) 53-58.
69 Angela Veale, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Former Child Soldiers: Contributions from
Psychology’ in Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski (eds), International Criminal Accountability
and the Rights of Children (The Hague Academic Coalition 2006) 105.
70 See Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2012) 79-80.
71 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 3.
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nified livelihoods and safety from damage should be protected.72 All children,
including those who were not involved in hostilities, need to be involved in
the reconciliation process so that they can become adults that will contribute
to the peace-making efforts.
Although the ICC proceedings cannot address all the needs of children or
any part of the civilian population in post-conflict situations, ICC proceedings
should endeavour to act jointly with the peace and reconciliation process or
at least, cause no harm to the civilians who may be attempting to regain
civilian life in peace. As regards children in particular, although the ICC should
protect them as witnesses and victims pursuant to Article 68 of the Rome
Statute, it should also allow children to participate in the international justice
arena, while safeguarding their well-being and security and the rights of fair
trial.73 As will be analysed further in Chapter 5 of this research, when children
give their voluntary consent, either individually or through their parent or
legal guardian, they can participate in justice mechanisms. Most importantly,
as will be further observed, allowing children to participate either as victims
or witnesses in ICC proceedings could prevent having testimonies based only
on the adult perception and perspective of the experiences lived by civilians
during an armed conflict.74
For example, in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
children under 18 could not give testimony, but were able to participate in
special hearings for children and youth.75 In the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission a child-friendly report was created, which includes
pictures made by children and a text suitable to read at elementary school
level. Other initiatives include the establishment of youth-to-youth networks,
in which children can work on issues of children and armed conflict, or “Voice
of Children”, a radio programme created in Sierra Leone so that children could
participate in the peace-making process.76 Although these examples may not
be applicable to the, in essence, ICC criminal proceedings, such ventures could
become part of the reparations proceedings foreseen in the Rome Statute.77
72 Paris Principles, 7.
73 Statement by Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund,
One Young Woman, Making a Richer World, International Youth Day, 12 August 2007.
74 Paris Principles, 9.
75 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC), TRC Report (29 October 1998)
Vol 4, Ch 9.
76 UN Commission on Human Rights, Rights of the Child: Annual report of the Special Representat-
ive of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr Olara A. Otunnu (3 March 2003)
E/CN.4/2003/77, 7.
77 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 242.
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS
Child victims and witnesses appearing before the ICC should not only be
regarded as vulnerable individuals that require protection pursuant to Article
68 of the Rome Statute. Although this may be the case in many cases involving
children, the ICC should also take into consideration that child witnesses and
victims who have experienced international crimes may have developed great
resilience and could have also perpetrated crimes themselves. Regrettably,
these children’s moral values could also have been affected by early exposure
to violence and separation from their parents and their communities. This
complex reality must be taken into account throughout the judicial process,
which should not label children solely as “vulnerable” individuals. As will
be analysed further in Chapter 5, a former child soldier witness may need
to be reassured that he or she will not be prosecuted in his or her own country
for crimes he or she will testify about in ICC proceedings (i.e. by ordering that
all of his/her testimony remains confidential pursuant to Rule 74 of the RPE).
A former child soldier or any child exposed to extreme levels of violence may
also need further preparation before his or her testimony, particularly to
understand the notion of telling the truth and taking an oath, but also to gain
trust and confidence in all the adults involved in the ICC proceedings (judges,
prosecutors, counsel).

2 Children and ICC’s structure
This Chapter introduces the different organs of the Court and their role in
the interaction of children with the ICC. It is aimed to those readers that may
not be familiar with the ICC structure and its main distinctions with other
international tribunals and courts. Although for the more knowledgeable reader
the following Chapter may seem obvious at a first glance, it is still of signi-
ficance, as it analyses the ICC structure and proceedings from the perspective
of child victims and witnesses. It proposes how each organ of the ICC has
responsibilities in order to guarantee the protection and participation of child
victims and witnesses pursuant to Article 68 of the Rome Statute and address
the harms suffered by children through reparations in accordance with Article
75 of the Rome Statute.
The present Chapter introduces the ICC, its history and its current struct-
ure.1 In the first section on the establishment of the ICC, it will show how
children’s rights and a child-centred perspective were discussed and imple-
mented in the adoption of the Rome Statute. The discussions of the Rome
Conference and other preparatory meetings may be important when inter-
preting ICC provisions, as ICC judges have repeatedly referred to the drafting
history of provisions in their decisions.2
Moreover, section two gives a general introduction to the structure of the
ICC, which has developed into a complex organisation, with seat in The Hague,
but also with field offices in the different African countries were the ICC is
1 This chapter very generally synthesises the main aspects of the ICC’s establishment and
structure from a children’s rights perspective. However, for further in-depth analysis on
the general establishment and structure of the ICC, the reader is referred to the following
literature: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 15-127 and 931-1063; William
Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2010) 1-27; Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal
Court: Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text (Transnational Publishers 2005) Volumes
1, 2, and 3; Roberto Belleli (ed), International Criminal Justice, Law and Practice from the Rome
Statute to its Review (Ashgate 2010), 5-66.
2 For example, in its decision confirming the charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial
Chamber I referred to the “Zutphen Draft”, which was a discussion paper adopted in a
PrepCom. See Lubanga case ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (29 January 2007) ICC-
01/04-01/06-803-tEN para. 267. See also Kenya Situation, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya’ (31 March 2010) ICC-01/09-19-Corr, paras 17-19.
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currently investigating and prosecuting cases. The Chapter focuses on how
the different organs of the ICC may play a role in the protection of child victims
and witnesses and particularly, in ensuring the ICC’s mandate under Article
68 of the Rome Statute and Rule 86 of the RPE.
2.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICC
In 1995, the UNGA established an ad-hoc committee for the establishment of
a permanent international criminal court. This ad-hoc committee, which later
was called the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), prepared a draft statute,
which finally was discussed and adopted in 1998, in the Plenipotentiaries
Conference convened by the UNGA in Rome, Italy.3
At the outset of the process, different organs of the UN that monitor and
protect children’s rights actively participated in the process for the creation
of the ICC. For example, in 1998, the CRC Committee rendered a recommenda-
tion to the PrepCom on this matter. On this occasion the CRC Committee urged
the PrepCom to consider the following when drafting the Rome Statute for
the ICC: a) definition of war crimes; b) age of criminal responsibility; c)
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of crimes; and d) protection of the
rights of the child. Most importantly, the CRC Committee stated that “the
provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC (must) be in line with the principles
and provisions of the CRC with respect to the various aspects of the protection
of children’s rights”.4
During the drafting process, as well as during the discussions that took
place in the Rome Conference, civil society played an important role that
unquestionably influenced the final version of the Rome Statute. Through the
NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), among other civil
society groups, more than eight hundred non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) from all corners of the world came to Rome, including women’s groups,
disabilities organisations, religious groups, and children’s rights groups, among
many others. Among the list of NGOs that participated in the Rome Conference,
some children-specific organisations were: Children’s Fund of Canada, Save
the Children Fund, Union to Protect the Children of Lebanon, and Youth
Approach for Development and Cooperation.5
The influence of civil society in the drafting of the Rome Statute is reflected
in the Rome Statute’s many provisions that include inter alia gender perspect-
3 UNGA, Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly (28 January 1998) A/RES/52/160.
4 UNGA, Recommendation adopted by the CRC Committee (2 April 1998) A/AC.249/1998/L.18.
5 UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Non-Governmental Organisations Accredited to Participate in the Conference
(5 June 1998) A/CONF.183/INF/3.
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ive, protective measures for victims of sexual violence, and special measures
for child victims. Undoubtedly, the ICC’s present system, which provides for
the participation of victims in the proceedings, as well as for reparations for
the crimes they suffered, are a consequence of the participation of civil society
groups in the adoption of the Rome Statute.
After five weeks of intensive discussions, amongst more than two thousand
delegates from around the world, the Rome Statute was adopted on July 17th,
1998, with 120 votes in favour, 7 against and 2 abstentions.
Unlike the ad-hoc tribunals, which derive from the mandate of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), the ICC originates from the UNGA. This
explains the democratic values of this international organisation, which en-
deavours to have equitable geographical representation and gender balance
in its human resources, from judges to general staff. Likewise, this egalitarian
nature is reflected in the diversity of its provisions, which include procedural
institutions both of common law and civil law systems.
Participation of children’s NGOs and UN agencies, such as UNICEF, in the
Rome Conference is reflected in provisions such as Article 26 of the Rome
Statute that excludes criminal responsibility for children under 18, or Articles
36(8)(b) and 42(9), which call for expertise in violence against children among
judges, and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Likewise, the inclusion of child-
specific crimes, such as forcible transfer of children (Article 6(e)), war crimes
for intentionally attacking a school (Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv)), and
conscripting, enlisting or using children under 15 to actively participate in
hostilities (Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii)) are unquestionably the result
of the efforts made by children’s rights organisations in the preparatory
discussions prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Already in the Rome
Conference UNICEF called upon States to use the CRC as “guiding reference
and framework for the work of the (International) Criminal Court whenever
the situation of children is at stake”. It also affirmed that the CRC should inform
the drafting process of the Rome Statute, considering the “virtual universal
ratification” of the CRC and the consensus built around it.6
The efforts to include children’s rights in the ICC went beyond Rome, with
the drafting and adoption of the RPE and the Elements of Crimes. For example,
in 1999, the PrepCom held a “Seminar on victims’ access to the ICC”,7 with
the participation of sixty experts from different parts of the world that spoke
on a personal basis and made recommendations on how to include effective
victims’ rights in the ICC’s RPE. In this Seminar important discussions took place
6 UNICEF and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 17 March 1998, ICC Preparat-
ory Works, available at < http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/f0fa26/ > (accessed 7 August
2013) pp. 1-2.
7 UN Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (PrepCom) Report on
the International Seminar on Victims’ Access to the ICC (6 July 1999) PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/
INF/2.
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that resulted, for example, in the Rules related to Victims and Witnesses Unit
(VWU), which should have staff with expertise amongst others, in traumatised
children.
In 2000, another seminar was held by the PrepCom to discuss protection
of victims, in particular of special groups of victims, such as children and
disabled persons. In its report, the PrepCom brought to the attention of State
Parties to the Rome Statute the importance of: a) adopting special techniques
to preserve the credibility and to protect a child witness; b) training investiga-
tion personnel in order to avoid re-traumatisation of child witnesses; and c)
putting in place alternative means to obtain and admit children’s evidence
(i.e. video testimony).8
Clearly, as a result of these and many other discussions, children’s rights
are protected in various provisions of the Rome Statute and the RPE. For
example, Rules 16 to 19 of the RPE regulate the functioning of the VWU and
include many of the recommendations made by the PrepComs, such as the
expertise in violence against children (Rule 19(f)), and the possibility to assign
a child-support person to assist a child witness or victim through all stages
of the proceedings (Rule 17(3)).
Ten years after the establishment of the ICC the participation of NGOs in
the work of the ICC continues. As the OTP has stated, NGOs continue “to form
a vital part of the Office’s comprehensive strategy and fulfil various comple-
mentary roles within the scope of the ICC”. For example, up until June 2006,
the OTP had contact with over 300 NGOs.9 For example, in June 2003, three
months after being sworn in, the Prosecutor had a first public hearing with
State Parties, NGOs and academics in which he presented the OTP’s policy. The
prosecution later included all comments made into a “Paper on Some Policy
Issues before the OTP”.10 Likewise, NGOs continue to offer continuous support
to the ICC but also monitor its work. For example, in preparation for the 2011
election of six new judges, a panel of experts made recommendations regarding
the qualifications of the candidates.11 It is to be noted that none of the can-
didates deemed unqualified by the panel were elected by the ASP.
NGOs also play a fundamental role in the field. For example, in the first
Situation referred to the ICC, namely Uganda, both the OTP and the Registry
8 PrepCom, Report of the Seminar of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Intersessional meeting,
Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC), January 31 – February 5, 2000.
9 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June
2003-June 2006) (12 September 2006) para. 93 < http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%20
strategies/Pages/report%20on%20the%20activities%20performed%20during%20the%20first
%20three%20years%20%20june%202003%20%20%20june%202006.aspx > accessed 7 August
2013.
10 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June
2003-June 2006) (12 September 2006), para. 57.
11 Independent Panel on International Criminal Court Judicial Elections <http://iccindependent
panel.org/> accessed 7 August 2013.
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held workshops with traditional leaders (150 leaders, 120 NGOs, 60 local
government representatives and 50 religious leaders) in order to analyse the
relationship between the ICC and the peace process in this country.12 Likewise,
the Director of the TFV held consultations with local and religious leaders, and
representatives of victims organisations in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) and Uganda, in order to make an “initial assessment of the assistance
being provided to victims” and explain to key stakeholders in both countries
the “foundations for funding of the first projects” of the TFV.13
Although the ICC has become a strong organisation in its first ten years
of existence, it still requires the assistance and cooperation of NGOs. Although,
as will be analysed in Chapter 5, the involvement of intermediaries, often
members of NGOs, could have affected the fairness of proceedings in the first
cases before the ICC, the ICC cannot work isolated from local and international
NGOs involved in the countries where the ICC is currently involved. The
involvement of NGOs during the entirety of ICC proceedings, from the initial
stages of Article 15 authorisation to commence an investigation, to the final
phase of reparations, is incontestable. However, this association of the ICC with
NGOs must be organised, duly regulated, and most importantly, kept under
careful judicial scrutiny. Beyond the effectiveness of proceedings, the number
of convictions or the number of participating victims, ICC judges should remain
vigilant in order to guarantee that NGOs that assist the ICC, for example, in
investigations, in the victims’ application process and in the reparations
proceedings, are also knowledgeable and respectful of the ICC provisions,
particularly the safety and well-being of victims and witnesses pursuant to
Article 68 of the Rome Statute, but also of the rights of the accused to a fair
trial, as enshrined in Article 67 of the Rome Statute.
12 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June
2003-June 2006) (12 September 2006) para. 34.
13 ICC Press and Media, ‘Director of the Trust Fund met with victims’ communities in Uganda’
(Press release 13 June 2007) < http://www.icc-cpi.int/fr_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%
20court/outreach/uganda/press%20releases/Pages/director%20of%20the%20trust%20fund%
20met%20with%20victims’%20communities%20in%20uganda.aspx > accessed 7 August
2013; ‘Première visite du Directeur exécutif du Fonds au Profit des victimes en RDC’ (Press
release 15 June 2007) < http://www.icc-cpi.int/fr_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/
press%20releases/2007/Pages/première%20visite%20du%20directeur%20exécutif%20du%
20fonds%20au%20profit%20des%20victimes%20en%20rdc.aspx > accessed 7 August 2013.
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2.2 ORGANISATION OF THE ICC
2.2.1 The Assembly of State Parties
The deliberative organ of the ICC is the ASP. This democratic organ makes many
of the fundamental decisions for the functioning of the ICC, including any
amendment to the Rome Statute and the RPE and approval of the ICC’s annual
budget. For example, in 2010, the ASP adopted a definition for the crime of
aggression in the Review Conference held in that year.14
The ASP also elects ICC judges, as well as the Prosecutor and Deputy
Prosecutors, and the Board of Directors of the TFV, all of which are nominated
by the State Parties. In reference to the above, the ASP has repeatedly reminded
State Parties to “take into account the need to include judges with legal
expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited too, violence against
women and children”.15 The ASP has also reminded the ICC of its obligation
to recruit staff seeking expertise on issues such as violence against women
and children.16
Since the ASP is the organ of the ICC that approves the yearly budget, it
also provides management oversight to ICC organs. In this sense, the
Presidency, Registry and the OTP yearly submit to the ASP their staffing and
resources requirements. Consequently, the decisions of the ASP are fundamental
in allocating resources and staff to the different sections of the ICC so they can
meet their obligations as regards the protection of child victims and witnesses
pursuant to the Rome Statute. Moreover, as will be analysed in Chapter 5 of
this research, the ASP could amend the RPE in order to make participation for
victims, particularly the application procedure, more collective and less
burdensome for the victims, but ultimately for the accused persons who have
the right to challenge such participation.
Another important aspect of the ASP, as an organ composed of all State
Parties to the Rome Statute, is the necessary cooperation that must exist
between the ICC and State Parties (i.e. for enforcement of sentences, relocation
of witnesses, facilitating testimonies of witnesses, etc.).
14 On 11 June 2010 the ASP included Article 8bis to the Rome Statute, which defines the crime
of aggression. This amendment was inserted by: ICC Review Conference Resolution, The
Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) RC/Res.6.
15 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Procedure for the Election of the Judges for the International
Criminal Court (Resolution of 9 September 2002) ICC-ASP/1/Res.3, para. 2.
16 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly
of States Parties (Resolution of 1 December 2006) ICC-ASP/5/Res. 3, para. 21. See also
Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties (Resolution
of 5 of December 2005) ICC-ASP/4/Res.4, para. 23.
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2.2.2 Presidency and Chambers
The Presidency of the ICC has three main functions: external relations,
administrative and judicial. Although the OTP may negotiate and conclude
agreements on its own, the Presidency is the organ of the ICC that principally
endorses cooperation agreements with State Parties, non-State Parties, as well
as with international organisations and NGOs. Since the ICC does not have a
police force to execute its warrants of arrest, or prison facilities for the
enforcement of sentences, it depends on these agreements to fulfil its
mandate.17
This mandate is paramount to protect children’s rights before the ICC, as
the Presidency could negotiate agreements with international organisations
and/or NGOs with expertise in childrens’ rights. For example, the Presidency
adopted a “Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the United
Nations”, in which it is established that the “United Nations or its programmes,
funds and offices” may provide cooperation and assistance to the ICC.18
Assistance and cooperation of UNICEF or other UN agencies or experts could
prove essential for the ICC’s work.19 In fact, as will be studied further in
Chapter 5, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children
and Armed Conflict acted as amicus curiae and later as expert witness in the
ICC’s first trial. Cooperation with other organisations, such as the African Union
and other international organs specialised in children’s rights, is also important
(i.e. the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child),
particularly to gain support and outreach in the continent currently under
the ICC’s scrutiny.
The Chambers of the ICC consist of three Divisions to which judges have
been assigned: the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division and the Appeals
Division.
The Pre-Trial Division is composed of three Pre-Trial Chambers with three
judges serving in each Chamber, although a single judge may exercise the
functions of a Pre-Trial Chamber. The Pre-Trial Chamber monitors fairness
of the proceedings from the initial investigation of a Situation by the Prosecutor
to the confirmation of charges against a suspect.20 Among its multiple
functions, the Pre-Trial Chamber may authorise the Prosecutor, upon request,
17 ICC, Structure of the Court, Presidency < http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure
of the court/presidency/Pages/the presidency.aspx> accessed 7 August 2013.
18 ICC Assembly of States Parties and United Nations, Negotiated Relationship Agreement between
the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (October 2004) ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, article
15.
19 See for example: Children and Armed Conflict: International Standards for Action” (April 2003)
<http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/HSNBook.pdf> accessed 7 August 2013.
20 See Hall 1133-1145 and Schabas and Shibahara 1171-1181 in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary
on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft 2008).
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to commence an investigation proprio motu and may review the Prosecutor’s
decisions not to investigate or not to prosecute.21
The powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber are also significant in relation to the
preservation of evidence, especially when there is a unique investigative
opportunity, in accordance with Article 56 of the Rome Statute, or when the
Prosecutor needs to take investigative steps in the territory of a State Party,
as provided for in Article 57 of the Rome Statute.22 For example, in
investigations involving child witnesses, these powers of the pre-trial judges
allow the Prosecutor to take the statement of child witnesses in a timely
manner for their future use in pre-trial or trial proceedings. This possibility
could prove helpful to take a statement or testimony from child witnesses only
once, during the investigation stage, thus avoiding multiple contacts of the
child witness with the ICC.23
Likewise, the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders for the protection of
victims and witnesses from an early stage of the proceedings. Such measures,
as will be analysed further in Chapter 5, may not only serve to protect the
well-being and security of a child witness, but may also preserve the probative
value of his or her testimony in trial, preserving its integrity, reliability and
trustworthiness. Moreover, the Pre-Trial Chamber may decide on the
participation of victims during this initial stage.24
In the Trial Division, judges are assigned to Trial Chambers of three judges
each. Unlike the Pre-Trial Chamber’s functions, which may be exercised by
a single judge, the functions of the Trial Chamber must be carried mostly by
the three judges of the said Chamber.25 However, recently Rule 132 bis was
adopted, allowing for a Single Judge to act alone for the preparation of trial.26
During the trial proceedings the Trial Chamber hears the evidence and
submissions of parties and participants. Additionally, according to Article 69(3)
of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber may request the submission of evidence
21 ICC, Structure of the Court, Chambers, Trial Division < http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/trial%20division/Pages/trial%20division.aspx
> accessed 7 August 2013. See also Guariglia and Hochmayr in Otto Triffterer (ed),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 1117-1131.
22 See Guariglia and Hochmayr in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 1107-1115.
23 Rome Statute, Article 56.
24 See for example, Lubanga case ‘Decision on the applications for participation in the
proceedings of a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo and the investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (28 July 2006)
ICC-01/04-01/06-228-tEN.
25 See Bitti in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 1199-1218.
26 ICC, Structure of the Court, Chambers, Trial Division <http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/
structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/trial%20division/trial%20division?lan=en-GB>
accessed 31 August 2012.
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necessary for the determination of the truth, and may, according to Rule 103
of the RPE, invite or grant leave to amicus curiae to give an observation on any
issue that the Chamber considers appropriate. As will be hereinafter further
analysed, in the Lubanga case, the Trial Chamber called four expert witnesses,
among them, the UN Secretary General Representative for Children and Armed
Conflict, and an expert on children with trauma.27
The Trial Chamber also decides on applications of victims to participate
in the trial proceedings and the manner in which they will do so. Most
importantly, the Trial Chamber judges decide on the acquittal or conviction
(Article 74 of the Rome Statute) and sentence (Article 76 of the Rome Statute)
of an accused person, as well as on reparations orders (Article 75 of the Rome
Statute).
Finally, judges may form part of the Appeals Division, which is formed by
5 judges, all of them serving as an Appeals Chamber. Pursuant to Article 81
of the Rome Statute, the Appeals Chamber has the power to decide on the
appeals against final decisions, such as acquittal, conviction or sentence against
an accused. The Appeals Chamber may also decide on interlocutory appeals
of pre-trial and trial decisions. Finally, the Appeals Chamber may revise a
final judgment of conviction or sentence, if the requirements established in
Article 84 of the Rome Statute are met.
Although, as will be analysed in Chapter 3, the decisions of the Appeals
Chamber are not binding, its criteria are often referred to by other ICC
Chambers and thus they are due to influence the moulding of the ICC’s case
law. As many of the provisions under the Rome Statute are open to
interpretation, the decisions and judgments of the Appeals Chamber are
important, particularly in the ICC’s first cases. For example, the Appeals
Chamber has set principles regarding victims’ participation and has also
established principles for the interpretation and application of the Rome Statute
pursuant to international human rights law.28 However, more guidance is
still required, for example as regards the victims’ application process, which
as will be further analysed in Chapter 5, is different amongst the various ICC
Chambers.
2.2.3 The Registry
The Registry is the main administrative organ of the ICC and is, unlike the
OTP, under the authority of ICC’s Presidency (Article 43(2) of the Rome Statute).
Though both the Presidency and the OTP can sign agreements with States and
other international actors, the Registrar is the main focal point between the
27 The testimony of these two expert witnesses is analysed in depth in Chapters 4 and 5 below.
28 This is further analysed in Chapters 3 and 5 below.
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ICC and the ASP, other States and international organisations and NGOs. The
Registrar is also the focal point between the TFV and the ICC.29
The Registry is composed of multiple sections and divisions, which have
been set up to fulfil the mandate provided for in the Rome Statute and the
RPE. All of them play a role in the fulfilment of children’s rights before the
ICC.
As will be studied in Chapter 5, the outreach work of the Public
Information and Documentation Section (PIDS) is crucial so that child victims
and witnesses understand the nature of the ICC in a way and manner that is
comprehensible according to their age, maturity and level of education (i.e.
its jurisdiction, the possibility of victims to participate in proceedings, the right
to reparations, etc.).30
In accordance with Article 43(6) of the Rome Statute, the VWU provides
protective and security measures, counselling, and support for victims and
witnesses, their family members and any other person at risk. Although this
vast role of the VWU is further explained in Chapter 5, it is important to state
at the outset that the main purpose of the VWU should be to prevent the re-
victimisation of victims and witnesses as a result of their participation before
the ICC. Victims and witnesses of the current situations before the ICC travel
to a foreign country and appear before a foreign court. They participate in
unfamiliar proceedings, in a language that often is not their own, face the
perpetrators, testify about horrendous experiences, encounter cross-
examination, and possibly also place themselves and others at risk.31 The VWU
must thus assist victims and witnesses so that such interaction is made in a
manner that protects their well-being and security, but also with due regard
to the rights of the accused and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. In
order to fulfil this mandate, and pursuant to the Rome Statute, the VWU shall
include staff members with expertise in trauma, children and disabled victims
and victims of sexual violence.
In order to ensure that victims receive support in the application process
to request participation or reparations before the ICC, there is a Victims
Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) within the Registry. In relation to
victims’ participation, the VPRS supports victims in their initial organisation
to participate before the ICC, including in the selection of their common or
individual legal representative. In relation with victims’ reparations, the VPRS
is responsible for assisting victims in obtaining reparations, including giving
publicity to reparations proceedings before the ICC as well as assisting victims
29 ICC, Structure of the Court, Registry <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+
Court/Registry> accessed 31 August 2012.
30 UNGA, CRC (20 November 1989) UN Treaty Series vol 1577 p 3 (CRC) article 12.
31 Thordis Ingadottir and others The International Criminal Court, The Victims and Witnesses
Unit (Article 43.6 of the Rome Statute): A discussion paper (Project on International Courts
and Tribunals (PICT) March 2000).
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in submitting applications for protective measures and for the purposes of
confiscating property from the suspect or accused persons. Most importantly,
as the ICC may decide to grant reparations through the TFV, the VPRS may assist
victims in their dealings with this entity. The role of the VPRS will also be
analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Another autonomous organ of the ICC that deals with victims is the Office
of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV). This office has the mandate to support and
assist legal representatives and victims in their participation in ICC proceedings
as well as in their requests for reparations. In accordance with Regulation 81
of the RoC, the OPCV may also conduct legal research and advice and may
appear in hearings in respect of issues relevant to victims. In this sense, the
OPCV could conduct research on the particular situation of child victims of
international crimes or the impact of armed conflict on children (i.e. for
reparations matters). As the OPCV is an impartial and independent office, which
is part of the Registry only for administrative purposes, their legal opinion
could be of great assistance to the Chamber, as it could avoid or solve conflicts
of interests between victims (i.e. regarding common legal representation). In
the past, the OPCV has represented victims during the application process and
during their participation in ICC proceedings. The OPCV has also been granted
leave to make submissions on issues concerning victims.32 In the first
reparations proceedings before the ICC, the OPCV was granted leave to represent
the interests of victims who had not applied for reparations but eventually
may be beneficiaries of collective reparations.33 Moreover, recently in the
Gbagbo case, the OPCV has been assigned as common legal representative of
victims participating in the confirmation of charges hearing.34 Likewise, in
the Kenya cases the OPCV has been given a prominent role to act together with
the common legal representatives for victims.35
The TFV is administered by the Registry but is supervised by an
independent Board of Directors, elected by the ASP. The mission of the TFV
is to grant reparations to victims, either with its own funds (grants from
governments, individuals or international organisations) or through funds
deposited by the ICC resulting from payment of fines or forfeitures of a
convicted person. According to the RTFV, other resources of the TFV (other than
32 See: Lubanga case ‘Order on the Office of Public Counsel for Victims’ request filed on 21
November 2007’ (27 November 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-1046 para. 2; The Prosecutor v
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Katanga and Ngudjolo case) ‘Ordonnance
relative à la soumission d’écritures sur l’interprétation de la norme 42 du Règlement de
la Cour (norme 28 du Règlement de la Cour)’ (12 June 2009) ICC-01/0401/07-1205.
33 Lubanga case ‘Decision on OPCV’s request to participate in reparations proceedings’ (5 April
2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2858 para. 12.
34 The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo (Gbagbo case) ‘ Decision on Victims’ Participation and
Victims’ Common Legal Representation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in
the Related Proceedings’ (4 June 2012) ICC-02/1101/11-138, paras 42-44.
35 Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October
2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-498.
42 Chapter 2
those obtained by fines and forfeitures) may be used to benefit victims and
their families “who have suffered physical, psychological and/or material
damage as a result of these crimes”, even before the Trial Chamber renders
a conviction judgment.36 This possibility is essential for child victims, as
rehabilitation programmes could be initiated promptly, without having to wait
for a final judgment from a Chamber.
Although the mandates of the Registry (PIDS, VPRS, VWU), the OPCV and
the TFV are further analysed in Chapter 5 of this research, it is important to
observe that all these sections of the ICC, in one way or another, facilitate the
participation of victims in ICC proceedings, provide support and protection
to victims and witnesses, and facilitate and grant victims’ access to reparations.
The aforementioned sections, along with the OTP, will most likely be the first
point of contact between child victims and witnesses and the ICC. Accordingly,
they must work in unison, avoiding overlapping or inconsistent approaches
to the interpretation and application of the Rome Statute and other ICC legal
instruments, in order to guarantee the protection of child victims and witnesses
pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute, enable them to present their
views and concerns in judicial proceedings pursuant to Article 68(3) of the
Rome Statute, and facilitate reparations for the harms they could have suffered
as a result of crimes within the ICC jurisdiction pursuant to Article 75 of the
Rome Statute.
2.2.4 The OTP
As provided for in Article 41, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute, the OTP is an
independent and separate organ of the ICC responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, as a result of referrals
received from State Parties or the UN Security Council or on the basis of proprio
motu investigations.
In light of its independence, in 2003 the OTP adopted a “Paper on some
policy issues before the OTP”, which delineated since the beginning the general
strategy of this organ of the ICC.37 From the outset the Prosecutor established
that due to its limited resources, as a general rule, his office would “initiate
prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for crimes” and would
“encourage national prosecutions for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work
with the international community to ensure that offenders are brought to justice
by some other means”.38
36 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims (3 December 2005)
ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (RTFV) paras 48-50.
37 ICC, OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the OTP (September 2003) <http://www.amicc.
org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9_03.pdf> accessed 31 August 2012.
38 Ibid 3.
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It is important to notice that this prosecution policy, limited to the most
serious crimes and against those who bear the most responsibility, classified
crimes committed against children as major international crimes and its first
two cases included charges for enlistment, conscription and use of children
to actively participate in hostilities.39
The role of the OTP, particularly its obligation to protect the security, safety
and well-being of child victims and witnesses pursuant to Article 68(1) of the
Rome Statute, will be further analysed in Chapter 5 of this research. In this
sense, this research will address the obligation of the OTP to safeguard the
probative value of witnesses’ testimonies (including children), and hence
preserve the fairness of proceedings by putting in place mechanisms to prevent
false testimonies and improper practices by intermediaries and investigators
that not only affect the evidence of witnesses as such, but may also lead to
their re-victimisation.
2.3 CHILD-SENSITIVE READING OF THE ROME STATUTE AND OTHER ICC
PROVISIONS
Children have interacted and will interact with the ICC as victims and
witnesses. As stated in the document adopted in UNGA Special Session on
Children in May 2002:
‘(…) children are among the principal victims of war,(…) in the last decade, an
estimated 2 million children have died and 6 million have been wounded as a direct
result of armed conflict (…) 300,000 child soldiers (…) are exploited in armed
conflicts in over 30 countries around the world.’40
Consequently, as argued in the Introduction, a children’s rights approach
should be adopted throughout all the ICC organs and entities analysed above.
As noted by the CRC Committee, such an approach requires a paradigm shift
away from child protection approaches in which children are perceived and
treated as “objects” in need of assistance rather than as rights holders entitled
to non-negotiable rights to protection.41 As studied in Chapter 1 of this
research, there are at least three different “ images” of children that should
be taken into consideration when adopting a children’s rights approach at the
39 The Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (Kony
and others case) ‘Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on
27 September 2005’ (27 September 2005) ICC 02/0401/05-53; Lubanga case ‘Warrant of Arrest’
(10 February 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-2-tEN.
40 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 12.
41 CRC Committee, General comment No. 13 (2011): The right of the child to freedom from all forms
of violence (18 April 2011) CRC/C/GC/13, para. 59.
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ICC: the victim, the perpetrator and the peace-maker. Moreover, within these
three general images, there are particular circumstances and realities that must
also be taken into consideration (i.e. a boy child soldier must be distinguished
from the girl child soldier who additionally suffered from sexual violence/
forced marriage).
Within the current situations before the ICC, the OTP has investigated and
brought charges for crimes committed against children.42 Consequently, child
victims and witnesses have participated in the ICC’s first trials. As noted in
the Introduction and as will be further analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this
research, a children’s rights perspective was not only desirable in terms of
achieving international standards, but in fact was necessary in order to avoid
the unfortunate consequences of the Lubanga case, particularly vis-à-vis the
rights of the accused, since child victims and witnesses were found unreliable
and untrustworthy and investigators and intermediaries could have breached
the statutory obligation to protect victims and witnesses, and to take into
account the needs of victims and witnesses, particularly children.
In order to fulfil these obligations enshrined in Article 68 of the Rome
Statute and Rule 86 of the RPE, child-friendly procedures need to be adopted
and the ICC’s staff must have adequate experience and training in a children’s
rights perspective.43
As will be analysed in the following Chapter, a child-sensitive reading of
the ICC provisions requires ICC practitioners to go beyond the Rome Statute
and the RPE of the ICC, by applying other international instruments that could
provide further guidance as to the interpretation and application of the ICC
provisions from a children’s rights perspective. In accordance with Article 21(3)
of the Rome Statute, the application of the CRC and other international
instruments on children’s rights is not only essential, but mandatory to
interpret and apply ICC provisions pursuant to internationally recognised
human rights. As will be analysed in the following Chapter, the CRC is an
international human rights instrument of almost universal ratification. As such,
it should guide the ICC’s work when dealing with child victims and witnesses.
Its fundamental principles should also be guiding principles of the ICC when
dealing with child victims and witnesses. As correctly noted by Mconigle Leyh,
when an international criminal court deviates from minimum human rights
standards, the court undermines existing human rights and minimum rights
are the baseline under which a court cannot go without compromising fairness
42 Kony and others case ‘Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended
on 27 September 2005’ (27 September 2005) ICC 02/04 01/05-53; Lubanga case ‘Warrant
of Arrest’ (10 February 2006) ICC-01/04 01/06-2-tEN; The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga
and The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo (Katanga and Ngudjolo case) ‘Mandat d’arrêt à
l’encontre de Germain Katanga’ (18 October 2007) ICC-01/04-01/07-1; ‘Mandat d’arrêt à
l’encontre de Mathieu Ngudjolo Chu’ (7 February 2008) ICC-01/04-02/07-260.
43 No Peace without Justice, International Criminal Justice and Children (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, September 2002) 15.
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and effectiveness.44 Insofar as children’s rights standards do not compromise
or diminish the rights of the accused person enshrined in Article 67 of the
Rome Statute, they should be applied in order to interpret and apply ICC
provisions from a children’s rights perspective.
The following Chapter will analyse applicable law in depth, beyond
statutory provisions, and particularly paying attention to international
children’s rights instruments that could be helpful to pursue the ICC’s
obligations as regards child victims and witnesses.
44 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal
Proceedings, (Intersentia 2011), 360.

3 Application of children’s rights to the ICC’s
legal framework
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter firstly analyses Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which lists the
ICC’s applicable sources of law, evaluating the different points of views of
commentators in relation to this pivotal provision as well as the developing
ICC case law in this regard. Taking Article 21 of the Rome Statute as a starting
point, the Chapter then refers to other sources of law that could be applied
or used as guidance in judicial proceedings pertaining to children, namely
the CRC and its Optional Protocols, the Geneva Conventions and their Addi-
tional Protocols, as well as other “soft law” instruments, including the Paris
Principles and UN Resolutions. The Chapter will then assess applicability of
the case law of other international tribunals in the ICC’s legal framework.
Taking into consideration their relevance as regards children in judicial pro-
ceedings, this Chapter will mainly analyse the case law of the SCSL as well
as the regional human rights courts (primarily the Inter-American and Euro-
pean Courts of Human Rights).
This Chapter is not intended to exhaust all possible applicable instruments
or case law regarding children’s rights in ICC proceedings. However, it en-
deavours to provide the reader with the basic legal tools to mainstream a
children’s rights perspective through the application and interpretation of ICC
provisions in accordance with internationally recognised children’s rights. As
stated by the IACtHR and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), human
rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must go hand in
hand with evolving times and current living conditions.1 Although the Rome
Statute can be seen as a “criminal code”, it is also an international human
rights and humanitarian law treaty. Thus, whoever interprets the ICC provisions
(whether a judge, prosecutor, legal representative or an ICC staff member) must
also constantly revise and update the list of “applicable law” referring to
internationally recognised human rights, pursuant to Article 21(3) of the
Statute.
While the ICC is a criminal court, its human rights and international human-
itarian law foundations are undeniable. As noted by Werle, international
1 ECtHR, Tyrer v the United Kingdom 25 April 1978 Series A no 26, para. 31; IACtHR, Case
of the Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia (Mapiripán Case) Merits Reparations and Costs,
Judgment of September 15, 2005 Series C No 134, para. 106.
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criminal law is an instrument for the protection of human rights, as it comple-
ments other human rights instruments and thus aims to their protection.2
Additionally, the same author states that the duty to protect human rights
is not fulfilled with the application of international criminal law by convicting
and sentencing perpetrators. In his view, it is important to apply the law in
order to protect victims and to determine reparations to victims within inter-
national criminal proceedings.3 Moreover, as stated by Cryer, international
criminal law developed in response to mass abuses of international human-
itarian law and human rights law.4 In fact, Article 36 of the Statute clearly
states that ICC judges “shall” either have established competence in criminal
law and procedure or international law, such as international humanitarian
law and law of human rights. The requirement to have judges specialised in
these two areas of law evidences that human rights and humanitarian law
are intrinsic to the ICC.
Ohlin also identifies “standard setting” as a more specific goal of inter-
national criminal procedure, stating that international trials provide an
exemplar against which domestic legal systems can measure their own criminal
procedure and make necessary improvements.5 Thus, the interpretation and
application of ICC provisions should not only meet internationally recognised
human rights standards for the sake of international criminal proceedings,
but also bearing in mind that the ICC case law and practice will have resonance
in domestic proceedings.
Nonetheless, one could argue that the ICC, as an international organisation,
is not bound by international human rights treaties, which are signed and
ratified by States and which refer specifically to State responsibility. The ICC
is not a party to international human rights treaties and thus it may be con-
sidered that it is not formally bound by their provisions or the case law of
human rights courts.6 However, as stated by Gradoni, although an inter-
2 Gerhard Werle, Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional (Tirant lo blanch tratados 2005) 98-100.
3 Gerhard Werle, Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional (Tirant lo blanch tratados 2005) 100.
4 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007) 9-10. See also Jen David Ohlin in: Goran Sluiter and others
(eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013),
55 and 66. The author states that there are two identifiable and overlapping objectives of
international criminal law: a) restoring international peace and security; and b) strengthening
human rights and international humanitarian law prospectively. Some, like Triffterer, go
even beyond, as he believes that international criminal justice could be used in the future
“to abolish starvation, hunger, poverty and similar intolerable forms of social injustice in
the world”, which in his view are caused by international terrorism, drug offences and
abuse of power. See: Otto Triffterer, The Object of Review Mechanisms: Statute’s Provisions,
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in: Roberto Belleli (ed), International
Criminal Justice, Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to its Review (Ashgate 2010) 381.
5 Jen David Ohlin in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013), 66.
6 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007) 353-354.
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national organisation is not a party to any human rights treaty, it is neverthe-
less bound by norms similar or identical in content of international customary
law or general principles of law.7 This consideration is in fact reflected and
made explicit in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, which, as will be analysed
further below, requires that the application and interpretation of the law be
made pursuant to internationally recognised human rights.
Gradoni has identified four manners in which human rights shape inter-
national criminal proceedings. Firstly, the statutes and other provisions of
international tribunals refer to human rights or related concepts. In the case
of the ICC, as noted earlier, this is evidenced in provisions such as Article 67
of the Statute on the rights of the accused. Secondly, the practice of inter-
national criminal tribunals demonstrates the place of human rights norms
within their legal systems. In the case of the ICC, contrary to other international
tribunals, Article 21(3) of the Statute distinctly places human rights in a para-
mount position within the ICC legal framework. Thirdly, the practice of inter-
national tribunals extracts the content of relevant human rights standards from
human rights instruments of various sorts (including “soft law” and regional
instruments), as well as from case law of human rights courts or bodies. In
the case of the ICC, as will be studied in this Chapter, the ICC case law has
referred to international human rights treaties (such as the CRC), soft law
human rights instruments (such as the Paris Principles), as well as regional
human rights case law. Lastly, international criminal practice may use statutory
human rights norms (such as Article 67 of the Statute) to interpret ICC pro-
visions, override hierarchically inferior ones, and derive power-conferring
norms.8
In light of the above, it is but expected that the ICC refers to human rights
law in their interpretation of substantive and procedural international criminal
law.9 As noted by Gradoni, although human rights are not strictly speaking
rules of international criminal procedure, they have nonetheless a considerable
impact on the way in which those rules are defined, interpreted and applied.10
Article 67 of the Statute on the rights of the accused is the clearest example
of the relationship between human rights standards and international criminal
proceedings. It would be contrary to the ICC’s goals (among them, and pur-
7 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 80-81. The author also refers to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World
Health Organisation and Egypt (20 December 1980), para 27, in which the ICJ found that
international organisations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by
any obligation incumbent upon them under general rules of international law.
8 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 74.
9 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007) 10.
10 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 74.
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suant to the Statute’s Preamble, to guarantee international justice) if the ICC
would not apply international human rights standards in its criminal proceed-
ings, including not only in the determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused, but also when deciding on victims and witnesses protection pursuant
to Article 68(1) of the Statute, victims’ participation as enshrined in Article
68(3) of the Statute, and victims’ reparations in accordance with Article 75
of the Statute.
3.2 INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 21 OF THE ROME STATUTE
Article 21 of the Statute is the core provision dealing with applicable law before
the ICC. As pointed out by McAuliffe de Guzman, this Article is the first
codification of sources in international criminal law.11 It reads as follows:
‘1. The ICC shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its RPE;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles
and rules of international law, including the established principles of the inter-
national law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the ICC from national laws
of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States
that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards.
2. The ICC may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this Article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in Article 7,
paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.’
Accordingly, all legal arguments submitted by participants before the ICC and
all ICC decisions should be based on the sources of law stipulated in the
provision above.
As explained by Bitti, there are three interesting aspects in this provision
of the Rome Statute. In the first place, its existence is an innovation because
there is no provision on applicable law in any of the Statutes of other inter-
national criminal tribunals (Nuremberg, International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ICTR, SCSL, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC) or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon), as they all rely on
11 Mc Auliffe de Guzman in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 703.
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Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in this regard.12
In the second place, the specificity of its content is also a novelty since, pur-
suant to this provision, the sources of law of the ICC are: a) the Rome Statute,
the Elements of Crimes and the RPE; b) applicable treaties and principles and
rules of international law; and c) general principles deriving from national
legal systems. Finally, Bitti recognises that Article 21 of the Rome Statute is
innovative as it creates a hierarchy between all these sources of law, which
is unique to the ICC, and does not follow the hierarchy of sources of law
provided for in Article 38 of the Rome Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Thus, although at first glance it appears that the Rome Statute,
Elements of Crimes and RPE all have the same hierarchical level as ICC’s legal
texts, in light of the Rome Statute’s Articles 9(3) (the Elements shall be con-
sistent with the Rome Statute) and 51(5) (in the event of conflict between the
RPE and the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute shall prevail), it is clear that the
Rome Statute has a superior hierarchy over the Elements of Crimes and RPE.
This has been confirmed by the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers, which have
determined that the RPE and the RoC are subordinated to the Rome Statute.13
Furthermore, during the first ten years of the ICC’s existence, other internal
sources of law have been adopted, that although not included in Article 21
of the Rome Statute, are without a doubt internal sources of law that have
been regularly applied by ICC’s Chambers (they are: the RoC, the RoR, the
Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, and the RTFV).
Article 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute provide two subsidiary and
external sources of law, namely sources of international law (second source)
and sources of national laws (third source).
As a second source, Article 21(1)(b) identifies the following: applicable
international treaties, and principles and rules of international law. As regards
this second source (sources of international law under Article 21(1)(b), the
Rome Statute makes no difference between applicability of either “applicable
treaties” and “principles and rules of international law”. Thus, as maintained
by Sadat, subparagraph 1(b) “permit(s) judges considerable leeway in con-
sidering which sources of international law could be appropriately applied
in a particular case”.14
12 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
13 DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1,
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006) ICC-01/04 101-tEN-Corr
para. 47; Lubanga case, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté
provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (13 February 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-824 para. 43.
14 Leila Sadat ‘The ICC and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium’
(Transnational, 2002) 177.
52 Chapter 3
As a third source, Article 21(1)(c) identifies the following: general principles
of law derived by the ICC from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime. The third source of law derives from
national systems, namely “general principles of law derived by the ICC from
national laws of legal systems of the world, including, as appropriate, the
national laws of the States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crime”. Commentators such as McAuliffe de Guzman, describe this part of
Article 21 of the Rome Statute as being the most controversial. She considers
that the less often the ICC considers these sources of law, the more likely it
will be able to develop a cogent body of international law.15 However, if one
considers that these sources of law will be applicable as long as they are not
inconsistent with the Rome Statute, contradictions and discrepancies may be
diminished.16
The Appeals Chamber of the ICC has concluded that the application of the
second and third sources of law is subject to a condition: the existence of a
gap in the Rome Statute.17 They are thus subsidiary sources of law and cannot
be used just to “add” to the Rome Statute and the RPE other procedural
remedies, but should act as sources of law only when there is a lacuna in the
Rome Statute and the RPE.18
Bitti affirms that if the ICC case law maintains this current view, application
of international law before the ICC will be more restrictive than its predecessors,
the ad-hoc tribunals, and will be based more on the 128 Articles and 225 Rules
of the ICC than on general sources of international and national laws.19 How-
ever, since no legal system is deprived of such lacunae, these sources of law,
deriving from national and international law, may be of great value for ICC
judges.20 Moreover, this “restriction” may only be apparent, since the Appeals
Chamber has also stipulated that other sources of law, although not applicable
per se, may act as “guidance” for the interpretation and application of the Rome
15 Mc Auliffe de Guzman in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 708-709.
16 Roy S Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Inter-
national 1999) 215.
17 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the
Rome Statute of 3 October 2006’ (14 December 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-772, para. 34.
18 DRC Situation ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (13 July 2006) ICC-
01/04-168, paras 33-42.
19 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
20 Mc Auliffe de Guzman in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 701-712.
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Statute and other ICC provisions.21 Thus, although in appearance the ICC
Appeals Chamber has been strict in applying sources under Article 21(1)b)
and 21(1)(c), it has opened the door to refer in essence to any international
instrument (including “soft law” instruments) as “guidance”. For example,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that “soft law” instruments such as the UN
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Basic Principles) may be
used as “guidance”.22 Therefore, documents that are far from being “inter-
nationally recognised human rights” or international customary law, may still
be used by ICC judges as “guidance”, or draw inspiration, when making their
decisions, insofar as these “guiding” instruments are not contrary to the Rome
Statute.23
The second paragraph of Article 21 of the Rome Statute gives the possibility
to the ICC to apply case law from its previous decisions, but does not compel
a Chamber to necessarily follow a previous ruling in a given matter (the
provision uses the word may but not shall), including decisions of the Appeals
Chamber. As such, the Rome Statute does not distinguish between case law
of the Appeals Chamber and the other Chambers, and this has been reflected
in the ICC’s recent case law. For example, as identified by Bitti, the Pre-Trial
Chambers and the Trial Chamber have made reference to their own case law
and that of other Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals Chambers, without giving any
superior weight to the case law of the Appeals Chamber.24
As stated by Lee, this provision is a “soft approach” to case law, as it refers
only to the applicability of principles and rules of law as interpreted in its
previous decisions which the judges may or may not decide to apply under
their discretionary powers.25 Moreover, contrary to the subsidiary sources
under paragraph 1(b) and (c) analysed above, applicability of the ICC case law
is not subject to any lacuna under the ICC’s Statute.
21 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, para. 33.
22 UNGA, UN Basic Principles (21 March 2006) A/RES/60/147.
23 Drumbl correctly states that the view of global civil society, child rights advocates and inter-
governmental organisations (including UN agencies) do not constitute international law.
However, he acknowledges that these actors currently shape the content of binding inter-
national law. See Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy
(Oxford University Press 2012) 135. See also: Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others
(eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013)
89.
24 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
25 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008) 215.
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The jurisprudence of other international tribunals has also been referred
to in ICC decisions. However, this source of law is nowhere to be found in
Article 21 of the Rome Statute.26 Accordingly, it appears that this juris-
prudence could only be applicable if it has created “principles and rules of
international law”, including the “established principles of the international
law of armed conflict”, under Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute. However,
as explained above, application of this jurisprudence would be, according to
the rulings of the Appeals Chamber, subject to a lacuna or gap in the Rome
Statute and the RPE. Nevertheless, the application of this case law could be
difficult, since, as noted by Bitti, in the diversity of case law of the international
tribunals, it appears that “international criminal practice” has become as
diverse as national criminal practice. Thus, it may be difficult, if not impossible,
to identify principles and rules that could be of general application throughout
all international criminal tribunals.27 This in fact has been affirmed by Trial
Chamber I of the ICC, which stated in a decision referring to the practice of
“witness proofing” in the ad-hoc tribunals, that:
‘(…) while acknowledging the importance of considering practice and jurisprudence
of the ad hoc tribunals, the Chamber is not persuaded that the application of the
ad hoc procedures, in the context of preparation of witnesses for trial, is appro-
priate.’28
In fact, Trial Chamber I of the ICC adopted a completely different approach
to that taken in the ad-hoc tribunals by prohibiting practice of witness proofing,
despite the fact that this had been common practice in the ad-hoc tribunals.
This issue, however, as will be analysed further in Chapter 5, raises a more
serious question, since the practice of “witness proofing” prohibited in the
Lubanga case, but also in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case and the Bemba case,
has now been permitted (albeit with the different name of “witness pre-
paration”) in the two Kenya Situation cases.29 Hence, this example reflects
not only that the practice of international tribunals is diverse, but that the
practice within the same ICC is just as varied (and sometimes contradictory).
Paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the Rome Statute, although located at the end
of this provision, could be regarded in fact as a “chapeau”, which provides
26 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
27 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
28 Lubanga case ‘Decision regarding the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses
for giving testimony at trial’ (30 November 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, para. 45.
29 Ruto and Sang case ‘Decision on witness preparation’ (2 January 2013) ICC-01/09-01/11-524;
Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on witness preparation (2 January 2013) ICC-01/09-02/
11-588.
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a general consistency test for the interpretation and application of the law,
subject to internationally recognised human rights. This last paragraph of
Article 21 also includes an express prohibition on adverse distinction of any
sort, including age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic, or social origin, wealth, birth or other status. As noted
above, neither the Nuremberg nor Tokyo Tribunals, the ad-hoc tribunals nor
the SCSL has had any similar human rights related provision as Article 21(3)
of the Rome Statute.
Although the application of human rights law in these other tribunals was
implicitly accepted, Article 21(3) of the Statute has, as described by Gradoni,
made an explicit transformative renvoi to human rights law.30 The same author
believes that this provision has the advantage of giving in a few words the
essence of current practices and it also reflects, through its relative vagueness,
“the decentralized structure of authority of human rights law and juris-
prudence”. Along the same lines, Schabas has commented that this provision
is rich with potential, as it governs the application and interpretation of all
statutory provisions, as well as all of the other sources of applicable law. The
author even goes to the extent of stating that Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute
is analogous to constitutional provisions that authorise courts to interpret and
even disallow legislated texts if they are incompatible with fundamental human
rights or are discriminatory.31
In fact, in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, the Trial Chamber concluded that
it was unable to apply Article 93(7) of the Rome Statute in conditions, which
were inconsistent with internationally recognised human rights law, as required
by Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.32 Thus, although statutory provisions
may be set aside when their application could be contrary to internationally
recognised human rights law, they are not invalidated, but simply set aside
on a case-by-case basis.33
The Appeals Chamber of the ICC has stated the following regarding the
“constitutional” nature of paragraph 3 of Article 21:
30 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 76, 82.
31 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford
University Press 2010) 398. See also: Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of
the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International
Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
32 Katanga and Ngudjolo case ‘Decision on an Amicus Curiae application and on the “Requête
tendant à obtenir présentations des témoins DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-
0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins d’asile” (articles 68 and 93(7) of the Statute)’(9
June 2011) ICC-01/04-01/07-3003, para. 73.
33 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 83.
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‘More importantly, Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute makes the interpretation as
well as the application of the law applicable under the Rome Statute subject to
internationally recognised human rights. It requires the exercise of the jurisdiction
of the ICC in accordance with internationally recognised human rights norms.’34
In another judgment, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the following regarding
Article 21(3):
‘(…) law applicable under the Rome Statute must be interpreted as well as applied
in accordance with internationally recognized human rights. Human rights underpin
the Rome Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the ICC. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied in accord-
ance with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, in the context
of the Rome Statute, the right to a fair trial, a concept broadly perceived and
applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety. The Rome Statute itself makes
evidence obtained in breach of internationally recognized human rights inadmissible
in the circumstances specified by Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute. Where fair trial
becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect
or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put
the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do
justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated
and the process must be stopped.’35
In accordance with the above Appeals Chamber’s case law, the Rome Statute
compels the organs of the ICC to interpret and apply all applicable law, regard-
less of its hierarchy, in accordance with international human rights and abiding
to the principle of non-discrimination. Accordingly, internationally recognised
human rights (though external sources of law) are not subject to a lacuna or
gap in the statutory rules, but are to be applied as guiding principles in the
application and interpretation of any internal or external source of law. Thus,
as affirmed by Arsanjani, the language of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute
“is a sweeping language” which, as drafted, could apply to all three categories
of applicable law under Article 21 of the Statute.36 Furthermore, Bitti considers
that internationally recognised human rights could be an additional source
34 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the
Statute of 3 October 2006’ (14 December 2006) ICC-01/04 01/06-772, para. 38.
35 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the
Statute of 3 October 2006’ (14 December 2006) ICC-01/04 01/06-772, para. 37.
36 M Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) American Journal
of International Law, para. 22.
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of law as they could provide additional procedural remedies to participants
in the proceedings that are not foreseen in the Rome Statute or the RPE.37
As to the definition of “internationally recognised human rights”, it appears
that ICC case law has given a broad meaning to Article 21(3) of the Rome
Statute. In this regard, the ICC judges have included within this concept not
only universally recognised human rights (i.e. CRC) but also regional human
rights (i.e. referring to jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the IACtHR).38 Hence,
although international human rights treaties and case law (particularly from
the ECtHR and the IACtHR) could fall under Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute
(treaties and principles and rules of international law), they could also be
applied as “internationally recognised human rights” (under Article 21(3) of
the Rome Statute).
This research will analyse all human rights instruments (including regional
ones) under this scope, as this has significant impact in their applicability.
While international treaties and principles in general apply subordinated to
the statutory provisions and are only applicable when there is a lacuna in the
Rome Statute, international human rights treaties and principles apply above
all statutory provisions, acting as a chapeau to all provisions under the Rome
Statute, the RPE and the Elements of Crime.
In conclusion, Article 21 of the Rome Statute grants judges the discretion
(but also the obligation pursuant to paragraph 3 of this provision) to apply
international children’s rights instruments, established principles of inter-
national law, and international and regional case law related to children’s
rights in their judicial decisions. Accordingly, the ICC must adhere to inter-
nationally recognised human rights standards, particularly as regards the rights
of the accused, but also in relation to the protection of victims and witnesses,
pursuant to Articles 67 and 68 of the Rome Statute. If Article 21(3) of the Rome
Statute is to be interpreted as a multiple renvoi giving rise to human rights
obligations over and above customary ones, then the ICC is to be systematically
bound by the highest among the relevant standards, as compliance with the
latter would ensure that no internationally recognised human right is
infringed.39 As stated by Gradoni, such an obligation is a logical consequence
of the lex superior status enjoyed by human rights standards within the legal
system of the ICC. In fact, the author states that interpreting procedural rules
37 Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in: Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008).
38 Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC referred to jurisprudence of both regional courts of human
rights in: DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal
the Chamber’s Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (31 March 2006)
ICC-01/04 135-tEN para. 115.
39 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 86.
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in accordance with human rights law is, in essence, a conflict-avoidance
technique.40 In light of the diverse and sometimes conflicting case law among
ICC Chambers, adherence to internationally recognised human rights should
at least be the “common denominator” among all ICC decisions.41
However, since not all provisions children’s rights treaties and particularly
not all the findings of regional courts of human rights can be categorised under
“internationally recognised human rights”, they can still be of use for applica-
tion and interpretation of the ICC provisions under the concept of “guidance”
developed by the ICC Appeals Chamber analysed above.42 Since the Appeals
Chamber’s criteria allows the use of other “soft law” human rights instruments
under this condition of “guidance” for the interpretation and application of
the law (insofar as they are not contrary to the Rome Statute), this research
will thus refer to these soft law instruments in the present Chapter (i.e. the
Paris Principles and the UN Guidelines on Child Victims and Witnesses of
Crime (UN Guidelines)).43
Lastly, it is important to recognise that international human rights law and
international criminal law, although intrinsically related, are not synonymous.
As such, human rights instruments and the case law of human rights courts
should be applied insofar as they do not violate fundamental principles of
criminal law such as the principle of legality and the principle of non-
retroactivity, enshrined in Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the Rome Statute. Although
human rights law may be given a broad and liberal interpretation in order
to achieve its objects and purposes, in international criminal law there are
countervailing rights of the accused that are protected through principles
strictly construed and ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the accused.44
40 Lorenzo Gradoni in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure, Principles
and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 93.
41 As noted by Cryer, although the ad-hoc tribunals have sometimes departed from strict
adherence to human rights standards, the Rome Statute, on the other hand, contains
provisions reflecting international human rights and directs that the Court must apply
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law as sources of law. See:
Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007) 354. Werle has also noted that the “limit” of international
criminal law is given by human rights law, particularly as regards procedural rights of
the accused. See: Gerhard Werle, Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional (Tirant lo blanch
tratados 2005) 101-102.
42 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04
01/06-1432, para. 33.
43 ECOSOC, UN Economic and Social Council 2005/20: Guidelines on Justice in Matters Involving
Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (UN Guidelines) (22 July 2005) E/RES/2005/20.
44 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007) 10-11.
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3.3 THE CRC
In relation to children’s participation in ICC proceedings, the CRC is undoubted-
ly the starting point of any interpretation and application of the statutory
provisions pursuant to internationally recognised children’s human rights.
Provisions such as Rule 86 of the RPE, which embraces the general principle
on victims and witnesses before the ICC, should be read along with the CRC
in order to properly identify and attend to the “needs” of child victims and
witnesses before the ICC acknowledged in that Rule. After all, the CRC contains
universally recognised human rights already included in the international
covenants of human rights, but particularly referring to the specific needs and
vulnerability of children not necessarily covered in these other general human
rights treaties.45 In the same manner, although the Rome Statute contains
general provisions that apply equally to adults and children interacting with
the ICC, the CRC is valuable when applying and interpreting these general ICC
provisions to meet the specific needs of child witnesses and victims.
Moreover, the CRC is the most widely ratified United Nations treaty, with
only the United States of America, Somalia and South Sudan not having
ratified it. Therefore, all other member States of the UN have committed them-
selves to be bound by the CRC.46 Likewise, for all but three UN State Parties,
the CRC is binding and must be applied in good faith and these States have
committed themselves to act pursuant to the CRC’s objective and purpose.47
As noted previously in this Chapter, although the ICC is an international
organisation and thus not a State Party to the CRC, it is bound by international-
ly recognised human rights contained therein, pursuant to the unequivocal
obligation provided in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.
However, not all provisions of the CRC may be automatically transposed
to the ICC setting and others may be irrelevant for international criminal
proceedings (i.e. Article 21 of the CRC related to adoptions). As regards other
provisions that could be of relevance, they should still be interpreted and
applied taking into consideration that they are to be used in international
criminal proceedings, and with due regard to the rights of the accused. For
example, Article 16 of the CRC related to a child’s rights to privacy may be
applicable when determining protective measures for a child witness (for
example when ordering that his or her testimony be given in closed session
so as to grant the witness anonymity vis-à-vis the public). However, this same
45 Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 2-4.
46 Pursuant to the Vienna Convention the “ratification” is the international act whereby a
State accepts to be bound by a treaty, United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(23 May 1969) UN Treaty Series, vol 1155 p 331 (Vienna Convention) articles 2(1)(b) and 11.
47 Vienna Convention, article 18 and article 26 contain the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”.
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CRC provision should be balanced with other “competing” human rights of
the accused, including his or her right to a public hearing.
Although one could argue that not all of the provisions in the CRC are
“internationally recognised human rights”,48 this research will interpret
children’s rights enshrined in the CRC as indivisible, interrelated and of equal
importance.49 As noted by Detrick, each individual right contained in the
CRC is fundamental to the dignity of the child and implementation of each
right should take into account the implementation of or respect for all other
rights.50 Hence, it can be concluded that the CRC, in its entirety, as an almost
universally ratified treaty, is to be considered as “internationally recognised
human rights” pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Nonetheless, this
Chapter will refer to the most relevant provisions of the CRC vis-á-vis ICC
proceedings.
The Rome Statute contains no definition of “child”. The only provision
that refers to age is Article 26 of the Rome Statute, which limits the jurisdiction
of the ICC to persons who are 18 years old. On the other hand, Articles
8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) define the crime of child recruitment and establishes
an age limit of 15 years. In this sense, Article 1 of the CRC provides a clear
definition of the child that should be applicable when interpreting ICC pro-
visions that refer to child victims or witnesses before the ICC. In this sense,
a child should mean “every human being under the age of eighteen years
unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.
However, the age of 18 should not be set in stone. As noted by Drumbl,
one should not overlook other articles of the CRC, such as Article 5, which
recognises the “evolving capacities” of children, or Article 12 of the CRC, which
establishes that the view of children should be considered in accordance with
the child’s “age and maturity”.51 In this sense, although a “child” strictly
applying the CRC means a person under the age of 18, the end of childhood
could also correspond to the relevant social and cultural conditions of a child
48 For example, those CRC provisions that have been subject of reservations by many State
Parties to the CRC, such as the duty to respect the right of the child to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion (article 14 of the CRC).
49 UNGA, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 1993) A/CONF.157/23, para. 5.
See also: Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 22.
50 Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 22.
51 For a critique as to the “universal childhood” established by the law of the CRC see Mark
Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press
2012) 44-50. See also: Beijer and Liefaard, ‘A Bermuda Triangle? Balancing protection,
participation and proof in criminal proceedings affecting child victims and witnesses’ (2011)
Utrecht Law Review, p. 70-106.
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(as long as the age of majority is not set unreasonably low or contrary to the
provisions, aims and objectives of the CRC).52
Thus far, the ICC Chambers have established that victims under 18 years
of age are to be considered children. However, applicant victims who were
not yet 18 but were close thereto were allowed to participate in proceedings
without parental authorisation.53 Likewise, as will be analysed in Chapter 5
of this research, witnesses who were already 18 when they appear in court
but were under 18 at the time of the crimes could still be considered as “child
witnesses” at the time of their testimony.
Articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 of the CRC are the core and basic general principles
that should be read in combination with other CRC provisions and in general
any other applicable law in cases involving children.54 Any international
criminal procedure in which children are either participating as witnesses or
victims is bound by these four basic principles: non-discrimination, best
interests of the child, child’s right to life, survival and development, and the
child’s right to participate in matters concerning him/her.55
Article 2 of the CRC provides a definition of the principle of non-discrimina-
tion particularly relevant to children. Although the principle of non-discrimina-
tion is provided for in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, the CRC’s definition
could be helpful in order to apply the Rome Statute’s principle to the particular
conditions of children appearing before the ICC. In this regard, in addition
to the grounds of discrimination included in the Rome Statute, grounds such
as the “parent’s or legal guardian’s race” and “disability”, included in Article 2
of the CRC, could be referred to in ICC proceedings.
Article 3 of the CRC is without a doubt the guiding principle of all interpreta-
tion and application of law involving a child, and thus is applicable to
situations in which a child is a victim or witness before the ICC. Article 3(1)
of the CRC recognises the following:
52 Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 52 and 60.
53 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings’ (16
December 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1556, para. 78.
54 It is important to observe that many CRC State Parties have made reservations to Article
2 of the CRC. However, considering that article 21(3) of the Rome Statute already contains
the principle of non-discrimination, the use of Article 2 of the CRC could be limited in the
ICC context. As for articles 3 and 6 of the CRC, a very limited number of States have made
reservations. Luxemburg has made a reservation in relation to article 3 of the CRC and
China, Luxembourg and Tunisia have made reservations to article 6 of the CRC. No State
Party to the CRC has made any reservation vis-à-vis article 12 of the CRC. Information
available at: <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 8 August 2013.
55 CRC Committee, General comment No. 5 (2003): General measures of implementation of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (27 November 2003) CRC/GC/2003/5, para. 12.
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‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’.
In light of this provision, the judges, prosecutors, investigators and other
members of the ICC should take into consideration the best interests of the
child when fulfilling their mandate as regards child witnesses or victims
appearing before the ICC, as well as children that could be indirectly affected
by ICC proceedings (i.e. as a result of the testimony of a parent that needs to
be relocated).
Though this principle has been broadly applied both nationally and inter-
nationally, it is difficult to define its concrete content because it is an open
provision left to the interpretation of the judge, investigator or other Court
official applying it. Some commentators to the CRC have stated that the child’s
best interests is not a single and definite concept, but that it should be defined
taking into consideration the child’s own views, thus including other rights
of the child enshrined in the CRC, such as the right to be heard (Article 12 of
the CRC). Others have referred to the child’s best interests as a principle that
must be defined with due regard to the cultural and social situation of the
child.56 This must be done, however, balancing cultural sensitivity with the
child’s basic rights. In other words, cultural, traditional or religious practices
cannot override children’s fundamental human rights.
The CRC Committee has stated that the child’s best interests is a threefold
concept. Firstly, it is a substantive right of the child to have his or her best
interests assessed and taken as primary consideration when different interests
are at stake. It is also a fundamental interpretative legal principle, meaning
that if a legal provision is open to more than one interpretation, the interpreta-
tion which most effectively serves the child’s best interests should be chosen.
Thirdly, it is a rule of procedure that establishes that whenever a decision is
to be made that will affect a specific child or a group of children or children
in general,, the decision-making process must include an evaluation of the
possible impact of the decision on the child or children concerned.57
Though Freeman has affirmed that the concept of best interests of the child
is indeterminate, he quotes the following definition by Eekelaar as one of the
best attempts to define it:
56 Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 89.
57 CRC Committee, General comment No. 14 (2013): The right of the child to have his or her best
interests taken as a primary consideration (29 May 2013) CRC/C/GC/14, para. 6.
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‘Basic interests, for example to physical, emotional and intellectual care development
interests, to enter adulthood as far as possible without disadvantage and autonomy
interests, especially the freedom to choose a lifestyle of their own.’58
In light of the ICC’s international character, and the diversity of children that
will come before it, it seems logical to adopt an approach that takes into
account that different societies and different historical periods will give a
different definition to this principle. However, no interpretation shall ever be
contrary to the purpose and objective of the CRC and the Rome Statute (in-
cluding the rights of the accused).
Alston and Parker have distinguished three objectives within Article 3 of
the CRC.59 These objectives could be applicable to the ICC’s objectives in
regards to child victims or witnesses before the ICC.
The first role for Article 3 of the CRC is identified as one of supporting,
justifying and clarifying a particular approach to issues arising in regards to
children’s rights. Applied to the ICC’s scenario, the best interests of the child
could be applicable when a Trial Chamber decides, for example, on a repara-
tions order. In application of the principle of best interests of the child, the
Chamber should take children into account when ordering reparations, because
reparation measures could have a long-time effect in their future development
(i.e. rehabilitation and reintegration programmes aimed for child victims vis-à-
vis pecuniary compensation for the parents).60
The second role of Article 3 of the CRC is to act as a mediating principle
that can assist in resolving conflicts between rights where these arise within
the overall framework of the CRC (or the Rome Statute). For example, the
principle of the child’s best interests could justify anonymity of a child victim
(right to protection) vis-à-vis the rights of the accused to know the victim’s
identity in an ICC trial.
Thirdly, Article 3 of the CRC is the basis for evaluating the laws and
practices where the matter is not governed by positive rights in the CRC (or
the Rome Statute for ICC purposes). For example, the Rome Statute has a lacuna
regarding the concept of children, and leaves somewhat unprotected child
soldiers above the age of 15, who are neither regarded as victims or as per-
petrators under the Rome Statute. Under the principle of the child’s best
interests, although an accused cannot be charged with the crime of child
recruitment of children above the age of 15, these children could still be
considered beneficiaries of reparation programmes implemented by the TFV
in the broader scope of “victims of a situation” although not victims of a given
58 Michael Freeman, Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child (Vol. 3 Commentary on the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 27.
59 Michael Freeman, Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child (Vol. 3 Commentary on the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 32.
60 Reparations for child victims are analysed further in Chapter 5.
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case covering crimes of child recruitment. This could be possible since the Trust
for Victims has a more general assistance mandate that is not limited to specific
charges brought against an accused person, but may address the broader needs
of victims of other crimes not included in specific charges in Situations referred
to the ICC.61 However, such an interpretation would be contrary to the rights
of the accused if reparations would be ordered against a convicted person
(strictly bound by the charges and the subsequent conviction). Thus, a balance
must be struck between existing (and sometimes conflicting) rights of child
victims and witnesses and the accused person.
Article 6 provides for the child’s inherent right to life and the subsequent
obligation to ensure to the maximum extent possible survival and development
of the child. The CRC Committee has interpreted “development” in a broader
sense, including the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological
and social development.62 This provision, although very general in scope,
could still serve as guidance when deciding on protective measures for a child
victim or witness, including his or her relocation to a place where the child
victim or witness can develop (i.e. for example, taking into consideration
language and schooling possibilities).
Another provision that is fundamental in the practice of the ICC is Article
12 of the CRC, which establishes the right of children to present their views
in matters that affect them. Regarding the ICC, Article 12 could be applicable
in order to give children the opportunity to express their views and concerns
as victims under Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, and thus participate in ICC
proceedings. Rule 87 of the RPE, which states that when deciding on protective
measures for witnesses or victims the Chamber shall seek to obtain the consent
of the person concerned, should also be read in unison with Article 12 of the
CRC, when such measures concern children. Hence, when the victim wishing
to express his or her views and concerns (pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome
Statute) is a child, or when the witness or victim for whom protective or special
measures are sought is a child (pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Statute and
Rules 87 and 88 of the RPE), Article 12 of the CRC should offer guidance in the
interpretation of the relevant ICC provisions.
The CRC Committee has stated that although the term “participation” does
not appear in the CRC, it has evolved and is now widely used to describe “on-
going processes, which include information-sharing and dialogue between
children and adults based on mutual respect, and in which children can learn
how their views and those of the adults are taken into account and shape the
61 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims (3 December 2005)
ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (RTFV) Regulations 47 and 48.
62 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 12.
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outcome of such processes”.63 Considering that criminal proceedings before
the ICC are a process that lasts several years, not only for the conviction of
those responsible, but also to achieve reparations for victims, the above defi-
nition of “participation” could be adopted for ICC proceedings as regards child
victims and witnesses. It is important to note that in light of the duration and
complexity of ICC proceedings, participation of children should not be regarded
as a one-time event, but should be seen as a process. Although the ICC is
limited to its jurisdiction and the charges brought against an accused person,
other areas of the ICC proceedings (i.e. reparations) could be seen as a more
elaborate process in which an exchange between child victims and the ICC to
develop reparations that are relevant to the children’s lives.64 In this sense,
the CRC Committee affirmed that Article 12 is not only about listening to
children, but also about seriously considering their views.65 As it will be
further analysed in Chapter 5, it is not only about granting children the status
to participate as victims in trial proceedings before the ICC, but in actually
making their participation an effective and significant one in which their views
and concerns will be heard and taken into account, not only for the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence of accused persons, but also for sentencing purposes
and reparation measures.
As already stated in Chapter 1 of this research, child victims or witnesses
participating in ICC proceedings could have a level of maturity superior to
that of children their age given their experiences in an armed conflict or in
situations where crimes against humanity and genocide are committed. In this
sense, Article 12 of the CRC, read with the interpretation of the age of children
analysed above, establishes that the views of the child shall be given due
weight in accordance with age and maturity of the child, and therefore no
strict age limit must be imposed to determine whether a child is old enough
to participate in ICC proceedings.66 For example, even though a child may
still be subject to parental guardianship for reasons of age, he or she could
be in a position to express his or her own views and concerns, sometimes even
contrary to that of his/her parents or guardian, given, for example, that the
child lived without parental supervision for a number of years, or even was
subject to “marriage” while in recruitment as a child soldier. The CRC Commit-
tee stated that capacity of children must be presumed and thus children
63 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 3.
64 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 13.
65 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 28.
66 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, paras 21 and 29-30.
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wishing to participate should not have the burden to prove their capacity.67
As will be analysed in Chapter 5 below, the ICC case law has been inconsistent
in this regard, with some ICC decisions imposing strict 18 years of age limits
to victims’ participation without parental or guardian authorisation, while
other decisions have authorised children to participate without adult authorisa-
tion.
Pursuant to Article 12 of the CRC, the child shall be provided the right to
be heard, either directly or indirectly, or through a representative or an appro-
priate body. This is of particular importance regarding children, since organs
of the ICC will have to verify on a case-by-case basis, whether it is appropriate
for a child to appear directly before the ICC or through a representative. This,
as will be analysed further in Chapter 5, is of relevance when the ICC judges
decide on common legal representation for child victims or when the ICC needs
to appoint a counsel for child witnesses that could give self-incriminatory
testimony.
A balance must be struck when applying Article 12 of the CRC, between
the empowerment of children on one hand (allowing their participation in
judicial proceedings) and their vulnerability on the other (guaranteeing their
protection against re-victimisation).68 Often, a child appearing before the ICC
will be both a vulnerable person but also an empowered individual. The ICC,
including its judges, prosecutors and lawyers, as well as support staff of the
VWU, will have to guarantee that the child’s voice is heard, while at the same
time protecting the child’s well-being and dignity. Importantly, measures
should be taken by the ICC under Rule 86 of the RPE in order to assure that
the judicial environment in which children participate is not intimidating,
hostile, insensitive or inappropriate for them, with child-friendly information,
support and staff, as well as courtrooms, judges and lawyers.69 For example,
as will be analysed further in Chapter 5 of this research, the testimony of child
witnesses could be recorded to be presented in trial in lieu of live testimony
or judges could adopt protocols to safeguard the rights of child witnesses
during examination and cross-examination, while still guaranteeing the rights
of a fair trial for the accused.
Article 12 of the CRC should also be read taking into account the child’s
consent. In this sense, the ICC should involve children in their proceedings
as long as they wish to do so, particularly since contrary to other criminal
67 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 20.
68 Beijer and Liefaard, ‘A Bermuda Triangle? Balancing protection, participation and proof
in criminal proceedings affecting child victims and witnesses’ (2011) Utrecht Law Review,
75.
69 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 34.
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tribunals, the ICC does not have the power to subpoena witnesses, but can only
call witnesses as long as they wish to cooperate with the ICC.70
In accordance with Detrick, Article 12 of the CRC encompasses the obliga-
tion to assure the child the right to freedom of expressing his or her views
and the right to say what he or she pleases without interference and to choose
whether to express his or her views or not.71 Within the context of the ICC,
it is important for the ICC’s organs to verify the child’s consent, for example
when deciding upon an application for victim’s participation submitted by
a parent or guardian acting on behalf of a child victim. As stated by the CRC
Committee, a child has the right not to exercise his or her right to be heard,
as this is a choice, not an obligation.72 Likewise, consent of a child has to be
informed and free of any coercion or manipulation.73 This is particularly
important since children could be “used” by adults wishing to gain something
from their participation in the ICC (i.e. funding as intermediaries or legal
representatives or reparations as parents of victims). Although the ICC cannot
compel anyone, be it a child or an adult, to testify in court, other external
factors (i.e. protection or financial assistance) could compel a child to testify
before the ICC or to submit an application to participate as victim in ICC pro-
ceedings. As already mentioned in the Introduction of this research, and as
will be further studied in Chapter 5, this lack of information or proper consent
could have been an issue as regards former child soldier witnesses who
allegedly were corrupted by intermediaries.
The CRC Committee identified five steps that need to be taken in order
to implement a child’s right to be heard. These five steps could very well be
adapted to ICC proceedings. Firstly, there needs to be preparation, meaning
that the child needs to be informed of his or her rights in the judicial proceed-
ings, including the right to have a legal representative, in a language and
manner that he or she understands.74 Second, if the child wishes to participate
70 See: Ruto and Sang case ‘Victims and Witnesses Unit’s Amended Protocol on the practices
used to familiarise witnesses for giving testimony’ (25 April 2013) ICC-01/09-01/11-704-Anx,
para. 10. This protocol indicates that: “The VWU will only be able to arrange the witness’
availability for testimony as long as the individual consents to appear as a witness”. See
also: Goran Sluiter, Appearance of Witnesses and Unavailability of Subpoena Powers for the Court,
in Roberto Belleli (ed), International Criminal Justice, Law and Practice from the Rome Statute
to its Review (Ashgate 2010), 459-472.
71 Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 221.
72 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 16.
73 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 22.
74 It is to be observed that the ICC’s Chambers had prohibited witness proofing in the
Lubanga, Bemba and Katanga and Ngudjolo cases. However, recently in the Kenya Situation
cases, the Trial Chamber has allowed once again this practice. This is analysed further in
Chapter 5.
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in person in a hearing, this should be an enabling and encouraging experience,
which should have a more informal format and should be done under con-
ditions of confidentiality. In this regard, it is important to balance the child’s
rights with the rights of the accused person, particularly taking into considera-
tion that Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute states that victims’ participation
should be appropriate and with due regard to the rights of the accused and
a fair trial. Thirdly, the child’s views must be given due weight in accordance
with his or her capacity, on a case-by-case basis. In this sense, as noted above,
the child’s maturity should be determined individually and general age limita-
tions should be avoided. Fourth, the child has to be informed of the outcome
of the process and explain how his or her views were considered. Considering
the different phases of the ICC proceedings and their duration, information
should be adapted to the child’s development and age, throughout the length
of the proceedings. Finally, children must have at their disposition procedures
to present complaints and remedies when their right to be heard is disregarded
or violated.75 In the ICC there are currently no complaints systems in place.
Moreover, the ECtHR recently dismissed an application by an ICC witness,
alleging that his rights had been violated in The Netherlands as a result of
his participation as a witness in ICC proceedings. The ECtHR determined that
although in Dutch territory, the witness was subject to ICC jurisdiction.76
Consequently, an ICC internal complaint system for victims and witnesses could
be put in place. Moreover, Article 70 investigations could be open and indi-
viduals charged and convicted, when crimes against the administration are
committed (i.e. inducing a child witness to give false testimony).
The CRC Committee has enumerated nine requirements for all processes
in which a child or children are heard and participate.77 These also could
be applicable to ICC proceedings and have been taken into consideration in
the analysis in Chapter 5 of this research. Taking into consideration the recom-
mendations of the CRC Committee,78 participation of children in the ICC, either
as victims or witnesses should aim to be:
a) Transparent and informative: children must be provided with full, accessible
information. Outreach carried out by the ICC as well as the information
given to child victims by legal representatives, ICC investigators and
75 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, paras 40-47.
76 ECtHR, Bede Djokaba Lambi Longa v Netherlands, Application no 33917/12, Admissibility
Decision, (9 October 2012). See also: International Bar Association, Witnesses before the
International Criminal Court, July 2013, pages 51-54.
77 The application of Article 12 of the CRC to ICC proceedings in which child victims and
witnesses participate is analysed in-depth in Chapter 5 below.
78 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 134.
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Registry staff should consider the need to inform children in a language
and manner they understand.79
b) Voluntary: children must never be coerced to present their views. The
voluntariness needs to be ascertained beyond a simple “yes” or “no”, in
order to disregard any undue pressure that could be exercised upon the
child to participate in ICC proceedings (including by parents and legal
guardians).
c) Respectful: children’s views must be treated with respect, understanding
the context of each child’s life. In this regard, child witnesses should not
be subject to strenuous examination and cross-examination (albeit with
due regard to the rights of the accused) and their “views and concerns”
pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute should be taken into con-
sideration (albeit not for purposes of a conviction, they could be considered
for sentencing and reparations purposes).
d) Relevant: issues must be of real relevance for the lives of children. As noted
above, particularly as regards reparations, these should be relevant and
adequate to the child’s needs (see also Rule 86 of the RPE).
e) Child-friendly: judicial proceedings must be adapted to children’s capacity
and need for support. Although general decisions and policies could be
taken as regards the general obligation of the ICC to protect child victims
and witnesses, support should be tailored and adapted to the needs of a
particular Situation or case before the ICC and the particular needs of a
child (i.e. when deciding on witness relocation, language and cultural needs
of children should be taken into consideration).
f) Inclusive: participation must avoid discrimination and encourage opportun-
ities for different groups of children. In situation countries where certain
types of children may be discriminated (i.e. girls or indigenous children),
the ICC may have to adopt affirmative action mechanisms to have these
groups of children represented, when this is possible within the ICC’s
jurisdiction and in due regard to other competing objectives of the ICC (i.e.
expeditiousness of proceedings).80
79 Article 17 of the CRC, on the rights of children to access information, is also relevant. The
ICC should make an effort to reach child victims and witnesses through dissemination
of information that is child-friendly so that children can take an informed decision as to
their participation in ICC proceedings. As stated in this provision, this dissemination of
information should be done taking into account different cultural and linguistic needs of
children participating as victims and witnesses before the ICC.
80 Article 23 and Article 30 of the CRC, which refer to the rights of children with disabilities
and children of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, should also be taken into con-
sideration. In accordance with these two provisions, when implementing child-sensitive
measures, the organs of the ICC should not only take into consideration children as a group
that needs special protection, but also take into account the particular needs and condition
of children with disabilities and children coming from different ethnic or cultural back-
grounds. In fact, in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, these guarantees
should not only apply to children, but to all witnesses and victims before the ICC.
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g) Supported by training: adults working with children need preparation, skills
and support. From ICC judges to intermediaries working in the field, adults
working with child victims and witnesses in ICC proceedings should be
trained in order to meet the ICC’s obligations pursuant to Rule 86 of the
RPE.
h) Safe and sensitive to risk: precautions to minimize risks to violence and
exploitation must be taken. This is intrinsically related to requirement b)
above on voluntariness. The ICC should adopt safeguards to guarantee that
children’s decision to participate in ICC proceedings is voluntary and also
duly informed of possible risks.
i) Accountable: provide feedback to children, monitoring and evaluation of
their participation needs to be undertaken. As noted above, a monitoring
and even a complaint system could be put in place to make sure that the
ICC meets these international children’s rights standards.
Other CRC provisions are also relevant to ICC proceedings. For example, as
will be further analysed in Chapter 4 of this research, Article 38 of the CRC,
which prohibits child recruitment under the age of fifteen, could be seen as
the predecessor of the crimes of child recruitment as provided for in Article 8
of the Rome Statute. As a result, the discussions around the adoption of this
provision of the CRC and its interpretation by the CRC Committee could be
useful tools for judges of the ICC when interpreting the Rome Statute’s defi-
nition of child recruitment. However, it is important to take notice that the
Rome Statute’s concept of child recruitment goes beyond the CRC. While the
CRC prohibits the use of children to take direct part in hostilities, the Rome
Statute provides a broader concept of actively participating in hostilities, thus
lowering the threshold of the crime to both direct and indirect participation
in combat.
Another relevant provision is Article 39 of the CRC, on the recovery and
social reintegration of victims of child recruitment. It is thus a valuable that
could be considered when judges decide on reparations orders for child victims
of crimes.81
The CRC thus gives the general framework on “internationally recognised
human rights” as regards children in ICC proceedings. However, because of
its general scope, sometimes its provisions may lack real guidance to particular
cases in which child victims and witnesses are involved in ICC proceedings.
81 In accordance with the CRC Committee, measures under this provision include, inter alia:
a) policies and programmes, including at family and community levels, to address physical
and psychological effects of conflicts on children and to promote their reintegration in
society; b) demobilisation of child soldiers and to prepare them to actively and responsibly
participate and in society; c) education and vocational training; and d) surveys and research
on the matter. See: CRC Committee, General Guidelines regarding the Form and Contents of
Periodic Reports to be Submitted by State Parties under Article 44, para. 1(b) of the Convention
(Adopted by the Committee at its 343rd meeting, 11 October 1996) CRC/C758 para. 130.
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Thus, the CRC Committee’s General Comments or other more specific inter-
national children’s rights instruments (i.e. such as the UN Guidelines analysed
below) may have a more practical use in ICC proceedings. However, for the
determination of principles in which the ICC practice is to be founded, the CRC
is undoubtedly the starting point when dealing with child victims and
witnesses in the ICC.
As regards the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in
armed conflict,82 this international instrument has limited applicability regard-
ing the ICC’s jurisdiction because the Rome Statute prohibits child recruitment
under the age of 15, while the Optional Protocol to the CRC rises the age of
prohibition of child recruitment to 18 years. Though the ICC has no jurisdiction
to prosecute an individual for recruiting children under 18, the fact that a State
is prosecuting under this higher standard could be important in application
of the principle of complementarity.83
The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and
child pornography,84 could be of use to define existing crimes under the Rome
Statute. For example, the concept of “child prostitution” could be used to
define the crime against humanity of “enforced prostitution” (Article 7(1)(g)
of the Rome Statute) when committed particularly against children. Likewise,
under Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute the concept of “child pornography”
could encompass a crime against humanity under the wider conduct of “any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”. Finally, the concept of
“sale of children” could be of use to define the crime of enslavement and
sexual slavery included in Article 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute.
Furthermore, in accordance with Article 8 of the Optional Protocol on the sale
of children, child prostitution and child pornography, the ICC could adopt
measures included therein, which aim to protect the rights and interests of
child victims at all stages of the criminal justice process and could be applied
in ICC proceedings.
82 UNGA, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict (25 May 2000, entry into force on 12 February 2002) A/RES/54/263.
83 The Optional Protocol on children and armed conflict, which has also been ratified by some
State Parties to the Rome Statute, goes beyond the Rome Statute’s standard of protection,
including within the scope of the prohibition of child recruitment, any person under 18
years of age. Thus, the State Parties to the Rome Statute that have also ratified the Optional
Protocol on children and armed conflict could investigate and prosecute within their
jurisdiction the recruitment of children between 15 and 18 years of age or include these
children in national reparation or reintegration programmes. For example demobilisation
efforts of children in a State Party to the ICC who has also ratified the Optional Protocol
on children and armed conflict could include all children under 18, thus corresponding
to the Optional Protocol’s standard of 18 years and by doing so, close the gap of the Rome
Statute as regards children older than 15 and younger than 18 years.
84 UNGA, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children:
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (25 May 2000, entry into force on 18 January
2002) A/RES/54/263.
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Finally, the Optional Protocol to the CRC on a Communications Procedure,85
which creates a procedure by which individuals or groups of individuals may
submit complaints before the CRC Committee, could complement the ICC’s
jurisdiction, since it could address State responsibility for violations of human
rights encompassing crimes committed against children. This mechanism could
also complement ICC’s jurisdiction when judicial proceedings may not be
possible (i.e. due to lack of evidence connecting crimes to specific individuals)
or when the ICC lacks jurisdiction (i.e. crimes occur in the territory of a non-
State party).
3.4 APPLICABILITY OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Apart from the CRC, other international instruments may also be applied in
ICC proceedings, pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome Statute. Some of these
instruments, analysed in the present section, may be applicable pursuant to
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute as internationally recognised human rights,86
whereas other instruments may only be applicable if a lacuna exists in the
Statute, as subsidiary sources of law analysed above. Moreover, other “soft
law” instruments, although no applicable per se, could serve of “guidance”
to interpret existing ICC provisions.
3.4.1 International Humanitarian Law Instruments
As noted above, international criminal law developed as a response to viola-
tions of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.
Evidently thus, instruments of international humanitarian law are helpful
sources of law for the interpretation of crimes within ICC’s jurisdiction that
are violations to it, namely war crimes.
As regards children in armed conflict, although international humanitarian
law provides for their protection, it mainly focuses on their position as civilians
and non-combatants and does not address protection and rehabilitation of
85 UN Human Rights Council, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
a Communications Procedure: resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council (14 July 2011) A/
HRC/RES/17/18, opened for signature on 28 February 2012.
86 A relevant international instrument, which has been ratified by 161 countries, is the Inter-
national Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 182. The ILO Convention 182 could be
a helpful tool when considering not only child recruitment to participate in armed conflict,
but also other crimes committed against children, often within the broader context of child
recruitment (i.e. sexual slavery).
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children participating in armed conflict.87 However, while the Geneva Con-
ventions refer only to children as civilians and do not include in their provi-
sions any reference to children as participants in armed conflict, the Optional
Protocols prohibit recruitment of child soldiers and thus crystallised for the
first time in history the principle of international humanitarian law that pro-
hibits participation of children in armed conflict. However, the Optional
Protocols rule out actual child recruitment (as it only refers to its prohibition
and prevention), and therefore do not offer any guidance regarding the pro-
tection and rehabilitation of children that ultimately become victims of child
recruitment in international and non-international armed conflicts. In other
words, the Optional Protocols assume that State Parties will not recruit
children, and thus omit any reference as to possible solutions when child
recruitment ultimately occurs, including the investigation, prosecution and
punishment of those responsible for recruiting children in armed groups or
forces.
Notwithstanding its limitations, in accordance with Article 21(1)(b) of the
Rome Statute, international humanitarian law could still be useful to define
the elements of war crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. Since many
of the crimes included in Article 8 derive from international humanitarian law
instruments, the definition of terms such as “civilian population”, “military
necessity”, “civilian objects” could be found in international humanitarian law
instruments. Moreover, as will be studied in Chapter 4 below, international
humanitarian law is useful to interpret the crimes of enlistment, conscription
and use of children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in the
hostilities.
3.4.2 The Paris Principles
In 1997, the Cape Town Principles were adopted during a symposium
organised by UNICEF and the NGO Working Group on the CRC.88 As a result
of this global review initiated by UNICEF, ten years after the adoption of the
Cape Town Principles, the Paris Principles were adopted.89 This instrument
consolidated the accumulated knowledge of a decade-long experience, parti-
cularly taking into consideration advances in international law regarding child
recruitment, among them the adoption of the Rome Statute and the juris-
87 Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing International
Standards’ Sixteenth Annual International Law Symposium “Rights of Children in the New
Millennium” (Fall 1999) Whittier Law Review, 193.
88 Paris Principles, 4.
89 Drumbl states that the Cape Town and Paris Principles, along with the 1996 Machel Report,
are the “most influential among formally non-binding documents concerned with the legal
permissible age of association with armed forces or groups”, Mark Drumbl, Reimagining
Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2012) 140.
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prudence of the first cases in the SCSL. Most importantly, States endorsed the
Paris Principles in a ministerial meeting held in Paris in February 2007.90
Thus, as noted by Drumbl, although a soft law and hence non-binding instru-
ment, the Paris Principles have obtained widespread professional, operation
and political currency.91
Even if the Paris Principles are not considered as “internationally
recognised human rights”, and therefore not applicable law in accordance with
the strict sense of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, these principles could serve
as “guidance” for the Chambers and other organs of the ICC in the interpreta-
tion and application of relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. In this sense,
as will be analysed further in Chapter 4, the Paris Principles could for instance
provide guidance in defining the concept of children “used to participate
actively in hostilities” under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome
Statute so as to guarantee the maximum degree of protection.
Given that the Paris Principles also provide a course of action in the
implementation of strategies to prevent child recruitment, protect children
from recruitment and facilitate their reintegration and rehabilitation, they may
well be useful in fulfilling the objectives and purposes of the ICC as regards
children, not only in respect of the ICC’s mandate to investigate and prosecute
those responsible for these crimes, but also the ICC’s objective to provide
reparations to victims of these crimes. The applicability of the Paris Principles
in this regard is further analysed in Chapter 5 below.
The fact that the Paris Principles are based on “lessons learned” in the
decade after the adoption of the Cape Town Principles, should be of signi-
ficance when the ICC deals with child victims and witnesses of crimes of child
recruitment, but could also be useful when dealing in general with children
in armed conflict situations in which the ICC has jurisdiction.92 The Paris
Principles must nevertheless be understood within the limited scope and
90 Paris Principles, 5. As of September 2010, the number of states endorsing the Paris Principles
had reached 95. See: Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy
(Oxford University Press 2012) 111.
91 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University
Press 2012) 3.
92 For this purpose, the ICC could take into account the following concerns identified in the
Paris Principles (Principle 1.7): The precise nature of the problem and the solution will
vary according to the context. A situation analysis, including a gender analysis, should
inform and guide all interventions; Any solution should address the needs of all children
affected by armed conflict and incorporate activities to develop and support local capacity
to provide a protective environment for children; The protective environment should
incorporate measures to prevent discrimination against girls whose use in armed conflicts
is pervasive yet often unrecognised and to promote their equal status in society; A long
term commitment by all actors to prevent the unlawful recruitment or use of children,
promote their release from armed forces or armed groups, protect them and support their
reintegration is essential; The family including the extended family and clan and the
community should be actively incorporated in the development and implementation of
interventions and activities, and they in turn should participate in finding solutions.
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jurisdiction of the ICC, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the broader
concept of international justice and transitional justice. In this sense, the ICC
must fulfil its mandate to investigate and prosecute crimes, and order repara-
tions for victims of crimes, including those committed against children. How-
ever, many other goals of the Paris Principles should be fulfilled by other
actors, such as States, NGOs, other international organisations (i.e. UN, African
Union), and grass-roots organisations.
As already mentioned in Chapter 1 of this research, the Paris Principles
provide a comprehensive and inclusive definition of child recruitment as
“children associated with an armed force or group”. This concept incorporates
not only children that have been formally recruited, trained, and used as
combatants, but also includes children that have been recruited in any capacity
and are thus involved with the armed force or group in a way that he or she
is in danger. Thus, as will be further analysed in Chapter 5, the Paris Principles
definition is paramount in order to guarantee that certain groups of children
(and particularly girls) recruited as cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for
sexual purposes, are also able to participate as victims in ICC proceedings and
receive reparation for the harms suffered.
The Paris Principles could also be useful to define other concepts of ICC
provisions, within the scope of child recruitment. For example, Principles 3.2
and 3.3, read within the ICC context, and particularly in application of the
principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute,
provides for the involvement of girls in the justice process. Thus, this Principle
could be of guidance in order respond to the needs of girls and their children,
for example by adopting reparations that do not further stigmatise their
involvement with an armed group or force and certainly preventing that their
situation is worsened because of their participation in ICC proceedings.93
Likewise, Principle 3.4 translates the principle of “best interests of the child”
to the particular situation of former child soldiers, stating that any effort
towards the prevention, release, protection and reintegration of child soldiers
should include affected children. Additionally, Principle 3.14 is of significance
to interpret Article 12 of the CRC as regards former child soldiers, as it estab-
lishes that children’s views, but also those of their families and communities
where the children will return, should always be taken into consideration.
The Paris Principles also include certain guidelines regarding persons
working with former child soldiers, and thus could be helpful for ICC judges,
prosecutors, lawyers and staff in their work with child victims, particularly
victims of child recruitment. In this regard the Paris Principles contain
93 The Paris Principles also refer to the specific situation of girls, affirming that his group
suffers from child recruitment and involvement in armed conflict differently from boys,
and therefore should be addressed accordingly. Principle 4.1 states that girls are at risk
to become “invisible” and encourages measures to ensure that they are included in reintegra-
tion, monitoring and follow-up programmes.
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operational principles, which when implemented by the ICC, could provide
helpful guidelines for its current and future work. For example, Principle 3.17
recommends adoption of a code of conduct for staff that includes protection
of children (i.e. Guiding Principles of Unaccompanied and Separate Children
of the International Red Cross Committee of 2004). In this sense, the ICC could
adopt such a Code of Conduct for staff that includes these obligations towards
children, particularly victims and witnesses or General Guidelines on Children
and the ICC (as proposed in the final chapter of this research). Moreover,
Principles 3.18 and 3.19 could be of guidance when the ICC Prosecutor adopts
policies for the investigation and prosecution of crimes of child recruitment.
For example, the said principles refer to strategies and programmes (i.e. investi-
gations, prosecutions, protection programmes, reparation orders), which should
be based on a comprehensive analysis of the political, social, economic and
cultural context, informed by a gender analysis of the reasons, motivations
and incentives of child recruitment and should encompass a thorough risk
analysis to ensure that children, families and communities involved with ICC
proceedings (i.e. as victims or witnesses) are not placed at greater risk for their
participation. These principles could thus guide the ICC Prosecutor in her
decision to initiate an investigation for crimes of child recruitment.
The Paris Principles also include guidelines regarding coordination, col-
laboration and cooperation in order to protect and reintegrate former child
soldiers. Although this is not in essence the mandate of the ICC, it could be
of guidance for ICC reparations and ICC’s work in the field with other inter-
governmental and non-governmental organisations in the field. It is essential
for the ICC to work along with other key actors at international, regional and
local levels. For example, Principle 3.26 establishes that coordination, communi-
cation, cooperation and information sharing and transparency are essential
at all times. In this regard, the Paris Principles recommend creating interagency
groups where inter alia: roles and responsibilities are agreed, communicated
and respected, possible collaborative action is planned, policy and programme
approaches are defined, and protocols for information sharing are developed.
Accordingly, the ICC could develop such agreements with international,
regional, national and local governmental organisations and NGOs in order
to complement its investigations, prosecutions and reparation programmes
with other efforts being done by other entities at the international level or in
the field.
Principle 6 of the Paris Principles mentions the international standards
referring to prevention of child recruitment, which particularly refers to the
Rome Statute. Principle 6.6 refers to the verification of a child’s age, which
could be useful as guidance for judges in determining the mens rea of an
individual in the commission of the crime of enlistment, conscription or use
of children under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. In this regard it is provided
that “where documentary evidence of the recruit’s age is not available, other
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means of verification – such as cross checking with other persons and medical
screening – may be required”.
The Paris Principles also provide valuable guidance on the treatment that
should be given to former child soldiers. These could be applicable to victims
and witnesses of child recruitment interacting with the ICC. For example,
Principle 7.28 provides useful guidelines in relation to interviews of former
child soldiers, which could be applicable to the interaction of the ICC with these
children (i.e. investigators, trial lawyers, judges, etc.).94 Moreover, Principle
7.75 refers to the psychosocial support to be provided to these children, which
could be useful for ICC staff working with children (such as investigators,
VWU’s staff and judges).95
Another important aspect covered by the Paris Principles is that of “inclus-
ive approach to reintegration”, which could be taken into consideration,
particularly in the implementation of reparation orders and reparation pro-
grammes. In this regard, Principle 7.30 states that programmes should support
not only children who have been recruited or used, but also include other
vulnerable children and thus benefit the wider community. Principles 7.31
and 7.32 could also be applicable when deciding on reparation measures for
former child soldiers under Article 75 of the Rome Statute as they address
the importance of rehabilitation programmes and material assistance that could
94 For example, the Paris Principles provide that interviews should be carried out by personnel
who are trained in interviewing children; children should be interviewed by adults of the
same sex wherever possible; multiple interviews should be avoided; sensitive issues should
be raised with children only when essential and in their best interests; additional support
should be provided as necessary to children during and after the interview; psychological
support should be available to children before, during and after interviews; interviews
should be conducted in private where they cannot be overheard and confidentiality should
be respected at all times by the organisation collecting the information.
95 For example, it is provided that children should be allowed to work together to solve
problems, develop social competencies appropriate to civilian life and define their roles
and responsibilities in their community; that culturally appropriate approaches to assisting
children with emotional and behavioural problems should be identified and assessed. It
is also stated that it should not be assumed that all children associated with an armed force
or armed group are traumatised although support should be available for children who
have been severely affected. Importantly, the Paris Principles provide that the different
experiences of girls and boys of different ages and level of responsibilities within the armed
force or group should be taken into account.
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be provided to former child soldiers.96 These could be possible reparations
schemes under the Rome Statute.
Principle 8 of the Paris Principles is of fundamental importance for ICC
proceedings, as it refers to justice mechanisms. This Principle provides that:
a) children’s participation in international justice must be voluntary; b) under
no circumstances should the provision of services or support be dependent
on a child’s full participation in justice mechanisms; c) information should
be gathered from children only in a manner that respects their rights and
protects against causing additional distress to the child and should be regarded
as confidential; and d) specific information gathered from children should in
general only be disclosed upon a court order and in responding to such an
order all efforts should be made to secure a further court order ensuring that
the information will be treated in a way that respects children’s rights and
does not cause distress to the child.97
As noted above, standards incorporated in the Paris Principles, as well
as the child-centred and rights-based approach of this instrument, provide
judges, prosecutors, lawyers and the ICC’s staff with valuable lessons that could
be incorporate in ICC proceedings insofar as they are compatible with the Rome
Statute and particularly respectful of the rights of the accused.
96 Principles 7.31 and 7.32 state that rehabilitation programmes should: facilitate local and
national reconciliation and should always be preceded by a risk assessment including a
cultural and gender analysis addressing issues of discrimination and should be based on
the child’s best interests irrespective of national considerations or priorities; build on the
resilience of children, enhance self-worth and promote their capacity to protect their own
integrity and construct a positive life; incorporate the views of women and girls; take into
account the age and stage of development of each child and any specific needs; develop
links with all programmes, policies and initiatives which may benefit these children and
their families either directly, for example through local or national social welfare pro-
grammes, or indirectly, through reconstruction and rehabilitation of national institutions
and other development programmes. As for material assistance, the Paris Principles provide
that this should: aim to enable children leaving an armed force or armed group to assume
a place within their community and standard of living comparable to that of other children
of the same age; take into account that circumstances vary, and it should not be assumed
that all children who have been associated with an armed force or armed group require
direct material assistance in order to reintegrate; give particular attention to the needs of
children with disabilities or girl mothers; avoid that assistance impedes reintegration,
particularly if it is perceived to be rewarding children who have committed acts harmful
to their community; be structured and provided in a manner that does not either stigmatise
or inappropriately privilege children or place them at risk.
97 Paris Principles, principle 8.
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3.4.3 United Nations Resolutions98
UN resolutions are not included as “applicable law” under Article 21 of the
Rome Statute, however they could be of guidance for the interpretation and
application of law in the ICC. In fact, as previously stated, the Appeals Chamber
of the ICC confirmed that a UNGA Resolution, particularly the UN Basic Prin-
ciples, could be applied in this broader sense of “guidance”.99 Although the
applicability of UNSC or Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolutions
have not been analysed by the Appeals Chamber yet, they could also be
applicable under the same general interpretation of “guidance” explained
above.100
Moreover, UNGA Resolutions could be of importance in ICC proceedings
as they reflect the unanimous view of UN member States and thus could be
viewed in some instances as international customary law. For example the
UNGA Resolution of 1999 calls upon States and other parties concerned (i.e.
international organisations such as the ICC) to continue to “cooperate with the
Special Representative, to implement the commitments they have undertaken
and to carefully consider all the recommendations of the Special Representative
and address the issues identified”.101 Likewise, the Resolution of 2006 urges
international cooperation to ensure the respect for children’s rights in armed
conflict and calls upon governments, UN bodies and other actors, to cooperate
in concert to fulfil their mandates as regards children.102
These UNGA Resolutions recognise the legal capacity and mandate of the
ICC to end impunity for serious crimes against children, and urges States
(including non State Parties to the Rome Statute) not to grant amnesties for
98 The Resolutions contained in this section were selected from the list of “Key documents”
included in the webpage of the Office of the UN Special Representative to the Secretary
General on Children and Armed Conflict: <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/
index.html> accessed 8 August 2013. However, there may be other resolutions, as well
as numerous UN reports from other UN Committees, Councils and agencies, which may
also be useful in particular ICC cases. Likewise, other UNGA and UNSC resolutions, such
as those related to women, peace and security could also be applicable as regards child
victims before the ICC.
99 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04
01/06-1432, para. 33.
100 Though this section does not intend to encompass all resolutions that could apply to the
work of the ICC, it will refer to those that have been identified as valuable in what refers
to children and their interaction with the ICC. Moreover, ECOSOC Resolution “Guidelines
on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crimes” will be analysed
and referred to in depth in Chapters 5 and 6 of this research.
101 UNGA, The Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (17 December 1999)
A/Res/54/149 paras 4, 16 and 17.
102 UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (11 January 2006) A/
RES/60/231, 9.
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these crimes.103 Moreover, as previously stated, the ICC does not and should
not work alone in fulfilling its mandate, and the experience and knowledge
acquired by the office of the Special Representative is useful for the work of
the ICC. This in fact has been the case in the first trial of the ICC, where judges
requested observations to the Special Representative on a series of issues
related to the use of children as child soldiers.104 Thus UNGA Resolutions
could reinforce ICC decisions calling for State cooperation in matters related
to children in ICC proceedings (i.e. investigation of crimes committed against
children) as they reflect the commitment of UN member States to work collect-
ively (including with the ICC) in situations where children are affected by
armed conflict.105
The UNGA Resolution on the “Rights of the Child” of 2003, which incor-
porates for the first time reference to the Rome Statute of the ICC,106 and all
subsequent UNGA Resolutions that call for the end of impunity for perpetrators
of crimes against children as defined in the Rome Statute,107 could thus be
103 UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (11 January 2006) A/
RES/60/231, 5. See also: UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
(23 January 2007) A/RES/61/146, 6
104 Lubanga Case ‘Submission of the Observations of the Special Representative of the Secretary
General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict pursuant to Rule 103 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (18 March 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1229. The sub-
missions of the Special Representative are further analysed in Chapters 4 and 5.
105 The Resolution of 1999 also referred to the ECOSOC decision to call for “systematic,
concerted and comprehensive inter-agency efforts on behalf of children, as well as adequate
and sustainable resource allocation to provide both immediate emergency assistance to
and long-term measures for children”. See: UNGA The Rights of the Child: Resolution
adopted by the General Assembly (17 December 1999) A/Res/54/149, para. 11, referring
to ECOSOC Conclusions, A/54/3, chap. VI, para. 5, agreed conclusions 1999/1, para. 22.
For the final text, see UNGA Official Records, Report of the Economic and Social Council for
1999: Foreword by the President of the Council (31 December 1999) A/54/3/Rev.1. For example,
the ICC’s outreach programme in the Central African Republic implemented such collective
work with local and international NGOs and other actors because it lacked permanent staff
in that country during the beginning of the investigations. Hence, outreach focused on
raising awareness on the mandate of the ICC among representatives of the affected commu-
nities (including NGOs, academia, journalists, victims associations, women’s groups,




106 UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (19 February 2003)
A/RES/57/190, 13.
107 See: UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (9 March 2004)
A/RES/58/157; Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (24 February
2005) A/RES/59/261; Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (11
January 2006) A/RES/60/231; Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
(23 January 2007) A/RES/61/146; Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly (22 February 2008) A/Res/62/141.
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useful legal basis to requests of cooperation, particularly as regards non-State
parties to the Rome Statute.
Other UNGA Resolutions, which are more specific in their contents, such
as that one of the “Rights of the Child” of 2004, which refers to diversity within
the concept of children, particularly addressing the needs of the girl child,
children with disabilities, refugee and internally displaced children, child
workers and migrant children, could be useful for “guidance” purposes,
particularly when interpreting general ICC provisions such as Rule 86 of the
RPE.108 Likewise, the UNGA Resolution on the rights of the child adopted in
2010, which focuses mainly on the rights of children to be heard on matters
affecting them, could serve as guidance in the interpretation of ICC provisions
in accordance with Article 12 of the CRC.109
As explained above, although UNGA Resolutions are not applicable law
per se, the recommendations contained therein may be implemented, not only
within the UN system, but most importantly, by States and other international
actors working with children (including the ICC). Most importantly, these UNGA
Resolutions reflect some issues in which there is international agreement and
consensus on the obligations of States and other international and national
actors, and thus opinio juris, in relation to children’s rights but also as regards
States’ obligation to cooperate with the ICC. Although it could be argued that
most UNGA Resolutions may be very general in their contents to serve as
guidance for the application or implementation of the Rome Statute, they could
be particularly useful for ICC judges in decisions concerning cooperation of
UN member States with the ICC, particularly in relation to non-State Parties
to the Rome Statute (i.e. in cases triggered by UNSC referrals), in which the
legality of the ICC and its jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute certain
crimes may be challenged. Accordingly, read together with Chapter IX of the
108 Resolutions on the “girl child” adopted in 2010 and 2011, affirm the need for mainstreaming
gender perspective in all policies and programmes regarding children and the need to fight
impunity for crimes committed against girls, particularly sexual violence. See: UNGA, Rights
of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (22 February 2008) A/Res/62/141,
2; UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (13 March 2009) A/
Res/63/241, 3; UNGA, The Girl Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (3 March
2010) A/RES/64/145, para. 29; UNGA, The Girl Child: Resolution (18 November 2011) A/C.3/
66/L.24/Rev.1; UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (9 March
2004) A/RES/58/157, 8-9.
109 This resolution emphasises that children’s participation must be institutionalised and active
consultation of children and the consideration of their views must be encouraged. The
Resolution also concludes that institutions dealing with children (such as the ICC) should
adopt a child-centred attitude, establish or strengthen structures for children, involve
children in planning, design and evaluation of policies and plans, fund for the participation
of children, ensure equal participation of children, including girls and adolescents, and
ensure child-sensitive procedures. See: UNGA, Rights of the Child: Resolution adopted by the
General Assembly (3 March 2010) A/Res/64/146, paras 32, 33 and 58.
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Rome Statute and the principle of complementarity, UNGA Resolutions confirm
the obligation of all UN member States to cooperate with the ICC.
As regards UNSC Resolutions, their validity as applicable law in the ICC
has not yet been analysed by the judges of the ICC. However, they could be
of significance, since in light of Article 13 of the Rome Statute, a referral by
the UNSC by way of Resolution from that body is one of the three triggering
mechanisms of the ICC’s jurisdiction. This gives noticeably some validity to
the UNSC Resolutions as applicable law within the ICC. Moreover, UNSC Resolu-
tions could be of use to determine whether crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC have been committed, particularly the newly defined crime of aggres-
sion.
In relation to children and armed conflict, UNSC Resolutions have been
taken on a nearly yearly basis since 1999.110 Although their contents, as with
UNGA Resolutions, may sometimes be too general, these Resolutions could be
of relevance for ICC proceedings, particularly as regards cooperation of non-
State Parties with the ICC when crimes against children are committed. For
example, Resolution 1314 (2000) urges all parties to armed conflict to bear in
mind relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, while it urges Member States
of the UN to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the CRC. This is the first
UNSC Resolution that refers to the Rome Statute. Although in this Resolution
the UNSC gives a different legal value to the Rome Statute vis-à-vis the Optional
Protocol to the CRC (it does not “urge” for its ratification),111 the fact that
the UNSC (and therefore some of its permanent members who oppose or have
not ratified the Rome Statute) mentions the Rome Statute and urges its con-
sideration in situations of armed conflict, was already a significant victory
for the ICC’s positioning in the international arena (as this Resolution was
issued even before the Rome Statute entered into force). Subsequent UNSC
Resolutions that have referred situations to the ICC (i.e. Darfur and Libya), have
110 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1261 (1999) (on children in armed conflicts) (25 August
1999) S/RES/1261 (1999); Security Council resolution 1314 (2000) (on the protection of children
in situations of armed conflicts) (11 August 2000) S/RES/1314 (2000); Security Council resolution
1379 (2001) (on the protection of children in armed conflicts) (20 November 2001) S/RES/1379
(2001); Security Council resolution 1460 (2003) (on children in armed conflict) (30 January
2003) S/RES/1460 (2003); Security Council resolution 1539 (2004) (on children in armed conflict)
(22 April 2004) S/RES/1539 (2004); Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) (on children in
armed conflict) (26 July 2005) S/RES/1612 (2005); Security Council resolution 1882 (2009) (on
children and armed conflict) (4 August 2009) S/RES/1882 (2009) and Security Council resolution
1998 (2011) (on children and armed conflict) (12 July 2011) S/RES/1998 (2011). See also:
Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law (Manchester 2005) p. 42-49.
111 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1314 (2000) (on the protection of children in situations of armed
conflicts) (11 August 2000) S/RES/1314 (2000), paras 3 and 4.
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reinforced the position of the ICC vis-à-vis the international community and
particularly as regards non-State parties.112
Most importantly, as these UN Resolutions reflect reiterated and often
unanimous declarations to the ICC’s jurisdiction as regards international crimes
in general, but also in particular as regards crimes committed against children,
they serve as clear examples of the international community’s acknowledgment
that the ICC has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes committed
against children, including in situations where these crimes occur in the
territory of non-State parties (i.e. Libya and Darfur). Moreover, these Resolu-
tions reflect the international community’s commitment to cooperate with the
ICC in fulfilling its mandate.
3.5 REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND CASE LAW
3.5.1 Brief introduction to the Regional Human Rights Systems
The case law of the regional human rights systems could be useful for ICC
proceedings, as they offer guidance to ICC judges when interpreting patent
human rights provisions (such as Article 67 of the Rome Statute).113 The ECtHR
has valuable jurisprudence that could thus be helpful for the ICC judges when
interpreting concepts such as fair trial and equality of arms, for example vis-à-
vis protective measures for child victims or witnesses.114 Moreover, in parti-
cular the case law of the IACtHR could be of use for the ICC when taking
decisions pertaining to reparations, as this regional court has developed
extensive jurisprudence on this subject.115 As regards the African Court on
112 Likewise, Resolution 1379 (2001), though not referring specifically to the Rome Statute,
does call Member States to put an end to impunity, and prosecute those responsible for
international crimes. committed against children and to ensure that post-conflict and truth-
and-reconciliation processes address serious abuses involving children. See: UNSC, Security
Council resolution 1379 (2001) (on the protection of children in armed conflicts) (20 November
2001) S/RES/1379 (2001), para. 9(a).
113 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended
Requests for Redactions under Rule 81”’ (14 December 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-773, paras
50 and 51. The Appeals Chamber referred to the ECtHR: Doorson v the Netherlands (26 March
1996) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, para. 72.
114 The ECtHR has its origins in the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human
Rights (European Convention) of 1950. The 47 State Parties to the Council of Europe are
automatically parties to the Convention and are under the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. The
ECtHR has its headquarters in Strasbourg, France and after the adoption of Protocol 11
in 1998, the ECtHR was reformed into a permanent tribunal. Information has been obtained
via the website of the ECtHR: <http://www.echr.coe.int> accessed 8 August 2013.
115 The IACtHR was created through the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights of
the Organisation of American States. Although the international treaty was signed in 1969,
it was not until 1978 that it was enforced. The IACtHR was not established until 1979 in
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Human and Peoples’ Rights (AFCtHPR), its case law (when it develops) could
be of use for future ICC decisions.116
As these three courts have jurisdiction to make advisory opinions and to
render judgments regarding contentious cases of violations of human rights
in these three continents, they have in general the potential to also overlap
with the ICC’s jurisdiction as violations of human rights to be evaluated by
these regional courts could also encompass crimes within the Rome Statute.
Hence, the ICC could also refer to these regional court’s findings (i.e. to deter-
mine whether there was an “attack” under crimes against humanity). More-
over, regarding victims’ participation, individuals acting in the ECtHR could
also be victims in ICC cases related to crimes committed in a State party to
the ICC but also to the ECtHR system.117 Moreover, in relation to the IACtHR,
victims could be entitled to reparations in the regional human rights system
but also in ICC proceedings. Thus, in the future it could be possible that the
ICC would in a sense “share” its jurisdiction with these regional human rights
courts.
3.5.2 The African Human Rights System
To date the AFCtHPR has only rendered one judgment on merits.118 However
this judgment relates more to the jurisdiction of the court, which still needs
to be reinforced, than to specific violations of human rights, and particularly
children’s rights. The court has made various decisions declaring it has no
San José, Costa Rica. However, unlike its European counterpart, the IACtHR is not per-
manent. The judges meet only periodically in sessions in order to hear and decide upon
pending cases. The information has been obtained via the website of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/> accessed 8 August 2013.
116 The AFCtHPR was established by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
adopted by the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
in 1998. The Protocol entered into force in January 2004 and in 2006, the AFCtHPR was
created and its judges were elected. The AFCtHPR has its seat in Arusha, Tanzania, and
like its Inter-American counterpart, is not permanent. The AFCtHPR has 25 State Parties,
namely those members of the OAU that have additionally ratified the Protocol relevant
to the establishment of the AFCtHPR. Unlike the IACtHR and ECtHR, which have decades
of functioning, the AFCtHPR only became functional in 2008, when it received its first cases.
Information has been obtained via the website of the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights: <http://www.african-court.org> accessed 8 August 2013.
117 The IACtHR still requires that cases be presented via the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, which declares the cases admissible in first instance and then presents the
claim to the tribunal. In the AFCtHPR, NGOs with Observer Status before the African
Commission and individuals can institute cases directly before that tribunal if the State
party from which they come from has made a declaration allowing such direct applications.
In all three systems States can directly present cases.
118 Femi Falana v African Union ‘Judgment of 26 June 2012’ (26 June 2012) Application No 001/
2011.
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jurisdiction, particularly because NGOs or individuals have applied without
the State declaration allowing for such direct application. Nevertheless, this
regional tribunal has several pending cases and consequently it is expected
that the AFCtHPR will render more judgments in the near future.119 As noted
above, this regional human rights system may be of value in the future, once
it consolidates jurisprudence that could be useful for the ICC.
As regards children’s rights, it is important to note that the African human
rights system adopted in 1990 the African Charter on Rights and Welfare of
the Child, which entered into force in 1999. This is an innovative instrument
that has been ratified by 41 African states, and deals with children’s rights
from a unique African perspective.120 As stated by the UN, the CRC and its
Optional Protocol, along with the African Charter, constitute the legal backbone
of war-affected children in Africa and their co-existence provides windows
of opportunity for the effective protection of children living in conflict and
post-conflict situations across the continent.121
The African Charter refers to forms of children’s rights violations that are
closely related to crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. For example, Article
22 refers to children and armed conflict and adopts the same threshold as the
Optional Protocol to the CRC, which is a prohibition of child recruitment under
the age of 18. Article 23 touches upon refugee and internally displaced
children, guaranteeing the same rights to both categories. Furthermore, Article
25 of the Charter refers to children separated from their parents, and estab-
lishes the obligation to give special protection and assistance to these children,
and thus brings together the principle of best interests of the child with other
children’s rights (the right to family life and the right to the child’s ethnic,
religious or linguistic background) regarding protection and assistance of these
children in situations of armed conflict. Other provisions of the Charter could
be of use to interpret crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction committed against
children. For example, Article 27 of the Charter refers to crimes of sexual
exploitation against children, prohibiting not only sexual exploitation, but also
any type of inducement, coercion or encouragement of a child to engage in
any sexual activity. Although under Article 22 of the Rome Statute, crimes
within the ICC’s jurisdiction should be interpreted in accordance with the
principle of legality, the definition adopted by the Charter could be of use
119 See: <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/2012-03-04-06-06-00/list-cases> accessed
8 August 2013.
120 See: <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ratification/> accessed 8 August 2013.
121 Centre for Conflict Resolution and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on
Human Rights, Children and Armed Conflicts in Africa: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report
(April 2007) 6.
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to interpret the crimes of “other forms of sexual violence”, when these are
committed against children.122
It is also important to note that the Charter created an African Committee
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of Child, which is the main treaty-created
body that has as mandate children’s rights protection and promotion in the
African continent (Articles 32-46). This Committee could eventually cooperate
with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against
children. For example, the Committee could submit an expert report on
children in situations investigated or prosecuted by the ICC in the African
continent or could also cooperate in the enforcement of reparations orders
where child victims in Africa are beneficiaries. This would not only be parti-
cularly helpful for the ICC’s work, it could also provide the ICC with a unique
African insight of the situation of children in this continent and the particular
effects of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC upon children in the African
context.
3.5.3 Inter-American Human Rights System
In relation to children’s rights, the Inter-American system has no specific
instrument related to this group. However, the case law of the IACtHR in this
area is valuable and could be of guidance for the current and future work of
the ICC. Using as starting point Article 19 of the American Convention on
Human Rights and Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights, that briefly and very generally refers to the
rights of the child,123 the IACtHR has interpreted many other human rights
122 Another Article that could be particularly important, as it is closely related to such crimes
as child recruitment and sexual slavery in present armed conflicts, is Article 28 of the
Charter, which refers to the protection of children against the use of drugs, their production
and their trafficking. Article 29 of the Charter, which touches upon sale, trafficking and
abduction of children by any person, including their parents or legal guardians, is also
a valuable provision that could be used to encompass within crimes such as child recruit-
ment, other forms of abduction or abuse against children (i.e. begging).
123 Article 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides the following: Every
minor child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor
on the part of his family, society, and the state. Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights states: Every child, whatever his parentage,
has the right to the protection that his status as a minor requires from his family, society
and the State. Every child has the right to grow under the protection and responsibility
of his parents; save in exceptional, judicially-recognized circumstances, a child of young
age ought not to be separated from his mother. Every child has the right to free and
compulsory education, at least in the elementary phase, and to continue his training at
higher levels of the educational system. See: Organisation of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose”, Costa Rica) (22 November 1969); Organisation
of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
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provisions within the Inter-American system from the perspective of children,
providing an hermeneutic analysis of all other rights included in these instru-
ments with the rights of the child. Accordingly, the IACtHR has stated that the
content and scope of Article 19 of the American Convention must be specified,
taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Convention of the Rights
of the Child, as this instrument and the American Convention “are part of
a very comprehensive international corpus juris for protection of children”.124
Although, contrary to the ICC, jurisdiction of the IACtHR is based on state-
responsibility, the IACtHR has established standards that could be applicable
in the ICC’s system, such as protection of children in situations of armed
conflict, the crime of child recruitment, but also as regards reparations for child
victims of gross violations of human rights. As Feria-Tinta has noted, the
IACtHR has pronounced itself on individual rights of children under complaint
procedures in a way that no other international judicial body has been
empowered to do.125 In more than three decades of existence, the IACtHR has
rendered decisions regarding children in situations of extreme vulnerability,
such as situations of armed conflict, forced disappearances, torture, street
children, etc. Undoubtedly these ground-breaking rulings will be of value for
the work of the ICC as many of these gross violations of human rights are also
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Far from endeavouring to analyse in depth the wide-ranging case law of
the IACtHR, this Chapter will briefly refer to some of the most important rulings
of this regional Court that could be of significance to guarantee children’s
rights within the ICC’s system. Although the ICC is a criminal tribunal, it also
has particular characteristics, which are parallel to the IACtHR proceedings,
particularly as regards victims’ participation and their right to receive re-
parations. Moreover, given that most ICC crimes are also violations to human
rights, the IACtHR case law may be of use when defining crimes within ICC’s
jurisdiction (such as child recruitment).126
The first case brought before the IACtHR concerning children was the
Villagrán Morales Case against Guatemala, better known as the “Street Children
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”) (16 November
1999) A52.
124 Mapiripán Case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 15, 2005 Series C
No 134, para. 153.
125 Mónica Feria Tinta, The Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the Rights of the Child (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 2.
126 This section is based on the reading of these main decisions as well as the analysis made
by Mónica Feria Tinta on the case law of the IACtHR regarding children’s rights. However,
since the IACtHR has developed more case law related to the rights of children in the latter
years, this Chapter also includes more recent jurisprudence. See: Mónica Feria Tinta, The
Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Rights of the Child (Leiden,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008).
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Case”.127 In this case dealing with the crimes committed against street children
in Guatemala, the IACtHR dealt with crimes of torture and wilful killing (both
crimes currently under the jurisdiction of the ICC). In more recent cases the
IACtHR has also referred to child soldiers and children in armed conflict, all
which could be applicable to situations and cases brought before the ICC.
3.5.3.1 Definition of child
In reference to the definition of a child, the IACtHR adopted the standard of
the CRC since its first case, stating that a child is anyone under the age of 18,
unless by law, he/she previously attained majority.128 The IACtHR has also
referred to the superior interests of the child, affirming that the prevalence
of the child’s superior interests should be understood as the need to satisfy
all the rights of the child. In the view of the IACtHR, the superior interests affect
the interpretation of all the other rights established in the Convention when
a case refers to children.129 According to Feria-Tinta, this example very well
serves to illustrate how rights could intertwine and indeed be indivisible.130
This interpretation of the IACtHR could be of use, for example, when deter-
mining the “superior” or best interests of the child requiring protective or
special measures, vis-à-vis the rights of the accused in ICC proceedings.
3.5.3.2 Special protection of children, particularly during armed conflict and in
situations of gross violations of human rights
The IACtHR also determined that due to the vulnerability of children vis-à-vis
adults’ human rights violations against children are crimes against humanity
and they are an aggravating factor of responsibility (State-responsibility).131
The IACtHR has affirmed that violations such as inhumane treatment, torture,
etc. are worse when children are victims of these violations, since the State
has a special obligation regarding them, over and above those it has regarding
adults.132 The IACtHR has also concluded that the special vulnerability of boys
127 Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al) v Guatemala (Street Children case)
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of May 26, 2001 Series C No 77.
128 Street Children case, Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, para. 188.
129 Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic (Yean and Bosico case) Preliminary
Objections Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 8, 2005 Series C No 130,
para. 134.
130 Mónica Feria Tinta, The Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the Rights of the Child (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 218.
131 Street Children case, Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, para. 146 and
Case of Bulacio v Argentina (Bulacio case) Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of
September 18, 2003 Series C No 100, para. 133.
132 Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v Paraguay (JR Institute case) Preliminary
Objections Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 2, 2004 Series C No 112,
paras 301-302.
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and girls due to their condition as such becomes even more evident in a
situation of armed conflict, since they are least prepared to adapt or respond
to said situation and, sadly, it is they who suffer its abuse in a disproportionate
manner.133 This interpretation of the IACtHR could be helpful when deter-
mining whether the threshold of ICC’s jurisdiction has been reached (i.e. when
deciding whether serious bodily or mental harm has been committed as a crime
of genocide). In light of the aforesaid case law, the ICC judges could interpret
that the “seriousness” requirement is reached more easily when the crimes
are committed against children than against adults.
In regards to children’s rights in situations of armed conflict, the IACtHR’s
judgment in the Gomez Paquiyauri v. Peru Case was the first international case
concerning protection of children in the context of an armed conflict to be
adjudicated by an international tribunal where the substantive law concerning
the rights of the child was fully examined.134 In this case, the IACtHR estab-
lished that special measures of protection and additional duties that States
have towards the fundamental rights of children are non-derogable in times
of war.135 Findings such as this one of the IACtHR could be of use when deter-
mining whether war crimes were committed against children as protected
civilians under international humanitarian law, and particularly when inter-
preting common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Referring to crimes of torture committed against children, the IACtHR has
also established important jurisprudence as regards the crime of torture, which
could be of use to define this crime in ICC proceedings. The IACtHR has stated
that in order to determine whether torture has been committed, all circum-
stances should be taken into consideration, including nature, context and
method of aggressions, their physical and mental effects and the sex, age and
state of health of the victims.136 Regarding the psychological effects of torture,
the IACtHR indicated that this might be inferred (particularly when the victim
is no longer alive) as a result of the circumstances in which the crime of torture
was committed.137 These findings could thus be also useful when determining
the “harms suffered” in ICC reparations proceedings for child victims of torture.
The IACtHR extensively analysed the crime of forced disappearances, and
thus its jurisprudence could be particularly helpful to define this crime
133 Mapiripán Case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 15, 2005 Series C
No 134, para. 156.
134 Mónica Feria Tinta, The Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the Rights of the Child (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 58 referring the Case of
the Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v Peru (Gómez case) Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment
of July 8, 2004 Series C No 110.
135 Mónica Feria Tinta, The Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the Rights of the Child (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 154, referring to the Gómez
case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of July 8, 2004 Series C No 110.
136 Street Children case Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, para. 74.
137 Street Children case Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, para. 163.
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included in the Rome Statute but also to determine the harms suffered by
victims of forced disappearances. As regards child victims of this crime, the
case law of the case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador is of significance, since
the IACtHR determined that the abduction of children and separation from their
parents and family harms the mental, physical and moral integrity of children
and leads to feelings of “loss, abandonment, intense fear, uncertainty, anguish,
and pain, all of which could vary or intensify depending on age and the
specific circumstances”.138 The IACtHR also determined children’s rights to
an identity and a name and to have a family are violated when these crimes
are committed.139
In the case of Gelman v. Uruguay, the IACtHR also analysed the situation
of a child who was abducted from her biological parents as a baby and given
away to another family during the Argentinean and Uruguayan dictatorships
in the 1970’s.140 The IACtHR determined that the abduction of children con-
stitutes a complex act that involves a series of illegal actions and violations
of rights that impede restoration of the relationship of the children and their
family members.141 In another case, the Cotton Fields case, the IACtHR deter-
mined that violence against children takes a variety of forms and is influenced
by a wide range of factors, from the personal characteristics of the victim and
perpetrator to their cultural and physical environments and includes all forms
of physical or mental violence, injury and abuse, neglect or negligent treatment,
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse.142 Findings of the IACtHR
in cases of forced disappearances and abductions of children such as the above,
could be useful for ICC proceedings dealing with child recruitment, abductions
of children for slavery, including sexual slavery, forced prostitution of children,
and forced displacement of children, since all these crimes have in common
the fact that children are very often deprived of their family life and identity.
The IACtHR has also analysed crimes of sexual violence committed against
children, and it has concluded that during armed conflicts women and girls
face specific situations affecting their human rights, such as rape, which is
often used as a symbolic means of humiliating the opposing side and pre-
dominantly affects those who have reached puberty or adolescence. It has also
determined that sexual violence “can include acts that do not involve penetra-
138 Case of Contreras et al v El Salvador (Contreras case) Merits Reparations and costs, Judgment
of August 31, 2011 Series C No 232, para. 85.
139 Case of the “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v Guatemala (Las Dos Erres case) Preliminary Objection
Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 24, 2009 Series C No 211.
140 Case of Gelman v Uruguay (Gelman case) Merits and Reparations, Judgment of February
24, 2011 Series C No 221.
141 Case of Gelman v Uruguay (Gelman case) Merits and Reparations, Judgment of February
24, 2011 Series C No 221, para. 120.
142 Case of González et al v Mexico (Cotton Field case) Preliminary Objection Merits Reparations
and Costs, Judgment of November 16, 2009 Series C No 205 para. 407; Contreras case, Merits
Reparations and costs, Judgment of August 31, 2011 Series C No 232, para. 101.
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tion or even any physical contact”.143 Such findings could be useful in ICC
proceedings to determine whether rape was committed with a genocidal
intention (with the intent of humiliating a group) but also to determine “other
forms of sexual violence” that go beyond the physical contact (i.e. forced
pornography).
The IACtHR also has extensive case law regarding the rights of indigenous
persons, which could be applicable to ICC proceedings in cases in which the
victims are part of an indigenous group. In this regard, the IACtHR has been
particularly pioneering in the topic of the harms suffered by indigenous
persons and consequently adequeate reparations for those harms. For example,
in the case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the IACtHR
referred to violations suffered by the indigenous community and the particular
effects they had in children’s education, healthcare and overall wellbeing.144
In the case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, the Court referred to the effects
of forced disappearances and forced displacement in the lives of children in
an indigenous community, which carries abandonment of their traditions and
culture.145
3.5.3.3 Recruitment of children
The IACtHR has also dealt with crimes of child recruitment as violations of
human rights within the Inter-American system. Although recruitment could
be a violation of human rights and not necessarily a crime within the ICC’s
jurisdiction, its jurisprudence could be useful to determine the harms suffered
by child victims of these crimes and the consequent reparations.
In the Case of Vargas Areco v. Paraguay, the IACtHR dealt with recruitment
of children under the age of 18 in the armed forces of that country. Although
this case was about torture and killing of a minor who had been recruited
by the Paraguayan armed forces, and did not directly deal with the legality
of his recruitment, the IACtHR affirmed that international law sets forth special
rules to protect the physical and psychological integrity of children while
involved in military activities, whether in times of peace or during armed
conflict.146 In this case, the IACtHR referred to the coercive environment in
which children are recruited, since many of them are recruited “through
143 Cotton Field case, Preliminary Objection Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of Novem-
ber 16, 2009 Series C No 205, para. 407.
144 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Xákmok Kásek case) Merits
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No 214.
145 Case of Chitay Nech et al v Guatemala (Chitay case) Preliminary Objections Merits Re-
parations and Costs, Judgment of May 25, 2010 Series C No 212 paras 125 and 135.
146 Case of Vargas-Areco v Paraguay (Vargas-Areco case) Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment
of September 26, 2006 Series C No 155, para. 112.
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coercion on the children themselves or their relatives”.147 This finding is
significant, particularly since the child, who was 15 years old at the time of
his recruitment, had presumably enlisted “voluntarily”. This interpretation
could be of use in determining cases of child recruitment before the ICC and
the reasoning of whether voluntary enlistment exists at all in coercive circum-
stances such as poverty, armed conflict or internal displacement.
3.5.3.4 Procedural rights of children
The IACtHR has also adopted important rulings referring to children’s rights
in judicial proceedings, interpreting the principle of equality and non-discrim-
ination from a children’s rights perspective. Thus, findings such as the one
below, could be useful for ICC proceedings involving child victims or witnesses:
“the notion of equality springs directly from the oneness of the human family
and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual. That principle cannot
be reconciled with the notion that a given group has the right to the privileged
treatment because of its perceived superiority. It is equally irreconcilable with
that notion to characterize a group as inferior and treat it with hostility or
otherwise subject it to discrimination in the enjoyment of rights which are
accorded to others not so classified. It is impermissible to subject human beings
to differences in treatment that are inconsistent with their unique and
congenerous character”.148
The IACtHR also stated that the principle of equality does not impede
adoption of specific regulations and measures regarding children who require
different treatment due to their special conditions insofar as this treatment
is targeted towards the protection of children’s rights and interest.149
Taking into consideration the above conclusions of the IACtHR, Article 21(3)
of the Rome Statute could be read using the above interpretation in order to
adopt measures (including affirmative action) to have children represented
in ICC proceedings (as victims participating pursuant to Article 68(3) of the
Rome Statute and as beneficiaries of reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the
Rome Statute). The IACtHR has concluded that children participate in judicial
proceedings under different conditions from those of an adult and thus, special
measures should be adopted for an effective defence of their interests and in
order to ensure that children enjoy a true opportunity for justice. Although
the IACtHR has made these findings mainly in relation to children in conflict
with the law, these general principles are still applicable within the context
of children participating as victims and witnesses in ICC proceedings. In this
147 Vargas-Areco case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 26, 2006 Series
C No 155, para. 129.
148 Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child (Child Advisory Opinion) Advisory
Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28, 2002 Series A No 17, para. 45.
149 Child Advisory Opinion, para. 79.
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sense, the IACtHR findings could be of use to affirm in ICC proceedings that
children have at least the same fundamental guarantees of due process as any
other person, but that additional safeguards are also necessary to fulfil the
ICC’s mandate pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE.150
The IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion on the Juridical Condition and Human
Rights of the Child could be of great significance for ICC proceedings, par-
ticularly when defining the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article
21(3) in cases where children are involved in ICC proceedings. In this decision,
the IACtHR determined that it is evident that a child participates in proceedings
under different conditions from those of an adult and to argue otherwise
would disregard reality and omit adoption of special measures for protection
of children, to their grave detriment. Therefore, the IACtHR determined that
it is indispensable to recognise and respect differences in treatment, which
correspond to different situations among those participating in proceedings.151
The IACtHR also established in that same decision that to accomplish its object-
ives, the judicial process must recognise and correct any real disadvantages
that may require countervailing measures (i.e. in the ICC context these could
be protective and special measures, but also outreach activities targeting child
victims) that help to reduce or eliminate the obstacles and deficiencies that
impair or diminish an effective defence of one’s interests. The IACtHR further
concluded that if these countervailing measures are not adopted, it is im-
possible to say that there is true opportunity for justice.152
In relation to the actual participation of a child in the proceedings, the IACtHR stated
that the degree of participation of a child in the proceedings must be reasonably
adjusted, so as to attain effective protection of his or her best interests. It determined
that those responsible for the application of the law, must take into account the
specific conditions of the child and his or her best interests to decide on his or her
participation, as appropriate, in establishing his or her rights, considering as much
as possible, the views of the child of his or her own case.153 These conclusions
could be helpful in ICC proceedings when determining whether the participation
of a child victim pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Statute is appropriate, not only
vis-à-vis the rights of the accused, but also as regards the best interests of the child.
The IACtHR could also offer useful case law as regards protective and special
measures under Rules 87 and 88 of the RPE vis-à-vis the rights of the accused
under Article 67 of the Rome Statute. For example, as to the public nature of
judicial proceedings, the IACtHR has stated that when addressing issues per-
taining to children, it is appropriate to set certain limits to the principle of
150 Mónica Feria Tinta, The Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the Rights of the Child (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 41-42.
151 Child Advisory Opinion, para. 96.
152 Child Advisory Opinion, para. 97.
153 Child Advisory Opinion, paras 101-102.
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publicity of proceedings, not in relation to the parties, but rather vis-à-vis the
public observation of the procedural acts.154
3.5.3.5 Children’s rights to reparation
As stated before, perhaps the most valuable case law of the IACtHR is that one
pertaining to reparations, as in this aspect the IACtHR has been undoubtedly
pioneering and often unique. The IACtHR has significant case law as regards
the concept of victim and thus, within the ICC context, its case law could be
helpful to define a victim under Rule 85 of the RPE and consequently also to
determine whether the victim suffered harm (for the purposes of participation
under Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, but also reparations pursuant to Article
75 of the Rome Statute). Moreover, the IACtHR case law could be helpful in
order to determine the evidentiary threshold required under Rule 85 of the
RPE, and particularly whether inferences of the harm suffered are possible in
this regard.
The IACtHR has adopted a notion of victim and beneficiary that encompasses
not only the child, but also his or her family as direct victims of violations,
as it has stated that relatives of these children are also direct victims of viola-
tions, since crimes suffered by child victims may also constitute cruel and
inhumane treatment for their relatives, particularly their parents. The IACtHR
has also established that circumstances such as the closeness of the family
relationship and the degree to which the family member(s) witnessed the
violation, are elements to consider as to whether they are also victims of
violation.155 In fact the IACtHR has established that in cases of gross violations
against children (particularly forced disappearances and torture) no evidence
is required to conclude that the distress suffered by the child extends to the
closest members of the family, especially those who had close emotional contact
with the child, such as parents, siblings and grandparents.156 The IACtHR also
stated that relatives of child victims are victims themselves on account of their
own suffering as they suffer from psychological distress as a direct consequence
of the violation suffered by the child.157 Likewise, the IACtHR has concluded
that when parents of children suffer from gross human rights violations (i.e.
extrajudicial killings), the Court may infer that the violation could have pre-
judiced the schooling of the children of the victim, even if there is no evidence
in this regard.158 Importantly, the IACtHR has adopted a broad concept of
154 Child Advisory Opinion, para. 134.
155 Street Children case, Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, para. 174.
156 Bulacio case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 18, 2003 Series C No
100, paras 98-99.
157 Vargas Areco case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 26, 2006 Series
C No 155, para. 95.
158 Case of Family Barrios v Venezuela (Barrios case) Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment
of November 24, 2011 Series C No 237, para. 336.
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family and next-of-kin which could certainly be useful in cases involving child
victims before the ICC. The IACtHR has stated that the concept of family goes
beyond marriage-based relationships and may encompass other de facto family
ties where the parties are living together outside marriage.159
In relation to child victims who have died, the IACtHR has established that
family members, such as the mother and grandmother of child victims are
to be considered on the one hand as successors of their next of kin who are
dead and, on the other, as victims themselves, since the IACtHR presumes that
a person’s death causes non-pecuniary damage to his/her parents and
siblings.160 Moreover, the IACtHR established that children who were not yet
born at the time of the violation (i.e. forced disappearance) also suffered a
violation of their moral and mental integrity because they lived in an environ-
ment of suffering and uncertainty.161
As regards the notion of harm and reparation, the IACtHR has developed
important jurisprudence on the concept of “damage to a life plan” of an
individual as a result of grave violations to his/her human rights. In cases
involving children, the IACtHR has established that measures adopted to protect
children are of special importance, because children are at a critical stage in
their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development
that will impact, in one way or another, their life plan.162 However, deter-
mining the life plan, and thus the material harm suffered by children may
be difficult given the lack of precise information on real earnings of victims.
In these cases, the IACtHR has determined for example, that the minimum wage
in the country where the victims lived was used as basis to grant compensation
to the victims and/or their relatives. The IACtHR has established that in what
refers to children, where there is no certainty regarding the activity or pro-
fession they might practice in the future, the IACtHR has deemed that loss of
earnings must be based on evidence that establishes losses with certainty. The
IACtHR thus determined that this loss of earnings must be calculated on basis
of the victim’s age and the end of his or her life expectancy at the time of the
events coupled with the minimum wage in force in the country concerned.163
The IACtHR also established that violations to children can also result in
damages to their families, for example, loss of jobs of the parents due to the
159 Child Advisory Opinion, para. 69.
160 Street Children case Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, paras 65-68.
161 Contreras case, Merits Reparations and costs, Judgment of August 31, 2011 Series C No 232,
para. 122.
162 JR Institute case, Preliminary Objections Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of Septem-
ber 2, 2004 Series C No 112, para. 172.
163 Street Children case, Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, paras 79-81;
Preliminary Objections Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 2, 2004 Series
C No 112, para. 288; Mapiripán Case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September
15, 2005 Series C No 134, para. 277.
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change in their personal circumstances because of the violations (i.e. death
or disappearance of a child).164
Regarding non-pecuniary damage, the IACtHR has determined that this
includes both the suffering and distress caused to the direct victims and their
next of kin, and the impairment of values that are highly significant to them
and their next of kin as well as other sufferings that cannot be assessed in
financial terms. Given their nature, the IACtHR granted reparations for these
damages by paying sums of money or goods or services that can be monetarily
assessed, applying judicial discretion and the principle of equity. The IACtHR
has also granted reparation in form of execution of acts or works of a public
nature which recover the memory of the victims, re-establishes their reputation,
comforts their next of kin or transmit a message of official condemnation to
the violations in question.165
Although the jurisdiction of the IACtHR and the ICC are different as regards
responsibility (State v. individual responsibility), the findings of the IACtHR
are valuable to the ICC in various manners. Firstly, as noted above, the IACtHR
case law could be of guidance as regards the definition of general principles
included in the Rome Statute (such as the principle of non-discrimination and
the right to a fair trial). The IACtHR case law could also be useful when defining
a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC, particularly when this crime has been
committed against children (i.e. to determine whether “serious” bodily or
mental harm was committed to meet the requirements of the crime of geno-
cide). Moreover, the IACtHR may be of enormous use when determining the
“harm suffered” by child victims, in order to determine whether a child is
a victim under Rule 85 of the RPE, and thus eligible to participate in proceed-
ings or receive reparations.
3.5.4 European Human Rights System
Unlike its counterpart in the Inter-American system, the European Convention
does not have a specific provision regarding children. Nevertheless, in the
words of Judge Jean-Paul Costa of the ECtHR, Article 1 of the European Conven-
tion166 provides that States shall secure the rights and freedoms of “every-
one”, which ultimately includes children too.167 Furthermore, the ECtHR has
often relied on the CRC as guidance in the application of the provisions of the
European Convention. In the last decade, the ECtHR, as an organ of the Council
164 Bulacio case, Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 18, 2003 Series C No
100, para. 88.
165 Street Children case Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999 Series C No 63, para. 84.
166 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No 11 and 14(4 November 1950) ETS No 5.
167 Council of Europe, International Justice for Children: Foreword by Jean-Paul Costa (Vol 3 of
Building a Europe for and with Children, Council of Europe 2008) 5.
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of Europe system, has also worked closely with the Council of Europe Secret-
ariat, particularly with its programme “Building a Europe for and with
Children” in order to promote children’s rights among its members States and
also to improve accessibility of children in the European Human Rights system.
Likewise, in accordance with the European Social Charter,168 children’s rights
have also been analysed by the European Committee on Social Rights, which,
unlike the ECtHR, has jurisdiction over collective complaints against State Parties
to the European Social Charter.169
It is also important to point out that during the past years, other child-
specific instruments have been adopted within the European Human Rights
system. For example, in 1996, the European Convention on the Exercise of
Children’s Rights (ECECR) was adopted to guarantee children’s access to judicial
proceedings, namely family proceedings.170 Some of the provisions of this
convention could be of use in ICC proceedings. For example, Article 1, para-
graph 6, of the ECECR states that nothing in the Convention prevents Parties
from applying more favourable rules to the promotion and exercise of
children’s rights. It enshrines the principle that international legal instruments
lay down minimum standards but that States (or international organisations
such as the ICC) may go beyond those legal texts to guarantee children’s rights.
Article 3 of the ECECR provides the minimum standards on the child’s right
to be informed and to express his or her views in proceedings, particularly:
the right to receive all relevant information, to be consulted and to express
his or her views, and to be informed of the possible consequences of com-
pliance with these views and possible consequences of any decision. In accord-
ance with this Article, children are considered as having sufficient understand-
ing and have procedural rights that should be granted to them.171Article 5
of the Convention further grants children other procedural rights, such as the
right to apply to be assisted by an appropriate person of their choice in order
to help them express their views and the right to apply themselves, or through
other persons or bodies (not necessarily parents or guardians) for the appoint-
ment of a separate representative (other than that of their parents). The ECECR
also provides minimum guidelines to be followed by the judicial authorities
before making a decision. In Article 6, the ECECR states that judges shall con-
sider whether they have sufficient information to make a decision in the best
interests of the child, or otherwise, obtain further information. It also obliges
judges to ensure that the child has received all relevant information and has
consulted with the child in person, where appropriate and allow the child
168 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (18 October 1961) ETS No 35 and revised ETS
No 163.
169 Council of Europe, International Justice for Children: Foreword by Jean-Paul Costa (Vol 3 of
Building a Europe for and with Children, Council of Europe 2008) 12.
170 Council of Europe, ECECR (25 January 1996) ETS No 160.
171 Council of Europe, The ECECR, Explanatory Report <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Reports/Html/160.htm> accessed 8 August 2013.
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to express his or her views. The above standards set by the ECECR could be
of guidance for ICC proceedings dealing with child victims and witnesses.
The Council of Europe also adopted in 2007 the “Convention on the Pro-
tection of children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse”, which
provides a legal framework for the prevention and protection of children
against this abuse, but also for the punishment of these crimes, including
against legal persons or corporations. Importantly, this Convention contains
guidelines regarding the investigation, prosecution and procedural measures
that could be taken into consideration when dealing with sexual exploitation
and abuse against children in ICC proceedings.172
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Recom-
mendation 1864 (2009) “Promoting the participation by children in decisions
affecting them”, which could also be of guidance for the ICC.173 In Recom-
mendation 1864, the Council of Europe highlighted the need for State Parties
to the Council to implement the ECECR and also Article 12 of the CRC, which
deals with children’s access to justice and their participation in judicial pro-
ceedings.174 The Recommendation urges all decision-makers to seriously
consider the opinions, desires and feelings of children, including very young
children and ensure that participation is always voluntary and facilitated.
Furthermore, the Recommendation proposes that children be able to express
their views in a climate of respect, trust and mutual understanding and special
attention is paid to avoid putting them at risk in any way.175
Moreover, in November 2010, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe adopted a series of guidelines on child friendly justice.176 This
document, which will be analysed more in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, provides
recommendations on children’s access to justice, including information on the
judicial proceedings, protection, safety and participation from the initial
proceedings (i.e. investigation) to the final phases (i.e. enforcement and execu-
tion of a decision).
172 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of children against sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse (Lanzarote Convention), (25 October 2007) CETS No 201.
173 Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1864(2009): Promoting the
Participation by Children in Decisions Affecting Them (13 March 2009) Doc.12080.
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the ECECR and Article 12 of the CRC: Whenever a decision which affects a child is taken,
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Regarding the ECtHR’s case law in relation to children, the ECtHR has
adopted principles of interpretation and application of the law in order to
protect children’s rights that could be of guidance for the work of the ICC.
Although this study does not intend to review all the abundant jurisprudence
of the ECtHR that directly or indirectly relates to children’s rights, it aims to
analyse some key decisions that are of particular relevance and importance
to the work of the ICC.
In what refers to crimes committed against children, the ECtHR has copious
case law on torture, slavery and other violations of human rights that are also
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Thus, this abundant case law could be
of use to define these ICC crimes. For example, in the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka
and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, the ECtHR held that the State was responsible
for torture when it detained an illegal immigrant, a 5-year old unaccompanied
child, in an adult detention centre. It found that the child’s detention and the
conditions of her detention reflected a lack of humanity to such a degree, that
it amounted to inhumane treatment.177 In another case, that of Siliadin v.
France, the ECtHR analysed modern slavery, in a case where a girl was subject
to domestic slavery. In this case, the ECtHR defined “forced or compulsory”
labour as “all work of service which is exacted from any person under the
menace of any penalty for which the said person has not voluntarily offered
himself”. It then established that the fact that the victim was a child in a
foreign country, with an illegal migratory status and thus feared arrest, created
the “threat of penalty” element necessary for forced labour to exist.178 These
findings could not only be of use to define the crime of slavery or sexual
slavery, but also to analyse the term of “consent” in crimes of sexual violence
in general and in crimes of child recruitment.
In relation to children’s access to justice, the ECtHR case law could be of use
to determine the needs of children under Rule 86 of the Rules (and
consequently protective and special measures under Rules 87 and 88 of the
Rules) vis-à-vis the rights of the accused pursuant to Article 67 of the Rome
Statute. For example, in the case of S.C. v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR
determined that in cases involving children, it is “essential that it be dealt with
in a manner that takes full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual
and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability to
understand and participate in the proceedings, (…) including conducting the
hearing in such a way as to reduce as far possible his feelings of intimidation
and inhibition”. The ECtHR also referred to the concept of “effective partici-
pation”, which in cases involving children “presupposes that the accused (a
child) has a broad understanding of the nature of the trial process and of what
is at stake for him or her”. Most importantly, the ECtHR held that the said
procedure must adapt to the child’s needs (taking into consideration age, but
177 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium no 13178/03 ECHR 2006-XI, paras 55-58.
178 Siliadin v France no 73316/01 ECHR 2005-VII, paras 116-120.
100 Chapter 3
also special conditions such as handicaps).179 Although this case dealt with
a child’s right to participate in proceedings as a defendant, the same principle
could apply for a child’s right to participate in proceedings before the ICC as
victim or witness in a case.
In the case of S.N. v. Sweden, the ECtHR referred to the right of child victims
for protection in judicial proceedings vis-à-vis the rights of the defence.180
In this case, which involved a 10-year old boy who had been victim of sexual
violence, the ECtHR affirmed that when assessing the concept of “fair trial”
for an accused, “certain measures may be taken for the purpose of protecting
the victim, provided that such measures can be reconciled with an adequate
and effective exercise of the rights of the defence”. The ECtHR further stated
that judicial authorities may be required to take measures which counter-
balance the handicaps under which the defence labours.181 Cases such as
this one could be of use for the ICC to guarantee protection to child victims
and witnesses, but also guarantee the accused’s right to a fair trial. These
counter-balancing measures are essential to guarantee victims participation,
while protecting them (particularly those most vulnerable, such as children),
and protect at the same time the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial.
In fact, according to the Appeals Chamber of the ICC, counter-balancing
measures are necessary to guarantee the rights of the accused in spite the non-
disclosure of information to him/her.182
The case of Bocos-Cuesta v. The Netherlands could also be of guidance for
ICC proceedings involving child victims of sexual violence. In this case, the
ECtHR reiterated that the fact that the accused doesn’t have access to examine
the witness (a child victim of sexual abuse), does not per se lead to a violation
of the accused’s right to a fair trial. For example, the ECtHR referred to the
possibility of having the previous interviews of child witnesses recorded or
even transmitted via technical devices to the accused, to enable his defence
to examine the witness or at least to follow their testimonies. Likewise, the
ECtHR found that, although the accused’s rights could be limited in order to
protect vulnerable children from possible re-traumatisation, these decisions
should be based on concrete evidence or for example, expert’s opinion.183
179 SC v the United Kingdom no 60958/00ECHR 2004-IV, paras 28-35.
180 SN v Sweden no 34209/96 ECHR 2002-V.
181 SN v Sweden no 34209/96 ECHR 2002-V, para. 47.
182 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber
I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered
by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused,
together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”’ (21
October 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1486, para. 48.
183 Bocos-Cuesta v the Netherlands no 54789/00, 10 November 2005, paras 69-74. See also PS
v Germany no 33900/96, 20 December 2001, in which the ECtHR held that in spite the due
protection to child victims and witnesses, the rights of the defence to a fair trial had been
violated.
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The abovementioned cases are just some examples of the extensive juris-
prudence of the ECtHR and the legal instruments of the Council of Europe that
could be of use for the work of the ICC. In general, although the case law of
the IACtHR and the ECtHR (and expectedly soon of their African counterpart)
is regional and related to State responsibility, many of the principles and rights
interpreted by these courts are of universal application and thus useful in ICC
proceedings concerning children’s rights. Although Article 21 of the Rome
Statute is silent regarding regional or other international case law, the practice
of the ICC judges so far has been to refer to this case law when applying and
interpreting the law of the ICC.184 However, this has been a discretionary
power of the judges, and in fact, there is no settled rule as to what case law
of the regional courts should be applied. Although perhaps not applicable
law per se, it appears that this case law could be helpful as “guidance” for ICC
judges, insofar as this is not contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute.
For example, when defining crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the regional
case law could be of use, but must be read and analysed in light of the crimes
as defined by the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, and within the
limits of the principle of legality enshrined in Article 22 of the Rome Statute.
However, as regards other procedural aspects (i.e. protective measures versus
rights of the accused), the case law of the regional human rights courts will
most likely meet the Rome Statute’s standards, and thus be more easily trans-
posed to the ICC setting. Moreover, as regards reparations proceedings, which
are clear human rights proceedings within ICC’s criminal proceedings, the
regional case law will most likely not only be in accordance with the Rome
Statute, but also give greater specificity to the general ICC provisions in this
regard (i.e. Article 75 of the Rome Statute).
3.5.5 Case Law of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
In the same manner in which regional human rights case law has no clear
applicability in the ICC, the jurisprudence of other international criminal
tribunals is also not strictly applicable law under Article 21 of the Rome
Statute. In fact, although it could be used and has been used as “guidance”
for the interpretation and application of ICC provisions, this is completely
discretionary and in fact, in some instances judges have also disregarded
established practice of other international tribunals when this has been inter-
184 See for example: DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006)
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 51-53; Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18
January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 78; Kenya Situation ‘Decision Pursuant to Article
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya’(31 March 2010) ICC-01/09-19-Corr, paras 31-32.
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preted as contrary to the Rome Statute.185 So, although the current practice
of the ICC is that Chambers, parties and participants, including the Appeals
Chamber, have referred to such international case law, particularly of the ad-
hoc tribunals but also the SCSL, there is no clear rule as to when this case law
needs to be followed or disregarded.186 In essence, it is a discretionary power
of the judges of the ICC to refer to this case law, insofar as it is not contrary
to the Rome Statute and applying the Appeals Chamber’s ruling mentioned
above, it could be used as “guidance” to interpret and apply ICC applicable
law.
As regards children, the case law recently developed by the SCSL is certainly
most significant for the work of the ICC, particularly in relation to the crimes
of enlistment, conscription and use of children to participate actively in hostil-
ities. In fact, all the accused before it have been charged with crimes of child
recruitment.187 Although the case law of other international tribunals, parti-
cularly the ad-hoc tribunals, could be useful for the interpretation, for example,
of provisions of international humanitarian law contained in the Rome Statute,
this section will focus on the jurisprudence of the SCSL, as it is the most relevant
in respect to children. Moreover, most of the significant jurisprudence of the
ad-hoc tribunals is already reflected in the Rome Statute and the RPE provisions
(i.e. the crimes of sexual violence and the principles of evidence in cases of
sexual violence). In the case of the SCSL, as noted by Trial Chamber I of the
ICC in the Court’s first ever conviction and sentence (which referred to the
case law of the SCSL) although the decisions of other international tribunals
are not part of the directly applicable law under Article 21 of the Rome Statute,
the case law of the SCSL could potentially assist in the interpretation of the
185 See for example Lubanga case ‘Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and
Witness Proofing’ (8 November 2006) ICC-01-04 01-06-679. This decision prohibited the
procedural practice of “witness proofing” which is well established and unquestioned in
the ad-hoc tribunals. As will be analysed further in Chapter 5, more recently the Trial
Chamber in the Kenya situation cases has allowed this practice, albeit by the name of
“witness preparation”.
186 See for example, Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Requests
and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81”’ (14 December 2006) ICC-01/04
01/06-773, para. 20; Katanga and Ngudgolo case ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain
Katanga against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Defence
Request Concerning Languages”’ (27 May 2008) ICC-01/04-01/07-522 paras 16 and 48;
Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral Decision of
Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1433, para. 78. Drumbl
has noted that the references to SCSL case law in ICC rulings suggests “the interactive
nature of the jurisprudence of these two institutions”. See: Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child
Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2012) 152.
187 Naïri Arzoumanian and Francesca Pizzutelli, ‘Victimes et Bourreaux: Questions de Respons-
abilité Liées à la Problématique des Enfants-Soldats en Afrique’ (December 2003) Revue
du Comité International de la Croix Rouge, Vol 85, 827.
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Rome Statute’s provisions as the crimes of child recruitment are identically
defined in both Statutes of the SCSL and the ICC.188
The first major judgment of the SCSL is that of the Appeals Chamber of
31 May 2004, in which it decided on a preliminary motion by the accused
which contended that the principle nullum crimen sine lege had been violated
because the act of child recruitment was not a crime under customary inter-
national law at the time of the alleged commission. The SCSL Appeals Chamber
concluded that the crime of child recruitment was crystallised as international
customary law, regardless of whether it had been committed in internal or
international armed conflict, even before the adoption of the Rome Statute
in 1998.189
The first conviction in the SCSL (and first ever conviction for crimes of child
recruitment) was the Judgment of 20 June 2007, in which Trial Chamber II
of the SCSL in the case of Brima, Kamara and Kanu, also known as the Case
of the Armed Forces for Revolutionary Council (“AFRC Case”), found that the
accused were individually criminally responsible for conscripting children
under the age of 15 years into an armed group and/or using them to par-
ticipate actively in hostilities.190
Since the SCSL adopted the elements of the crime in accordance with the Rome
Statute and the Elements of Crimes, the above case law could be helpful for the
interpretation of the ICC provisions in future judgments before this Court.
Of particular importance is the SCSL jurisprudence as regards to crimes of
sexual violence committed against girls that are abducted in armed conflict.
188 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 603. See also, Lubanga case ‘Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article
76 of the Rome Statute’ (10 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, paras 12-15.
189 The SCSL Appeals Chamber found that the fact that 187 States were parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and 137 States were parties to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions, and that all but 6 States had ratified the CRC at that time, and that the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child had been adopted and prohibited such
practice, as well as the widespread prohibition of recruitment or voluntary enlistment of
children under the age of fifteen in domestic legislations, all lead to the conclusion that
the prohibition of child recruitment was crystallised under international customary law,
even before the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998. See: The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga
Norman ‘Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment)’
(31 May 2004) SCSL 04-14-131 paras 10-24.
190 As will be studied further in Chapter 4, the Trial Chamber determined that the actus reus
of the crime was satisfied by either enlisting, or conscripting children under the age of
fifteen or by using them to participate actively in hostilities and that enlistment entails
accepting and enrolling individuals when they volunteer to join an armed force or group.
In what refers to the concept of “conscription” the Trial Chamber concluded that this
conduct encompasses acts of coercion, such as abductions and forced recruitment, by an
armed group against children, committed for the purpose of using them to participate
actively in hostilities. The Prosecutor v Brima et al (“AFRC case”) ‘Sentencing Judgment’
(19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, 711, 729, 733 and 734.
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Although this jurisprudence will be further analysed in Chapter 4, it is im-
portant to note that the SCSL case law could be of use for ICC cases involving
crimes of sexual violence committed against girl-child recruits. Moreover, the
case law of the SCSL could be helpful to interpret crimes against humanity of
sexual slavery and also the crime of “forced marriage” or “ forced conjugal
association” as defined by the SCSL, to define “other forms of sexual violence”
under the Rome Statute.191
Three other cases and convictions have followed after the AFRC case.192
Although the SCSL is now completing its mission and its case law will thus
be limited to these four cases, its findings could still be of relevance, at least
for the purposes of the first cases before the ICC, as was the case of the Lubanga
judgment, in which, as noted above, the Trial Chamber referred to the SCSL’s
case law on the subject of child recruitment.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
Article 21 of the Rome Statute provides a system of applicable law in which
the Rome Statute appears to be the pinnacle of the legal hierarchy. However,
upon a closer analysis of this provision, particularly paragraph 3, it is clear
that internationally recognised human rights are the “chapeau” of this legal
provision and that all interpretation and application of the law is subject to
these human rights standards. Referring to children’s rights, this means that
internationally recognised instruments such as the CRC should guide the
191 AFRC case ‘Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Julia Sebutinde Appended to Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 88 (c)’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624 para. 16 and ‘Partly Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Doherty on Count 7 (sexual slavery) and Count 8 (‘forced marriages’)’
(19 June 2007) para. 49; The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Taylor case) ‘Judgment’ (18 May
2012) SCSL03-01-1281, paras 422 and 426.
192 The second conviction came on 2 August 2007 judgment, when Trial Chamber I of the SCSL
in the case of Fofana and Kondewa known as the Civil Defence Forces (“CDF Case”), found
the accused Kondewa guilty by majority of ‘(e)nlisting children under the age of 15 years
into armed groups and/or using them to participate actively in hostilities, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law’. In this judgment, the Trial Chamber referred
to the general concept of ‘recruitment’, and came to the conclusion that this term en-
compasses ‘conscription’, ‘enlistment’ and the ‘use of children to participate actively in
hostilities’. On 2 March 2009, Trial Chamber I of the SCSL in its judgment in the case of
Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, also known as the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF Case”) found
the accused individually, criminally responsible for the crime of conscription and enlistment
of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, and of using them to
participate actively in hostilities, and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law. The findings of the SCSL in the Taylor case are also relevant, as the judges analysed
the crime of child recruitment, among other crimes. See: The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana
and Allieu Kondewa (“CDF case”) ‘Judgment’ (2 August 2007) SCSL 04-14-785, 191, 192,
and 291; The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay et al (“RUF Case”) ‘Judgment’ (2 March 2009)
SCSL 04-15-1234; Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281 and ‘Sentencing
Judgment’ (30 May 2012) SCSL03-01-1285.
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interpretation and application of all provisions within the Rome Statute and
other ICC legislation. In fact, one could argue that a statutory provision could
become inapplicable if its application would be contrary to the CRC in a given
context.
As for other “soft law” children’s rights instruments (i.e. the Paris Prin-
ciples), although the ICC is not bound to apply them, it may use them as
guidance in order to apply and interpret the ICC’s applicable law. This is a
discretionary power that the judges of the ICC have, insofar as the “guidance”
provided by these instruments is not contrary to the Rome Statute and other
applicable law under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.
Most importantly, this Chapter has demonstrated that taking into considera-
tion the experience of other international, national and regional tribunals,
inasmuch as they are compatible with internationally recognised human rights
and the Rome Statute, is not only permissible but also recommendable.
Although human rights instruments and case law have to be adapted to the
ICC’s legal framework (i.e. State vs individual responsibility) and with due
regard to Article 22 of the Rome Statute containing the principle of legality,
its findings could be of use when giving concrete and more specific content
to general provisions such as Rule 85 of the RPE, which defines the concept
of “victim” or when deciding on reparations measures pursuant to Article
75 of the Rome Statute.
It is important to note, however, that the instruments and case law analysed
above are far from being all-inclusive. Applicable law or guidance instruments
will vary, depending on the case at hand. The list of “applicable law” under
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute is dynamic, ever-changing and in constant
progression. Insofar as developing human rights law achieve the “international-
ly recognised” level, their application is compulsory under the Rome Statute.
As for the other “guidance” human rights instruments, as long as they are
not contrary to the Rome Statute and insofar as the interpretation of crimes
within the ICC’s jurisdiction adheres to the principle of legality, its application
by ICC judges will be discretionary. Therefore, it is important for judges,
prosecutors, counsel and ICC staff in general to be attentive to the developments
in international human rights law, in order to progress the law established
in the Rome Statute in 1998, which should not remain “set in stone”, particular-
ly not regarding internationally recognised human rights, pursuant to Article
21(3) of the Rome Statute.

4 Crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC
and children
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and the crime of aggression.1
The jurisdiction rationae temporis of the ICC extends to crimes committed
after the entry into force of the Rome Statute, 1 July 2002. However, for all
other States that have become State Parties to the Rome Statute after that date,
the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed after the entry into force of
the Rome Statute for that State.2 Non-State Parties or new State Parties may
make a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC from an earlier date
or for specific crimes, in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Rome
Statute.
Regarding its territorial jurisdiction, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction
if the crime was committed in the territory of a State Party or in the territory
of a State that has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction. Likewise, the ICC has juris-
diction rationae personae in relation to crimes committed by a national of a State
Party or of a State that has accepted its jurisdiction.3
The only exception to these two preconditions for the exercise of the ICC’s
jurisdiction is the referral of a situation to the Prosecutor by the UNSC, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in accordance with Article 13(b) of the
Rome Statute. In view of this provision, the ICC holds a broader jurisdiction
in relation to the situations referred by the UNSC.
This Chapter analyses the definition of particular crimes under the ICC’s
jurisdiction that affect children. While this Chapter focuses primarily on crimes
affecting children exclusively or disproportionately vis-à-vis adults, it is clear
that children, as any human being, can be victims of any crime within the
jurisdiction of the ICC.
1 This section very briefly synthesises the main aspects of the ICC’s jurisdiction. However,
for further in-depth analysis of the topic, the reader is referred to the following literature:
Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by
Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 129-142 and 539-700; William Schabas,
The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press
2010) 101-118 and 273-372.
2 Rome Statute, article 11(2).
3 Rome Statute, article 12.
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Although the analysis contained in this Chapter focuses on substantive
criminal law, it also has a bearing in the procedural aspects of children’s
interaction with the ICC analysed throughout this research. A child will be
defined as a “victim”, pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE or Article 75 of the Rome
Statute, depending on the definition given to the crime he/she suffered and
the determination of the harms suffered as a result of that crime. This, since
these provisions establish that there must be a causal link between the crimes
allegedly committed and the harms suffered by victims.4
Moreover, the ICC must protect child victims and witnesses’ physical and
mental well-being throughout all stages of their involvement with the ICC,
pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute. Because of their age (in addition
to their cultural and socio-economic background and gender), children will
suffer the negative consequences of crimes differently from adults and thus,
the ICC must address these particular needs of child victims and witnesses.
For example, in order to decide on judicial and non-judicial protective and
special measures for child victims of crimes, the ICC needs to understand the
nature of the crimes committed against these children. Only if ICC staff, in-
cluding persons working with the VWU, OPCV and the VPRS, among others,
understand the harms suffered by children as a consequence of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC, will the ICC be able to guarantee a sound judicial
environment in which children can participate in proceedings as victims and
witnesses pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE.
As noted above, all crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction are crimes that could
affect children either as direct or indirect victims. However, for the purposes
of this Chapter, only some underlying acts within the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes will be analysed: namely those in
which children are a material element of the crime (child recruitment and
forced displacement of children), and those crimes which disproportionately
affect children (such as sexual violence and attacks against certain civilian
objects such as schools).5 However, taking into consideration that current
armed conflicts predominantly victimise civilians and non-combatants, it is
foreseeable that most crimes within the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction will signi-
ficantly affect children, as they represent a considerable part (if not the major-
ity) of the civilian population. However, as noted above, a children’s dimension
of all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC should not be disregarded.
4 Kai Ambos, The first Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga):
A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 12,
No. 2 (2012).
5 Though the crimes in the Rome Statute are categorised under the crimes of genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression, this Chapter will not deal with the general
elements of these crimes, but only with the conduct affecting children. For example, in the
analysis of child recruitment, the contextual elements of armed conflict will not be analysed,
but only the elements concerning the conduct of enlistment, conscription and use of children
to participate actively in the hostilities.
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Children will be affected by crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction differently
than adults. Thus, all investigations and trials before the ICC should ideally
take into account a “children’s dimension” of crimes. When investigating or
prosecuting any international crime, investigators, prosecutors, judges and
counsel should bear in mind that children are very often affected by inter-
national crimes, but may not directly approach the ICC because of their age.
Although in the Lubanga case, the Katanga case and the Ngudjolo case, which
encompass crimes committed against children (i.e. child recruitment), children
have participated as victims and witnesses, in other cases children may not
participate at all.6 However, this does not exempt the ICC from considering
the impact these crimes have upon children. What happened to the children
of the adult victims of other ICC crimes? This is a question that ICC investigators
could pose, but also judges, who pursuant to Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute
shall determine the truth.
4.2 WHO ARE THE VICTIMS OF CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST CHILDREN?
Children, but also their parents and family members, as well as their commun-
ity, are affected by crimes committed against children. These crimes not only
affect their childhood, their youth, and therefore their right to have an adequate
development, but also affect their family life and their interaction with their
community. Crimes against children affect the communities’ future citizens
and often deprive an entire generation within a community of their funda-
mental rights.
Recruitment of children in armed groups is prohibited because it violates
children’s rights to physical and psychological health, education, and family
life, among others. Therefore their recruitment is prohibited, as it destroys
childhood, and prematurely enters children into adulthood, along with all
the psychological and physical effects this encompasses.7 Triffterer’s Comment-
ary to the Rome Statute supports this argument with the following statement:
“(b)esides the risk to their physical well-being, active participation in armed
hostilities teaches them the rule and culture of violence, disrupts their edu-
cation and frequently results in grave traumas, because children are even less
capable to deal with the horrors of war than grown adults.”8 In fact, a court
expert in the Lubanga case at the ICC suggested that children associated with
armed groups are exposed to consequences which destroy the valuable child-
6 See for example the case of the Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba, ICC-01/05 01/08 (“Bemba
case”), which encompasses crimes of pillage, murder and rape.
7 Ann Davison, ‘Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident’ (2004) Willamette Journal of
International Law and Dispute Resolution, 125.
8 Michael Cottier, “(xxvi) Participation of Children in Hostilities” in: Otto Triffterer (ed),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 467.
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hood of a person’s life, and deprives them of key services such as education
and healthcare.9
The legal provisions that punish crimes committed against children also
protect the parents and other family members of the child victims of these
crimes, particularly in what refers to their family life, their ties and overall
well-being, which are affected by the commission of a crime against a young
family member. In the Lubanga case, which exclusively dealt with recruitment
of children, Trial Chamber I determined that parents acting on behalf of their
children who also claimed to have suffered harm as a result of their child’s
alleged recruitment could be granted status to participate as victims in the
proceedings.10 The same Chamber determined in fact that the harm to children
and their parents is presumed, stating that recruitment of children under the
age of 15 to participate actively in the hostilities, ipso facto, will have resulted
in some form of physical or psychological injury or harm to the child, or his/
her parents (or both), regardless of whether specific harm or injury was set
out in the victim’s application form.11
The community where children live could also be considered a victim of
crimes committed against its youngest members. Crimes committed against
children often disrupt the healthy functioning of the community as a society,
in view of the fact that children are the future of the community and how they
can contribute to it may be seriously hampered by these crimes. In this sense,
the expert witness on children and post-traumatic stress disorder who appeared
in the Lubanga case stated, regarding child recruitment and its effects on its
victims and communities:12
“(The communities) “lose a critical mass of the young people who could be product-
ive agents for future development. You lose them as active agents, as productive
people in society.”
Although it could be argued that all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
affect the communities in which they occur, systematic crimes committed
against children and which target children have longer-lasting effects in society,
as children are still developing, and thus crimes could have greater impact
on them and on their future function as members of society. In fact, the same
9 Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering, Report of Ms Elisabeth Schauer
following the 6 February 2009 “Instructions to the Court’s expert on child soldiers and
trauma” ICC-01/04-01/06-1729-Anx1, 25 of February 2009) 3.
10 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings’ (15
December 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1556-Corr, para. 118.
11 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings’ (15
December 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1556-Corr, para. 120. See also: Lubanga case ‘Decision
on indirect victims’(8 April 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-1813 para. 50.
12 Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (7 of April 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-166-ENG, 33 lines
8-14.
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court expert who appeared in the Lubanga case stated that during childhood
and adolescence the mind and brain are particularly flexible and therefore
stress has the greatest potential to affect cognitive and affective development.
She explained that due to the exposure to stress during this developmental
period, the brain could develop along a stress-responsive pathway that is
associated with increased risk of developing serious medical and psychiatric
disorders, for example, intense aggressiveness or fear.13 It could be foreseeable
then, that children who have developed in an environment of massive crimes
and armed conflict could have difficulties as adults in recognizing basic moral
principles, such as respect to human dignity and to human life. In many
developing countries, where children represent more than half of the popula-
tion, such adverse effects in children could have devastating effects to the
future of communities as a whole.14
Likewise, in crimes such as child recruitment, the community and civilian
population in general is a victim of this crime because children can be fierce
soldiers that do not distinguish between right and wrong and between com-
batants and civilians as adults may do, since they do not necessarily have
completed their ethical and moral development.15 Triffterer’s Commentary
of the Rome Statute stresses this point of view, stating that social reintegration
poses particular problems for children who have never seen anything else but
conflict and violence. Also, children’s combat behaviour is more erratic; they
may more easily shoot indiscriminately at anything that moves. Because their
conduct is more difficult to predict, they can present an increased danger for
persons protected under humanitarian law, including civilians, humanitarian
workers or persons hors de combat.”16 This is also echoed by the Special
Representative of the Secretary General of the UN for Children and Armed
Conflict, Ms Coomaraswamy, who participated as an expert witness in the
Lubanga case and who stated during her intervention in that trial that children
13 Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering, Report of Ms. Elisabeth Schauer
following the 6 February 2009 “Instructions to the Court’s expert on child soldiers and
trauma” ICC-01/04-01/06-1729-Anx1, 25 of February 2009) 17.
14 For example, in the DRC, 44% of the population are between 0-14 years old and the median
national age is 17 years. This means that in the DRC, at least 44% of its population was
born after the Mobuto era and thus has suffered from the various armed conflicts that have
raged the country since 1996. For background information on the First Congo War in 1996
see: Human Rights Watch, The War <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/zaire/Zaire-05.htm>
accessed 8 August 2013. See also: CIA World Fact Book, Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic
of the <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> accessed 8 August
2013.
15 Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing International
Standards’ Sixteenth Annual International Law Symposium “Rights of Children in the New
Millennium” (Fall 1999) Whittier Law Review, 192.
16 Michael Cottier, “(xxvi) Participation of Children in Hostilities” in: Otto Triffterer (ed),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 467.
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under 18 years and certainly those under 15 years of age have an
underdeveloped notion of death, which makes them fearless in battle, often
thinking of it as a game, rushing straight into the line of fire.17 Abbott also
stresses that military groups use children because they consider them “expend-
able, less demanding and easier to manipulate than adult soldiers”.18 As noted
by the author, the tendency to use child soldiers in armed conflicts, coupled
with drugs and alcohol, transforms children into valuable and desensitized
executioners, assassins and combatants for warring parties.19 Fujio also notes
that children tend to be more easily manipulated and tricked into believing
what adults tell them and can be moulded into effective and expendable
fighters.20
It is thus clear that crimes committed against children affect their entire
social structure and very often change ordinary social hierarchies (i.e. by giving
a child a weapon) that can no longer be reset once the armed conflict or crimes
have ceased. It also has a generational effect, since many child victims of armed
conflict will have their education and healthcare limited or completely
annulled, all of which will have consequences for generations to come.
The ICC needs to consider the multiple effects that crimes committed against
children have. Only if the effects of crimes against children are integrally
understood, judicial proceedings at the ICC will meet the needs of children
pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. Likewise, only if there is a comprehensive
knowledge of the harms suffered by children, their families and their commun-
ities, will reparations be meaningful for all these victims and aim to restore
the peace that was affected by the commission of these crimes.21
17 Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (7 January 2010) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-223-ENG, 11 lines
22 et seq. See also International Bureau for Children’s Rights, Children and Armed Conflict:
A Guide for International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (Canada 2010) 132-133.
18 Amy B Abbott, ‘Child Soldiers – The Use of Children as Instruments of War’ (Summer
2000) Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 507.
19 Amy B Abbott, ‘Child Soldiers – The Use of Children as Instruments of War’ (Summer
2000) Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 510.
20 Christy Fujio, ‘Invisible soldiers: how and why post-conflict processes ignore the needs
of ex-combatant girls’ (Fall 2008) Journal of Law and Social Challenges, 4.
21 The Preamble of the Rome Statute recognized that the crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC “threaten peace, security and well-being of the world”.
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4.3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN WHICH CHILDREN ARE A MATERIAL ELEMENT
OF THE CRIME
4.3.1 Genocide by forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group
4.3.1.1 Brief note on the crime of genocide in general
Article 6 of the Rome Statute defines the crime of genocide as an act “com-
mitted with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such”. Article 6 includes as conduct of genocide the
following: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or
mental harm to the members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
This crime in general has four elements: a) the group (national, ethnical,
etc.); b) the intention (to destroy in whole or in part), c) the context (in an
emerging pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or that the
conduct itself effect destruction); and d) the conduct (killing, rape, etc.).22
It is important to highlight several considerations in light of the Elements
of Crimes. First of all, according to this legal instrument of the ICC, the crime
of genocide is committed when one or more persons are victims of the crime
(i.e. “the perpetrator killed one or more persons”).23 Thus, the crime of
genocide has a group element.
It is also essential to take note of footnote 3 of the Elements of Crimes,
which includes as conducts within “causing serious bodily or mental harm”,
acts such as “torture, rape, sexual violence or inhumane or degrading treat-
ment”. Though these conducts are not further defined, the concepts contained
in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, relating to crimes against humanity, may be
applicable, as this provision defines terms such as enslavement, torture, and
forced pregnancy.24 Crimes of sexual violence committed against children,
either in the context of genocide or crimes against humanity, will be analysed
further in the following section of this chapter.
Also, in relation to the act of genocide to deliberately inflict conditions
of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, it is important to notice
that footnote 4 of the Elements of Crimes defines “conditions of life” as
“resources indispensable for survival, among others food and medical services,
22 ICC, Elements of the Crimes (Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May-11 June 2010) (Elements of the Crimes)
RC/11, article 6, Introduction.
23 Elements of the Crimes, article 6(a).
24 Rome Statute, article 7(2).
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or systematic expulsion from homes”. This crime could of course have parti-
cular effects on children, because they have particular medical, hygienic and
nutritional needs, among others, that differ from the adult population. It could
also be argued that the threshold for the commission of this crime will be lower
when committed against children (particularly young children), as they have
more indispensable needs than adults which also have more enduring effects
(i.e. genocide committed by depriving victims of food could have devastating
consequences in the cognitive and physical development of children due to
malnutrition).
Another conduct within genocide, that of imposing measures intended
to prevent births within a group, could also be considered as affecting children,
because it prevents the birth of children within a certain group. However, due
to the polemic consequences of any discussion involving unborn children vis-à-
vis the right to abortion, this research will focus on crimes in which born
children are affected. Notwithstanding the limitations of this research, this
could be an interesting topic to consider if these charges are ever brought
before the ICC.
Notwithstanding the importance and negative effects that the conducts
within the crime of genocide included in Article 6 of the Rome Statute have
on children’s lives, this section will focus on the crime of “forcible transfer
of children”, because in this crime children are a material element of the crime
as it specifically requires that the crime is inflicted on children under the age
of 18 years. However, as will be explained below, age determination in this
crime is perhaps not as challenging as in the crime of recruitment, because
child victims of this crime will most likely be very young children.
4.3.1.2 The act of genocide of “forcible transfer of children”
Article 6 of the Rome Statute prohibits the act of genocide by forcibly trans-
ferring children as follows:25
‘Article 6 Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts com-
mitted with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group as such:
(…) (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
According to the Elements of Crimes (footnote 5), forcible transfer of children “is
not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking
advantage of a coercive environment”. On this same line of thought, the judges
of the ICTR established that the objective of this provision is not only to “sanction
25 Rome Statute, article 6(e).
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a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or
trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to
another”.26
The Elements of the Crimes also establish that a “child”, for the purposes of
Article 6(e) is a person under the age of 18 years. As with the mens rea of the
crimes of child recruitment analysed above, the Elements of Crime lower the
threshold of Article 30 of the Rome Statute, establishing that the perpetrator
either “knew or should have known” that the person or persons were under
the age of 18 years. Commentators, such as Schabas, have stated that this
provision of the elements of crimes is inconsistent with Article 30 and could
be considered ultra vires. Schabas argues, however, that this is unlikely to have
any real consequence, since this crime refers to young children who are trans-
ferred from a group to another resulting in a loss of their original identity.
This crime is thus improbable to apply in reality to adolescents and thus
Schabas argues, the issue of mistake of fact about the age of a teenage child,
resulting from a lack of due diligence, would never arise.27
Although, as stated by Schabas, this crime could be in reality inapplicable
for adolescents, it is still important that such apparent legal contradictions
between the Elements of Crimes and the Rome Statute are analysed and
reconciled.28 The same arguments could apply to resolve the friction between
Article 30 of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes of Article 8(2),
(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii), which will be further analysed in the following section.
4.3.2 Enlistment, conscription and use of children under the age of fifteen
to participate actively in the hostilities
Article 8 of the Rome Statute prohibits recruitment and use of children under
the age of 15 as follows:29
‘Article 8 War crimes
1. The ICC shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes.
26 ICTR, Akayesu case, ‘Judgement’ (2 September 2008) Case No ICTR-96-4-T, para. 509.
27 Schabas in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 154; William Schabas, The
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press
2010) 133.
28 For example Sonja Grover suggests that children, including adolescents forcibly recruited
by armed groups, could be considered as victims of the crime of genocide of forcible transfer
of children. See Sonja Grover, Humanity’s Children ‘ICC Jurisprudence and the Failure to Address
the Genocidal Forcible Transfer of Children’ (Springer 2013) 97-196.
29 Rome Statute, Article 8(2), subparagraphs b(xxvi) and e(vii).
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2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:
(…) (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any
of the following acts:
(…) (xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into
the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
(…)
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts
not of an international character, within the established framework of international
law, namely, any of the following acts:
(…)
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities; (…)’
To date, there are two cases at the ICC in which charges of enlistment, con-
scription and use of children have stood trial.30 However, as will be analysed
below, so far only the Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case has made a compre-
hensive analysis of this crime in the ICC’s first-ever conviction. Thus, although
the ICC judges have already determined some of the aspects that will be
analysed below, these may be upheld or quashed by the Appeals Chamber
of the ICC in the appeals proceedings pending in the Lubanga case. Moreover,
depending on how future charges for these crimes are presented in future cases
(i.e. in order to include sexual violence within the “facts and circumstances”
of the charges) some aspects which were not encompassed in the ICC’s first
trial, could be of relevance in future ICC cases.
4.3.2.1 Nature of the crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of children to parti-
cipate actively in the hostilities
These three conducts of, a) enlisting, b) conscripting and c) using children to
participate actively in hostilities, all have in common the principle of inter-
national humanitarian law that prohibits the participation of children in
combat, as it is considered an inhuman practice.31 In this sense, the crime
encompasses the principle of non-recruitment, which prohibits both compulsory
and voluntary enlistment of children, as well as their taking part in hostilities.
Although the Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions and other prior
legal instruments use the concept of “recruitment”, the Rome Statute contains
the words “enlistment” and “conscription”. However, as noted by the SCSL
case law referred to in the previous Chapter, prohibition of these crimes is
not new to the ICC Statute, and is a well-established principle of international
30 Lubanga case and Katanga and Ngudjolo case.
31 Jean Pictet and others, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1987) 900.
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customary law. Hence, the Rome Statute did not prohibit child recruitment
for the first time, but distinctly defined this crime in an international treaty.
In its judgment of 31 May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL decided
on a preliminary motion by the accused that contented that the principle
nullum crimen sine lege had been violated because the act of child recruitment
was not a crime under international customary law at the time of the alleged
commission. The SCSL Appeals Chamber concluded that the crime of child
recruitment was crystallised as international customary law, regardless of
whether it had been committed in internal or international armed conflict.32
It is important to note that the SCSL Appeals Chamber found that “States clearly
consider themselves to be under a legal obligation not to practice child recruit-
ment”.33 As stated before, in the first-ever conviction before the ICC, the Trial
Chamber used the SCSL case law as guidance for the interpretation of the Rome
Statute’s provisions.34 The Trial Chamber also referred to the CRC, the Addi-
tional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention, as well as to the CRC Optional
Protocol on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, thus in a sense acknowledging
that the definition of the crime of child recruitment may be found beyond the
Rome Statute, in these other international treaties, particularly as neither the
Rome Statute nor the Elements of Crimes really define this criminal conduct.35
4.3.2.2 Conscription and enlistment and the controversial element of “voluntariness”
Pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome Statute, ICC judges may apply other sources
of law in order to define and differentiate the concept of “enlistment” and
“conscription”. Most importantly, although a general concept of the crime may
be possible to achieve, judges will need to take into consideration the facts
and circumstances of each case (i.e. considering the multiple tasks that children
32 The SCSL Appeals Chamber found that the fact that 187 States were parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and 137 States were parties to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions, and that all but 2 states had ratified the CRC, and that the African Charter
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child had been adopted and prohibited such practice,
as well as the widespread prohibition of recruitment or voluntary enlistment of children
under the age of 15 in domestic legislations, all lead to the conclusion that the prohibition
of child recruitment was crystallised under international customary law, even before the
adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, and at least as early as 1996, when the jurisdiction
of the SCSL started. See: The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman ‘Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment)’ (31 May 2004) SCSL 04-14-131,
paras 10-24.
33 The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman ‘Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment)’ (31 May 2004) SCSL 04-14-131, para. 51.
34 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, para. 603.
35 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, para. 604.
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perform in the efforts of war carried out by adults), in order to define the crime
of child recruitment in a given case.
One important aspect of these two conducts is that they are independent
of the “use” of children. Thus, the simple recruitment of children, either by
force (conscription) or voluntarily (enlistment) encompasses a war crime,
regardless of whether children were recruited for active use in hostilities or
for other purposes such as domestic labour or sexual slavery.36
The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case concluded in fact that conscription,
enlistment and use are three alternative and separate offences. Thus, the
Chamber determined that a child might be enlisted or conscripted, inde-
pendently of whether she or he is later used to participate in hostilities. This
is particularly significant, because the Chamber rejected the defence’s sub-
mission that enlistment and conscription had to be done for the purpose of
using the child to participate actively in hostilities.37 This interpretation per-
mits the inclusion within the concepts of “enlistment” and “conscription” the
plight of girls who are often abducted by armed groups to act as sexual slaves,
cooks or domestic workers. This is also a helpful interpretation which in a
sense presumes that any child who joins an armed group, either by force or
voluntarily, to serve in the military efforts or to act as domestic servant or
sex slave, is equally put at risk by losing his or her protection as a civilian
and thus becoming a military target.
The element that differentiates “conscription” from an “enlistment” is how
recruitment occurs, either with the consent of the child (enlistment) or by force
(conscription). Three interpretations are possible regarding consent, that offer
three diverse levels of protection for children: a) consent of the child is a valid
defence; b) consent of the child is not a valid defence but is legally relevant;
and c) consent of a child under the age of 15 is legally irrelevant. It is im-
portant to study and analyse these three levels of protection in order to identify
which interpretation is applicable to the Rome Statute, in accordance to the
definition of enlistment, conscription and use provided for in Article 8 of the
Rome Statute, but also in accordance with Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute
that subjects the interpretation and application of the applicable law to inter-
nationally recognised human rights law.
In the Lubanga case, the Trial Chamber concluded that although “it will
frequently be the case that girls and boys under the age of 15 will be unable
to give genuine and informed consent when enlisting in an armed group or
force”, it still analysed whether the valid and informed consent of a child
36 Allison Smith, ‘Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2004) Journal
of International Criminal Justice.
37 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, para. 609.
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under 15 years of age is a valid defence.38 Thus, the Chamber accepted the
possibility that some children below the age of 15 could give consent to enlist.
As will be noted further below, it appears that the Majority of Trial Chamber
I also accepted that consent is legally relevant as regards the sentence to be
imposed to the convicted person.
a. Consent as a valid defence
One could declare that consent of a child to join an armed group is a valid
defence, although as will be analysed below, under the Rome Statute this
would be incompatible with its object and purpose and also irreconcilable with
internationally recognised human rights. However, at least theoretically, the
aspect of consent as a valid defence is still worthy of evaluation, particularly
considering that recently there are commentators questioning whether child
soldiers are all “vulnerable victims” that should be protected. Drumbl for
example states that most child soldiers are neither abducted nor forcibly
recruited, and at the time children exercise considerable initiative in joining
an armed group. The author in fact states that the “international legal imagina-
tion” has predetermined that no child has the capacity to volunteer to consent
to serve in an armed group.39 In fact the author points out that just as Article
5 of the CRC recognises the “evolving capacities” of children, the term of
“childhood” should not cover all underage fighters and a more refined appre-
ciation of interstitial developmental categories would enhance the dexterity
of international law in addressing young adults.40 Although these affirmations
may be the reality for some children joining armed groups (particularly
adolescents), it is important to focus on the legal framework of the ICC, which
prohibits, without exception, the recruitment of children, either voluntarily
or compulsorily in armed groups or forces, in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.
While the Rome Statute could be part of this “legal imagination”, its
provisions are clear and thus interpretations as those made by Drumbl,
although applicable perhaps for purposes of reparations (that should not be
seen to benefit victims of child recruitment vis-à-vis their communities), cannot
be used to exclude children from participating as victims in ICC proceedings
pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE or to lead to impunity of these crimes enshrined
in Article 8 of the Rome Statute as war crimes (i.e. this is also the case in the
crime of statutory rape in many domestic jurisdictions, where there is a pre-
sumption of lack of consent due to the child’s age). In accordance with Article
38 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 613-614.
39 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University
Press 2012) 13.
40 Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford University
Press 2012) 48-49.
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31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties from 1969, a treaty
shall be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose” (emphasis added). Given that the Rome Statute declares in its
Preamble that it is “determined to end impunity for perpetrators”, an inter-
pretation of this sort would be against the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute, which criminalised the conduct of enlistment, conscription and use
of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in the hostilities.
b. Consent is not a valid defence but is legally relevant
Article 8 of the Rome Statute can also be interpreted as providing a certain
level of protection, recognising that consent of a child to enlist is possible,
although it is not considered a valid defence that would justify the criminal
conduct on behalf of the perpetrator. This in fact appears logical since the
Rome Statute clearly differentiates three conducts: a) enlistment – which
includes voluntary recruitment, b) conscription – which includes recruitment
by force, and c) use of children to participate (either by force or voluntarily).
It can thus be argued that Article 8 of the Rome Statute foresees that children
may consent to join an armed group and/or to participate in hostilities.
The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case interpreted Article 8 as such
and concluded that a child’s consent is not a valid defence.41 Trial Chamber
I in the conviction of Mr Lubanga adopted this same interpretation as regards
the “defence”. Moreover, the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case concluded
that crimes of conscription and enlistment are continuous in nature and thus
only end when the child reaches 15 years of age or when he or she leaves the
armed group or force.42
In the Lubanga case, the majority of the Trial Chamber appears to have
accepted that consent of children under the age of 15 is possible and is legally
relevant, at least in relation to the sentence to be imposed to the convicted
person. In that case, the majority of the Trial Chamber concluded that the crime
of conscription, which has an “added element of compulsion”, warranted 13
years of imprisonment, while enlistment warranted 12 years of imprison-
ment.43 Judge Odio Benito, in her dissenting opinion, concluded that crimes
of enlistment, conscription and use, although distinct crimes pursuant to the
Rome Statute, result in damage to the victims and their families, “regardless
of the nature of their initial recruitment” (voluntary or compulsory). She also
stated that all three crimes (enlistment, conscription and use) “put young
41 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (14 May 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-803-
tEN, para. 247.
42 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 616-618.
43 Lubanga case ‘Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Rome Statute’ (10 July 2012)
ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, paras 37 and 98.
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children under the age of 15 at risk of severe physical and emotional harm
and death”, and therefore she concluded that the sentence to be imposed to
the convicted person for all three crimes was to be the same and not differ-
entiated, as the majority decided.44 Indeed, Judge Odio Benito’s dissent
focuses not on the origin of the crime (with or without consent), but
emphasises on the result (harms suffered by the victims) which expectedly
would be the same, regardless of whether the child originally “consented”
to the commission of the crime.
A similar interpretation has been applied by the SCSL, which has accepted
that children do have voluntariness, although rejecting it as a possible defence
for the accused.45 For example, the Trial Chamber in the RUF case at the SCSL
made an interesting interpretation of “conscription”, which defined two
manners in which this conduct may take place. It stated that this practice to
compel a child to join an armed group may be done a) by “legal” means (i.e.
by State law); or b) illegally (through use of force or by abduction).46 The
first manner, the “legal” way, gives leeway to an interpretation by ICC judges
that could include other “legal” manners of conscription, (such as propaganda
or pressure to parents) that could have an impact on the child’s “consent”
to join the armed group.
However, not all the criteria adopted by the SCSL are applicable to the ICC’s
legal framework and thus should be used with caution, because it could either
have a more restrictive or broader approach than the Rome Statute and its
Elements of Crimes. For example, in the AFRC case, the SCSL Trial Chamber
defined conscription as encompassing acts of coercion by an armed group
against children, committed for the purpose of using them to participate
actively in hostilities.47 This concept seems to add an extra element to the
crime, which is not included in the elements of crimes, that is the “purpose”
of using children to participate in hostilities. This interpretation, however, is
clearly contrary to the criteria applied by Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case
already analysed above. Another example can be found in the RUF Case, in
which the Trial Chamber noted that since many of the children abducted were
subsequently forcibly trained, it would be impermissible for the Chamber to
treat these practices as separate bases for findings of conscription.48 This
interpretation by the SCSL, which could have been applicable to the case at
hand, may not be applicable to cases before the ICC, where children could very
well be conscripted within an armed group and not necessarily receive military
training (i.e. if they are to be used for other purposes, such as being
44 Lubanga case ‘Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Rome Statute’ (10 July 2012)
ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, para. 51.
45 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, para. 735.
46 RUF case ‘Judgment’ (2 March 2009) SCSL04-15-1234, para. 186.
47 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, para. 734.
48 RUF case ‘Judgment’ (2 March 2009) SCSL 04-15-1234, para. 1695.
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messengers, porters or sexual slaves). This concept of conscription, which links
it to military training would very often leave many children associated with
armed groups unprotected and therefore should not be adopted as a “general
principle” but applied on a case-by-case basis.
Likewise, regarding the concept of “enlistment”, the SCSL Appeals Chamber
established that enlistment in the broad sense includes any conduct in which
a child is accepted as part of the militia, thus coming in fact close to a crime
by omission (of not stopping the child from joining the armed group). In the
view of the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL, by simply not stopping or not
preventing a child from joining an armed group the crime of “voluntary
enlistment” is committed.49 This however, could be complicated to apply in
the ICC framework, because Article 25 of the Rome Statute does not foresee
criminal responsibility by omission.
It can thus be concluded that although a child’s consent is not a valid
defence, the Rome Statute appears to accept that children can legally “consent”
to either join an armed group or to participate actively in the hostilities.
However, additional elements such as the purpose of the enlistment or con-
scription, which are not required by the ICC provisions, should be disregarded
as they may lead to impunity against these crimes and may leave many
children unprotected, particularly those who are recruited by armed groups
but not clearly to fulfil a military purpose within the group.
Notwithstanding the fact that the ICC case law so far has accepted that
consent may be possible, although not a valid defence, the following sub-
section will analyse one more interpretation, which disregards consent of
children under the age of 15 to form part of an armed group and/or to parti-
cipate in hostilities and consequently makes it legally irrelevant (including
for sentencing and reparations purposes).
c. Consent is impossible and legally irrelevant
The highest level of protection for children is the interpretation that children
under the age of 15 cannot legally give consent to join an armed group.50
As mentioned before, this interpretation seems to go one step beyond the level
of protection provided for in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which foresees
the crime of “enlistment” and thus the voluntary recruitment of children
(involving some kind of consent). One could thus argue that although consent
is practically impossible, it is legally foreseen under ICC standards.
However, if the crime of enlistment, conscription and use is considered
on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the environment of violence
in which child victims could be immersed, one could conclude that consent
49 CDF case ‘Judgment’ (28 May 2008) SCSL-04-14-829, para. 144.
50 Nienke Grossman, ‘Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights
Violations’ in Sara Dillon (ed), International Children’s Rights (Carolina Academic Press 2010)
727.
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is not legally possible, as children under 15, even if they appear to consent,
do not necessarily fully understand the negative consequences of their enlist-
ment (i.e. danger to their lives, punishments, sexual violence, etc.) or do not
have the possibility to do so freely (i.e. hunger, domestic violence, civilian
insecurity, etc.).51 One could also argue that although there is consent at the
beginning of the crime (when the child is enlisted), the child will later not have
the possibility to stop the crime (i.e. by leaving the armed group and enrolling
in a school to study). Furthermore, as noted by Judge Odio Benito in her
dissenting opinion referred to above, no matter how the crime of recruitment
is initiated (by force or “voluntarily”), children indistinctly suffer harm as a
result of their involvement with the armed group or force.
Accordingly, although consent of children under the age of fifteen is
foreseen in the Rome Statute, it may be difficult to determine, because many
of the “voluntary” child soldiers who decide to join the armed groups face
some kind of physical, psychological or socio-economic circumstances that
force them towards the armed group: violence, starvation, revenge for the
killing or abuses committed against the child or his or her family, etc.52
Likewise, though not strictly “compelling” children to enlist, some governments
51 For example Abbott states that children often join armed groups as a consequence of a
culture of violence, desperation for food, the need for security or the drive to avenge the
deaths of family members. The author also notes that children often “volunteer” to fulfil
their basic needs or merely to survive. This commentator concludes that in a war-torn
context, it is difficult to establish whether the child did indeed have freedom of choice in
his or her decision to volunteer and may lack the capacity to determine his or her best
interests, to independently form opinions or to analyse competing ideologies. Fujio also
mentions that poverty, ethnic marginalisation, lack of education and spread of war and
disease are some of the “root causes” of the use of children in armed conflict as children
who enlist have not freely chosen this lifestyle; rather they were drawn into it by forces
beyond their control. See: Amy B Abbott, ‘Child Soldiers – The Use of Children as Instru-
ments of War’ (Summer 2000) Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 516-518; Christy Fujio,
‘Invisible soldiers: how and why post-conflict processes ignore the needs of excombatant
girls’ (Fall 2008) Journal of Law and Social Challenges, 2 and 5.
52 See the Paris Principles: Principle 6.0 states that children become associated with armed
forces or armed groups for numerous reasons. Many are forcibly recruited; others
“volunteer” because of their circumstances. While war itself is a major determinant, children
may view enlistment as their best option for survival for themselves, their families or
communities in contexts of extreme poverty, violence, social inequality or injustice. Gender
inequalities, discrimination and violence are frequently exacerbated in times of armed
conflict. Girls and boys may be seeking to escape gender-based violence or other forms
of discrimination. See also Principle 6.29, which states that girls’ “voluntariness” may be
the route to escape other crimes committed against them, such as sexual and gender-based
violence and early marriage. See as regards girls: Plan UK, Because I am a Girl, The State
of the World’s Girls, Special Focus: In the Shadow of War (2008) 60-61, which observes that
although both boys and girls are “pushed” by circumstances to join an armed group, girls
are pushed by additional gender-specific factors, such as domestic physical and sexual
violence.
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or rebel armed groups use propaganda to convince children to join in hostil-
ities, thus in a sense, predetermining their will to enlist and fight.53
In the context of the Lubanga case, a psychological expert witness called
by the Trial Chamber declared that from a psychological point of view children
cannot give informed consent to join an armed group due to the fact that they
have none or limited access to information concerning the consequences of
their choice and they neither control nor fully comprehend the structures and
forces they are dealing with. She stated that children do not have full know-
ledge and understanding of the mind and ignore long-term consequences of
their actions.54
From a legal point of view, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General for Children and Armed Conflict in her observations submitted to
the Trial Chamber in the same case stated that ‘(a)ll “voluntary” acts or state-
ments or other indications or interpretations of consent by children under the
legal age for recruitment are legally irrelevant’.55 She stated that consent is
not a defence since it is absolutely agreed universally that children under 15
years cannot reasonably give consent to their own abuse and exploitation and
any line between voluntary and forced recruitment is not only legally irrelevant
but also practically superficial in the context of children in armed conflict.56
However, one could argue that Article 8 of the Rome Statute clearly
includes the crime of “enlistment” and foresees voluntary recruitment and
this is legally relevant under ICC standards, which clearly differentiates between
“conscription” and “enlistment”. Nevertheless, prosecution policy in the future
could shift and bring charges against the accused only for the conduct of
conscription and use, thus leaving out the conduct of enlistment and eventually
making it obsolete. Likewise, in cases such as the current ones before the ICC,
in which the crime of enlistment is charged, victims participating in the case
could bring the factors that lead to their recruitment to the attention of the
Chamber. This could give the Chamber the basis to refer to lack of consent
of victims (i.e. extreme hunger, violence, loss of parents, displacement, etc.)
and thus re-characterise the charges so as to only include conscription and
53 Amy B Abbott, ‘Child Soldiers – The Use of Children as Instruments of War’ (Summer
2000) Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 516.
54 Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (7 of April 2009) ICC-01/04 01/06-T-166-ENG, 13 and
90; Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering (Report of Ms. Elisabeth
Schauer following the 6 February 2009 “Instructions to the Court’s expert on child soldiers
and trauma” ICC-01/04-01/06-1729-Anx1, 25 of February 2009) 7-8.
55 Lubanga Case ‘Annex A of Submission of the Observations of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (18 March 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-
AnxA para. 10.
56 Lubanga Case ‘Annex A of Submission of the Observations of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (18 March 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1229-
AnxA, para. 14.
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use. Another option would be, not to drop the charges of enlistment, but make
a determination in the sense that although enlistment occurs when the child
seems to accept his or her recruitment (in the origins of the commission of
the crime), this consent is only temporary (and apparent), as the crime is
continuous in nature and children under the age of 15 in armed conflict
situations could not possibly consent to the harms suffered as a consequence
of these crimes.
The bottom line is that although the reality in the field is that many
children “consent” to enlist in order to have food or obtain what in their view
is safety, this should not be legally relevant, particularly considering that the
ICC sets international standards that are often followed by other international
and national jurisdictions. The ICC will need to acknowledge that regardless
of how the recruitment of a child is initiated (with or without consent, either
real or apparent, with or without physical force or other means of coercion)
harm suffered by the child will be equally serious and devastating for his or
her childhood and his or her future life as an adult.57 As mentioned by the
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN for Children and
Armed Conflict, there is no “best interests of the child defence” and recruit-
ment per se is against the best interests of the child.58
Therefore, any difference between “conscription” and “enlistment”, namely
“voluntariness”, should be made only to satisfy legal requirements under
Article 8 of the Rome Statute (i.e. indictment against the accused), but should
certainly not serve as a legal basis to justify the perpetrator’s conduct, or to
diminish his or her sentence, or to diminish the victim’s rights for reparation.
Likewise, as has been the experience in the Lubanga case, Chambers should
adopt the practice of calling expert witnesses that will describe to the Chamber
the realities of the armed conflict context and the forces that drive children
57 For example, as expert witness Elisabeth Schauer stated in the Lubanga case before the
ICC, the effect of cumulative exposure to violence makes ex combatants a highly vulnerable
group as they are exposed to a high number and outstanding diversity of traumatic stressors
that can even go beyond the child’s generation and pass on to future generations (his or
her eventual children), Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering,
ICC-01/04-01/06-1729-Anx1 (25 of February 2009) 15 and 25. This is also shared by Abbott,
who considers that children’s participation in warfare “violates their innocence, exploits
their particular vulnerability and destroys their future and, therefore, the future of their
society”. Amy B Abbott, ‘Child Soldiers – The Use of Children as Instruments of War’
(Summer 2000) Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 518.
58 Lubanga Case ‘Annex A of Submission of the Observations of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (18 March 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1229-
AnxA, para. 11.
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to join armed groups and adults (often including their own parents) to recruit
them.59
4.3.2.3 The concept of use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in
hostilities
Regarding the concept of “use” there are three main criteria that offer three
distinct levels of protection for children that in one way or another are asso-
ciated with armed groups or armed forces. The first one, the most limited,
requires that children take direct part in hostilities. The second criterion requires
that children take active part in hostilities, although not necessarily direct,
thereby excluding children used by armed groups for domestic or sexual
purposes. A third criterion, the one that provides most protection for children,
includes within the concept of “use” all children that are associated with armed
groups and therefore seen as a military target by warring factions. The follow-
ing subsection will examine these three criteria and also examine the interpreta-
tion of “use” adopted by Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case’s verdict.
a. Use as “direct participation”
The prohibition to use children in hostilities was first codified in the Additional
Protocols of 1977, and was differently formulated, depending on whether the
armed conflict was international or non-international.60 Article 77(2) of Addi-
tional Protocol I refers to “measures so children who have not attained the
age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities”, and thus applies
the most restrictive criteria. Additional Protocol I thus prohibits the use of
children for functions of a combatant, as defined by international humanitarian
law, and therefore leaves unprotected children involved in other indirect
activities, such as those that work as messengers, transporting ammunition,
etc. This narrow concept was also adopted by the ICTR Trial Chamber in the
Akayesu judgment, which found that “to participate actively in hostilities” is
synonymous of taking “direct part in the hostilities” as used in Additional
Protocol I.61
59 Judges could call not only children’s rights experts, but particularly experts in other fields
that are not necessarily legal, for example, psychologists, sociologists, military experts, etc.
In the Lubanga case there were two experts called. One is a clinical psychologist with
specialisation in post-traumatic stress disorder who has worked extensively with de-
mobilised children, particularly in Africa. The other expert is the UN Special Representative
on Children and Armed Conflict, who as part of her work visits different areas of the world
in which there is armed conflict and investigates on the situation of children therein. The
curriculum vitae of Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy is provided for in: Lubanga case ‘Annex
A: Submission by the Registrar of the Curriculum Vitae of Chamber expert Mrs Radhika
Coomaraswamy’ (3 June 2010) ICC-01/04-01/06-2464-AnxA.
60 Allison Smith, ‘Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2004) Journal
of International Criminal Justice, 1145.
61 ICTR, Akayesu case, ‘Judgement’ (2 September 2008) Case No ICTR-96-4-T, para. 629.
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Article 38 of the CRC, which refers to child combatants, also applies the
standard of “direct part in hostilities” and thus paradoxically offers the lowest
level of protection for children who are involved in armed conflict. In fact,
given the quasi universality of the CRC, one could argue that this is an inter-
nationally recognised (low) standard which is again repeated in the Optional
Protocol to the CRC, in which, although the standard is raised to 18 years of
age, still refers to children taking “direct part in hostilities”.
However, this low standard of CRC can be overcome by using Article 41
of the same Convention, which states that nothing in it (and its Protocols) shall
affect any provisions that are more conducive to the realization of the rights
of the child. In a sense, Article 41 of the CRC acknowledges that higher
standards of protection of children may exist at national or international level,
and thus these should prevail over the CRC. Consequently, higher levels of
protection contained in other legal provisions in the following subsections b)
and c) should be applied, as they provide more protection to children in armed
conflict.
b. Use as direct and indirect participation but excluding use for other purposes
(namely domestic work and sexual violence)
Article 4(3)(c) of Additional Protocol II states that “children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces
or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities”, and thus protects children
from direct and indirect participation in hostilities. In fact, the International
Committee of the Red Cross Commentary to Protocol I concludes that since
the intention of the drafters was to keep children under fifteen outside of
armed conflict, the lower criteria in Protocol I should be interpreted as in-
cluding both direct and indirect participation in hostilities in light of the higher
standard contained in Protocol II.62
The Rome Statute seems to apply this higher standard, as it uses the term
“actively participate in hostilities”, and thus appears to include both direct
and indirect participation insofar as it is “active”. However, the question then
arises as to what is “active participation”.
The case law of the SCSL sheds some light on the notion of “active parti-
cipation”, as well as some preparatory documents to the Rome Statute, which
could identify the drafters’ intention in this regard. In the SCSL, the Trial
Chamber in the AFRC case opted for a definition of the concept of active
participation that encompasses any conduct that places the lives of children
directly at risk and thus did not limit the term solely to “participation in
combat”. The Chamber stated that any labour or support that gives effect to,
or helps maintain, operations in a conflict constitutes active participation. In
the AFRC case, in the Chamber’s view, carrying loads for the fighting action,
62 Allison Smith, ‘Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2004) Journal
of International Criminal Justice, 1145.
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finding or acquiring food, ammunition or equipment, acting as a decoy,
messenger, making trails or finding routes, working at checkpoints or acting
as a human shield, are all some of the examples of active participation.63 In
fact, if one reads the criteria applied by the Trial Chamber in the AFRC case,
most children associated with armed groups, including girls who are forcibly
abducted for sexual purposes, also fulfil one or more of the above tasks (i.e.
acquiring food) and could be included in this broad term of children “used
to actively participate in hostilities”.
The Trial Chamber in the RUF case adopted a concept of “active parti-
cipation” that clearly departs from a focus on the “tasks” performed by the
children, and instead concentrates on the fact that children lose their civilian
status and thus become a military target.64 However, in spite of the above
criteria, the same Trial Chamber unfortunately determined that abducted girls
of less than 15 years of age, who had been forced into sexual partnership with
fighters and used to perform domestic chores for commanders, did not per
se participate actively in hostilities, as these activities were not related to the
hostilities and did not directly support the military operations of the armed
groups.65 Thus, it appears that the Trial Chamber in the RUF Case contradicted
its own criteria, as clearly girls used for sexual and domestic purposes by
armed groups will lose their civilian status vis-à-vis the enemy, regardless
of whether their activities are related to military operations.
The Zutphen Draft of the Rome Statute has also been referred to by ICC
Chambers, as it may be considered as a document that reflects the drafters’
intention as to the meaning of the words ‘using’ and ‘participate’. The Zutphen
Draft states in its footnotes that these cover both direct participation in combat
and active participation in military activities linked to combat such as scouting,
spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military
checkpoints. The draft excludes activities which are described as clearly un-
related to hostilities, such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of
domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation.66 It is clear that the
Zutphen Draft, as the SCSL case law above, did not include many of the tasks
63 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, paras 736-737.
64 The Chamber is mindful that an overly expansive definition of active participation in
hostilities would be appropriate as its consequence would be that children associated with
armed groups lose their protected status as hors de combat under the law of armed conflict.
(…) The Chamber considers this interpretation necessary to ensure that children are
protected from any engagement in violent functions of the armed conflict that directly
support its conflict against the adversary and in which the child combatant would be a
legitimate military target for the opposing armed group or groups. See: RUF case ‘Judgment’
(2 March 2009) SCSL 04-15-1234, para. 1723.
65 RUF case ‘Judgment’ (2 March 2009) SCSL 04-15-1234, paras 1622 and 1730. See also Taylor
case ‘Judgment’ (18 May 2012) SCSL-03-01-1281, para. 1411.
66 PrepCom, Report of the Inter-sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The
Netherlands (4 February 1998) A/AC.249/1998/L.13, Article 20(E), at 23 n. 12.
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usually performed by girls (although not exclusively), such as domestic work
and sexual slavery, within the concept of “use”.
Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC defined the concept “participate actively”
following the Zutphen Draft and thus excluding conducts such as the delivery
of food and the domestic help in an officer’s married accommodation, as these
activities were considered to have no connection to the hostilities. However,
the Chamber included conducts such as guarding military objects and acting
as a bodyguard within the concept, thus expanding the notion slightly fur-
ther.67 The Pre-Trial Chamber also determined that in order for these activities
to be related to hostilities the following two requirements are necessary: a)
the military commanders are in a position to take all necessary decisions
regarding the conduct of hostilities; and b) they have a direct impact on the
level of logistic resources and on the organisation of operations required by
the other party to the conflict whose aim is to attack such military objectives.68
The criteria adopted by the SCSL and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (relying
on the Zutphen Draft) thus adopted a higher standard, in order to include
both direct and indirect participation. However, these criteria did not include
other dimensions of child recruitment, namely the work performed by girls
who are used for domestic and sexual purposes. In principle, the criteria
adopted by the SCSL and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber focuses on the nature of
the tasks and the link between these tasks and the military objectives of the
armed group or force. As will be noted below, a criterion that focuses on the
risk and the fact that children lose their civilian status, offers greater protection
to these children.
c. Use as “associated with an armed group”
Although one could argue that the Rome Statute does not include within the
concept of “use” the plight of children serving as domestic servants or sexual
slaves (as the aforesaid criteria of the Pre-Trial Chamber), it is also possible
to interpret and apply the law in order to adopt a more comprehensive defi-
nition that encompasses other activities connected with hostilities and that
are part of today’s armed conflicts.
A broader notion of “use” should not only focus on the tasks performed
by children within the armed group, but also on how other warring factions
in armed conflict see that child who is associated with the armed group.
Therefore, focus should not only be given to the internal tasks children perform
within the armed group, but also on external considerations, namely that the
child will be perceived as a combatant, regardless of the nature of the task
he or she performs within the armed group. In summary, all children asso-
67 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (14 May 2007) ICC-01/04 01/06-803-
tEN, para. 267.
68 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (14 May 2007) ICC-01/04 01/06-803-
tEN, para. 263.
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ciated with armed groups are seen as military targets by outsiders and thus
are equally unprotected and vulnerable. In fact, one could even argue that
children who are used for “non-military” purposes such as domestic or sexual
servants, are even more vulnerable as they are not necessarily armed. Likewise,
as noted by Fujio, girls suffering goes beyond their recruitment, as they often
face new obstacles and prejudices as they attempt to reintegrate into society,
having been exposed to sexual violence and its accompanying “twin dangers”:
unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.69 The author also
states that children who are associated with an armed group and witness
atrocities can be equally harmed as those being forced to take part in combat
and commit atrocities.70 Clearly, a definition of child recruitment that ignores
this reality seems incomplete, as it ignores the gender-specific harms suffered
by children as a result of the crime of child recruitment. A broader concept
would thus satisfy the main object of the prohibition of child recruitment,
which is to keep children safe from violence, abuse and exploitation, taking
into account risks for their physical and psychological well-being resulting
from such involvement with an armed group, regardless of whether this
involvement occurred in the battlefield or in the armed group’s kitchen or
sleeping quarters.
If one considers that the criminalisation of child recruitment aims to limit
the exposure of children to violent acts, any child associated with an armed
group could thus be seen as a combatant by the enemy, and lose de facto the
protective status of civilian and become a legitimate military target under the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, regardless of whether
that child is a boy soldier or a girl “married” to a commander.
In fact, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children
and Armed Conflict, who testified as an expert in the ICC Lubanga case, rejected
any definition that excludes a great number of children in current armed
conflicts that are some way or another associated with armed groups.71 The
Special Representative suggested that the ICC should adopt a case-by-case
approach, in which children’s participation is analysed on the basis of whether
it served a support function to the armed force or group during the period
of conflict. The Special Representative identified within such roles, activities
69 Christy Fujio, ‘Invisible soldiers: how and why post-conflict processes ignore the needs
of ex-combatant girls’ (Fall 2008) Journal of Law and Social Challenges, 10.
70 Christy Fujio, ‘Invisible soldiers: how and why post-conflict processes ignore the needs
of ex-combatant girls’ (Fall 2008) Journal of Law and Social Challenges, 6. The State of the
World’s Girls has observed that in fact, conscription of girls is often accompanied by rape
and sexual violence and most (if not all) girls who have been associated with armed groups
have been raped. See: Plan UK, Because I am a Girl, The State of the World’s Girls, Special Focus:
In the Shadow of War (2008) 65.
71 Lubanga Case ‘Annex A of Submission of the Observations of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (18 March 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1229-
AnxA, para. 20.
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such as acting as cooks, porters, nurses, spies, messengers, administrators,
translators, radio operators, medical assistants, public information workers,
youth camp leaders, and girls or boys used for sexual purposes.72
However, the ICC needs a legal basis to justify such a broad concept,
particularly in light of Article 22 of the Rome Statute, containing the principle
of legality. A plain reading of Article 8 of the Rome Statute does not limit the
concept of “use”, as adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, the Zutphen
Draft clearly reflects drafters’ rejection to include this broader concept. Al-
though the Zutphen Draft is not applicable law per se, it does provide some
guidance as to the intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute. However, the
changing nature of armed conflicts and the Rome Statute’s purpose and object-
ive, which is to put and end to impunity to crimes committed against children,
women and men (Preamble of the Rome Statute), should also be taken into
consideration. In fact, the Zutphen Draft referred to activities carried out by
children “in the frontline”. The concept of “frontline” in current armed conflicts
is a grey zone and one could consider that any child who is related to an
armed group is within this frontline, whether the child is a girl who is
“married” to a commander or is the bodyguard to a commander. They all
suffer the same risks of physical and mental damage due to their relation with
the armed group.
The ICC could rely on more than the Zutphen Draft for its interpretation
of the concept of “use”, for example using as guidance the Paris Principles,
which refer to a broader concept of “children associated with armed forces
or armed groups” including girls recruited for sexual purposes. In fact, looking
closer at the criteria of the Pre-Trial Chamber, one could even argue that
domestic and sexual activities carried out by children associated with armed
groups are activities in which: a) commanders are in a position to take all
necessary decisions regarding these activities; and b) these activities have a
direct impact on the level of logistic resources and on the organisation of
operations required by the other party to the conflict whose aim is to attack
such military objectives.73 To ignore the “support” given by child sexual slaves
to military commanders in battle is to ignore the patriarchal aspect of armed
72 Lubanga Case ‘Annex A of Submission of the Observations of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict pursuant
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (18 March 2008) ICC-01/04 01/06-1229-
AnxA, para. 23. The same multiple roles of girls associated with armed groups are identified
by “The State of the World’s Girls”, which identified within reasons why armed groups
recruit girls, not only to serve as fighters, but also to give sexual services and play different
roles in the armed conflict. See: Plan UK, Because I am a Girl, The State of the World’s Girls,
Special Focus: In the Shadow of War (2008) 59.
73 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (14 May 2007) ICC-01/04 01/06-803-
tEN, para. 263.
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conflict, which requires that men receive not only weapons, but also food and
sexual pleasure before and after battle.74
d. “Use” according to the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case
In the Lubanga case, the majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge Odio Benito
dissenting, adopted an approach to “use” of children which is not based on
the specific task carried out by the child, but on the risk to which the child
is exposed, namely to the fact that the child becomes a target (and thus similar
to the concept applied on section c) above).75 The Trial Chamber adopted
74 Although in the Lubanga case, the victims’ legal representatives failed in their attempt to
include crimes of sexual violence within a case of child recruitment, some of the criteria
applied by the judges in that case could actually be of use for future cases. In summary,
the legal representatives of the victims filed a joint application pertaining to a procedure
under Regulation 55 of the RoC, submitting that victims had suffered, additionally to their
recruitment, inhumane and/or cruel treatment, and that young girls had been subjected
to various acts of sexual violence and were reduced to sexual slavery, as a widespread
and systematic practice, within the scope of the charges against the accused. The Trial
Chamber, by majority, decided that the submissions of the legal representatives of victims
and the evidence heard during the course of the trial had persuaded them that such a
possibility (changing the legal characterisation of the facts) could exist. Accordingly, the
parties and participants received notice that the legal characterisation of the charges could
change in order to include sexual violence and inhumane treatment. The majority decision
was however reversed in appeal since in the view of the Appeals Chamber, this interpreta-
tion of Regulation 55 would also result in a conflict with the Rome Statute because new
facts and circumstances not described in the charges would be added to the case. See:
Lubanga case ‘Demand conjointe des représentants légaux des victimes aux fins de mise
en œuvre de la procédure en vertu de la norme 55 du Règlement de la Court’ (22 May
2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-1891 para. 11; Lubanga case ‘Decision giving notice to the parties
and participants that the legal characterization of the facts may be subject to change in
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court’ (14 July 2009) ICC-01/04-
01/06-2049, para. 33; Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the
Prosecutor against the “Decision of Trial chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled “Decision giving
notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterization of the facts may be
subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”’
(8 December 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, para. 94. During a later status conference in the
same case, a legal representative of the victims raised the issue again. The Trial Chamber
issued a decision in which it stated that the factual allegations of the legal representatives
supporting different crimes such as those involving inhumane and cruel treatment did not
support the legal “elements of crimes” with which the accused was charged, and the factual
allegations supporting sexual slavery had not been referred to at any stage in the decision
on the Confirmation of the Charges and therefore did not support any element of the crimes
constituting the charges confirmed against the accused.” See: Lubanga case ‘Decision on
the Legal Representatives’ Joint submissions concerning the Appeals Chamber’s Decision
on 8 December 2009 on Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court’(8 January 2010) ICC-
01/04-01/06-2223 paras 33-36.
75 The concept of target should not be interpreted as “lawful target” of international human-
itarian law, meaning that the child has lost his or her protection as a civilian. However,
de facto, children may lose this protection. See Roman Graf ‘The International Criminal Court
and Child Soldiers, An Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment’ Journal of International Criminal
Justice (2012) 963.
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a criterion which allows for the inclusion of children “involved with the armed
groups”, regardless of whether their participation is directly or indirectly
associated with hostilities. Thus, the Trial Chamber distanced itself from the
Zutphen Draft and consequently the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approach.76 In the
view of Trial Chamber I two factors need to be taken into consideration: a)
the support provided by the child to the combatants; and b) the level of risk.
As noted by Lieflander, the Trial Chamber thus defined the notion of “parti-
cipation in hostilities” as “exposure to danger”.77 The Trial Chamber deter-
mined that “although absent from the immediate scene of the hostilities, the
individual (child) was nonetheless actively involved in them”. The Chamber
finally concluded that given the “myriad of roles” carried out by children,
the determination of whether a particular activity is to be considered as “active
participation”, can only be made on a case-by-case basis (as in fact had been
recommended by Rhadika Coomaraswamy in that case).78 Finally, regarding
sexual violence, the Trial Chamber neither excluded nor included it as an
activity within the concept of “use”. This seems logical since it determined
that this has to be done on a case-by-case basis. However it accepted that this
may be taken into account for sentencing and reparations purposes.79 It is
to be noted however, that although the Trial Chamber did not make any
finding as to the individual criminal responsibility of Mr Lubanga regarding
sexual violence suffered by recruited children, it did refer in its Article 74
Judgment to the evidence that children, in particular girls, had been subject
to sexual violence.80
Judge Odio Benito dissented with the majority of the Chamber. While the
majority of the Chamber adopted a definition of “use” that is ultimately fact-
dependent, as it needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis, Judge Odio
Benito chose to adopt a legal concept that is independent of the evaluation
of the evidence.81 She thus concluded that the majority’s decision not to
include sexual violence within the legal concept of “use” could ultimately result
in the invisibility of this intrinsic part of the involvement of children with an
armed group.82 Judge Odio Benito also disapproved of the concept of “target”
76 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, para. 628.
77 Thomas Lieflander, The Lubanga Judgment of the ICC, Cambridge Journal of International
and Comparative Law (2012) 202.
78 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842.
79 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 630-631.
80 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 890-896.
81 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, paras 5-7 and 15.
82 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 16.
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adopted by the majority, because she considered that children who are used
by armed groups often suffer harm by the same armed group that recruited
them and not only from the “enemy” that sees them as a military target.83
The criteria adopted by both the majority of Trial Chamber I and Judge
Odio Benito in her dissent, appear to grant greater protection to children
associated with armed groups, as they focus not only on the tasks performed
by children to define the concept of “use to actively participate in hostilities”
pursuant to the Rome Statute. Although, as noted by Judge Odio Benito, the
notion of “target” focuses on the outsider “enemy”, very often, the “enemy”
is within the same armed group, who rapes, tortures and subjects child recruits
to inhumane and degrading treatment. Thus, a concept of “risk”, either vis-à-
vis enemies that consider the child as a combatant, but also vis-à-vis military
commanders, is more comprehensive of the situation of children who are
recruited by armed groups or forces. However, a too broad definition could
be contrary to Article 22 of the Rome Statute, and thus, the case-by-case
approach adopted by the majority of the Trial Chamber could be more favour-
able, as it would be bound by the “facts and circumstances” of the charges,
and thus respectful of the principle of legality but also the right of the accused
to have complete knowledge of his/her charges.
4.3.2.4 Age determination
A material element of the crime of child recruitment is that of the victim’s
age, which necessarily has to be below 15 at the time of the events. In this
sense, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited and a crime under the Rome Statute will
only occur insofar as the child being enlisted, conscripted or used is younger
than 15 at the time of the events. This material element is also closely linked
to the mental element, or mens rea of the crime, particularly in what refers to
the knowledge and intention of the perpetrator of the crime of the child’s age
at the time of the commission.
In many countries, particularly those currently under scrutiny by the ICC,
children have no documentation and birth registries are rare or inexistent in
some areas. In the Lubanga case, for example, a former prosecution investigator
testified that the DRC civil administration was limited and thus it was not easy
to establish a child’s age. The prosecution in the Lubanga case attempted to
prove witnesses’ ages based on their statements, civil status documents (where
available) and forensic evidence (namely wrist and dental x-rays to establish
physical development). However, in its judgment, the Trial Chamber found
that the prosecution had failed to verify the children’s age with their parents
or communities and with existing civil registries in the DRC. Finally, the Trial
83 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, paras 18-19.
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Chamber concluded that forensic evidence was based on a model that was
not meant to determine age, and particularly not of Sub-Saharan Africans.84
The Trial Chamber ultimately determined age relying on video footage
in which children clearly under the age of 15 appeared either in training camps
or being used as combatants,85 the testimony of several witnesses and the
comments that some witnesses made to video footage,86 as well as document-
ary evidence.87 These criteria, however, have the limitation of relying on a
subjective appreciation of the physical appearance or manners in which a child
acts, which, ultimately, could lead to mistakes. However, it can also be argued
that if video footage and testimonies corroborate each other, along with the
entire body of evidence in a trial, then this means of proof could be useful
in a case where civil registries and birth certificates are inexistent.
In the SCSL, the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case considered several reports
and expert evidence in order to determine age. It relied on an expert that
submitted a report based on research into a database of some two thousand
children who were abducted during the armed conflict when they were under
the age of 15 between 1996-2002 (although interestingly the charges were from
1998 to 1999 only).88 Most importantly, the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case
recognised that although documentary evidence is more reliable evidence as
to the age of a child, since this is not available in many parts of Sierra Leone,
it had to rely on the testimony of witnesses who observed children under the
age of 15. The Trial Chamber of the SCSL however acknowledged that these
were estimations of age based on appearance, height, physical development
and the witnesses’ personal experience, rather than objective proof of age.89
For example, the SCSL relied on the evidence of a former child soldier witness,
who testified “he was very small” and “did not have facial hair at the time
of his capture”. Although the witness could not state when he was born, he
testified that his father used to tell him he was 14 years old. The same witness
presented a birth certificate and a national identification card that indeed
appeared to be contradictory with regard to his exact age. Notwithstanding
these inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case concluded that he
“was about 13” at the time of the events.90
84 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 169-177.
85 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 779, 792-793.
86 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 255-257, 268, 644, 711-718 and 760-769.
87 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04
01/06-2842, paras 741-748.
88 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, paras 1359-1360.
89 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, para. 1361.
90 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, paras 1383-1393.
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The approach of the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case is without a doubt
more flexible than the one adopted by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case
(in which similar inconsistencies rendered child soldier witnesses unreliable).
The downside of this more flexible approach adopted by the SCSL is that
although it can lead to a conviction, it could also be contrary to the evidentiary
threshold of “beyond reasonable doubt” required to convict an individual
under the Rome Statute. Visibly, judges dealing with these crimes will need
to be extremely cautious in order to achieve a balance between the need to
fight impunity on the one hand, and the need to guarantee the rights of the
accused person on the other.
However, lack of State civil registry infrastructure in Situation countries
should not lead to impunity for international crimes. A high standard of
knowledge and consent could lead to practically the impossibility to prosecute
and convict someone for the crime of child recruitment. In fact, during the
PrepComs there were two main views regarding the knowledge of the per-
petrator of the victim’s age.91 Some States argued that no mental element
was required, and if the victim was under 15, there would be criminal respons-
ibility, even if the perpetrator ignored this. On the other hand, another group
of delegations thought that, in strict application of Article 30(3) of the Rome
Statute, full knowledge of the victim’s age was required.92 Finally a consensus
was reached, and the Elements of Crimes establish that the “perpetrator knew
or should have known” that the victim was under the age of 15.93
At a first glance it could appear that this element of the crime is contrary
to the Rome Statute, and concretely to Article 30 of the Rome Statute that
defines the mental elements of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, re-
quiring intent and knowledge. However, the “General Introduction” to the
Elements of the Crimes provides in its paragraph 2 the following:
‘As stated in Article 30, unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
ICC only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. Where
no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any
particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, it is understood that the
relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in Article 30 applies.
Exceptions to the Article 30 standard, based on the Rome Statute, including applicable
law under its relevant provisions, are indicated below.’ (Emphasis added)
Herman von Hebel, who chaired the working group on the Elements of
Crimes, believes that the above paragraph (adopted by two-thirds majority
91 Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the ICC (International
Committee of the Red Cross, 2003) 375.
92 Article 30(3) of the Rome Statute states that “knowledge” means awareness that a circum-
stance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.
93 William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities (Oxford University Press 2012) 126.
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of State Parties to the Rome Statute in September 2002, while celebrating its
first-ever ASP), reflects the consensus of the international community to lower
the standard of Article 30 of the Rome Statute so as to make viable the pro-
secution of crimes of child recruitment.94 The author also states that while
the elements are not binding per se, they have persuasive force as they reflect
the consensus view of the international community.95
One could also apply Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, which requires
that the law under the Rome Statute shall be interpreted and applied in accord-
ance with internationally recognised human rights. Considering that a strict
interpretation under Article 30 of the Rome Statute could leave most (if not
all) crimes of child recruitment unpunished, the interpretation that the “lex
specialis” of the Elements of Crimes applies over the “lex generalis” of Article
30 would grant a greater scope of protection to the victims of this crime.
Finally, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of the Treaties from 1969, a treaty shall be interpreted “in good faith in accord-
ance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose” (emphasis added). Given that
the Rome Statute declares in its Preamble that it is “determined to end im-
punity for the perpetrators”, a strict application of the mens rea requirements
of Article 30 of the Rome Statute would defeat the object and purpose of this
international treaty, leaving virtually all crimes of child recruitment un-
punished.
Although this could have been an issue to be dealt with by the Trial
Chamber in the Lubanga case, the Chamber concluded that since the prosecution
had not invited a conviction based on this lesser mental element of “should
have known”, the Chamber based its findings on the “knew” mental element
of Article 30 of the Rome Statute.96
Albeit the reluctance of the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case to make a
determination as to this mental element of “should have known”, Chambers
in future cases could adopt an approach in which Article 30(3) of the Rome
Statute does not apply for the crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of
children and therefore what applies are the specific elements of this crime,
which require that the perpetrator either knew the age of the child, or else
he or she consciously took no notice on the child’s age, even if it were possible
that the child was under fifteen (i.e. due to the child’s physical appearance).
Consequently, the perpetrator could be criminally responsible if he or she acted
94 Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (Transnational Publishers, 2001).
95 Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (Transnational Publishers, 2001). .
96 Regrettably, the Chamber simply noted that this lesser mental element raises a number
of issues. See: Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ (14 March 2012)
ICC-01/04 01/06-2842, para 1015.
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recklessly, not taking the necessary measures to assure him or herself of the
child’s age.
4.4 INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN WHICH CHILDREN ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY
OR MORE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED
4.4.1 Sexual violence
Article 7 of the Rome Statute prohibits the following acts of sexual violence
as crimes against humanity:
‘Article 7 Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(…)
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced steriliza-
tion, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(…)
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(…)
(c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the
course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;
(…)
(f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population
or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall
not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;
(…)
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers
to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender”
does not indicate any meaning different from the above.’
Article 8 of the Rome Statute prohibits the following acts of sexual violence
as war crimes:
‘(…) 2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:
(…) (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any
of the following acts: (…)
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
as defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;
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(…) (e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts: (…)
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as
defined in Article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions.’
Although the criminal conduct identified in Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome
Statute refer specifically to crimes against humanity and war crimes, they could
also be useful in the interpretation of acts of sexual violence as genocide under
Article 6(b) of the Rome Statute, as “causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group”. This in fact is stipulated in the Elements of Crimes
of Article 6(b), which in footnote 3 state that this conduct may include, but
is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or in-
humane or degrading treatment. Likewise, acts of sexual violence could be
equally considered torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, for example
when family members are forced to watch their relatives getting raped.97
It is also important to consider the previous analysis on the crime of
conscription, enlistment and use of children, and the fact that sexual violence
is very often an intrinsic element of the crime of child recruitment. Very often
girls and boys who are recruited by armed groups suffer from sexual violence.
Thus, crimes of sexual violence could also be brought as separate charges
against perpetrators of crimes of child recruitment. As pointed out by Judge
Odio Benito in her dissenting opinion in the Lubanga case judgment, although
sexual violence is an intrinsic element of the concept of “use of children under
the age of 15 to participate in the hostilities”, crimes of sexual violence are
also distinct and separate crimes that could be evaluated separately if they
are presented as separate charges by the Prosecutor.98
For the purpose of this research, each criminal conduct that is common
to the crimes of sexual violence under crimes against humanity and war crimes
will be individually yet succinctly described. Although this research will focus
on the Elements of Crimes, it is vital to acknowledge that landmark judgments
of the ad-hoc tribunals could be useful for the interpretation of the concepts
of sexual violence included in the Rome Statute.99 After all, the crimes
included in the Rome Statute are the result of the case law developed by the
97 See for example Bemba case ‘Amicus curiae observations of the Women’s Initiative for Gender
Justice pursuant to Rule 103 of the RPE’ (31 July 2009) ICC-01/05 01/08-466.
98 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 20.
99 See for example: ICTY, The Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucic et al, ‘Judgment’ (16 November
1998) Case No IT 96-21-T; ICTR, Akayesu case, ‘Judgement’ (2 September 2008) Case No
ICTR-96-4-T; ICTY, The Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija ‘Judgment’ (10 December 1998) Case
No IT 95-17/1-A; The Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac ‘Judgment’ (15 March 2002) Case
No IT 97-25-T.
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ad-hoc tribunals. Finally, this Chapter will refer to the developing ICC case
law, since there are several cases involving sexual violence before the ICC.100
However, a conviction for these crimes is yet to be seen.
4.4.1.1 The underlying acts of sexual violence
A fundamental element in crimes of sexual violence is the use of force or lack
of consent, which includes not only physical force, but also threat of force or
coercion.101 The Elements of Crimes include a broad range of forceful
100 Four cases are pending in the trial and appeal stage. The Katanga case and Ngudjolo case,
which involves crimes of rape and sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against
humanity, among other charges, is in its final phase, with Mr Ngudjolo having been
acquitted and released (final appeal is pending), while Mr Katanga is awaiting the Cham-
ber’s judgement under Article 74 of the Rome Statute. The Bemba case, which involves crimes
of rape as crimes against humanity and war crimes, is in the presentation of the defence
case. Moreover, in the Kenya Situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed charges of rape
and declined to confirm charges of “other forms of sexual violence” in the Kenyatta case.
The trial in this case is yet to commence. In other cases before the ICC, arrest warrants
on crimes of sexual violence have been issued, but the suspects remain at large. The first
case is the Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al. in Situation Uganda, which deals with rape and
sexual slavery as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Other two cases are those of
the Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (rape as crime against humanity) and the Prosecutor v. Abd Al-
Rahman and Harun (rape as war crimes and crimes against humanity) in Situation Darfur.
An arrest warrant has also been issued in Situation DRC against Sylvestre Mudacumura,
for mutilation (including genital mutilation) and rape as a war crime. The confirmation
of charges in the Ntaganda case, for rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity
and war crimes, among other crimes, is expected to start in February 2014, after the suspect
surrendered voluntarily to the ICC. In Situation Cote d’Ivoire, former President, Laurent
Gbagbo is currently awaiting the confirmation of charges in his case, which involves, among
others, crimes of rape and sexual violence. Finally, in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Callixte
Mbarushimana, the charges included crimes with a wide variety of conducts of sexual
violence allegedly committed in Kivu, DRC, The Pre-Trial Chamber however did not confirm
these crimes and the Appeals Chamber dismissed the prosecution’s appeal to the confirma-
tion of charges decision. See: Katanga and Ngudjolo case ‘Mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre de
Germain Katanga’ (18 October 2007) ICC-01/04-01/07-1; ‘Mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre de
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chu’ (7 February 2008) ICC-01/04 02/07-260. Mr Ndgujolo Chui was
acquitted of all charges on 18 December 2013 (Jugement rendu en application de l’article
74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-02/12-3) ; Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute’(23 January 2012) ICC-
01/09-02/11-382-Red paras 254-266; The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ICC-
02/05-01/09 (Al Bashir case) and The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb case) ICC-02/05-01/07;
The Prosecutor v Sylvestre Mudacumura (Mudacumura case) ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application under Article 58’ (13 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red; The Prosecutor v
Sylvestre Mudacumura (Mudacumura case) ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under
Article 58’ (13 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/12-1-Red; The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Ntagan-
da case) ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58’ (13 July 2012) ICC-01/04
02/06-36-Red; Ntaganda case, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Urgent Request to Postpone
the Date of the Confirmation Hearing” and Setting a New Calendar for the Disclosure of
Evidence Between the Parties, 17 June 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-73; Gbagbo case ‘Warrant of
Arrest for Laurent Koudou Gbagbo’ (30 November 2012) ICC02/11 01/11-1; The Prosecutor
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situations, such as fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression
or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking ad-
vantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against
a person incapable of giving genuine consent. It is important to also note that
in footnote 16, the Elements of Crimes clarify that a person may be incapable
of giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related capacity.
This undoubtedly relates to children and the cases of statutory rape, in which
there is a presumption of lack of consent due to the child’s age.
Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Bemba case determined that “coercion” does
not require physical force, and “threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms
of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and
coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or
military presence”.102 Also in the Bemba case, when the defence challenged
at the confirmation stage that some of the alleged victims had entered into
sexual relations with soldiers on a voluntary basis, the Pre-Trial Chamber
rejected the defence’s challenge, stating that this apparently concerned a small
number of women.103
In the SCSL, the Trial Chamber in the AFRC case determined that consent
can only be granted freely and must be determined in light of the surrounding
circumstances. The SCSL found that although force or threat of force is indicat-
ive of lack of consent, they are not per se elements of rape. The SCSL stated
that other factors that might render the act non-consensual or non-voluntary
should be considered and that in cases of armed conflict or detention, coercion
is almost universal. In regards to children, the SCSL also explained that children
v Callixte Mbarushimana (Mbarushimana case)‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (16
December 2011) ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red; ‘Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the
confirmation of charges”’(30 May 2012) ICC-01/0401/10-514.
101 After extensive lobbying from women’s rights organisations and two female judges of ICTY
(Judges Odio Benito and McDonald), the judges of ICTY adopted Rule 96 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, which were also later included in the ICTR Rules. Rule 96 of ICTY
and ICTR, and its successor Rule 70 of ICC’s RPE, provide that no corroboration of the
victim’s testimony is required, that consent shall not be allowed as a defence, except in
limited circumstances, and that no evidence on prior sexual conduct of the victim may
be introduced. Rules 70, 71 and 72 of the RPE are the minimum safeguards to the well-being
and dignity of victims and witnesses of sexual violence that should be taken into considera-
tion by the ICC. See: Kathy Hall-Martinez and Barbara Bedont, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender
Crimes under the International Criminal Court’ (1999) The Brown Journal of World Affairs,
65-86.
102 Bemba case ‘Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ (15 June 2009) ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
para. 162.
103 Bemba case ‘Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ (15 June 2009) ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
paras 167-168.
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under the age of 14 could not give consent.104 The SCSL concluded that given
the attacks suffered by the victims (murders of their relatives, the context of
violence, threats, abductions and subsequent confinements) it was clear that
the victims could not have consented to the repeated acts of sexual intercourse.
Also, the SCSL determined that these same factors indicate that the perpetrators
could not have thought that these victims had consented to their acts.105
In the Taylor case, the Trial Chamber concluded that a person may be
incapable of granting genuine consent “if affected by natural, induced or age
related incapacity”. The SCSL further determined that the circumstances of an
armed conflict, where rape occurs on a large scale, coupled with the social
stigma that is borne by its victims, “render the restrictive test” set out in the
elements of the crime difficult to satisfy. The Chamber therefore concluded
that circumstantial evidence might be used to demonstrate the actus reus of
rape.106
As for the specific crimes of sexual violence, in particular rape, it is im-
portant to note that the Elements of Crimes clearly establish the gender-neutral
nature of this crime, as it can be committed and suffered equally by men or
women.107 In fact, in the Bemba case, the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to a case
of rape of a male victim in its confirmation of charges decision.108
As for the crime of sexual slavery the Elements of Crimes require firstly
that the perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attached to the right
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending
or battering such person or persons or by imposing on them a similar depriva-
tion of liberty.109 As regards the element of force or coercion for this crime,
the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like
practices during armed conflict has pointed out that the mere ability to ex-
tricate oneself at substantial risk of personal harm from a condition of slavery
should not be interpreted as nullifying a claim of slavery and that in all cases
104 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, paras 694-695.
105 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, paras 966-1068.
106 Taylor case ‘Judgment’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, para. 155.
107 The first element, which is “penetration”, may involve not only the vagina but also the
anus, and penetration can be committed with body parts but also with objects.
108 Bemba case ‘Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ (15 June 2009) ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
paras 171-172.
109 As stated by Boot, although sexual slavery is listed as a separate offence, it should be
considered as a particular form of the general crime of slavery, which also includes traffick-
ing in persons, in particular women and children. See: Boot and Hall in: Otto Triffterer
(ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 211; Kathy Hall-Martinez and Barbara Bedont, ‘Ending
Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International Criminal Court’ (1999) The Brown
Journal of World Affairs, 65-86.
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a subjective gender-conscious analysis should be applied.110 It could be added
that in cases of children, an age-conscious analysis should also be applied when
interpreting whether the victim had reasonable fear of harm or perceived
coercion. In this sense, the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case determined that
the element of “deprivation of liberty” of slavery is fulfilled when the victim
is not physically confined, but is “otherwise unable to leave the perpetrator’s
custody as they would have nowhere else to go and feared for their lives”.111
The “sexual” nature of the slavery requires that the perpetrator caused
the victim(s) to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature. As noted by
the Special Rapporteur, sexual slavery also encompasses situations where
women and girls are forced into “marriage”, domestic servitude or other forced
labour that ultimately involved forced sexual activity as well as “enforced
prostitution”.112 Since “enforced prostitution” is defined as a separate crime
under Article 7 of the Statute, it will ultimately depend on the prosecutorial
strategy whether charges are brought against individuals for either crimes
of “sexual slavery”, “enforced prostitution” or even “forced marriage” or the
general crime of “other forms of sexual violence”. The pre-trial chambers could
also request an amendment of charges so that they reflect one of these crimes,
and ultimately the trial chambers could consider reclassification of charges
under Regulation 55 of the RoC if they deem that such conduct falls within
one or another sexual crime.
The Elements of Crimes of enforced prostitution requires, as an additional
element, that the perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain
pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts
of a sexual nature. This crime, however, does not require “exercise of any or
all the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons”,
which is an element of the crime of sexual slavery. Thus, it could be argued
that charges for the crime of enforced prostitution could be helpful to prosecute
cases in which this element of sexual slavery is not easily proven or for
“slavery like” situations.113 However, as pointed out by the Special
Rapporteur, most cases of forced prostitution also amount to sexual slavery
and could more appropriately be characterised as such.114
110 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict : Final Report Submitted by Gay
J McDougall, Special Rapporteur (22 June 1998) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, para. 28.
111 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, para. 420.
112 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict : Final Report Submitted by Gay
J McDougall, Special Rapporteur (22 June 1998) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, paras 30 and 31.
113 Kathy Hall-Martinez and Barbara Bedont, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the
International Criminal Court’ (1999) The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 65-86.
114 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict : Final Report Submitted by Gay
J McDougall, Special Rapporteur (22 June 1998) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, para. 33.
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Article 7(2)(f) and the Elements of Crimes state that the term enforced
pregnancy means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made preg-
nant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population
or carrying out other grave violations of international law.115
The Elements of Crimes define enforced sterilization as the deprivation of
one or more victims of their biological reproductive capacity with permanent
effects (excluding non-permanent birth-control measures). The only defences
admissible for this crime are when the conduct was justified by the medical
or hospital treatment of the person(s) concerned or when this was carried out
with the person’s consent.116
The last conduct of sexual violence provided for in Article 7(1)(g) is “any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”, which could arguably be a
“blank cheque” for the prosecution of an array of conducts not necessarily
falling within the elements of either of the crimes of sexual violence identified
above. The common element it shares with other crimes of sexual violence
is that of force, threat of force or coercion. The Elements of Crimes only
provide that the conduct shall be “of a gravity comparable to other offences”
of sexual violence, and, as stated by Schabas, these “other forms of sexual
violence” could also be prosecuted as “other inhumane acts”.117 The SCSL
has defined “other forms of sexual violence” as a residual category of sexual
crimes that may include an unlimited number of acts insofar as they are of
a sexual nature and are inflicted upon the victim by means of coercion, threat
of force or intimidation.118
A clear example of “other forms of sexual violence” that affects girls in
particular is the customary practice in some countries to commit female genital
mutilation. Also forms of sexual violence committed against men and boys
could be included within this rather general provision.119 Regretfully though,
in the case of The Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai
115 The Elements of Crimes clarify that this definition shall not in any way be interpreted as
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy. This clarification, which was inserted in the
Rome Statute as a result of the insistent pressure of some religious groups, responds to
political views against abortion and domestic laws penalising abortion. See: William Schabas,
The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press
2010) 173. The author states that this component was most controversial since it raised the
issue of abortion.
116 Boot argues, however, that the exception excluding temporary methods of birth control
could be inconsistent with international law, namely human rights law. See: Boot and Hall
in: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC: Observers’ Notes, Article
by Article (2nd Edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 214.
117 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford
University Press 2010) 175.
118 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, para. 720.
119 Sandesh Sivakumaran “Prosecuting Sexual Violence against Men and Boys” in Anne-Marie
De Brouwer and others (ed.) Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary
Approaches, Intersentia (2011), 79-97.
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Kenyatta (Muthaura and Kenyatta case), the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to
confirm the charges of sexual violence in the form of penile mutilation. In the
view of the Pre-Trial Chamber the “sexual” element was missing. The Pre-Trial
Chamber rejected the prosecution’s submission “that these weren’t just attacks
on men’s sexual organs as such but were intended as attacks on men’s identi-
ties within their society and were designed to destroy their masculinity”. In
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view, “not every act of violence which targets parts
of the body commonly associated with sexuality should be considered an act
of sexual violence”. It therefore concluded that these acts were “severe physical
injuries” that “were motivated by ethnic prejudice and intended to demonstrate
cultural superiority of one tribe over the other”.120 However, considering
that the penis is perhaps the most sexualised body part of any man, one could
argue that its mutilation has an inherent and undeniable sexual nature, as
means of attacking the victims’ sexual identity and self-worth. In the end, it
is through an attack to the male victims’ sexuality that the “cultural superiority
of one tribe over the other”, as stated by the Pre-Trial Chamber, could be
attained. Notwithstanding the Pre-Trial Chamber’s determination, as stated
above, trial in the Kenyatta case is yet to begin, and the facts could be rechar-
acterised under Regulation 55 of the RoC in order to include the criminal
conduct of “other forms of sexual violence” committed against male victims
in this case.121
4.4.1.2 Charges of sexual violence and cumulative charging and duplicity of charges
An important aspect that should be taken into consideration when analysing
crimes of sexual violence is whether charges brought against individuals for
multiple types of sexual violence are valid, particularly whether they are not
duplicating charges on the basis of the same criminal conduct and thus erring
in the use of cumulative charging. In fact this issue was at stake in the Trial
Chamber’s judgment in the AFRC case at the SCSL and was also an issue in the
confirmation of charges in the Bemba case at the ICC.
In the AFRC case, the SCSL Trial Chamber dismissed the prosecution’s charges
of “other forms of sexual violence” since it deemed this violated the rule
against duplicity of charges. The Trial Chamber found that the SCSL Statute
“encapsulates five distinct categories of sexual offences, each of which is
comprised of separate and distinct elements” and held that count 7 charged
the appellant with two distinct crimes against humanity in one count, namely
120 Kenyatta and Muthaura case, ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute’ (23 January 2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, paras
264-266.
121 Charges against Mr Muthaura were dropped on 11 March 2013. See: Kenyatta and Muthaura
case ‘Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura’
(11 March 2013) ICC-01/09-02/11-687.
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“sexual slavery” and “any other form of sexual violence”.122 The Trial Cham-
ber therefore found that count 7 prejudiced the accused’s rights and dismissed
the count in its entirety. The Trial Chamber also dismissed the charges of
sexual violence as “other inhumane acts”. It considered that given the exhaust-
ive list of sexual crimes covered under the SCSL Statute “rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence,”
“other inhumane acts” must only cover acts of a non sexual nature that con-
stitute an affront to human dignity.123 The Trial Chamber held, by a majority,
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was subsumed in its entirety
by the crime of sexual slavery and that there was no lacuna in the law that
would justify a separate crime of forced marriage as another inhumane act.
Thus, the Trial Chamber dismissed count 8 which charged the accused with
inhumane acts.124 Judge Doherty, in her dissenting opinion, concluded that
forced marriage is a different crime from sexual slavery due to the conjugal
status forced on these women and the social stigma that is associated with
being a “bush wife” or “rebel wife” which causes mental suffering.125
In the AFRC Appeals Judgment, the Appeals Chamber, agreeing with the
Trial Chamber, determined that the prosecution had effectively violated the
rule against duplicity by charging two offences in the same count as regards
sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence.126 However, referring to
“other inhumane acts”, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber
erred in finding that Article 2.1 of the SCSL Statute on “other inhumane acts”
excludes sexual crimes. The Appeals Chamber noted that international juris-
prudence has shown that a wide range of criminal acts, including sexual
crimes, have been recognised under this residual provision of “other inhumane
acts”.127 The Appeals Chamber stated that a determination on whether a
conduct falls within this category should be made “on a case-by-case basis
taking into account the nature of the alleged act or omission, the context in
which it took place, the personal circumstances of the victims including age,
sex, health and physical, mental and moral affects of the perpetrator’s conduct
upon the victims”.128 The Appeals Chamber saw no reason why crimes that
have a sexual or gender component should not be considered part of this crime
against humanity.129 Regarding the nature of the crime of “forced marriage”,
the Appeals Chamber quashed the Trial Chamber’s findings although it
decided not to enter a conviction on this charge. The Appeals Chamber con-
122 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, para. 94.
123 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, para. 697.
124 AFRC case ‘Sentencing Judgment’ (19 June 2007) SCSL 04-16-624, paras 711-714
125 AFRC case ‘Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty on Count 7 (sexual slavery) and
Count 8 (‘forced marriages’)’ (19 June 2007)SCSL 04-16-624 para. 49.
126 AFRC case ‘Judgment’ (22 February 2008) SCSL-04-16-675, para. 102.
127 AFRC case ‘Judgment’ (22 February 2008) SCSL-04-16-675, paras 183-184.
128 AFRC case ‘Judgment’ (22 February 2008) SCSL-04-16-675, para. 184.
129 AFRC case ‘Judgment’ (22 February 2008) SCSL-04-16-675, para. 186.
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cluded that “no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage
was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery”. Among the
reasons it gave to justify its conclusions, the Appeals Chamber referred to the
conjugal forced nature of the crime and the particular serious harms it causes
on the victim. The Appeals Chamber also stated that unlike sexual slavery,
the crime of forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity with conse-
quences for the victim if this “marriage” is breached. The Appeals Chamber
also determined that forced marriage goes beyond the sexual element, and
encompasses another conduct (i.e. forced domestic labour).130 The Appeals
Chamber finally decided that the notion of “other inhumane acts” forms part
of customary international law and is a “residual category designed to punish
acts or omissions not specifically listed as crimes against humanity” and thus
“forced marriage” can be included within this crime.131
More recently, in the Taylor case, the SCSL Trial Chamber stated that the
concept of “forced marriage” is a misnomer for the forced conjugal association
that was imposed on women and girls in circumstances of armed conflict, and
which involves: a) sexual slavery; and b) forced domestic work.132 The SCSL
also emphasised that the word “marriage” and “husband” in the context of
such a crime was inappropriate and unhelpful.133 The SCSL Trial Chamber
though adopted the concept of “conjugal slavery”, as it considered it more
appropriate than “forced marriage”. That Chamber further stated that this
“conjugal slavery” is more than sexual slavery, as it involves also a forced
conjugal relationship and forced domestic work.134
At the ICC, the prosecution charged Jean-Pierre Bemba with crimes against
humanity and war crimes of rape, torture, murder, pillage and outrages upon
personal dignity.135 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not confirm all the
charges and dismissed the charges of torture and outrages upon personal
dignity as it concluded that these charges incorrectly used the principle of
cumulative charging. In the opinion of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the acts of
torture and outrages upon personal dignity included in the charges (namely
family members watching relatives getting raped) did not encompass a distinct
130 AFRC case ‘Judgment’ (22 February 2008) SCSL-04-16-675, paras 195-196.
131 AFRC case ‘Judgment’ (22 February 2008) SCSL-04-16-675, para. 198.
132 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, para. 425.
133 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, para. 426.
134 Taylor case ‘Judgement’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, para. 428. The conduct of forced
marriage is further analysed below in the section below on duplicity of charges.
135 Bemba case, ‘Prosecution’s submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges and
Amended List of Evidence pursuant to the Third Decision on the Prosecutor’s Requests
for redactions and related request for the Regulation of Contacts of Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo’(19 November 2008) ICC-01/05 01/08-264; ‘Prosecution’s Submission of Amended
Document Containing the Charges, Amended List of Evidence and Amended In-Depth
Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence’(30 March 2009) ICC-01/05-01/08-395.
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element from the crime of rape and should be subsumed in the charge of
rape.136 The prosecution requested leave to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision and the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice was granted leave to
present an amicus curiae brief on the prosecution’s request for leave to appeal.
In its brief, the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice stated the following:137
‘(…) infliction of humiliating and degrading conduct is a stand-alone crime. The
elements of rape do not require humiliation, degradation, or otherwise violation
of dignity as part of the act. The Amicus recognizes that the intra-family nature
of public rapes were humiliating, degrading and an infliction upon dignity; how-
ever, the description of the outrages upon the personal dignity element should
not be conflated to satisfy the element of force or coercion of the crime of rape.’
Most importantly, the amicus curiae brief submitted that such a narrow inter-
pretation contravened internationally recognised human rights, namely the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) and the CRC, and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
gender. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied leave to appeal and the issue
thus remains unconfirmed by the Appeals Chamber.138 As noted by Ooster-
veld, given the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning, and the lack of Appeals Cham-
ber guidance, there is a risk that underlying acts such as the crime against
humanity of rape charged alongside other crimes (such as persecution), might
be rejected for being “cumulative” in future ICC cases.139
4.4.2 Intentional attacks against schools and other civilian objects and human-
itarian objects
Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which defines war crimes under the jurisdiction
of the ICC, includes several crimes on attacks to objects protected by inter-
national humanitarian law. Article 8(2)(b)(ii) prohibits attacks to civilian objects.
Likewise, Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) prohibit attacks to humanitarian
personnel and objects. Article 8(2)(b)(v) prohibits attacks to undefended civilian
places, such as towns, villages or buildings that are not military objectives.
136 Bemba case, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ (15 June 2009) ICC-01/05-01/08-424.
137 Bemba case, ‘Amicus Curiae Observations of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice
pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (31 July 2009) ICC-01/05-01/
08-466 para. 29.
138 ‘Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo”’(18 September 2009) ICC-01/05-01/08-532.
139 Valerie Oosterveld, “Prosecuting Gender-Based Persecution as an International Crime”
in Anne-Marie De Brouwer and others (ed.) Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Inter-
disciplinary Approaches, Intersentia (2011), 75.
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Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) prohibit attacks to protected objects for
reasons of religion, education, art, science and charitable purposes, historic
monuments and public health places.
All these crimes, although intended to protect civilian persons and objects
in general, may have disproportionate effects upon children, not only because
they represent a significant part of the civilian population in current armed
conflicts, but also because very often they use these specially protected objects,
such as schools, day-care centres, community centres, and other public health
and welfare objects.
In fact, in 2008, the CRC Committee hosted a day of discussion on education
in emergency situations and in its final recommendations urged State Parties
to the CRC to fulfil their obligation to ensure that schools are zones of peace
and places where intellectual curiosity and respect for universal human rights
is fostered; and to ensure that schools are protected from military attacks or
seizure by militants; or use as centres for recruitment.140 Following this same
line, the UNGA adopted in July 2010 a Resolution on the right to education
in emergency situations and urged all parties to armed conflicts to fulfil their
obligations under international law to refrain from attacking civilian objects
and persons, particularly students and schools.141
Likewise, it is important to analyse the crime of intentional attacks to
schools or other civilian objects in relation to other crimes committed against
children, particularly the crime of child recruitment. Very often, military
groups attack schools, boarding schools or other buildings used by children,
in order to carry out recruitment campaigns in which children under the age
of 15 are either conscripted or enlisted. Therefore, this crime could very often
be included in the charges brought against perpetrators of crimes of enlistment,
conscription and use of children under the age of 15 to actively participate
in hostilities. For example, in the warrant of arrest against Joseph Kony, the
Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the Lord Resistance Army had allegedly attacked
villages and internally displaced camps (IDP camps) in order to recruit
children.142 Consequently, the charges in this case not only include the crime
of enlistment, conscription and use of children under 15, but also crimes such
as intentional attacks against civilian population, particularly IDP camps. In
the Lubanga case, for example, the three victims who came to testify in court
referred to an alleged attack to a school, where individuals were beaten and
children were allegedly recruited.143 Although no charges of intentional
140 CRC Committee, The Right of the Child to Education in Emergency Situations: Recommendations
(49th Session, Day of General Discussion on 19 September 2008) para. 35.
141 UNGA, The Right to Education in Emergency Situations: Resolution Adopted by the General
Assembly (27 July 2010) A/RES/64/290.
142 Kony and others case, ‘Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended
on 27 September 2005’ (27 September 2005) ICC 02/04 01/05-53, 6.
143 Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (12 January 2010) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-225-Red-ENG WT.
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attacks to schools were brought against the accused in that case, considering
the testimony of these victims, this could have been possible.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
Children suffer from international crimes in a differentiated manner, and thus
the requirements under the Elements of the Crimes within the ICC jurisdiction
may be met distinctively if the crime is committed against a child. Thus, a
children’s rights perspective is important to achieve successful investigations
and prosecutions of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction committed against
children. However, the analysis of the Elements of the Crimes and the concepts
adopted by Chambers to define these crimes should always adhere to the
principle of legality, as a fundamental right of the accused person and a
cornerstone of the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Depending on the definition given to the crimes committed against
children, pursuant to the Rome Statute, the Elements of the Crimes, but also
in light of other applicable law in accordance with Article 21 of the Rome
Statute, children and their families may be granted status to participate in
proceedings pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. Thus, the broader
the concept adopted by ICC Chambers (although limited to the principle of
legality), the more access victims of these crimes will have to ICC proceedings.
The same applies for victims who may benefit from reparations. At the end,
depending on how ICC judges define these crimes (either broader or stricter)
so will be the concept of “beneficiaries” of eventual reparations orders.
Although in this chapter those crimes that mostly affect children are
analysed, children may be victims of any crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Hence, while children may seldom appear before the ICC in cases in which
they are not a material element of the crime (i.e. child recruitment), ICC cases
for other crimes could still include a children’s rights perspective. In such cases,
advocates of victims could play an important role in order to express through
their “views and concerns” the harms suffered by children as a consequence
of these other crimes. In a sense, all international crimes, even if committed
exclusively against adults, will have a lasting effect on children. For example,
persecution of men of an ethnic group may have as a consequence the displace-
ment of entire villages, families, and ultimately children who grow up far away
from their birthplaces and receive limited or no healthcare and education. Thus,
although child victims of these “other cases” may not come in person to
participate as victims or testify as witnesses before the ICC, they could, for
example, benefit from reparations, if the harms they suffered are taken into
account.
However, it is ultimately within the Prosecutor’s hands (his/her discretion
and policy) to include the children’s dimension of crimes being investigated
and prosecuted by the OTP. The Prosecutor should continue the policy adopted
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so far that recognises that crimes committed against children should be
regarded as “most serious crimes” within the ICC’s jurisdiction.144 However,
also as regards cases for “other crimes”, the effects that these crimes have on
children could also be included in the charges brought against accused persons,
so that they are considered in eventual convictions, sentencing and ultimately
reparations orders.
144 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012 (1 February 2010) paras 20-
30<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/
281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf> accessed 8 August 2013.

5 Children’s interaction with the ICC
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Children can interact with the ICC as witnesses to the defence, the prosecution
or the Chamber. As such, they have the right to be protected (Article 68(1)
of the Rome Statute) and to other safeguards provided for in the RPE (for
example, protective and special measures under Rules 87 and 88 of the RPE
or protection to witnesses of sexual violence under Rules 70 and 71 of the RPE).
Secondly, in accordance with Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, children may
interact with the ICC as participating victims, who can present their views and
concerns at various stages of the proceedings when their interests are affected.1
Lastly, children can interact with the ICC in order to benefit from reparations
for the harms suffered as a result of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC,
as provided for in Article 75 of the Rome Statute.
Children may have dual status as witnesses and victims with participatory
status. And ultimately, a dual status individual could also receive reparations.
Thus, the same child could interact with the Court within all three categories
identified above. However, his or her rights will vary, depending on whether
his or her interaction is as a witness testifying under oath, a participating
victim or a beneficiary of reparations. Moreover, as, depending on the child’s
interaction with the ICC, his or her interaction may have a different impact
on the rights of the accused, a balance must be found at all times in order to
guarantee the access of children to the ICC proceedings, in a manner that is
respectful to the rights of the accused and a fair trial.
This Chapter will analyse the existing legal framework and case law of
the ICC from a children’s rights perspective, applying and interpreting ICC
provisions in accordance with internationally recognised children’s rights and
taking into consideration crimes committed against children that have been
or can be brought before the ICC. It will aim to provide recommendations on
how this practice can be adjusted to better meet the particular needs and rights
of children interacting with the ICC, particularly in light of Rule 86 of the RPE,
which requires that the needs of children are taken into consideration through-
out all ICC proceedings.
1 As noted in the Introduction, the term child victim also includes victims who make repres-
entations in accordance with Articles 15(3) and 19(3) of the Rome Statute.
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5.2 REACHING OUT FOR CHILDREN
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute grants victims the opportunity to express
their views and concerns in criminal proceedings before the ICC. Furthermore,
Article 75 of the Rome Statute grants victims the right to receive reparations
for harms suffered as a result of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. However,
victims will only apply for participation or reparations before the ICC if they
are aware of its existence and their rights before this international tribunal.
Outreach is thus of great importance as it enables the ICC to inform victims
of the possibility they have to participate in international criminal proceedings.
As stated by the CRC Committee, the right to information is to a large degree
a prerequisite for the effective realization of children’s right to express their
views and concerns.2 Moreover, the CRC Committee has also stated that the
right to information is essential, because it is the precondition of the child’s
clarified decisions.3
For example, child victims must be appropriately informed about the
application process, modalities of participation, forms of reparations and they
must receive feedback from the ICC, either if their applications for participation
and/or reparations are accepted or rejected. Children who are interviewed
as potential witnesses also need to be informed about the judicial process, risks
involved, available protective measures, etc. Moreover, child victims should
also be informed about the impact their participation will have on the outcome
of a trial and they should not have unreal expectations.4 Potential child
witnesses who are later not called to testify should also receive feedback from
the ICC so that their interaction with the ICC does not become a source of
frustration.5Although this is required for all witnesses, including adults,
information needs to be provided to children in a manner that is accessible
and understandable to them, taking into consideration their age and maturity.
Moreover, as noted by the CRC Committee, children who express their views
in judicial proceedings should receive feedback in order to guarantee that their
views are not only heard as a formality, but are actually taken seriously.6 Thus
the importance of outreach, as it is a two-way sharing of information between
child victims and witnesses and the ICC.
2 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 82.
3 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 25.
4 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 41. See also UN Guidelines.
5 ICTJ, Outreach Strategies in International Hybrid Courts: Report of the ICTJ-ECCC Workshop,
Phnom Penh, March 3-5 2010 (Workshop Report 2010) 13.
6 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 45.
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Recently in the Kenya Situation, Trial Chamber V emphasised the import-
ance of informing witnesses of all the implications of testifying before the ICC,
including the eventual disclosure of information to other parties in the proceed-
ings, and possible consequences for the witness. The Chamber highlighted
that informing the witness, and thus keeping him/her in control of his or her
situation, may avoid traumatisation.7
The UN Guidelines also state that child victims and witnesses should be
provided support throughout their involvement in the justice process.8 The
word “throughout” in the UN Guidelines is of particular importance, since
the concept of who is a victim or a witness should be broad enough to
encompass those situations in which a child is first approached by the ICC,
although not necessarily falling within the strict category of a trial witness
or participating victim (i.e. a victim who has filled-in an application form for
participation but is awaiting a decision from the Chamber, or a witness that
has been withdrawn from the trial witnesses’ list). Support should start at the
earliest opportunity and continue uninterrupted throughout the entirety of
the person’s involvement with the ICC.
Outreach, which has been defined as the set of tools (materials and activ-
ities) that are put in to build direct channels of communication with the
affected communities, in order to raise awareness of the justice process and
promote understanding of the measure, is a function of the ICC that is essential
to meet the requirements of information and consequently of consent explained
above.9 The Outreach Unit at the ICC has defined it as a process of establishing
sustainable, two-way communication between the ICC and communities affected
by the situations that are subject to investigations or proceedings, and to
promote understanding and support of the judicial process at various stages
as well as the different roles of the organs of the ICC.10
Outreach has indeed been identified as a non-judicial core function of the
ICC since making judicial proceedings available to the public is a central
element of a fair trial and therefore necessary to ensure the quality of justice.11
In fact, as stated by Vinck and Pham, to the extent that affected communities
7 Ruto and Sang case, ‘Decision on the protocol concerning the handling of confidential
information and contacts of a party with witnesses whom the opposing party intends to
call’ (24 August 2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-449, Annex 1, paras 26-32.
8 UN Guidelines, para. 30(a).
9 ICTJ, Making an impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for
Transitional Justice (January 2011) 3; ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach
to Transitional Justice (August 2011) 35. Available at <www.ictj.org> accessed 31 August
2012.
10 ICC, Structure of the Court, Outreach, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+
Court/Outreach/> accessed 31 August 2012.
11 ICC, PIDS, Outreach Report 2010, 81. Available at: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/
structure%20of%20the%20court/outreach/outreach%20reports/icc%20outreach%20report%
202010> accessed 31 August 2012.
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have never heard about the ICC, none of the broader goals of international
justice can be achieved.12
Although the importance of outreach may be challenged for not being a
judicial function of the ICC, it is important to consider the purpose and object-
ive of the ICC in order to understand the positive consequences that outreach
has in the overall work of this international tribunal. The ICC was not only
established to investigate, prosecute and convict perpetrators of serious inter-
national crimes, but also to redress suffering of victims of these crimes, namely
by allowing them to participate in proceedings and to receive reparations. In
the ICC’s first-ever decision on victims’ participation, Pre-Trial Chamber I stated
that Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute imposes an obligation of the ICC vis-à-vis
victims and entails a positive obligation for the ICC to enable them to exercise
that right concretely and effectively. The Chamber went further stating that
the ICC has a dual obligation: on the one hand to allow victims to present their
views and concerns, and on the other, to examine them.13
In fact, Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute provides that the Court “shall
permit” that the views and concerns of victims be presented and considered
in ICC proceedings. This provision makes it clear that the possibility of victims
to present their views and concerns and that the obligation of the Court to
consider these during the proceedings is not discretionary but obligatory.14
In fact one could argue that the burdensome individual application process
adopted in the ICC’s first cases (which is not foreseen in the Statute but was
later developed in the RPE, Regulations of the Court and subsequent practice)
could be hampering the fulfilment of this obligation by the ICC.
The ICC has the obligation to guarantee that child victims participation
in ICC proceedings and eventual reparations in case of a conviction are respect-
ful of their well-being and security. This is provided for in Article 64(2) of
the Rome Statute, which states that the Trial Chamber “shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights
of the accused and with due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses”. Consequently, this provision embodies, along the concept of a “fair
and expeditious trial” for the accused enshrined in Article 67 of the Rome
12 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Outreach Evaluation: the ICC in the Central African
Republic’ (2010) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 10. See also Sara Darehshori,
‘Lessons Learned for Outreach from the ad hoc Tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
and the ICC’ New England Journal of International and Comparative Law (Volume 14:2) 299.
13 DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS
1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006) ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr,
para. 71.
14 The English version of the Rome Statute uses the word “shall permit”, which indicates
an obligation of the Court. The French version of the Rome Statute refers to “permet” and
the Spanish version to “permitirá”. Although these two languages are not as clear as the
phrase “shall permit” in the English version, they both reflect an affirmation of a right and
not a mere possibility that can be discretionally granted to victims.
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Statute, the “protection of victims and witnesses” provided for in Article 68
of the Rome Statute.
Child victims require access to information that is suitable to their age and
maturity (i.e. what are the requirements for participation) in order for the ICC
to accomplish its mandate. As stated by Vinck and Pham in their analysis of
the outreach strategy of the ICC in the Central African Republic, public aware-
ness of the justice mechanism is necessary for it to have a transformative
impact on society and also to produce greater judicial accountability, educate
on the rule of law and enable deterrence of future crimes and promote peace
and reconciliation.15
This is provided for in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, which refers to
putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and contri-
buting to the prevention of such crimes. It is important to note that one of
the triggering mechanisms of the ICC’s jurisdiction is the proprio motu powers
of the Prosecutor, who can request authorisation to start an investigation based
on information received by inter-governmental and NGOs and other reliable
sources. Only if victims and organisations working with victims are properly
informed about the ICC’s jurisdiction, will such information reach the ICC
Prosecutor. Regarding crimes committed against children or the harms suffered
by children as a result of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, public awareness
of the ICC’s jurisdiction and mandate is necessary so that information about
these crimes is brought to the attention of the ICC Prosecutor.
In fact, outreach (or lack of it) was a “lesson learned” from the ad-hoc tri-
bunals, which initiated outreach after several years of functioning, with harm-
ful, inaccurate and biased local reporting which undermined the tribunals’
impact.16 The SCSL, on the other hand, started outreach at the earliest stages
after its establishment and this was translated into greater knowledge about
the SCSL in comparison, for example, with Rwandans over the ICTR.17 This
however, may not only be due to outreach, but also to the fact that the SCSL
has seat in the place where the crimes occurred and has staff both from the
national judicial system and from the international UN system. This could also
be taken into consideration when deciding whether future ICC proceedings
should take place in situ, and thus come geographically closer to the affected
victim population.
In 2006, the ICC adopted a “Strategic Plan for Outreach at the ICC”, which
laid down the main objectives and principles of this essential part of the ICC’s
mandate. The main office in charge of developing and implementing outreach
15 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Outreach Evaluation: the ICC in the Central African
Republic’ (2010) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2.
16 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Outreach Evaluation: the ICC in the Central African
Republic’ (2010) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3.
17 Norman H Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing Justice Done: The Important of Prioritizing Outreach Efforts
at International Criminal Tribunals’ (Spring 2008) Georgetown Journal of International Law,
452.
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programmes is the PIDS, which is part of the Registry of the ICC. Already in
the initial strategic plan, the ICC acknowledged the importance of having
coordinated work between PIDS and other sections of the ICC, such as the
VPRS.18 The ICC also has field offices in the countries in which it is currently
involved. These offices have outreach officials that carry out different activities
in order to inform the local population about proceedings before the ICC and
also receive feedback from these persons as regards the work of the ICC and
the impact it has upon them. In fact, the ICC has recognised that in order to
fulfil its mandate it is imperative that those communities affected by crimes
under its jurisdiction understand its role and judicial activities, and also that
a two-way dialogue exists between these affected communities and the ICC,
so that the ICC can better understand the concerns and expectations of the
communities.19 This mandate is rather challenging. The ICC is currently
involved in eight situations, so it should not only develop a global ICC
Outreach strategy, but a tailor-made outreach strategy that accommodates the
language, legal and cultural particularities and responds to the needs of the
victims of each situation.
Additionally to a tailor-made approach regarding victims in the different
situations before the ICC, outreach must also be designed taking into considera-
tion the diversity within the population in a given situation before the ICC.
Children should be one of those groups of the population towards which
outreach must be aimed at. The UN Guidelines have recognised that children
have the right to be informed about the processes and services that concern
them.20 In order to achieve this, outreach programmes should be designed
so that they are relevant, age-appropriate and provide children with a safe
and receptive environment.21 Furthermore, information must be provided
in such a manner that marginalized children (i.e. girls, migrants, etc.) are
involved, taking into consideration that “children” is not a homogenous
group.22
In its 2006 Strategy, the ICC already identified children and youth as “the
most vulnerable victims of conflict” but also as dual actors in armed conflict,
as they can be both perpetrators and victims. To this vulnerability, one can
also add that children may very often be “information poor”, which has been
described by Vinck and Pham as “those who do not have access to formal
media such as newspapers, radio or the Internet because they are socially or
18 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 64.
19 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 3.
20 UN Guidelines, paras 19 and 20.
21 ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011)
35.
22 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 134.
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economically disadvantaged or because they lack physical access to information
networks”.23 In order to reach children, the ICC has to develop strategies that
take into consideration the way in which children gather or receive informa-
tion, which is usually, although not necessarily, through adults (i.e. their
parents or their teachers), but also through social networks.
The ICC has recognised that specific strategies are needed for reaching and
engaging with children.24 The ICC Outreach Strategy has referred, in general,
to how outreach should be tailored to specific audiences, bearing in mind their
specific needs, beliefs, attitudes, opinions and cultural context.25 For example,
it has specified that information given by the ICC to local populations should
be accurate but also simple and meaningful to a non-specialist audience.26
But how are these messages or information to be transmitted to children
interacting with the ICC? The International Center for Transitional Justice has
identified the following elements that should be taken into consideration when
developing outreach strategies for children: a) children’s best interests should
be taken into account at all times, according to the different age groups (i.e.
young children and youth); b) outreach efforts must be built upon a stable
infrastructure supervised by adults that are close to the children (i.e. families
and school teachers); c) children’s organisations and agencies (i.e. UNICEF)
should be consulted when developing outreach activities and materials.27
For example, when the Prosecutor requests the authorisation to start an investi-
gation and victims submit representations pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute, outreach activities could be developed differentiating among children
of different ethnic groups (particularly targeting a minority that could be
excluded from general approaches), age (young children and youth) and
gender (aiming at the girl-child who is often excluded). These outreach ac-
tivities could be developed in schools with teachers and parents, so that
children are protected from undue exploitation by other adults that may want
to benefit from ICC proceedings. In cases dealing with former child soldiers,
such activities could also be developed in demobilisation centres. Lastly,
children’s organisations in the field could become partners of ICC in developing
these outreach activities, particularly as they could have knowledge of culture,
language and other particularities in a given country or locality in order to
23 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Outreach Evaluation: the ICC in the Central African
Republic’ (2010) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 11.
24 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 26.
25 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 46.
26 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 47.
27 ICTJ, Making an impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for
Transitional Justice (January 2011) 26.
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create tailor-made outreach activities that meet the needs of children in a given
situation.
The ICC’s Strategic Plan refers in general to “victims” and identifies means
such as radio, booklets, posters, cartoons and training seminars to transmit
information to them.28 Regarding children and youth, the ICC identifies that
a possible tool could be the establishment of agreements with child agencies
and other child and youth groups. Means of communication that are identified
are for example child-friendly flyers, debates and competitions in schools.29
Most importantly, and as recommended by the International Center for Transi-
tional Justice, materials should be culturally appropriate and written in a
manner that facilitates understanding. For example, when designing material
for children, experts should be consulted and the material should be tested
with children in the field.30
In the ICC’s first-ever trial, which involved child victims and witnesses,
the PIDS developed an outreach strategy that included, among other activities,
radio and television programmes but also meetings with the communities.
For example, the PIDS planned a series of activities with demobilised children
in order to follow the trial, explain the judicial proceedings and discuss their
rights.31 Prior to the commencement of the trial, the PIDS carried out several
town hall meetings where the affected communities live, including meetings
with students and children.32
Some outreach activities carried out to inform child victims of judicial
proceedings before the ICC have been: drama performances or drama clubs,33
school clubs and/or human rights clubs,34 children/youth radio programmes
(“children to talk to children”),35 commemoration days (Day of the African
Child) to teach children, parents and community about the prohibition of child
recruitment,36 and closed information sessions for women, their husbands
and children.37
28 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 52.
29 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court
(29 September 2006) ICC-ASP/5/12, para. 56.
30 ICTJ, Making an impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for
Transitional Justice (January 2011) 15.
31 ICC Outreach Unit, Communication Strategy Trial of Thomas Lubanga (The Hague, January
2009) <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F8CB60B0-731D-41DB-9705-B45E20F0BE66/
279608/Outreach_SP_Lubanga_ENGpdf.pdf> 10, accessed 8 August 2013.
32 ICC Outreach Unit, Communication Strategy Trial of Thomas Lubanga (The Hague, January
2009) <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F8CB60B0-731D-41DB-9705-B45E20F0BE66/
279608/Outreach_SP_Lubanga_ENGpdf.pdf> 10, accessed 8 August 2013.
33 ICC, PIDS, Outreach Report 2010, 11.
34 ICC, PIDS, Outreach Report 2010, 14.
35 ICC, PIDS, Outreach Report 2010.
36 ICC, PIDS, Outreach Report 2010.
37 ICC, PIDS, Outreach Report 2010, 44.
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However, in the analysis carried out by Vinck and Pham of the ICC outreach
programme in the Central African Republic, surveys showed that the persons
who participate in ICC outreach meetings were on average young male adults,
who had a higher level of education, were wealthier and had more access to
the media than the general adult population.38 Although the survey did not
include reference to children, one could foresee that in comparison with the
general population, children could even be more disadvantaged. The study
recommends that outreach programmes be tailored to the needs and expecta-
tions of heterogeneous communities and target groups in unique contexts,
especially those who are unlikely to be reached by traditional media.39
Overall, the following outreach material could be appropriate for child
victims in cases before the ICC. These materials however, should be tested and
their use and impact should be evaluated for each particular situation in which
the ICC is involved: a) comics and graphic novels or other child-friendly
information (including plays, radio programmes, etc.);40 b) social network
internet sites (for situations where youth could be expected to have internet
access);41 c) websites with a section dedicated to children, which could be
used by NGOs or other intermediaries working directly with children or their
legal representatives with downloadable and printable material;42 d) radio
programmes in which children ask questions about the ICC that may interest
or affect them;43 e) meetings and workshops in schools, demobilisation centres,
displaced persons and refugee camps targeted at children and youth;44 f) visits
of school groups to the ICC premises in the headquarters or in the field (par-
38 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Outreach Evaluation: the ICC in the Central African
Republic’ (2010) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 17 and 19.
39 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Outreach Evaluation: the ICC in the Central African
Republic’ (2010) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 20-21.
40 ICTJ, Making an impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for
Transitional Justice (January 2011) 15; Victims’ Rights Working Group, Establishing effective
reparation procedures and principles in the ICC (September 2011); ICTJ, Through a New Lens:
A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011) 36.
41 ICC has a Facebook and Youtube accounts. <https://www.facebook.com/pages/
International-Criminal-Court/106219979409522> and http://www.youtube.com/user/
IntlCriminalCourt accessed 8 August 2013.
42 Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the ICC (September 2006) 34.
43 See for example Interactive Radio for Justice, which broadcasts radio talk shows in which
community members in DRC and Central African Republic ask questions to ICC officials
and other experts. See: ICTJ, Making an impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing
Outreach Programs for Transitional Justice (January 2011) 17.
44 For example, in the ECCC, the outreach programme conducts workshops “Youth for Peace”
targeting youth and teaching them about the tribunal. See Norman H Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing
Justice Done: The Important of Prioritizing Outreach Efforts at International Criminal
Tribunals’ (Spring 2008) Georgetown Journal of International Law, 472.
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ticularly in Situation countries);45 and g) train the trainer programmes tar-
geting teachers or other adults who can teach children (particularly child
victims in Situation countries) about the ICC.46
It is however important to understand the ICC’s limitations, not only as
regards its jurisdiction and mandate, but also its financial and human
resources. The ICC cannot fulfil all the needs of outreach in its multiple situ-
ations around the African continent. In fact, it is to be expected that in the
future the ICC could have situations in other continents, which would add
challenges if a tailor-made approach would be adopted. In this regard, the
partnerships between the ICC and key organisations and media in different
regions of the world is essential so that affected communities learn about the
ICC and the judicial proceedings concerning them. Importantly, it must be
acknowledged that local civil society organisations can conduct outreach in
a way that the ICC cannot, as they already have networks with local commun-
ities.47
It is important that the ICC benefits from child rights expertise of NGOs and
international organisations already working in the field in countries where
it has on-going situations and cases. However, the ICC also needs to have child-
rights specialists, including in the Outreach Unit (persons who also understand
the African-child context, for example in the current situations before the
ICC).48 Only if the ICC has in-house specialists will it be able to appropriately
train its intermediaries and also monitor and organise the work carried out
by them in the field. Moreover, it is also important for the ICC to have its own
specialists in situations in which NGOs in the field may be unwilling or unable
to cooperate with the ICC due to perceptions of impartiality or general security
risks for their involvement with the ICC.
Moreover, the ICC should not delegate outreach in its entirety to civil
society. Although NGOs are often well placed to conduct outreach activities,
the ICC should not rely completely on external actors, particularly when
45 For example, in the SCSL, because of the geographical proximity between the ICC and the
affected population, the ICC organised visits of school children and university students
with question and answer sessions. This could be foreseeable if the ICC conducts hearings
in situ in the future. See Norman H Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing Justice Done: The Important of
Prioritizing Outreach Efforts at International Criminal Tribunals’ (Spring 2008) Georgetown
Journal of International Law, 457.
46 In the ECCC in Cambodia, the outreach program, with several NGO’s developed training
programmes, for example for law students, who then travelled to provinces to teach villagers
about the tribunal. Norman H Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing Justice Done: The Important of Prioritiz-
ing Outreach Efforts at International Criminal Tribunals’ (Spring 2008) Georgetown Journal
of International Law, 471.
47 ICTJ, Outreach Strategies in International Hybrid Courts: Report of the ICTJ-ECCC Workshop,
Phnom Penh, March 3-5 2010 (Workshop Report 2010) 11.
48 For example, in the SCSL, the Outreach Section was originally composed of Sierra Leoneans.
Norman H Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing Justice Done: The Important of Prioritizing Outreach Efforts
at International Criminal Tribunals’ (Spring 2008) Georgetown Journal of International Law,
454.
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security, safety and confidentiality of child victims and witnesses are at
stake.49 Reporting by NGOs or media may still be susceptible to polarization
and misrepresentation and neither media nor NGOs can speak on behalf of
the ICC.50 Most importantly, although the ICC is bound by the principle of
presumption of innocence and other considerations pertaining to the rights
of the accused, local NGO’s or other intermediaries in the field could act dis-
regarding the right to a fair trial in ICC proceedings, and thus weaken the ICC’s
credibility as an impartial and fair court. In essence, as stated by Pentelovitch,
international tribunals must work with and not through NGOs in carrying out
outreach.51
5.3 PARTICIPATION OF CHILD VICTIMS AT THE ICC
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute is the core provision regarding victims’
participation at the ICC. This provision states the following:
‘(…) 3. Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the ICC shall permit
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceed-
ings determined to be appropriate by the ICC and in a manner which is not pre-
judicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial
trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of
the victims where the ICC considers it appropriate, in accordance with the RPE. (…)’
Although the RPE and the RoC further develop this notion of victims’ participa-
tion, it has been mostly the ICC’s practice and case law during its first years
that has created a legal system that enables victims to present their views and
concerns to the judges of the ICC, while safeguarding the rights of the accused
to have a fair and impartial trial. This system is far from perfect and can
certainly be improved and consolidated. Most regrettably, after ten years of
practice the ICC has not adopted a court-wide approach to victims’ participation
and in fact Chambers’ decisions in this regard are often contradictory. Thus,
the ICC urgently needs to orchestrate a court-wide strategy on victims’ parti-
cipation, that reflects coordination among the organs of the ICC (including
Chambers which have taken noticeably diverse approaches), but also
49 ICTJ, Making an impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programs for
Transitional Justice (January 2011) 29.
50 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Effective Public Outreach for the International Criminal
Court (January 2004), available at <http://web.undp.org/comtoolkit/why-communicate/
docs/Best%20Practices/EffectivePublicOutreachfortheInternationalCriminalCourt.pdf>
accessed 8 August 2013.
51 Norman H Pentelovitch, ‘Seeing Justice Done: The Important of Prioritizing Outreach Efforts
at International Criminal Tribunals’ (Spring 2008) Georgetown Journal of International Law,
446.
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coordination with the State Parties (budget and political implications) as well
as stakeholders in the field (NGOs, intermediaries, international organisations
(including the UN) and victims’ groups).
This section will analyse the existing legal framework of the ICC as regards
victims’ participation from a children’s rights perspective, applying and
interpreting ICC provisions in accordance with internationally recognised
children’s rights. It will study the developing ICC case law on the subject and
will aim to provide recommendations on how this practice could be improved
vis-à-vis child victims if a court-wide approach is to be adopted in the future.
5.3.1 Who is a victim?
Pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE, victims in the ICC can either be: a) natural
persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime
within the jurisdiction of the ICC; or b) legal persons, which are understood
as organisations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their
property. Thus, as noted in Chapter 4 above, the notion of victim will be
dependent on the notion of the crime adopted by the ICC Chamber deciding
on the victims’ status.
As regards legal persons, Rule 85 of the RPE gives examples of such legal
persons, and includes organisations or institutions dedicated to religion,
education, art or science or charitable purposes and to their historic monu-
ments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.
However, this list should not be read as a numerus clausus, and other legal
persons not foreseen in it could still be given the status of victims if they have
suffered direct harm. For example, a NGO that not necessarily works in charities
or for humanitarian purposes (i.e. microcredit organisation or human rights
organisation) could still be granted the status of victim if it suffered direct
harm to its property. In regards to children, institutions used for children’s
and youth’s recreation (such as playgrounds, sports halls) or day-care centres
or other buildings dedicated and used by children, could also be included
within the definition of “legal person” under Rule 85 of the RPE. However,
pursuant to Rule 85(b) of the RPE, the applicant institution would need to prove
that the property it owned suffered direct harm and that such property was
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or other charitable purpose.52
Trial Chamber I of the ICC used Principle 8 of the UN Basic Principles as
guidance to further define the concept of victim under Rule 85 of the RPE. In
accordance with the UN Basic Principles, a victim is someone who suffers,
either individually or collectively, directly or indirectly, from personal harm
in a variety of different ways, such as physical or mental injury, emotional
52 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal
Proceedings, Intersentia (2011), 242.
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suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental
rights.53 Thus, the consequences of international crimes upon children studied
in Chapter 1 are relevant to establish whether a child is a victim under the
Rome Statute. In addition, it is important to note that only victims who are
victims of crimes charged may participate in the trial proceedings. Thus,
applicants need to demonstrate the link between the harm suffered and the
crimes charged against the accused.54
It is also significant that while Rule 85 of the RPE states that legal persons
should suffer direct harm, nothing is said regarding natural persons. Thus,
it must be understood that natural persons can suffer both direct and indirect
harm. This is of particular importance for children, because they could suffer
indirect harm as a result of the direct harm suffered by their parents or other
caretakers, given their dependency status vis-à-vis adults (i.e. the child of an
adult victim of a crime that, as a result of the crime, has a permanent disability
could indirectly suffer harm as a result of his/her parent’s disability). Although
in situations where the parent of the child dies as a result of the crime, the
ICC case law has disregarded the possibility of relatives participating on behalf
of that deceased victim,55 it has been accepted that family members of
deceased persons may apply to participate for the direct moral damage they
suffered as a result of their relative’s death.56 Therefore, children whose
parents have passed away as a result of a crime within the jurisdiction of the
ICC may also participate in proceedings for the moral harm they suffered as
a result of the death of their parents.
In practice, the Chambers of the ICC have required victims to prove: a) their
identity; b) that they suffered harm; and c) that there is a causal link between
the harm suffered and the crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The ICC
53 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 90-92; ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, paras 31-39.
54 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, paras 62-64.
55 Situation in Darfur, Sudan (Darfur situation) ‘Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications
for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07,
a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07’ (14 December 2007) ICC 02/05-111-
Corr, para. 36; DRC situation ‘Corrigendum to the “Decision on the Applications for Partici-
pation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
by a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/
06 to a/0110/06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06,
a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to
a/0236/06, a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/
0239/06 and a/0241/06 to a/0250/06”’ (31 January 2008) ICC-01/04-423-Corr, paras 24-25.
56 Katanga and Ngudgolo case ‘Grounds for the Decision on the 345 Applications for Participation
in the Proceedings Submitted by Victims’ (Public redacted version, 23 September 2009)
ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red-tENG, paras 51-56.
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has also established that victims must not prove these requirements “beyond
reasonable doubt”, but that lower thresholds such as inferences of fact, circum-
stantial evidence, or prima facie evidence, suffices.57
The ICC’s first decision on victims’ applications to participate in the Situ-
ation of Uganda required victims to prove their identity with an official
identity document with photograph. However, the same decision concluded
that in areas affected by armed conflict “it would be inappropriate to expect
applicants to be able to provide proof of identity of the same type as would
be required of individuals living in areas not experiencing the same types of
difficulties”.58 Referring to children, this same initial decision requested the
Registry of the ICC to submit a report indicating the age at which children in
Uganda could receive an official identity document and also indicating whether
it was possible to obtain in Uganda an official document establishing the link
between a child and a parent or guardian.59
Throughout the years, and taken into consideration the difficulties ex-
perienced by most victims in the current Situation countries, case law of the
ICC has become more flexible in regards to child victims and their identifica-
tion, allowing other forms of identification (including non-official documents
such as voting cards, student cards, birth certificates or ultimately, when no
document is available, a statement signed by two witnesses).60
Regarding parents or guardians of children acting on their behalf, the ICC’s
first decisions rejected some applications on behalf of children or submitted
directly by children themselves, because they did not include consent of their
parents or legal guardian.61 However, later Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga
case, referring to the CRC, allowed children to act on their own (without
parental consent) or to have adults act on their behalf even if they did not
57 DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS
1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006) ICC-01/04 101-tEN-Corr,
paras 12 and 15; Darfur situation ‘Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participa-
tion in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to
a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07’ (14 December 2007) ICC 02/05-111-Corr; Lubanga
case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 99.
58 DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS
1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006) ICC-01/04 101-tEN-Corr,
paras 16-19.
59 DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1,
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006) ICC-01/04 101-tEN-Corr,
para. 20.
60 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 87-88; DRC situation ‘Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of Appli-
cants on application process for victims’ participation and legal representation’ (20 August
2007) ICC-01/04-374, paras 13-15.
61 DRC situation ‘Decision on the applications for participation filed in connection with the
investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Applicants a/0047/06 to a/0052/06,
a/163/06 to a/0187/06, a/0221/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to
a/0239/06, and a/0241 to a/0250/06’ (3 July 2008) ICC-01/04-505, para. 31.
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have an official document linking the adult to the child (either via family link
or legal guardianship).
On that occasion the Trial Chamber stated the following:62
‘The Chamber notes that the applicant has consented to someone else acting on
his behalf. The question that arises is whether the applicant needs to establish that
the person acting on his behalf is either a relative or legal guardian, in order to
participate in the proceedings. Alternatively, is the Chamber entitled to act on the
application that has been submitted “by a person” on the applicant’s behalf, which
indicates clearly that the victim wishes to participate in these proceedings.
The Rome Statute framework is clear on this issue. There are no provisions
establishing categories of people who alone are allowed to act for victims, whether
the latter are adults or children. Rule 89(3) of the Rules simply states that “(a)n
application ... may also be made by a person acting with the consent of the victim,
or a person acting on behalf of a victim, in the case of a victim who is a child ....”.
It follows that the person acting on behalf of a victim does not have to be a relative
or a legal guardian because, within the Rules, the “person acting” is undefined
and unrestricted.
In support of this approach, the inevitable experience of most, if not all, children
who were recruited in the circumstances alleged in this trial, is that they will have
been separated from their parents and other adult relatives at a relatively young
age. Many of them have been living, to put it at its lowest, disjointed and very
unsettled lives for a number of years. Some children have still not been reunited
with their families and they do not have legal guardians. To the extent that they
have managed to find representation at all, they are often assisted by people such
as schoolteachers and other similar community figures.
In this regard, the Chamber notes the General Comment No. 6 (2005) of the
CRC Committee in which it was recognised that separated or unaccompanied
children (defined as children who have been separated from both parents, other
relatives or from any previous legal or customary primary caregiver), in some
situations “have no access to proper and appropriate identification, registration,
age assessment, documentation family tracing, guardianship systems or legal
advice”. The Committee further noted that “in large-scale crises, where it will be
difficult to establish guardianship arrangements on an individual basis, the rights
and best interests of separated children should be safeguarded and promoted by
States and organisations working on behalf of these children”.
The Chamber has paid careful attention to the experience of the Registry in
the field in the DRC, and particularly its opinion that “legal guardianship is very
rare in Eastern Congo and many children who do not live with their parents, for
instance because they have not yet been reunited with their families after being
demobilised from an armed group or because they experience difficulties in
reintegration, are looked after by persons such as school principals, transition
62 Lubanga case ‘Annex A1 to the Order issuing public redacted annexes to the Decisions on
the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings of 15 and 18 December 2008’
(8 May 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-1861-AnxA1, 59-60.
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centres for demobilised children, who do not have a formal status in relation to
the child”.
The real possibility exists, therefore, that a number of applicants who seek to
participate in these proceedings will be living in circumstances where they cannot
be represented by their parents, other family relatives or a legal guardian. In
relation to these victims, who are over 18 years of age or are close thereto, they
have individually applied through a person acting on their behalf (who is not their
next of-kin or their legal guardian) to participate in this trial as a victim. In each
instance, the application accords with the express requirements of Rule 89 (3) of
the Rules. All of the matters set out above provide strong support for the approach
that the Rules have not restricted the types of people who are able to act on behalf
of all victims and including child victims. (footnotes omitted).’
The importance of the aforesaid decision is that it recognises that children may
submit an victim’s application form to participate in ICC proceedings, regard-
less of any parental permission or control.63 Since in the Lubanga case the
children concerned had been separated from their parents for a long period
of time in the context of an armed conflict and considering that these children
were adolescents between 15 and 18 years old, the Chamber decided that these
children could submit an application by themselves, without any parental con-
trol or decision.64
Trial Chamber II in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case similarly ruled that
children could submit an application on their own. Likewise, it accepted that
a statement signed by two credible witnesses could be used as proof of kinship
or guardianship when an adult is acting on behalf of a child victim. However
it concluded that this should be done on a case-by-case basis taking into
consideration the child’s maturity and capacity to make decisions.65 This ICC
decision is in fact in line with the CRC, since a child’s maturity is not only age-
related, but can also be drawn from the child’s experience, environment and
level of support.66
Nonetheless, in the Bemba case, Trial Chamber III distanced itself from the
other two Trial Chambers and required proof of kinship and guardianship
between the child victim and the person acting on his or her behalf. It has
63 In fact, the CRC Committee determined that the more the child knows, has experienced
and understands, the more the parent or legal guardian, or other persons responsible for
the child, will have to transform direction and guidance into “reminders and advice and
later to an exchange on an equal footing”. See: CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12
(2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July 2009) CRC/C/GC/12, 84.
64 Drumbl praises this approach, stating that this is an “individuated, careful and considered
approach to assessing the capacity of these children”. See Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child
Soldiers in international Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2012) 161.
65 Katanga and Ngudgolo case ‘Motifs de la décision relative aux 345 demandes de participation
de victimes à la procédure’ (23 September 2009) ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red, para. 98.
66 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 29.
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therefore required that an adult submits the application form for participation
on behalf of the child victim.67 In the Kenya Situation cases, Trial Chamber
V, when referring to child victims, has also required that, if possible, consent
be provided by the child’s parent or legal guardian. Thus, parental consent
although recommendable, appears not to be compulsory and it appears that
children could act on their own (that is without an adult acting on their
behalf).68
Before the Pre-Trial Chambers case law has been more consistent, as proof
of kinship between the child victim and the person acting on his or her behalf
is necessary for a child to apply to participate in pre-trial proceedings. As proof
of kinship, the Pre-Trial Chambers have required either official documents,
such as a birth certificate or a letter from the local Council, as well as non-
official documents, such as a birth notification card or a baptism card.69 Thus,
although the Pre-Trial Chambers have made proof of kinship compulsory,
a flexible approach has been adopted as to the means to prove this relationship.
Case law at the ICC is far from homogenous regarding children’s possibility
to participate without parental consent, on their own or via an adult acting
on their behalf (even if that adult is not related to them). From a children’s
rights perspective, and taking into consideration the CRC, the flexible standard
adopted by Trial Chambers I and II that allowed child victims to participate
in criminal proceedings should be preferred. This approach takes into con-
sideration that parental consent or legal guardianship is sometimes impossible
in situations of armed conflict or mass violations of human rights, in which
children are very often orphaned or unaccompanied. Furthermore, this
standard is also in line with Article 12 of the CRC and the Comments made
by the CRC Committee in the sense that the capacity of the child to express
his or her views should be presumed and it is not up to the child to prove
this capacity.70
67 ‘Decision defining the status of 54 victims who participated at the pre-trial stage, and
inviting the parties’ observations on applications for participation by 86 applicants’ (22
February 2010) ICC-01/05 01/08-699 para. 36.
68 Ruto and Sang case, ‘Decision on the protocol concerning the handling of confidential
information and contacts of a party with witnesses whom the opposing party intends to
call’ (24 August 2012) ICC-01/09-01/11-449, Annex 1, para. 33
69 Kony and others case ‘Decision on victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06
to a/0070/06,a/0081/06, a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06,
a/0099/06,a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/
0120/06,a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06’ (14 March 2008) ICC 02/04 01/05-282
para. 7; Bemba case ‘Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation’ (12 December 2008) ICC-01/05
01/08-320, para. 38; DRC situation, ICC-01/04-505, para. 31. See also Gbabgo case ‘Second
decision on issues related to the victims’ application process’ (05 April 2012) ICC-02/11-01/
11-86, para. 36 and ‘Decision on Victims’ Participation and Victims’ Common Legal Repres-
entation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings’ (4 June
2012) ICC-02/11-01/11-138, para. 26.
70 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 20.
170 Chapter 5
On the other hand, a very strict standard which compels the child to
present parental or guardian consent or a proof of this consent, is contrary
to this presumption, because it parts from the assumption that children are
incapable and thus require consent of an adult to participate in ICC proceed-
ings. Moreover, a blanket approach that treats all children alike or that sets
limits of age to determine maturity should be avoided. This should preferably
be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the personal
circumstances of that child.71
Nevertheless, safeguards must still be developed in order to verify that
children have made an informed decision to participate before the ICC and
that it is in the best interests of the child to participate in international criminal
proceedings. For example, even though the ICC could preliminarily grant status
to child victims acting on their own behalf, without parental consent, judges
could instruct the Registry to carry a field visit in order to interview these
children and check whether: a) they are separated or unaccompanied; b) they
have taken an informed decision on their participation before the ICC; and c)
their participation is not manifestly contrary to their best interests. This would
guarantee that children have access to the ICC, but also avoid that third persons
(such as intermediaries) take advantage of the child’s situation in order to
receive some kind of benefit for the child’s participation in the ICC.72 As
determined by the CRC Committee, children must be able to freely express
their view, which is without undue influence or pressure from others.73
Likewise, adults, including the ICC judges and staff, must not unilaterally
decide on the best interests of the child. This should be done in consultation
with the child concerned and taking into consideration the child’s unique
context.74
Particular attention must be given in this regard to the CRC Committee
General Comment on Article 12 of the CRC, which emphasises that the right
to be heard is a choice of the child, and not an obligation.75 Thus, the ICC
should adopt measures to ensure that the child receives all necessary informa-
tion and advice to make an informed decision in favour of his or her best
interests (beyond the interests of his or her parents or guardians or even those
71 Beijer and Liefaard, ‘A Bermuda Triangle? Balancing protection, participation and proof
in criminal proceedings affecting child victims and witnesses’ (2011) Utrecht Law Review,
p. 70-106.
72 In recent developments before the ICC it has been alleged that intermediaries have induced
child victims and witnesses to lie to the ICC in order to receive financial and other benefits.
See Lubanga case ‘Redacted Decision on intermediaries’ (31 May 2010) ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-
Red2.
73 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 22.
74 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 71.
75 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 16.
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of the prosecution or the ICC in general). In this last aspect, it is essential that
the ICC provides adequate training in children’s rights to those staff members
and intermediaries assisting the victims in their application process. Although
the work of intermediaries is essential for the functioning of the ICC in the
field,76 their benevolence could be detrimental to the child victim if his/her
particular needs are not taken into consideration (i.e. re-victimisation) and
safeguards are not adopted (i.e. protective or special measures under Rule 87
and 88 of the Rome Statute).
In order to reach more children and to facilitate that their decision to parti-
cipate is an informed one and in their best interests, the ICC could produce
an explanatory booklet aimed specifically to children or persons working with
children (i.e. social workers, demobilisation centres staff, etc.). Although it is
not required that the child has comprehensive knowledge of all aspects of what
participation entails, the ICC should guarantee that children have sufficient
understanding to be capable of making an informed decision.77 This would
allow not only for children to know their rights as victims before the ICC but
also to inform adults working with children on how to present an application
on behalf of a child. Although the ICC has an explanatory booklet to its
standard application forms, it does not have group-specific booklets. Such
specific booklets could be created to target groups of the population that
ordinarily have less access to information (not only children, but also for
example victims of sexual violence or specific minority or immigrant groups
in a given situation) and that require differentiated treatment in light of their
unique needs (pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE).
Considering the rapid developmental changes of children, the application
process should be expedited in general, but particularly when the application
concerns crimes committed against children. A child who applies at age sixteen
to participate in proceedings might not be interested in participating or might
even be unreachable if the ICC contacts him or her three or four years later.
Likewise, the interests of that victim might have also changed significantly
and eventual reparations could even become moot with the passing of time.
76 DRC situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the
Investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Applicants a/0189/06 to a/0198/06,
a/0200/06 to a/0202/06, a/0204/06 to a/0208/06, a/0210/06 to a/0213/06, a/0215/06
to a/0218/06, a/0219/06, a/0223/06, a/0332/07, a/0334/07 to a/0337/07, a/0001/08, a/
0030/08 and a/0031/08’ (4 November 2008) ICC-01/04-545 para. 25; Katanga and Ngudgolo
case ‘Motifs de la décision relative aux 345 demandes de participation de victimes à la
procédure’ (23 September 2009) ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red, paras 42-43.
77 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 21.
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5.3.2 The application process
According to Rule 89 of the RPE, victims wishing to participate in ICC proceed-
ings should present a written application to the ICC. During its first years, the
ICC developed standard application forms which victims (or someone acting
on their behalf) fill-in and present to the ICC. The practice during these first
years was that the Registry, more specifically the VPRS, would receive the
applications, prepare a report to the relevant Chamber and then transmit to
the judges all the applications received as well as the report. Once the Chamber
received the applications and the report, it would then instruct the Registry
to transmit the application forms (either in full or redacted) to the parties in
the proceedings and the parties would be granted the opportunity to submit
observations on the victims’ applications. The Chamber would finally issue
a written decision determining on an individual basis which applicants met
the requirements to participate as victims pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE.78
This process proved to be manageable in the Lubanga case, considering that
the number of victims participating in that first case was quite limited. In fact,
only 3 victims were granted status to participate at the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings and during the trial phase, 129 victims were granted status to
participate in the proceedings.79 However, in more recent cases before the
ICC, thousands of applications have been received.80
The drawback to this increased victims’ participation is that the Registry,
parties and Chambers appear to have become overwhelmed by the individual-
application system. In fact, victims’ participation became at one moment
torrential in the confirmation of charges of the Mbarushimana case and it was
reported that hundreds of victims were not able to participate because the
Registry had been unable to meet the deadline established by the Chamber
to receive victims’ applications.81 Likewise, victims’ interests may not be
78 Lubanga case ‘Decision inviting the parties’ observations on applications for participation’
(6 May 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1308.
79 ‘Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings’ (15 December
2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1556-Corr; ‘Decision on the applications by 3 victims to participate
in the proceedings’ (18 December 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1562; ‘Decision on the applications
by 7 victims to participate in the proceedings’ (10 July 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-2035; ‘Decision
on the applications by 15 victims to participate in the proceedings’ (13 December 2010)
ICC-01/04-01/06-2659-Corr-Red.
80 Wakabi Wairagala, ‘Thousands more apply to join Bemba trial as victims’ (The Trial of Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo: A project of Open Society Justice Initiative, 30 September 2011) <http://
www.bembatrial.org/2011/09/thousands-more-apply-to-join-bemba%e2%80%99s-trial-as-
victims/> accessed 8 August 2013.
81 Hirondelle News Agency ‘ICC/Mbarushimana – Registrar Flooded with Victims Requests’
(Hirondelle News, 13 September 2009) <http://www.hirondellenews.com/icc/318-mbarushi-
mana/25509-en-en-130911-iccmbarushimana-registrar-flooded-with-victims-re-
quests1456014560> accessed 8 August 2013.
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adequately represented if one or two legal representatives represent thousands
of clients, who may very well have different and even opposing interests.
However, victims’ participation is enshrined in the Rome Statute and cannot
be “reconsidered” or become impracticable or symbolic. Nevertheless, the pro-
cedure and particularly the individual application process should be amended,
in order to provide meaningful participation for victims, but also safeguarding
the rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Therefore it is irrefut-
able that the original application process (used mainly in the Lubanga case,
Katanga and Ngudjolo case and the Bemba case), which requires case-by-case
evaluation by the Registry, the Chambers and the parties in the proceedings,
needs to be revisited, particularly for cases in which a large amount of victims
have allegedly suffered harm. Otherwise, the application procedure could
become contrary to the principles of fair trial (both for the accused and for
the victims themselves) since victims’ participation should not overburden
defence teams and, on the other hand, victims should be able to effectively
participate in proceedings.
Judge Van Den Wyngaert of the ICC commented that the “individualised
approach” may work in a national proceeding, but at the ICC it was becoming
overwhelming and could become unsustainable. She also suggested that a
collective approach should replace the individual system of victims’ participa-
tion. Most importantly, this ICC judge concluded that victims’ participation
should not only be respectful of the rights of the accused, it should also be
meaningful to the victims, who, within the individual application system, were
represented by common legal representatives, mostly in a “symbolic” man-
ner.82
Not surprisingly, Trial Chamber V in the two Kenya Situation cases (of
which Judge van de Wyngaert was a member for over a year) decided to
change the individual approach to victims’ participation. In these two cases
the judges concluded that victims wishing to participate in person in trial
proceedings need to submit the individual victim’s application form. However,
for all other victims, the Registry was instructed to create a database or record
requiring less detailed information. This general group of victims, who does
not need to submit individual application forms, will remain anonymous to
the parties. A common legal representative, who works closely with the OPCV,
represents these victims’ interests.83
This approach, which as Trial Chamber V stated is not a general ICC rule
but case-specific, could be a viable form of victims’ participation for other cases
82 Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some views
and concerns of an ICC trial judge, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume
44 (2012), p. 475 – 496.
83 Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October
2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para. 24.
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with a large number of victims or in which victims have security concerns.84
The criteria adopted by Trial Chamber V could also be beneficial for child
victims, but only if they are properly included within the general group of
victims to be represented by the common legal representative and the OPCV.
In this regard, Trial Chamber V instructed that all victims, including the
vulnerable ones, should be treated in a fair and consistent manner.85 However,
in order to fulfil this judicial instruction, outreach is essential so that victim’s
representation does not exclude certain groups of victims, including children,
women and other usually unrepresented or underrepresented groups. Likewise,
more resources should be allocated to the OPCV so that their involvement in
the proceedings in Kenya does not reduce the OPCV’s ability to support victims’
in other cases, while at the same time providing legal support to the common
legal representative in the Kenya situation cases. However, it is too soon to
thoroughly evaluate the impact that this new collective approach will have
in the Kenya situation cases.
A new approach that also distances itself from the individual victims’
applications has been taken in the pre-trial phase of the Gbagbo case. In this
case, the Single Judge instructed the Registry to explore the possibility to
change the ICC’s application process into a collective procedure.86 Moreover,
the Single Judge proposed a procedure that appears to guarantee effective
participation of individual victims within a group. First of all, the Single Judge
instructed that only Registry staff assist applicants in completing the collective
form.87 This direct involvement of the Registry could indeed reduce the risks
of having to rely on intermediaries, which as seen in the Lubanga case, may
be prejudicial to a fair trial.88 Furthermore, the fact that the Registry is
involved at this early stage may also act as “quality control” so that the appli-
cations that reach the Chamber are only those that are complete and in accord-
ance with the ICC provisions. Importantly, the Single Judge foresaw that some
“sensitive categories of victims” might not be represented in collective applica-
tions.89 Though the Single Judge referred exclusively to victims of sexual
violence, children could also be included in these special categories that should
not be excluded when collective applications are submitted.
84 Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October
2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para. 23.
85 Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October
2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para. 31.
86 Gbagbo case ‘Organisation of the Participation of Victims’ (6 February 2012) ICC02/1101/11-
29-Red.
87 Gbabgo case ‘Second decision on issues related to the victims’ application process’ (05 April
2012) ICC-02/11-01/11-86, para. 27.
88 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 482.
89 Gbabgo case ‘Second decision on issues related to the victims’ application process’ (05 April
2012) ICC-02/11-01/11-86, para. 29.
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Recently in the Pre-Trial proceedings in the Ntaganda case, the Single Judge
in that case followed the precedent of the Gbagbo case, albeit with some caveats.
The Single Judge adopted again the case-by-case approach, in which each
application will be evaluated individually. However, the Single Judge ordered
the Registry to group the applications in order to make their assessment more
effective. Moreover, the Single Judge created a 1-page application form, con-
taining such basic information that it will most possibly repeat and rarely
identify the specific situation of individuals and most likely identify a “pattern”
of crimes committed and harms suffered by groups of persons in specific
locations.90
It seems that most of the recent ICC case law reflects a shift from individual
application forms to a more collective approach. At least, the thorough and
highly individualised applications forms of the first ICC cases seem to have
been abandoned. In fact, it is not anticipated that judges in future ICC cases
will go back to the approach adopted in the ICC’s first trials, particularly
considering that it is resource intensive and thus has budgetary implications,
not only for the ICC as an institution, but also for overburdened defence teams.
This new collective approach or the recently adopted approach in the Ntaganda
case should be welcomed, particularly since it simplifies the sometimes cumber-
some and complicated individual application forms. However, the fact that
one or two legal representatives represent the views of often thousands of
clients is not tackled by these new “collective” or “group” approaches. More-
over, there is a patent risk that children, as a vulnerable group, may be
excluded from the general interests of the “group”. Moreover, although the
OPCV has been granted a protagonist role in this new participation system,
its role needs to be coupled with more resources. Otherwise, these new collect-
ive or group approaches could also become “symbolic” rather than real and
meaningful for individual victims.
Furthermore, in spite of its clear effectiveness, this new collective approach
could be of questionable legality. Although Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute
is general and thus permissible of this type of collective approach, Rule 89
of the RPE and Regulation 86 of the RoC reflect a different intention from their
drafters, which clearly foresees an individual application process. Although
this individual application process may seem obsolete in most current ICC cases
and burdensome for the parties, participants, Chambers and the ICC’s budget,
amendments to the relevant provisions, and not case law, should ultimately
change the individual application approach. Consequently, a reform to Rule
89 of the RPE and Regulation 86 of the RoC would be most appropriate, not
only to adapt the ICC’s legal framework to the reality of its situations and cases,
but also in order to harmonise the current conflicting case law between ICC
Chambers in different cases.
90 ‘Decision Establishing Principles on Victims’ Application Process’, 28 May 2013, ICC-01/04-
02/06-67.
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5.3.3 Legal Representation and Legal Aid
Pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, victims have the right to present
their views and concerns to the ICC, and this can be done either via direct
participation or via a legal representative. For practical reasons, and certainly
considering the rights of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial, the majority
of victims who have participated in court proceedings thus far have not
addressed judges in person, but through common legal representatives. Regard-
less of whether a collective or individual victims application process is adopted,
the practice of assigning a common legal representative to a group of victims
should remain in practice. However, as noted above, the views of individual
victims should not dissolve within the general interests of “the group”” or
much less, become unrepresented in light of the legal representative’s own
views.91
In this sense, it is important to separate victims into different groups of
common legal representatives when their interests may be conflicting or when
victims of a certain group may have specific needs. In the Lubanga case, for
example, victims were assigned to two groups of common legal representatives
and a limited group of victims (those with dual status of victims and prosecu-
tion witnesses) were assigned to the OPCV.92 In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case,
victims were grouped into two categories, given potential conflicts of interests.
One category of victims were the former child soldier victims and the other
the victims of other crimes.93 In the Bemba trial, victims were assigned to two
groups according to the geographical location of the crimes.94
As noted by the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice, dividing victims
into groups based on grounds such as geographical location, although effective
for some purposes (particularly access to the victims by the legal representat-
ive), could also ignore that victims within that same geographical location may
have distinct interests.95 In fact, by dividing the victims based on geographical
91 See for example: Ruto and Sang case ‘Common Legal Representative for Victims’ Observations
in Relation to the “Joint Defence Application for Change of Place Where the Court Shall
Sit for Trial’ (22 February 2013) ICC-01/09-01/11-620, paras 13-29. In this submission the
common legal representative stated that although victims opposed an in situ trial in Kenya
or Tanzania, he gave his personal view supporting an in situ trial.
92 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 20.
93 ‘Order on the organisation of common legal representation of victims’ (22 July 2009) ICC-01/
04-01/07-1328.
94 ‘Decision on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial’ (10 November
2010) ICC-01/05 01/08-1005. As of February 2011, approximately 858 victims were repres-
ented by one legal representative and 451 victims by another one. See: Women’s Initiatives
for Gender Justice (WIGJ), Legal Eye on the ICC, <http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/
LegalEye_Mar11/index.html.> accessed 8 August 2013.
95 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ), Legal Eye on the ICC, <http://www.iccwomen.
org/news/docs/LegalEye_Mar11/index.html.> accessed 8 August 2013.
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aspects, particular interests, such as those of child victims, could be neglected.
Thus, victims should be grouped taking into consideration not only geo-
graphical location, but also grounds such as those included in Article 21(3)
of the Rome Statute: age, gender, race, religion, ethnic or social status, etc.
Doing otherwise could lead to the discrimination of certain groups of victims
within the “general group” represented by a common legal representative.
Moreover, preferably, the common legal representative should have some kind
of expertise in dealing with victims of a certain group, particularly those
included in Rule 86 of the RPE.
Thus, in future cases, it would be appropriate to assign child victims and
adult victims distinct common legal representatives. Although not compulsory
in the requirements to be included in the list of counsel, it would be appro-
priate to take into account experience with children and their rights when a
lawyer is to be assigned to a group of child victims. This is necessary because
a legal representative working with children has a client-lawyer relation that
is particular, since the lawyer must not only follow the instructions of his or
her client, but also take into consideration that in following such instructions,
the child’s best interests and overall well-being must be taken into considera-
tion. However, the child’s legal representative must not act as a guardian ad
litem. This is in essence a different role that, if necessary, should be fulfilled
by another person assigned by the Court for that particular purpose.
Another key player in the representation of victims before the ICC is the
OPCV. In the ICC’s first cases, judges instructed the OPCV to act on behalf of
unrepresented victims during the application process (prior to their status
being granted). The OPCV also assisted legal representatives by providing legal
advice and research for their respective submissions before the Chambers. The
OPCV also worked along with other sections of the ICC, namely the VWU and
the VPRS, in their work in the field in the various situation countries.96
More recently, as mentioned above, the OPCV has also been assigned as
common legal representative of victims participating in the confirmation of
charges hearing in the Gbagbo case.97 It is important to note that in this case,
the Single Judge instructed that the OPCV should be assisted by a team member
with wide knowledge of the context and based in Cote d’Ivoire.98 Likewise,
the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Ntaganda case has also given a more prominent
96 ICC, Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), Representing Victims before the ICC: A
Manual for legal representatives (December 2010) 34, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/01A26724-F32B-4BE4-8B02-A65D6151E4AD/282846/LRBookletEng.pdf>accessed
8 August 2013.
97 Gbagbo case, ‘Decision on Victims’ Participation and Victims’ Common Legal Representation
at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings’ (4 June 2012) ICC-
02/11-01/11-138, para. 42-43.
98 ‘Decision on Victims’ Participation and Victims’ Common Legal Representation at the
Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings’ (4 June 2012) ICC-02/11-
01/11-138, para. 44.
178 Chapter 5
role to the OPCV.99 A similar approach has also been taken in the two Kenya
Situation cases, in which Trial Chamber V decided that the common legal
representative of victims should be based in Kenya and the OPCV would attend
hearings in representation of the victims and their common legal representat-
ive.100
Although it is too soon to evaluate the results of this new approach assign-
ing more duties to the OPCV, it appears to be favourable to victims, as it
combines legal expertise based in The Hague (the OPCV) with local expertise
and direct contact with victims in their own language and culture (field team
member or common legal representative). However, unless the OPCV is
strengthened with more staff and more resources, their assistance to the legal
representatives or directly to victims could become a mere allegory.
Moreover, the possibility for victims to participate in person and indi-
vidually in court should also remain viable, although taking into consideration
the appropriateness of this participation in person and the rights of the
accused. This possibility was put in practice in the first two trials before the
ICC, in which victims requested leave and were granted the opportunity to
testify under oath in trial.101 In the Bemba case, victims were also granted
the opportunity to request leave to present their views and concerns in person,
not via sworn testimony as in the previous trials, but simply as victims giving
an unsworn statement.102 Taking into consideration the appropriateness of
99 Ntaganda case ‘Decision Establishing Principles on Victims’ Application Process’, 28 May
2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-67.
100 Kenyatta and Muthaura case ‘Decision on victims’ representation and participation’ (3 October
2012) ICC-01/09-02/11-498, para. 59.
101 However, they did not address the ICC as victims, presenting their “interests and concerns”,
but as witnesses. In these two trials, victims were subject to examination and cross-examina-
tion and did not necessarily express their “views and concerns”, pursuant to Article 68(3)
of the Rome Statute. See: Lubanga case ‘Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/
0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express their views and concerns in person and to present
evidence during the trial’(26 June 2011) ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx; Katanga and Ngudjolo
case ‘Décision aux fins d’autorisation de comparition des victimes a/0381/09, a/0018/09,
a/0191/08 et pan/0363/09 agissant au nom de a/0363/09’(9 November 2010) ICC-01/04-01/
07-2517.
102 One representative requested leave for one of his clients to “express his/her views and
concerns” via an unsworn statement. The legal representatives of other victims requested
leave to call their clients to testify as witnesses and thus to give evidence under oath. They
also requested leave to introduce, as evidence, written statements derived from interviews
by the parties to their clients. One of the legal representatives submitted that these victims
could give evidence on crimes committed in other areas of the Central African Republic
referred to in the charges but not covered by the witnesses brought by the prosecution.
See: Bemba case ‘Order regarding applications by victims to present their views and concerns
or to present evidence’ (21 November 2011) ICC-01/05-01/08-1935; ‘Application by the
Legal Representative of Victims for leave to call victims to appear as witnesses and present
their views and concerns to the Chamber’ (6 December 2011) ICC-01/05-01/08-1990-tENG,
paras 3-4; ‘Requete afin d’autorisation de presentation d’éléments de preuves et subsidiare-
ment de presentation de vues et preoccupations par les victims’ (6 December 2011) ICC-01/
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these requests, and particularly the expeditiousness of proceedings and the
rights of the accused,103 the Chamber authorised two victims to present
evidence as witnesses and three victims to express their views and concerns
in person.104
However, the real impact of the direct participation of victims in trial
proceedings is yet to be seen. Victims who participated in the Lubanga case
trial were deemed unreliable by the Chamber and in fact were referred to the
Prosecutor as they possibly could have committed false testimony.105 More-
over, in the Ngudjolo case, the accused was acquitted as a result of lack of
evidence, including unreliable witnesses.106 Thus, it will be in the judgments
of the Katanga case and the Bemba case, as well as the upcoming Kenya cases,
in which the impact of victims’ participation in person might be evaluated.
Regardless of whether counsel representing victims is a common legal
representative or counsel is attached to the OPCV, it is important that they are
trained in children’s rights, particularly if there are child victims within the
group they are instructed to represent. The CRC Committee has stressed that
in order for children’s views to be transmitted correctly to the judges, legal
representatives must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the
various aspects of the judicial proceedings, but also have experience in working
with children.107 The legal representative must thus be aware that he or she
exclusively represents the interests of the child or children he or she represents,
and not the interests of others (i.e. an NGO, the ICC or even the child’s parents
or guardians). In fact, the Code of Conduct of Counsel already contains a
provision that states that in his or her relations with the client, counsel shall
05 01/08-1989-Conf (as referred to in ‘Second order regarding the applications of the legal
representatives of victims to present evidence and their views and concerns of victims the
public decision of the Chamber’ (21 December 2011) ICC-01/05 01/08-2027).
103 Bemba case, ‘Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims
to present evidence and their views and concerns of victims the public decision of the
Chamber’ (21 December 2011) ICC-01/05 01/08-2027), paras 10-19; ‘Decision on the supple-
mented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the
views and concerns of victims’(23 February 2012) ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, paras 5, 21-23.
104 The Chamber authorised victims to testify if the harm suffered and their testimony would
be representative of a larger number of victims. See: Bemba case, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138,
paras 37-39, 55. See also: Bemba case ‘Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner on
the Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138’ (13 May
2008) ICC-01/05-01/08-2140, paras 10-11.
105 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842.
106 Ngudjolo case, Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut, 18 December 2012,
ICC-01/04-02/12-3.
107 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, paras 35-37.
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take into account the client’s personal circumstances, particularly when the
client is a child.108
The Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
on child friendly justice have recommended that legal counsel to child victims
should be trained and be knowledgeable on children’s rights and related issues.
Most importantly, the Council of Europe emphasised that children are fully-
fledge clients, with their own rights, and that lawyers should bring forth the
opinion of the child. Furthermore, in cases where conflicts of interest exist
between the child and the parents, a guardian ad litem could be appointed.109
As noted before, it is important to distinguish the figure of a legal represent-
ative from that of a guardian ad litem. The legal representative is the attorney
or legal agent of the child who should represent the views of his or her client,
even if these are in conflict with the views of the child’s parents or guardians
or even with his or her “best interests”. In this sense, the figure of the legal
representative recognises the child as a client, capable to instruct counsel in
legal proceedings. On the other hand, the guardian ad litem is of a contrary
nature, as it does not recognise the child as a capable party, and in fact is
someone (usually also a lawyer) who is appointed to act on behalf the “incom-
petent” child and thus protect and foresee that his/her best interests are
protected and safeguarded throughout the judicial proceedings.110 As noted
above, the ICC also has the possibility to appoint a child-support person during
his/her interaction with the ICC. This support person may be an ICC staff
member, but may also be someone that the child trusts, such as a mentor,
guardian or adult family member.
Training of counsel is a key issue. Only if they are properly trained they
will be able to address the interests of their clients, and particular groups
within those victims, such as children or, as in the Bemba case, victims of sexual
violence. Another crucial aspect regarding victims’ representation is feedback
and communication between victims (clients) and legal representatives (their
lawyers). In more recent cases, teams of victims’ legal representatives have
also been assigned field staff that work in the country where the victims are
and thus can be in more direct contact with them. For example, in preparation
for the trial in the case of the Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, the Registry has
proposed that the teams of common legal representatives be comprised of two
counsel and a case manager, but also legal consultants or field assistants, who
may assist the counsel in “maintaining communication with victims who are
located in the different countries” and who preferably “have an established
108 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel (Adopted on
2 December 2005) ICC-ASP/4/Res.1, Article 9 para. 2.
109 Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on child-friendly justice (17 November 2010).
110 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines “guardian ad litem” as a guardian appointed by the
court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party. Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th Ed 1999).
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relationship with the victims in question or have a background in outreach
or victim support”.111 This in fact is essential in order to preserve the client-
lawyer communication that is necessary to adequately represent the views
and concerns of individual victims, be it 3 victims (as was the case in the pre-
trial of Lubanga case) or thousands of victims (as is the current case in the trial
of Bemba case).
If there are child victims, it is needless to say that field staff working with
legal representatives must have training on children’s rights and particularly
on how to identify the best interests of these child victims and preserve their
well-being and avoid re-victimisation during their participation, particularly
in light of Rule 86 of the RPE. However, if a conflict of interest should arise
between the child-client instructions and his or her best interests, ICC judges
could appoint a guardian ad litem or a similar figure. A field officer with close
relationship to the child could be in the best position to detect such conflicts
of interests and inform an ICC-appointed legal representative, a guardian ad
litem or a child support person, as well as the judges, without delay.
5.3.4 Modalities of participation
As noted above, victims may participate in person in ICC proceedings. How-
ever, this is only one possible aspect of their participation in ICC proceedings,
pursuant to Article 68(3), insofar as this participation is appropriate and not
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Although victims participate in domestic criminal proceedings
in many jurisdictions, victims’ participation in the ICC is unique, since inter-
national crimes and thus proceedings to judge them have special features that
must be considered when deciding upon the appropriate modalities of victim
participation.112 Moreover, modalities of victims’ participation will also
depend on the stage of the proceedings. Thus, while victims’ participation
may be limited in the initial investigation stages, their participation should
reach its peak in reparations proceedings.
5.3.4.1 Pre-Trial Stage – Investigation
Proceedings at the ICC initiate differently, according to the triggering mechan-
ism of the ICC’s jurisdiction. When a State or the UNSC refers a situation to
the ICC (pursuant to Article 13(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute), victims’ parti-
111 Prosecutor v Banda and Jerbo ‘Proposal for the common legal representation of victims’
(25 August 2011) ICC-02/05-03/09-203.
112 Anne-Marie De Brouwer and Mikaela Heikkila, in: Goran Sluiter and others (eds), Inter-
national Criminal Procedure, Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 1341.
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cipation at the pre-trial stage is minimal insofar as there is not a concrete case
against an accused.
In the first investigations before the ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I originally
determined that victims were “an independent voice” vis-à-vis the Prosecutor
in the investigation stage and that their participation was warranted at this
early stage given that “the outcome of the criminal proceedings is of decisive
importance for obtaining reparations for harms suffered”.113 However, this
initial jurisprudence of the ICC was halted by the Appeals Chamber determina-
tion that victims’ interests cannot be affected “in general” at the investigation
stage. The Appeals Chamber reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision
authorising victims to participate in the pre-trial proceedings of the “DRC
Situation” which determined that “the personal interests of victims are affected
in general at the investigation stage, because the participation of victims at
this stage can serve to clarify the facts, to punish perpetrators of crimes and
to request reparations for the damage suffered”. The Pre-Trial Chamber had
concluded that victims’ participation at this early stage was important because
“it is at this stage that persons allegedly responsible for the crimes from which
they suffered must be identified as a first step towards their indictment”.114
The Appeals Chamber was not convinced by this reasoning, and determined
that the Pre-Trial Chamber “cannot grant the procedural status of victim
entailing a general right to participate in the investigation”, as this early stage
cannot be seen as “judicial proceedings” affecting the interests of victims.115
Although the Appeals Chamber did envisage other instances in which
victims could participate in pre-trial judicial proceedings prior to an arrest
warrant against a particular individual, its decision in fact limited almost all
possibilities of intervention by victims regarding the prosecution’s investigation
once a situation is referred by a State Party or the UNSC, but before a warrant
of arrest or summons to appear is issued. In fact, the Appeals Chamber has
ruled that, contrary to what had been established by the Pre-Trial Chamber,
113 DRC Situation ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS
1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’ (17 January 2006) ICC-01/04 101-tEN-Corr,
paras 51-52.
114 DRC situation ‘Corrigendum to the “Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed
in Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by a/0004/06
to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 to a/0110/
06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06,
a/0220/06 to a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to a/0236/06,
a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/0239/06 and
a/0241/06 to a/0250/06”’ (31 January 2008) ICC-01/04-423-Corr, paras 63 and 72.
115 DRC situation ‘Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings
in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007
and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 24 December 2007’ (19 December 2008) ICC-01/04-556, paras 45, 46 and 57.
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the investigation is to be carried out exclusively by the Prosecutor.116 Although
victims’ participation at this early stage could have had an impact on some
of the early situations referred to by State Parties to the ICC, which have been
appraised as one-sided or as targeting specific anti-government groups,117
this possibility was halted at an early stage in the ICC history.
Notwithstanding the above, a very different situation occurs when the Pros-
ecutor, using its proprio motu powers, decides to open an investigation in a
particular State or Situation under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. In this
particular instance, the Rome Statute clearly foresees victims’ representations,
which can be made to the Pre-Trial Chamber. In fact, in order to receive such
representations, the Prosecutor has the obligation to inform victims of his
intention to request authorisation to investigate under Article 15 of the Rome
Statute, either directly to those victims known to him or her or the VWU or
by general means (i.e. press release). In practice, the ICC Prosecutor has issued
general announcements inviting victims to make representations under Article
15(3) of the Rome Statute. The approach taken by the Pre-Trial Chambers,
however, has been somewhat different.
Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Kenya Situation instructed the Registry, parti-
cularly the VPRS to: (1) identify, to the extent possible, the community leaders
of the affected groups to act on behalf of those victims who may wish to make
representations (collective representation); (2) receive victims’ representations
(collective and/or individual); (3) conduct an assessment, in accordance with
paragraph 8 of this order, whether the conditions set out in rule 85 of the Rules
have been met; and (4) summarize victims’ representations into one con-
solidated report with the original representations annexed thereto.118 Mean-
while, in the Côte d’Ivoire Situation, Pre-Trial Chamber III did not instruct
the Registry to identify victims’ or victims’ groups, but instead relied on the
general notice given by the Prosecutor and ordered that any representation
received was to be transmitted to the Registry. The Registry was then ordered
116 DRC situation ‘Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings
in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007
and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 24 December 2007’ (19 December 2008) ICC-01/04-556, paras 48-51.
117 See for example: Hakan Friman, ‘The International Criminal Court: Investigations into crimes
committed in the DRC and Uganda, What is next?’(2004) African Security Review. See also:
Ivana Sekularac, ‘Gbagbo faces charges of crimes against humanity – ICC’ Reuters (The
Hague, 30 November 2011) <http://in.reuters.com/Article/2011/11/30/ivorycoast-gbagbo-
idINDEE7AT07V20111130> accessed 8 August 2013; Mark Kersten, ‘The ICC’s Next Top
Prosecutor: the Candidates’ (Justice in Conflict, 3 June 2011) <http://justiceinconflict.org/
2011/06/03/the-iccs-next-top-prosecutor-the-candidates> accessed 8 August 2013.
118 Kenya situation ‘Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning
Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute’ (10 December 2009)
ICC-01/09-4.
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to summarise the representations into a report.119 Notwithstanding the pro-
cedural differences between the two pre-trial chambers, victims’ representations
were effectively received in both situations and were taken into consideration
by both pre-trial chambers when determining whether to authorise an invest-
igation. However, an approach such as that one taken in Kenya could be more
beneficial for child victims, as they might not be informed properly about the
possibility to make Article 15 representations, unless information is specifically
targeted to them as a group. Thus, relying solely on the “general means”, may
leave out certain groups of victims (including among them children) that
simply do not have access to the general means of information (i.e. newspapers,
radio or internet).
What is interesting about the procedure of Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute
is that victims do not need to submit an application for participation but can
simply send their representations directly to the ICC, either by postal mail,
e-mail or even submitted in person at the seat in The Hague. Moreover, they
can act in a completely anonymous manner or send information on behalf
of a “group” (i.e. victims of torture) and not on behalf of individuals that could
be subject to retaliation. These representations also vary in format, size and
contents, and thus are not subject to requirements such as those established
by ICC Chambers (i.e. identification documents). For example, the ICC has
received representations in the form of standard application forms seeking
participation, but also audio-video material documenting crimes allegedly
committed in a given situation.120
Most importantly, in both situations in which victims’ representations have
been submitted, the Pre-Trial Chambers have taken into consideration the
information contained therein to establish if the criteria to authorise an inves-
tigation under Article 15 of the Rome Statute were met. For example, victims
representations contained information related to crimes allegedly committed,
the contextual elements of the crimes (such as the existence of an armed conflict
or the wide or systematic nature of an attack). Most importantly, victims’
representations also contained information on the victims’ interests in the
involvement of the ICC in a given situation.121 This of course is possible
considering the lowest evidentiary threshold required to open an investigation,
which certainly would not be possible to establish the individual criminal
responsibility under Article 74 of the Rome Statute. Thus, it seems that for
many victims (who may not wish to participate directly in proceedings or who
119 Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire (Cote d’Ivoire Situation), ‘Order to the Victims
Participation and Reparations Section Concerning Victims’ Representations Pursuant to
Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute’ (6 July 2011) ICC-02/11-6, 6.
120 Côte d’Ivoire situation ‘Report on Victims’ Representations’ (30 August 2011) ICC 02/11-11-
Red.
121 Côte d’Ivoire situation ‘Report on Victims’ Representations’ (30 August 2011) ICC 02/11-11-
Red; Kenya situation ‘Public Redacted Version of Report Concerning Victims’ Representations
(ICC-01/09-6-Conf-Exp) and annexes 2 to 10’ (29 March 2010) ICC-01/09-6-Red.
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may fear retaliation and thus wish to remain anonymous) representations
under Article 15(3) is the most appropriate means of participation.
One of the major challenges of victims’ representations is the access that
victims have to this procedure. In Kenya, the Registry was instructed to carry
out field missions to inform victims about their rights and collect their
views.122 The Registry noted that in that country victims have limited access
to media and communications technology and that the OTP general notice was
inaccessible to most victims and was well-understood by very few persons
in the country.123 In fact, in both the Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire situations,
victims’ representations received were in their majority from persons in their
middle age and predominantly men. Likewise some ethnicities or geographical
areas were more predominant than others.124 In the Kenya Situation, the
Registry noted that, despite efforts made by the VPRS to include as many
women as possible, “this was not always easy to achieve”. In reference to
children, the Registry contented itself with regretting “that it was not ultimately
able to identify appropriate representatives to specifically speak on behalf of
victims who are children or young people” and their views were consequently
“not visible in this process”.125
Thus, it is clear that ICC practice has not included children in Article 15
proceedings and consequently children are among those who have been
excluded, despite field visits and other outreach activities carried out by the
Registry. In fact, in the decision authorising the investigation in Cote d’Ivoire,
the Pre-Trial Chamber instructed the Registry to carry out general information
campaigns paying particular attention to the needs of groups of victims,
including children, women, victims of sexual violence and different ethnic
groups. The Chamber also instructed the Registry to report to the Chamber
if a group of victims or crimes had not been properly included or reflected
122 Kenya situation ‘Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning
Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute’ (10 December 2009)
ICC-01/09-4.
123 Kenya situation ‘Public Redacted Version of Report Concerning Victims’ Representations
(ICC-01/09-6-Conf-Exp) and annexes 2 to 10’ (29 March 2010) ICC-01/09-6-Red, paras 32
and 35.
124 In the Kenya Situation, there were no victims’ representations of children, the youngest
being that of a 19-year old person. The average age of the persons who made individual
representations was 44 years. Sixty per cent of the victims were men, see ‘Public Redacted
Version Of Corrigendum to the Report on Victims’ Representations (ICC-01/09-17-Conf-Exp-
Corr) and annexes 1 and 5’ (29 March 2010) ICC-01/09-17-Corr-Red, paras 40-45. In the
Cote d’Ivoire Situation, out of 655 individual representations received, 20 where from
persons aged 0-20 years old while the majority (232) were 31-50 years old. Of these repres-
entations (655), 423 were men and 179 were women, while 53 did not specify gender, see
Côte d’Ivoire situation ‘Report on Victims’ Representations’ (30 August 2011) ICC 02/11-11-
Red, paras 35-36.
125 Kenya situation, ‘Public Redacted Version Of Corrigendum to the Report on Victims’ Repres-
entations (ICC-01/09-17-Conf-Exp-Corr) and annexes 1 and 5’ (29 March 2010) ICC-01/09-17-
Corr-Red, paras 48-49.
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in the victims’ representations received under Article 15 of the Rome
Statute.126 Clear instructions such as these are welcomed. However, the
Registry must fulfil these directives and ICC judges should follow-up and
monitor this fulfilment. Thus, the ICC must go beyond “regretting” this ex-
clusion of certain groups such as children, and thus identify them and dis-
seminate information in a child-friendly manner (as explained in the previous
section on outreach above), so that children can make meaningful representa-
tions under Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute.
5.3.4.2 Pre-Trial Stage – Confirmation of Charges
Although victims’ participation in the initial pre-trial stage of an investigation
has been limited, it has been widely accepted in the pre-trial stage, once
warrants of arrest or summons to appear have been issued and thus individual
suspects and charges have been identified by the prosecution. Victims have
the possibility to make submissions as regards requests for conditional release
and may address the Pre-Trial Chamber by way of both oral and written
observations on either procedural or substantive aspects raised at the confirma-
tion of charges hearing. Under the Rome Statute, victims also have the possibil-
ity to make submissions on the prosecution’s decision not to investigate (Article
53 of the Rome Statute, Rules 93, 107 and 109 of the RPE), on measures for the
preservation of evidence (Articles 56(3) and 57(3)(c) of the Rome Statute), on
requests for protective or special measures (Rules 87 and 88 of the RPE), on
the decision to hold a confirmation of charges hearing in absentia (Rules 93
and 125 of the RPE), and on proceedings for the amendment of the charges
brought against the suspect (Rules 93 and 128 of the RPE).
Victims in the pre-trial stage have overall remained anonymous vis-à-vis
the defence, and thus have solely had access to the public record of the case
and their legal representatives have attended public sessions of the confirma-
tion of charges hearing.127
During the confirmation of charges hearing, victims (through their legal
representatives) have the right to make opening and closing statements.
However, the Chambers have interpreted that this right is limited to the
charges brought by the prosecution against the accused, and thus victims
126 Côte d’Ivoire Situation ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisa-
tion of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire’ (3 October 2011)
ICC 02/11-14, para. 211.
127 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/
06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing’ (22 September 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-462-
tEN, 7-8; Bemba case, ‘Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation’ (12 December 2008) ICC-01/
05-01/08-320, paras 103-107; The Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (Abu Garda case)
‘Decision on victims’ modalities of participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case’ (6 October
2009) ICC-02/05-02/09-136, paras 11- 18.
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cannot add new charges, or indeed extend the factual basis of the charges.128
Hence, ICC practice thus far has been emphatic that investigations and the
eventual decision to bring charges against suspects is an exclusive power of
the Prosecutor and thus victims’ participation in this regard is not appropriate.
Regretfully, this ICC practice impedes victims from addressing crimes com-
mitted against children if these have not been included in the charges brought
against a suspect. Pursuant to the Preamble of the Rome Statute, the ICC was
established to stop impunity for the commission of all crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Hence, although the Prosecutor has the power to choose
his or her prosecutorial strategy and limit the charges brought against indi-
viduals, Article 54(1) of the Rome Statute also provides that the Prosecutor
“shall” establish the truth, extending the investigation to cover all facts and
evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility
under the Rome Statute. Thus, victims’ participation, particularly when the
Prosecutor has omitted from the charges relevant facts that could be of the
victims’ interests to establish the truth, could be valuable at the early stages
of the confirmation of charges.
However, victims could still address in their submissions the children’s
dimension of the crimes included in the charges and how the crimes particular-
ly affected or caused harm to child victims. For example, if the prosecution
charges a suspect with crimes of sexual violence, victims or their legal repres-
entatives could make submissions at the pre-trial stage as to how these crimes
particularly or disproportionately affected children or how these crimes caused
particular harm to children. Hence, although it is ultimately the Prosecutor’s
decision as to what will be included in the “facts and circumstances” of the
charges, victims’ submissions in this regard could encourage the Prosecutor
to amend the charges or recharacterise the facts in a given case.
5.3.4.3 Trial Stage
In reference to the trial stage, Rule 93 of the RPE specifically refers to phases
of the trial in which victims may participate, including the decision on the
joinder or severance of trials (Rule 136 of the RPE), proceedings on the ad-
mission of guilt (Rule 139 of the RPE), and assurance of non-prosecution (Article
93(2) of the Rome Statute and Rule 191 of the RPE). However, in the practice
of the ICC thus far, victim’s participation has gone well beyond these examples.
The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case set the general guidelines on matters
related to victims’ participation in trial proceedings.129 The principles estab-
128 Katanga and Ngudgolo case ’Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural
Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case’ (13 May 2008) ICC-01/04-01/07-474,
para. 122.
129 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
para. 84.
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lished in that decision were subsequently followed, at least in general terms,
by the Trial Chambers in the Katanga and Ngdujolo case and Bemba case, and
confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.130
In general terms, participation at the trial stage has been decided on the
basis of evidence or issues under consideration at any particular point in time
and victims wishing to participate should set out the nature and the detail
of the proposed intervention in a discrete written application.131 Moreover,
in accordance with Rule 131(2) of the RPE, victims have been granted the right
to consult the record of the proceedings, including the index, subject to any
restrictions concerning confidentiality and the protection of national security
information. In principle, victims have had the right to access and receive
notification of all public filings and those confidential filings that concern them,
insofar as this does not breach protective measures in place.132 Victims have
also had the possibility to participate in public hearings and to file written
submissions and participate in closed or ex parte hearings or file confidential
or ex parte submissions, depending on the circumstances.133 Victims have
also presented evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused
and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence during trial pro-
ceedings.134 Victims have also been granted the right to lead evidence related
to reparations during the trial proceedings under Regulation 56 of the RoC.135
130 Bemba case ‘Corrigendum to Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on
86 applications by victims to participate in the proceedings’ (12 July 2010) ICC-01/05 01/08-
807-Corr; Katanga and Ngudgolo case ’Décision relative aux modalités de participation des
victimes au stade des débats sur le fond’ (22 January 2010) ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, paras
81-84; and ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber
II of 22 January 2010 Entitled “Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial”’
(16 July 2010) ICC-01/04-01/07-2288; Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Pros-
ecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of
18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1432.
131 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 101-104.
132 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 105-107.
133 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 112-115.
134 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 108-111; Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence
against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July
2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, paras 93-105; Katanga and Ngudgolo case ’Décision relative aux
modalités de participation des victimes au stade des débats sur le fond’ (22 January 2010)
ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, paras 81-84; and ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled “Decision on the Modalities
of Victim Participation at Trial”’ (16 July 2010) ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, 37-40; Bemba case
‘Corrigendum to Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications
by victims to participate in the proceedings’ (12 July 2010) ICC-01/05 01/08-807-Corr paras
29-37.
135 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 119-122.
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Regarding individuals with dual status of victim and witness (which in
some instances included children), the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case
adopted some key principles. The Chamber rejected the suggestion that victims
appearing before the ICC in person should automatically be treated as
witnesses.136 It also concluded that an individual’s participation as a victim
and witness in the proceedings should not compromise his or her security,
but should not grant him or her any right in addition to those of someone
who is only a victim or a witness.137
In cases involving children, victims’ legal representatives could offer crucial
evidence to the Chamber in the interests of their clients. For example, expert
reports on trauma or the psychological impact crimes charged have on
children, could be useful for sentencing and reparations purposes. However,
expert evidence could also be offered so that the judicial process adapts to
the needs of child victims pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. For example, in cases
in which child victims/witnesses will participate in person, the legal represent-
atives could offer an expert on judicial processes with children, so that the
proceedings are carried out in a manner consistent with the rights of the
accused, but also with the needs and well-being of child victims and witnesses.
Equally, the legal representatives could request that a special procedure is
adopted in which a child or group of child victims address the judges via
video-link by way of an unsworn statement, thus avoiding the burden of
travelling to The Hague and give testimony in court.138 Likewise, legal repres-
entatives of child victims could suggest in situ visits of the Chamber, for
example to meet with child victims in their own town or country. For example,
in cases involving child soldiers, the Trial Chamber could visit a demobilisation
centre or a former military camp.139
5.3.4.4 Appeal Stage
It is important to note that in the ICC system victims have not been granted
with the right to file an appeal for a decision affecting their interests. The only
possibility that exists in the Rome Statute is that of an appeal against a repar-
ations order.
136 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119,
paras 132-133.
137 ‘Decision on Certain Practicalities regarding Individuals who have the Dual Status of
Witness and Victim’ (5 June 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1379, para. 52.
138 This would be in line with the UN Guidelines, which state that children’s right to participa-
tion includes their right to express their views “in his or her own words” and thus contri-
bute to decisions affecting his or her life. See: UN Guidelines, para. 8(d).
139 ICC Press and Media, ‘ICC judges in case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui visit Ituri’
(Press release 27 January 2012) < http://www.flickr.com/photos/icc-cpi/sets/7215762905139
4811/> accessed 8 August 2013.
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However, victims have been granted status to participate in appeals pro-
ceedings, although their participatory status is not automatic, and thus does
not continue if they participated in the original proceedings giving rise to the
appeal. Hence, victims should apply for participation and parties must make
new submissions on whether or not they should be granted participatory
status. In general, victims who have participated in the proceedings giving
rise to the appeal have been granted status to participate in the appeal. How-
ever, this practice (adopted following an Appeals Chamber decision on this
matter)140 has proven burdensome, not only to victims, who have to submit
an application to participate, but also to the parties, who need to submit
observations on the matter. This has also inevitably affected the expeditiousness
of interlocutory appeal proceedings, adding a further procedural step to these
appeals.141 Thus, it would be more favourable, not only to the victims, but
also to the parties in the proceedings, and for the expeditiousness of proceed-
ings as a whole, if victims would have the automatic right to participate in
appeals of decisions in which they participated.
5.4 PROTECTION OF CHILD VICTIMS AND WITNESSES
5.4.1 Obligation to protect and support
Throughout the Rome Statute and other ICC provisions, protection of victims
and witnesses is regulated, taking into consideration the particular needs of
different groups of victims, including children.
Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute, which is the main provision in this regards,
states the following:
‘The ICC shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psycho-
logical well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the
ICC shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender as defined in
Article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but
not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence
against children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the
investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be pre-
judicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial
trial.’
140 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire
de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (13 February 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-824.
141 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire
de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (13 February 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-824.
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Although this provision refers in general to the “Court” and thus involves
all organs of the ICC that interact with victims and witnesses, it gives special
consideration to the Prosecutor, who shall take appropriate measures, parti-
cularly in the initial stages of the investigation, when other organs of the ICC
may not yet be involved. In fact, as early on as the moment when a situation
is referred to the ICC pursuant to Article 13 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor
may already adopt protective measures vis-à-vis individuals at risk (i.e. by
withholding information to States and pursuant to Article 54(3)(f) of the Rome
Statute). Thus, it is clear that the Prosecutor has an obligation to protect
individuals interacting with the ICC at the very outset of the ICC’s involvement,
even when judicial proceedings have not yet started and Chambers have not
been seized of any matter.
In early investigation stages, the OTP has an obligation to protect children
with whom it interacts, particularly any potential child witness that is inter-
viewed at this early stage. The Innocenti Research Center has proposed that
investigators collaborate only with trustworthy, impartial, professional, reliable
and reputable organisations, including child protection agencies, when working
through “intermediaries” in the field.142 Furthermore, it recommends that
the OTP develops guidelines for all members of the Office that interact with
child victims and witnesses.143
Referring to children in particular, the Rome Statute and the RPE refer to
the need to have persons with expertise in children. Article 43(2) of the Rome
Statute provides that the Prosecutor shall appoint advisers with legal expertise
in issues, including, inter alia, violence against children. As noted by the
Innocenti Research Center, to date the OTP has not appointed any adviser on
violence against children and it is unclear whether it has an expert on
children’s rights among its staff.144 However, as stated previously, the OTP
has established the GCU, which is part of its Investigations Division. The GCU
has ensured the inclusion of child-friendly guidelines throughout the investigat-
ive process and organises trainings to staff members on child-related issues.145
The GCU may also travel to the situation country to identify possible inter-
mediaries and modes of operating. Furthermore, a psychologist of the GCU
accompanies every investigation team that is to interview children.146
142 Cecile Aptel, Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of Inter-
national Criminal Courts (Innocenti Working Paper, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre
August 2010) 30.
143 Cecile Aptel, Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of Inter-
national Criminal Courts (Innocenti Working Paper, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre
August 2010) 31.
144 Cecile Aptel, Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of Inter-
national Criminal Courts (Innocenti Working Paper, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre
August 2010) 33.
145 Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the ICC (September 2006) 35.
146 Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the ICC (September 2006) 36.
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The Rome Statute also provides in Article 43(6) for the creation of the VWU.
This provision provides that the VWU, as an entity within the Registry:
‘(…) shall provide, in consultation with the OTP, protective measures and security
arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims
who appear before the ICC and others who are at risk on account of testimony given
by such witnesses.’
In light of this provision, the VWU protects three categories of persons: a)
witnesses who appear before the ICC; b) victims who appear before the ICC;
and) other persons at risk on account of testimony given by others. Thus, ICC
provisions refer to a broader group of persons, beyond those witnesses and
victims that appear before the ICC to include, for example, family members
that could be at risk.147 Therefore the ICC’s scope of protection goes beyond
victims with participatory status and witnesses appearing in court and may
include their family members, and even third persons referred to in their
testimony as well as intermediaries, translators, etc., who may be at risk.
Pursuant to Rule 17 of the RPE, the VWU should provide victims and
witnesses and others at risk with adequate protective and security measures,
including short-term and long-term plans for their protection. The VWU should
also assist them in obtaining medical and psychological assistance. Pursuant
to this provision, the VWU should also play an active role in making recom-
mendations and offering trainings to other organs of the ICC on issues of
trauma, sexual violence, security and confidentiality and codes of conduct.
Rule 19 of the RPE foresees that the VWU should have experts, among other
areas, on children and particularly traumatised children. Moreover, Rule 17
of the RPE foresees that the VWU may appoint a child-support person to assist
a child witness through all stages of the proceedings. A similar “support
person” is foreseen in the UN Model Law. This support person should accom-
pany the child from his or her initial interaction with the ICC (i.e. first interview
with an OTP investigator) until the end of the judicial process (i.e. trial and
eventual reparations process). The support person should not only provide
emotional support, but also act as a liaison between the child and his or her
family and legal representative. The support person could also carry out the
familiarisation process and even request protective measures on behalf of the
child.148
147 For example, Rule 93 of the RPE refers to victims participating in proceedings and “other
victims”, while Regulation 93(1) of the RoR refers to “persons at risk of the territory of
the State where an investigation is taking place” and Regulation 95 of the RoR refers to
a “person at risk of harm or death” while Regulation 96 of the RoR refers to “others
considered at risk of harm and/or death on account of a testimony given by a witness or
as result of their contact with the ICC”.
148 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of
Crime: Model Law and Related Commentary (April 2009), articles 16-19.
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In practice, the VWU works with protected individuals, including children,
in three main areas: a) protection; b) support; and c) operations. Regarding
protection, the VWU has developed best practices during the last years and
offers procedural protective measures (subject to authorisation of the relevant
Chamber), protective measures outside the ICC, and lastly, a relocation pro-
gramme. In relation to support, the VWU provides support to victims and
witnesses appearing before the ICC, in order to ensure their psychological well-
being, dignity and privacy. This assistance commences from the moment the
person is due to travel to the ICC and continues 24 hours per day and seven
days per week, until the person returns to his or her home or until needed.
Finally, regarding operations, the VWU makes the logistical and immigration
arrangements to ensure that victims and witnesses appear before the ICC.149
Notwithstanding its broad mandate, it is important to note that the VWU
cannot act alone, as it will only implement its protection mechanisms upon
referral by a party, participant or the Chamber. Thus, for example, when the
prosecution considers that a witness or potential witness may be at risk, it
will refer his or her situation to the VWU, who will then make an assessment
on the protective measures or assistance required.150
Ultimately the judges of the ICC will decide on judicial protective measures
and other special measures that could be adopted to avoid the re-victimisation
of a child witness during judicial proceedings. Thus, it is essential that pur-
suant to Article 36(8)(b) of the Rome Statute, individuals with expertise in,
inter alia, violence against children, are elected as judges.
5.4.2 Protective and special measures available to child victims and witnesses
The Lubanga case and the Katanga and Ngudjolo case before the ICC have been
challenging in many ways, particularly since they both involved crimes alleged-
ly committed against children. While in the ad-hoc tribunals only a few young
adults gave evidence to events that had occurred when they were still under
18 years of age, in the ICC’s first cases, a significant group of victims and
witnesses in these proceedings were children either at the time of the events
149 ICC, Structure of the Court, Protection, Victims and Witnesses Unit, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/protection/Pages/victims%20and%20witness%
20unit.aspx> accessed 8 August 2013.
150 At the beginning of judicial proceedings this interaction between the VWU and the prosecu-
tion was not at all clear, and it actually led to various Chambers’ rulings on the matter.
See: Lubanga case ‘Decision on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures
and other Procedural Matters’ (24 April 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1311-Anx; ‘Decision on
the prosecution and defence applications for leave to appeal the Trial Chamber’s “Decision
on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural
Matters”’(16 December 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1557.
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or at the time of their interaction with the ICC.151 In the SCSL, on the other
hand, the prosecution called children to testify for cases involving child recruit-
ment. Thus, its practice and “lessons learned” could be useful for the ICC in
current and future cases involving child witnesses.152
In the Lubanga case, ten former child soldiers testified.153 Although most
of these witnesses were already young adults by the time they testified, they
were still children when ICC investigators first contacted them.154 As stated
by An Michels in her experience with witnesses in the SCSL, witnesses older
than 18 who were children when the crimes were committed should still be
considered child witnesses at the time they testify. She explains that this
decision responds firstly to the reality that the exact age of many former child
soldiers cannot be established. Furthermore, former child soldiers who spent
years fighting during a crucial time of their development may show a signi-
ficant difference between their mental age and their biological age.155
The CRC Committee has established that children cannot be heard effectively
(either as victims or witnesses) when the environment is intimidating, hostile,
insensitive or inappropriate for her or his age. The CRC Committee has stated
that proceedings should be accessible and child appropriate, and measures
must be adopted, such as child-friendly design of courtrooms, clothing of
judges and lawyers, sight screens and separate waiting rooms.156 Further-
more, the CRC Committee has established that the child should be informed
about issues such as the availability of health, psychological and social services
and there should be a support mechanism in place and protective measures
available.157 The CRC Committee has also recommended that children be
151 In general, only four per cent of the ad-hoc tribunal’s witnesses were between 18-30 years
old when they testified before these tribunals (and thus possibly children at the time of
the events). Furthermore, witnesses who were children when the crimes occurred but adults
at the time of the testimony were treated like any other adult witness. Thus, little can be
taken from the ad-hoc tribunals’ practice regarding child witnesses. See: Cecile Aptel,
Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of International Criminal
Courts (Innocenti Working Paper, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre August 2010) 28.
152 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by
Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict (September
2011) 14.
153 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by
Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict (September
2011) 15.
154 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 32.
155 An Michels, Protecting and supporting children as witnesses: lessons learned from the Special Court
of Sierra Leone; cited in Cecile Aptel, Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The
Contribution of International Criminal Courts (Innocenti Working Paper, UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre August 2010) 28.
156 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 34.
157 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 64.
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provided with clear explanations as to how, when and where the hearing will
take place and who the participants will be.158 In reference to this last recom-
mendation, the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
has also stated that expectations of children must be managed as many po-
tential child witnesses or victims may have an erroneous idea as to what they
can obtain for being witnesses (it may seem all too exciting from a child’s point
of view).159 Similar recommendations are made by the UN Guidelines, which
could be advisable for future ICC proceedings involving child witnesses and
victims.160
Since the ICC relies greatly on intermediaries working in the field in situ-
ation countries, it is necessary that these individuals and organisations are
trained and supervised in order to prevent manipulation or any adverse contact
between intermediaries and child victims or witnesses.161 Ultimately, the
child’s contact with a given intermediary could also affect his or her reliability
as a witness. In fact in the Lubanga case, only one of the ten child witnesses
was found to be reliable by the Trial Chamber, as the credibility and reliability
of the other child witnesses were significantly affected by their involvement
with certain intermediaries. These nine individuals were not relied on by the
Chamber and those that had dual status finally lost their right to participate
as victims in the case.162 As the Trial Chamber concluded in the Lubanga case,
these children were potentially taken advantage of by the intermediaries and,
irrespective of their credibility or reliability, they were children exposed to
armed conflict and thus vulnerable to manipulation.163 Thus, protective
measures for children should not only encompass judicial and non-judicial
measures vis-à-vis supporters of the accused person, but also in respect of
persons that often work for the ICC in the field, such as the intermediaries
discussed above.
In the ICC’s practice so far, victims and witnesses may be granted judicial
and non-judicial protective and special measures. As regards the judicial
measures, the RPE provides the following:
158 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 41.
159 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by
Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict (September
2011) 13.
160 UN Guidelines, para. 30(d).
161 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 482-483.
162 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 207 and 478-484.
163 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, para. 482.
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‘Rule 87 Protective measures
1. Upon the motion of the Prosecutor or the defence or upon the request of a
witness or a victim or his or her legal representative, if any, or on its own motion,
and after having consulted with the VWU, as appropriate, a Chamber may order
measures to protect a victim, a witness or another person at risk on account of
testimony given by a witness pursuant to Article 68, paragraphs 1 and 2. The
Chamber shall seek to obtain, whenever possible, the consent of the person in
respect of whom the protective measure is sought prior to ordering the protective
measure.
(…)
3. A Chamber may, on a motion or request under sub-rule 1, hold a hearing, which
shall be conducted in camera, to determine whether to order measures to prevent
the release to the public or press and information agencies, of the identity or the
location of a victim, a witness or other person at risk on account of testimony given
by a witness by ordering, inter alia:
(a) That the name of the victim, witness or other person at risk on account of
testimony given by a witness or any information which could lead to his or her
identification, be expunged from the public records of the Chamber;
(b) That the Prosecutor, the defence or any other participant in the proceedings
be prohibited from disclosing such information to a third party;
(c) That testimony be presented by electronic or other special means, including
the use of technical means enabling the alteration of pictures or voice, the use of
audio-visual technology, in particular videoconferencing and closed-circuit tele-
vision, and the exclusive use of the sound media;
(d) That a pseudonym be used for a victim, a witness or other person at risk on
account of testimony given by a witness; or
(e) That a Chamber conduct part of its proceedings in camera.
Rule 88 Special measures
1. Upon the motion of the Prosecutor or the defence, or upon the request of a
witness or a victim or his or her legal representative, if any, or on its own motion,
and after having consulted with the VWU, as appropriate, a Chamber may, taking
into account the views of the victim or witness, order special measures such as,
but not limited to, measures to facilitate the testimony of a traumatised victim or
witness, a child, an elderly person or a victim of sexual violence, pursuant to Article
68, paragraphs 1 and 2. The Chamber shall seek to obtain, whenever possible, the
consent of the person in respect of whom the special measure is sought prior to
ordering that measure.
2. A Chamber may hold a hearing on a motion or a request under sub-rule 1, if
necessary in camera or ex parte, to determine whether to order any such special
measure, including but not limited to an order that a counsel, a legal representative,
a psychologist or a family member be permitted to attend during the testimony
of the victim or the witness.
(…)
5. Taking into consideration that violations of the privacy of a witness or victim
may create risk to his or her security, a Chamber shall be vigilant in controlling
the manner of questioning a witness or victim so as to avoid any harassment or
Children’s interaction with the ICC 197
intimidation, paying particular attention to attacks on victims of crimes of sexual
violence.’
One of the possible protective measures available for child victims and
witnesses is anonymity. Although it has been proposed that the testimony
of children should always be anonymous;164 this position could be in breach
with other rights, namely the rights of the accused person pursuant to Article
67 of the Rome Statute. Accordingly, child witnesses have had their identities
protected vis-à-vis the public, but they have testified in closed or private
sessions in which the accused was present.165 Thus, the accused has always
known the identity of child witnesses well in advance of their testimony.
However, a “curtain” has been used in the courtroom so that the witness and
the accused person do not have eye contact. The accused, on the other hand,
has been able to see the witness via a computer screen.166
Regarding child victims with participating status, most have remained
anonymous vis-à-vis the accused person. However, if the victim wished to
participate substantively in the proceedings (i.e. present evidence or make a
submission) his or her anonymity has been reconsidered and eventually his
or her identity has been disclosed to the accused.167
Considering that it was the first-ever trial before the ICC, and bearing in
mind that child witnesses were due to testify in court, the Trial Chamber in
the Lubanga case set out in a decision some of the measures available as regards
“vulnerable witnesses”, including children and/or victims of sexual
violence.168 In its decision, the Trial Chamber foresaw the use of measures
such as testimonies in closed sessions, use of video-link, and the presence of
164 ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011)
21.
165 See for example: Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (30 January 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-
113-ENG, 20-21.
166 See for example: Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (4 February 2009) ICC-01/04-01/07-T-
116-Red-ENG 66-67.
167 Lubanga case ‘Decision on victims’ participation’ (18 January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119.
168 Recently in the Kenya Situation cases, the VWU has defined “vulnerable witness” as follows:
For the purposes of this protocol witnesses are considered to be vulnerable if they face
an increased risk to suffer psychological harm through the process of testifying, and/or
to experience psychosocial or physical difficulties which affect their ability to testify. The
vulnerability of a witness can be determined by different factors: factors related to the
person: age (children or elderly), personality, disability (including cognitive impairments),
mental illness or psychosocial problems (such as trauma-related problems and/or lack of
social support); factors related to the nature of the crime: in particular victims of sexual
or gender-based violence, children that are victims of violence, and victims of torture or other
crimes involving excessive violence; factors related to particular circumstances, such as
significantly increased stress or anxiety due to relocation/resettlement or fear of retaliation,
adaptation difficulties related to cultural differences or other factors. (emphasis added).
Ruto and Sang case, ‘Victims and Witnesses Unit’s Amended Protocol on the practices used
to familiarise witnesses for giving testimony’ (25 April 2013) ICC-01/09-01/11-704-Anx,
footnote 5.
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psychologists to support the witnesses. It also provided that vulnerable
witnesses could be entitled to more frequent breaks, to have control of their
testimony and to use the language of their preference.169
In practice, and pursuant to Rule 87 of the RPE, most testimonies of child
witnesses before the ICC have been held in closed or private sessions or with
voice and face distortion and pseudonym when sessions are public.170 Video-
link has also been successfully used in ICC proceedings. This possibility avoids
eye contact between the witness and the accused and avoids other intimidating
factors such as giving testimony in a courtroom in a foreign country.171
Video-link is also favourable for children because they may give testimony
without leaving their hometown or country, while in a safe and protected
building or room nearby to their place of origin.172 Also, because the child
witness does not have to prepare to travel to The Hague, the child’s life is
less interrupted by the testimony, including any schooling or other learning
or social activities the child may have. However, the International Bar Associ-
ation (IBA) has also noted that video-link testimony may make it difficult for
counsel to “connect” with the witness and that the small field offices in which
video-link testimonies are held may also be “oppressive” for the witness.173
Moreover, other technical matters, such as the bad quality of the video-link,
may also affect the value of the testimony.
In the Lubanga case, a limited number of witnesses gave testimony via a
deposition in accordance with Rule 68 of the RPE. This meant that witnesses
gave testimony in closed session in the presence of counsel and a Legal Adviser
to the Chamber. Any objection as to the questioning was noted and
subsequently resolved by the Chamber.174 Although this was not used for
child witnesses in the Lubanga case, this could be a possibility to use in the
future for child witnesses. Such a modality of questioning could be made in
169 Lubanga case ‘Decision on various issues related to witnesses’ testimony during trial’ (29
January 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1140. In another decision in the Lubanga case, the Trial
Chamber also dealt with the special circumstances of individuals with dual status. In this
decision the Trial Chamber dealt with complex issues of client-lawyer relationship of victims
and their legal representatives vis-à-vis the party calling the same individual as a witness.
It also dealt with the situation of child witnesses-victims and their protection. See: Lubanga
case, ICC-01/04-01/06-1379.
170 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/
04-01/06-2842, paras 115-117.
171 As noted by Christine Kunst, there is a balance of interests that must be struck when
deciding on whether to use video-link technology, particularly between the needs of a
vulnerable witness and the right of the accused person to confront witnesses against him
or her. See: Christine Kunst, The Protection of Victims and witnesses at International and
Internationalized Criminal Courts – the example of the ECCC (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013) 229-
230.
172 Lubanga case, Transcript of hearing (30 January 2009) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-113-ENG.
173 International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court, July 2013,
page 18.
174 Transcript of hearing (12 November 2010) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-333-Red-ENG, 18 to 21.
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an office or in a more child-friendly environment than the courtroom and with
the presence of minimal staff (one counsel per party and a legal adviser to
the Chamber). Furthermore, it avoids witnesses having their testimony inter-
rupted by objections that sometimes may be confusing and distressful. In fact,
such a practice could be in line with the Council of Europe’s recommendations
that court sessions involving children should be adapted, and disruption and
distractions during court sessions should be kept to a minimum.175
In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, the judges of the Trial Chamber, along
with counsel to the parties and the participating victims in the trial and Regis-
try staff, visited the DRC, more specifically three localities in which the events
concerning this trial allegedly took place.176 Such visits could be beneficial
for cases involving children, in which judges could visit places to know the
conditions in which the crimes allegedly took place. Although the judges in
the Katanga and Ngudjolo case did not interview individuals, in future cases
an activity involving children of an affected community could be organised,
in which children could informally express to the Trial Chamber their views
on the crimes, or their expectations in reference to the trial (including, for
example, reparations). With these visits, judges would be able to understand
the conditions in which the crimes against children allegedly took place in
a manner that is not prejudicial to the best interests of the child, particularly
his or her well-being or security, which may be affected by in-court testimony
in the headquarters of the ICC in The Hague.
The Pre-Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case also took
early decisions regarding the witness proofing process, which in the ad-hoc
tribunals had been the common practice. This practice, in which parties are
responsible for preparing witnesses before trial appearance, significantly
changed in the Lubanga case, as Trial Chamber I decided that, upon their
arrival in The Hague, witnesses would be prepared or “familiarised” by special
staff of the VWU.177
These early ICC decisions prohibiting witness proofing have been thorough-
ly discussed by academics. While some authors support the practice of witness
175 Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on Child-Friendly Justice (17 November 2010).
176 ICC Press and Media, ‘ICC judges in case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui visit Ituri’
(Press release 27 January 2012) < http://www.flickr.com/photos/icc-cpi/sets/7215762905139
4811> accessed 8 August 2013.
177 Lubanga case ‘Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing’
(08 November 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-679; Decision regarding the practices used to prepare
and familiarize witnesses for giving testimony at trial’ (30 November 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06-
1049, and ‘Decision regarding the Protocol on the practices to be used to prepare witnesses
for trial’ (23 May 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1351.
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proofing in the ad-hoc tribunals and the SCSL,178 others have welcomed the
ICC’s prohibition of this practice.179
In regards to victims of sexual violence, Van Schaack has noted that witness
proofing may enable witnesses to refresh their memory, review prior state-
ments, identify relevant facts, present their evidence in a more complete,
orderly and structured manner and prepare for cross-examination. To the
contrary, the author considers that allowing witnesses to take the stand “cold”
threatens to render them unprepared to effectively testify in Court, set them
up for re-traumatisation during cross-examination, and risk their being dis-
credited where their testimony is stilted, confused or diverges from prior
statements.180
The Innocenti Research Center has also been critical to this approach by
the ICC, stating that witness proofing allows the witness to better get to know
the party calling them and thus feel less isolated in the courtroom when under-
going cross-examination. It has been stated that the current practice means
that witnesses meet very briefly with counsel and thus are “interrogated by
strangers”. The Innocenti Research Center states that witness proofing could
still be limited to avoid “coaching”, and could even include an informal
meeting with judges and lawyers of both parties in which matters unrelated
to the case could be casually discussed and thus build confidence of the child
that should testify.181
Recently, Trial Chamber V in the two Kenya Situation cases changed the
approach that had been adopted by the previous Trial Chambers in the ICC,
thus allowing some sort of witness proofing, although by the name of “witness
preparation”. Trial Chamber V defined the term ““witness preparation” as
“a meeting between a witness and the party calling that witness, taking place
shortly before the witness’s testimony, for the purpose of discussing matters
relating to the witness’s testimony”. As for the concept of “witness
178 See for example: Elies Van Sliedregt, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Law:
Introduction to a Debate. Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 21 (2008); Karemaker,
Taylor and Pittman, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical
Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence, Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume
21 (2008).
179 See for example: Wayne Jordash, The Practice of ‘Witness Proofing’ in International Criminal
Tribunals: Why the International Criminal Court Should Prohibit the Practice, Leiden Journal
of International Law, Volume 22 (2009); Kai Ambos, “Witness proofing” before the ICC:
Neither legally admissible nor necessary, in: Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2008); Kai Ambos, Witness Proofing
in International Criminal Tribunals: A Reply to Karemaker, Taylor and Pittman, Leiden
Journal of International Law, Volume 21 (2008).
180 Beth Van Schaack, Witness Proofing and International Criminal Law, IntLawGrrls, 26
November 2008, <www.intlawgrrls.com> accessed on 8 August 2013. Their new website
is: <http://ilg2.org> accessed on 8 August 2013.
181 Cecile Aptel, Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of Inter-
national Criminal Courts (Innocenti Working Paper, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre
August 2010) 34.
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familiarisation”, the Chamber determined that this is the support provided
by the VWU to witnesses as set out in the Registry’s “Unified Protocol on the
practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving testimony”.182
Trial Chamber V noted that a “witness who testifies in an incomplete,
confused and ill-structured way because of lack of preparation is of limited
assistance to the Chamber’s truth-finding function”.183 Thus, Trial Chamber
V allowed the practice of “witness preparation”, previously prohibited by all
other previous ICC Trial Chambers, stating “that permitting witnesses to re-
engage with the facts underlying their testimony aids the process of human
recollection, better enables witnesses to tell their stories accurately on the stand
and can assist in ensuring that the testimony of a witness is structured and
clear”.184 According to Trial Chamber V, “judicious witness preparation
aimed at clarifying a witness’s evidence and carried out with full respect for
the rights of the accused is likely to enable a more accurate and complete
presentation of the evidence, and so to assist in the Chamber’s truth finding
function” (footnoted omitted).185
Trial Chamber V recognised the difficulties that witnesses encounter when
given testimony before the ICC. It first noted that the crimes under the juris-
diction of the ICC are legally and factually complex. Furthermore, most
witnesses who appear before the ICC have no experience in a courtroom or
the practice of examination and cross-examination, they come from places far
from the seat of the ICC and have different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.
Moreover, Trial Chamber V observed that witnesses often testify about events
that happen many years ago. All these factors, in its view, increase the “likeli-
hood that witnesses will give testimony that is incomplete, confused or ill-
structured”.186
In its decision allowing the practice of witness preparation, Trial Cham-
ber V determined that “proper witness preparation also enhances the protection
and well-being of witnesses, including by helping to reduce their stress and
anxiety about testifying”.187 Most importantly, Trial Chamber V recognised
that Article 68(1) of the Statute includes the Chamber’s “duty to take appro-
182 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 4.
183 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 31.
184 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 32.
185 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 50.
186 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 36.
187 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 37.
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priate measures to protect the well-being and dignity of witnesses”.188 More-
over, as regards vulnerable witnesses, Trial Chamber V stated that witness
preparation “may help to reduce the psychological burdens of testimony, since
those witnesses may face unique difficulties when being questioned repeatedly
about traumatic events”.189 Lastly, it is important to observe that Trial Cham-
ber V adopted a Protocol, in which it sets out the permitted and prohibited
conducts that counsel should follow and it also required that these preparation
sessions are video recorded. Thus, judicial control of “witness preparation”
will be essential to safeguard the guarantees of a due process in the two Kenya
Situation cases.
Moreover, it should be observed that the VWU continues to provide its
assistance in the witness familiarisation process.190 According to the latest
VWU Protocol, once a vulnerable witness (which as noted above includes
children) arrives at the location of testimony, and subject to the witness’
consent, he/she is given a further assessment by the VWU psychologist. The
psychologist then discusses any relevant special measures with the witness
and seeks his/her consent.191 The VWU has also developed a witness feedback
programme which is “designed to provide information to the VWU that would
allow the Unit to improve its provision of services to witnesses and to share
outcomes and information with other relevant areas of the Court”.192
Notwithstanding the abovementioned critics against the ICC’s approach
to witness proofing in the first trials (Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo and Bemba
cases) and the recent shift in the Kenya Situation, it is clear that the VWU, as
a neutral and specialised body of the ICC, may be better placed to offer protect-
ive measures and support to a child witness, upon his or her arrival in The
Hague, during his or her testimony, and during the “cooling-down” period
after the testimony. On the other hand, it is also true that a casual exchange
between the witness and counsel, as noted by Trial Chamber V in the Kenya
Situation cases, could be beneficial, if this is carried out within legal parameters
and in consultation with the VWU, and with the prior informed consent of the
witness. Taking into consideration the problems faced in the Lubanga case
as regards witnesses’ reliability referred to above, the approach taken by Trial
188 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 37.
189 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524,
para. 37.
190 Ruto and Sang case, Decision on witness preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-524-
Anx. See also: International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court,
July 2013, page. 23
191 Ruto and Sang case, Victims and Witnesses Unit’s Amended Protocol on the practices used
to familiarise witnesses for giving testimony, 25 April 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-704-Anx, paras
46-47.
192 Ruto and Sang case, Victims and Witnesses Unit’s Amended Protocol on the practices used
to familiarise witnesses for giving testimony, 25 April 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-704-Anx, para.
101.
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Chamber V, in which the “witness preparation” process involves more parti-
cipation from counsel, particularly by the party calling the witness, is wel-
comed and probably will be followed in future ICC trials. Moreover, judicial
safeguards, such as the adoption of the Protocol with prohibited conducts,
as well as the video recording of these sessions, should circumvent possible
tampering of witnesses during witness preparation. However, as noted by
the International Bar Association, what is most important is that a court-wide
approach as regards witness proofing/preparation and familiarisation is
adopted for all cases (i.e. by a judges plenary),193 since currently, depending
on the case and the Chamber, the ICC practice is conflicting.
Moreover, other measures may be necessary, particularly as regards child
witnesses, in order to make their testimony reliable and trustworthy for the
effects of an Article 74 judgment, but also in order to avoid re-traumatisation
of the child witness. In this regard, the CRC Committee has recommended that
questioning be made in a conversation-like format rather than a one-sided
examination and under conditions of confidentiality.194 The UN Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in her Working Paper on
Children and Justice states that it is rarely in the child’s best interests to be
interviewed on repeated occasions and interviews should be kept to a
minimum and should be conducted only by trained professionals.195 This
is also recommended by the UN Guidelines that state that the number of
interviews should be limited and special procedures should be established
in order to collect evidence from child victims and witnesses and in order to
reduce “unnecessary contact with the justice process”.196
However, so far in ICC proceedings child witnesses have been subject to
thorough examination and cross-examination. They have also been interviewed
on various occasions and after long periods of time.197 This practice should
be avoided, particularly regarding child witnesses who may be re-victimised
by such an interaction with the ICC. Also, as stated in the UN Guidelines, there
should be continuity in the contact between child victims and professionals
(i.e. investigators) and trials involving child victims and witnesses should be
expedited.198 If there is a long period of time between the initial interviews
193 International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court, July 2013,
page 24.
194 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12 (2009): The right of the child to be heard (20 July
2009) CRC/C/GC/12, para. 43.
195 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by
Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict (September
2011) 15. See also Beijer and Liefaard, ‘A Bermuda Triangle? Balancing protection,
participation and proof in criminal proceedings affecting child victims and witnesses’ (2011)
Utrecht Law Review, 76.
196 UN Guidelines, para. 31. See also Paris Principles, principle 7.28.
197 Lubanga case ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’(14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 32.
198 UN Guidelines, paras 30(b) and (c).
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and the actual trial in which the child witness testifies, the continuity of any
relationship with the ICC staff may be difficult if not impossible.
Thus, passing of time is critical when referring to child witnesses and it
is perhaps the most patent risk against their reliability.199 Beresford has stated
that although an adult’s memory deteriorates, the deterioration of a child’s
memory is more profound. Furthermore, depending on their age and own
individual development, young children may not have a sufficiently developed
understanding of the concepts of truth and lies, which form the basis of
criminal justice. For example, children may face difficulties in distinguishing
between reality and fantasy, especially when recounting traumatic events.200
Thus, ICC proceedings need to be reconsidered when children appear as
witnesses.
If child-friendly measures are not taken, testimonies of child witnesses
could simply become unreliable and thus disregarded by the Chambers. It
would be regrettable to have children endure a judicial process before the ICC
in vain, simply because the special circumstances of their age, development
and maturity were not taken into consideration. As discussed above, this was
in fact the regrettable result in the Lubanga case, in which child witnesses and
victims were found to be unreliable by the Trial Chamber.
The European Council has established the following guidelines regarding
evidence and statements by child witnesses:201
‘64. Interviews of and the gathering of statements from children should, as far as
possible, be carried out by trained professionals. Every effort should be made for
children to give evidence in the most favourable settings and under the most
suitable conditions, having regard to their age, maturity and level of understanding
and any communication difficulties they may have.
65. Audiovisual statements from children who are victims or witnesses should be
encouraged, while respecting the right of other parties to contest the content of
such statements.
66. When more than one interview is necessary, they should preferably be carried
out by the same person, in order to ensure coherence of approach in the best
interests of the child.
67. The number of interviews should be as limited as possible and their length
should be adapted to the child’s age and attention span.
68. Direct contact, confrontation or interaction between a child victim or witness
with alleged perpetrators should, as far as possible, be avoided unless at the request
of the child victim.
199 Beijer and Liefaard, ‘A Bermuda Triangle? Balancing protection, participation and proof
in criminal proceedings affecting child victims and witnesses’ (2011) Utrecht Law Review,
94.
200 Stuart Beresford, ‘Child Witnesses and the International Criminal Justice System: Does the
ICC Protect the Most Vulnerable?’ (2005) Journal of International Criminal Justice 737, 740.
201 Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on Child-Friendly Justice (17 November 2010).
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69. Children should have the opportunity to give evidence in criminal cases without
the presence of the alleged perpetrator.
70. The existence of less strict rules on giving evidence such as absence of the
requirement for oath or other similar declarations, or other child-friendly procedural
measures, should not in itself diminish the value given to a child’s testimony or
evidence.
71. Interview protocols that take into account different stages of the child’s develop-
ment should be designed and implemented to underpin the validity of children’s
evidence. These should avoid leading questions and thereby enhance reliability.
72. With regard to the best interests and well-being of children, it should be possible
for a judge to allow a child not to testify.
73. A child’s statements and evidence should never be presumed invalid or untrust-
worthy by reason only of the child’s age.
74. The possibility of taking statements of child victims and witnesses in specially
designed child-friendly facilities and a child-friendly environment should be
examined.’
All of the above are valuable recommendations that should be taken into
consideration in ICC proceedings dealing with children, pursuant to Article
68(1) of the Statute and Rules 86 of the RPE. Bearing in mind the strenuous
effects that traditional examination and cross-examination and multiple inter-
views could have on a child’s well-being, measures such as the above could
be of guidance for future ICC proceedings. After all, these measures are not
only beneficial to child victims; ultimately they are beneficial to a fair trial,
as it also helps to preserve child witnesses’ evidence so that their testimonies
are credible and reliable.
Aside from the judicial protective measures identified above, the ICC also
provides witnesses and victims with non-judicial protective measures. These
measures include a protection system that has been put in place in countries
where the ICC has situations and also a witness relocation programme. More-
over, when the witness is giving testimony, the VWU guarantees support “24
hours a day, seven days a week to witnesses during their stay at the location
of testimony” in order to attend “the psycho-social and physical well-being
and the practical needs of witnesses including any special needs vulnerable
witnesses may have”.202
The Initial Response System (IRS) provides for an immediate response to
direct or imminent threats to victims or witnesses in the field.203 This system
is a 24/7 emergency response system that enables the ICC to be informed at
short notice of any immediate threat to victims and witnesses in order to take
202 Ruto and Sang case, Victims and Witnesses Unit’s Amended Protocol on the practices used
to familiarise witnesses for giving testimony, 25 April 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-704-Anx, para.
44.
203 Lubanga case ‘Submission of Redacted Documents’ (Document reclassified as public,
18 March 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-39-US-AnxD.
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appropriate actions.204 It should also be noted that the OTP has internal sec-
tions that deal with the protection of witnesses. In this regard, it has its own
Protection Strategy Unit, which also deals with responsibility for security-
related issues.205
The ICC additionally has a witness protection programme, which relocates
witnesses in cases where the risk is such that such a measures becomes
necessary. However, relocation should be ultima ratio, particularly when the
individual concerned is a child, as it transfers the witness or victim and often
his or her relatives to another location (in or outside his or her home country)
and has a permanent character as the person can no longer return to his or
her place of origin. In the Lubanga case however, 20 prosecution witnesses,
including children, were admitted to the ICC Protection Programme.206 Until
March 2013, 199 witnesses had testified before the ICC and more than 300
individuals had been admitted into the ICC Protection Programme for their
relocation.207 The numbers above demonstrate the vast responsibilities of
the VWU, but also of the ICC as a whole in respect of witnesses, victims and
other persons at risk in the current 8 situations under the ICC’s scrutiny.
Given the implications of permanent relocation, child victims and witnesses
should be properly informed of the consequences of their involvement with
the ICC, and of what an eventual relocation could entail. In the Kenya Situation,
for example, a national newspaper reported that ICC witnesses were negotiating
lifetime protection by the ICC.208 This sort of misunderstanding that could
lead to unjustifiable expectations of victims and witnesses should be avoided.
Although the details of the ICC Protection Programme are confidential, outreach
should avoid misconceptions and give the general public, and particularly
victims and witnesses concerned, available information on the implications
of relocation and other non-judicial protective measures available for witnesses
and victims, as well as any risks that the individuals’ involvement with the
ICC may entail.
204 ICC ASP, Press and Media, ‘ICC Registrar participates in panel on impact of the Rome
Statute system on victims and affected communities’ (Press release 2 June 2010) < http://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/reviewconference/pressreleaserc/Pages/icc%20registrar%
20participates%20in%20panel%20on%20impact%20of%20the%20rome%20statute%20system%
20on%20vict.aspx> accessed 8 August 2013.
205 International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court, July 2013,
pages 29-30.
206 Jennifer Easterday, ‘Witness Protection: Successes and Challenges in the Lubanga Trial’
(The Lubanga Trial at the International Criminal Court, June 26 2009) <http://www.lubangatrial.
org/2009/06/26/witness-protection-successes-and-challenges-in-the-lubanga-trial/> accessed
8 August 2013.
207 International Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court, July 2013,
p. 14 and 35.
208 Tom Mailiti, ‘Expert: Relocation of a witness does not entail life protection by the ICC’
(The ICC Kenya Monitor, 29 July 2011) <http://www.icckenya.org/2011/07/expert-relocation-
of-a-witness-does-not-entail-life-protection-by-the-icc> accessed 8 August 2013.
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5.4.3 Protection and reliability of child witnesses
Reliability of child witnesses and reliability tests due to their young age will
unlikely be an issue at judicial proceedings in the ICC as it is in national
jurisdictions. Young children will not be expected to come to testify before
the ICC because there will presumably be other older witnesses available to
testify in lieu of very young children. The ICC will most probably not be faced
with cases in which the sole victim and witness is a small child, as is the
situation in many abuse cases in national jurisdictions. Due to the passing of
time between the events and the actual trial, and also due to the fact that very
small children (for example under 8 years of age) are not likely to be recruited,
child witnesses who come to testify before the ICC will most likely be
adolescents or even adults at the time of the trial proceedings.
Thus, the issue of child witnesses’ reliability is not whether they are capable
to testify or not. In principle, child witnesses before the ICC will have the age
and maturity to presume that they are reliable and therefore reliability tests
will not be necessary. However, as any other witness appearing before a court,
their reliability and trustworthiness will be tested. Nevertheless, their particular
circumstances, such as age and maturity, should be taken into consideration
by the judges when testing the child’s reliability and credibility. Likewise,
when determining the reliability of a child witness, judges should weigh their
evidence bearing in mind the trauma these children could have suffered, as
well as the effect that the passing of time has on children’s memories.
In the SCSL Taylor case, the Trial Chamber took into consideration the young
age of a witness at the time of the events and her apparent shyness and
nervousness during testimony when evaluating her trustworthiness and
reliability. The SCSL Trial Chamber considered that the witness had little
education and therefore she would be able to recall events rather than numeric
representations of time (i.e. the year in which she was captured).209 Although
the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case ultimately did not rely on this witness
to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt”, the above analysis is a useful
example of the various aspects that need to be considered when evaluating
a child witness’s testimony.
Similarly, in the Lubanga case, Judge Odio Benito in her separate and
dissenting opinion took into consideration the fact that child witnesses who
are subject to multiple examinations during a long period of time logically
and explicably have difficulties recollecting events. In fact, Judge Odio Benito
concluded “it would be suspicious if their accounts would remain perfectly
alike and unchanged”.210 Similarly to the Trial Chamber in the Taylor case,
209 Taylor case ‘Judgment’ (18 May 2012) SCSL 03-01-1281, paras 1398-1402.
210 Lubanga case ‘Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute’ Separate and Dissenting
opinion of Judge Odio Benito’ (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 32.
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although Judge Odio Benito concluded that the children’s testimony could
not be used to convict the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, her analysis
could allow judges to rely on child witnesses’ testimonies, in spite of logical
and expected contradictions that may exist in their evidence, when the overall
evidence of the case supports the accounts contained in those testimonies.
5.5 REPARATIONS TO CHILD VICTIMS
Article 75 of the Rome Statute is perhaps one of the most innovative provisions
of the ICC framework, establishing a mechanism for reparations for the benefit
of victims.211
This Article provides as follows:
‘1. The ICC shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of,
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in
its decision the ICC may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional
circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to,
or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.
2. The ICC may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensa-
tion and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the ICC may order that the award for
reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in Article 79.
3. Before making an order under this Article, the ICC may invite and shall take
account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other
interested persons or interested States.
4. In exercising its power under this Article, the ICC may, after a person is con-
victed of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, determine whether, in order
to give effect to an order which it may make under this Article, it is necessary to
seek measures under Article 93, paragraph 1.
5. A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this Article as if the provisions
of Article 109 were applicable to this Article.
6. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims
under national or international law.’
5.5.1 Victim beneficiary of reparations
Rule 85 of the RPE should serve as basis to define who is a victim beneficiary
of reparations before the ICC, and thus the definition of the crime included
in the charges, and eventually decided upon by the judges of the ICC, will have
211 Although this provision is pioneering in international criminal law, other prior instruments,
namely the UN Basic Principles and case law such as the one of the IACtHR, could provide
guidance for its interpretation. The applicability of these instruments is referred to in
Chapter 3 of this research.
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a bearing on whether specific individuals or groups of persons are considered
as beneficiaries of reparations.212
Although the criteria established by the ICC case law so far regarding
identification matters, indirect and direct victims, the prima facie evidentiary
threshold, etc., could be applied to reparations proceedings, it should be noted
that these reparations have a distinct nature, as they occur when there has
been a conviction against an individual. Moreover, while in pre-trial and trial
proceedings victims have to demonstrate that they have an interest in the case,
in reparations proceedings this interest is presumed. The victims, however,
will require proving the harm suffered as a consequence of the crime for which
an individual has been convicted, albeit with a lower evidentiary threshold,
such as balance of probabilities or even presumptions.
Reparations can be made in favour of victims either individually or collect-
ively. Taking into consideration that the ICC will be unable to identify each
and every child victim of a given crime for which an individual is convicted,
collective reparations appear to be more recommendable due to the often-
generalised nature of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes. For example, in the first case before the ICC, which involves crimes
of enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers, individual reparations
could even be detrimental to the victims, who could be further stigmatised
vis-à-vis their communities. In fact, it has been recommended that the ICC
awards individual reparations solely when the accused has assets that have
been seized, there is a link between the accused and a particular group of
victims, and the case concerns a limited and definable group of victims.213
So far no pending case before the ICC seems to fulfil the above requirements.
However, safeguards should be put in place when implementing collective
reparations, particularly because they could reflect patronising attitudes or
replace humanitarian or developmental projects, which should be distinct from
reparations mechanisms. As stated above, prior consultations with victims,
for example via the TFV, as to what they expect of reparations, could be
beneficial.214 Most importantly, collective reparations should always aim to
212 The relationship between the definition of the substantive law and its implication in
reparations is touched upon in Chapter 3 of this research.
213 P De Grieff and W Marieke, ‘The Trust Fund for Victims of the ICC: Between Possibilities
and Constraints’ in M Boossuyt and others (eds) Out of the Ashes: Reparations for Victims
of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia 2006).
214 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report
of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations < http://
shr.aaas.org/projects/human_rights/guatemala/ceh/mos_en.pdf> accessed 8 August 2013.
The Commission stated that participation of the Guatemalan society was vital in the
definition, execution and evaluation of the National Reparation Programme, and that in
the particular case of collective reparations, it was essential “that the beneficiaries themselves
participate in defining the priorities of the reparation process” (page 51).
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have an individual component, which could finally include monetary com-
pensation or rehabilitation that benefits individual victims.215
Finally, referring to child victims, collective reparations should pay special
attention to children within the group that will benefit from reparations. Within
the group of “children”, particular consideration must be given to girls, who
often will suffer differently from the crime or have different access to repar-
ations because of gender-specific social and cultural rules. For example, as
stated in the Paris Principles, measures should be taken so that girls are not
made invisible during the reparations process. Likewise, the particular situation
of children who are refugee or internally displaced should also be con-
sidered.216
Most importantly, victims should be consulted whenever a collective repar-
ations scheme is to be implemented. In fact, the ICC has recognised the import-
ance of victims’ involvement in their own reparations.217 Three advantages
of consulting with victims can be identified. Firstly, the ICC could know the
victims’ real needs and the priorities that victims and their communities may
have (including the needs of child victims pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE).
Moreover, consultation also gives victims a sense of ownership, as they are
able to define and implement reparations. Finally, it also has a healing effect,
as victims are treated with dignity and it helps them to move forward.218
5.5.2 Types of reparations and harms
Article 75 of the Rome Statute provides for at least three types of reparations:
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. However, in addition to these,
other modalities of reparations could be applicable for child victims of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
5.5.2.1 Restitution
Restitution is an “ideal” type of reparation, because it takes the victim back
to how things were prior to the commission of the crime.219 The UN Basic
215 C Tomuschat, ‘Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human Rights Violations:
The Position under General International Law’ in: A Randelzhofer and C Tomuschat (eds)
State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights
(Kluwer Law International 1999) 20.
216 Paris Principles, principles 4 and 5.
217 ICC Assembly of State Parties, The impact of the Rome Statute system on victims and affected
communities (Adopted 8 June 2010) RC/Res.2, para. 4.
218 Maria Suchkova, The Importance of a Participatory Reparations Process and its Relationship to
the Principles of Reparation (University of Essex, Transitional Justice Network, Reparations
Unit, Briefing Paper No. 5, 2011) 2.
219 See also Permanent Court of International Justice, Case of the Factory at Chozow, Judgment
on the Merits, Series A No 17 1928 para. 21.
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Principles define it as the possibility to restore the victim to the original
situation before the crime. It includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty,
enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s
place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property.220
However, in reality restitution is very often impossible, particularly as regards
children, since the passing of time between the commission of the crime and
the reparations may make it impossible to restore the child’s life to how it
was prior to the crime.221 In fact, for many (if not all) victims of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC, their childhood is permanently affected by these
crimes and thus restitution seems unattainable.
Likewise, restitution should be applied with caution, as the victim should
not go back to a previous situation of discrimination or violation of rights.
For example, in cases involving child victims, if the child was already suffering
from lack of education or proper nutrition, restitution should not just “place”
the child in his or her previous precarious condition. This is particularly
important for girls, who may be in a situation of disadvantage prior to the
crime and should not be returned to this situation as part of restitution mech-
anisms. Restitution should therefore aim to rectify any discriminatory situation
that existed prior to the crime.222 However, the ICC may not have the mandate
nor the resources to “rectify” such injustices. But at least, as noted by the Trial
Chamber in the Lubanga case, reparations “need to address any underlying
injustices and in their implementation the Court should avoid replicating dis-
criminatory practices or structures that predated the commission of the crimes”
(emphasis added).223
5.5.2.2 Compensation
Another type of reparation for victims of crimes within the ICC is that of
compensation. Because often restitution is simply impossible (i.e. restitution
of a deceased parent or because restitution of a life in a place that has been
destroyed by armed conflict is impossible), compensation attempts to pay the
victim for the harm he or she suffered as a result of a crime (either in cash
or by other means).
220 UNGA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law: resolution adopted by the General Assembly (UN Basic Principles) (21 March
2006) A/RES/60/147, principle 19.
221 McCarthy notes that although restitution plays a significant role in the reparation awards
of international human rights courts, the limitations of the concept have been recognised.
Conor McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support under the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, Doctoral dissertation, (University of Cambridge 2011), page 138.
222 Cotton Field case, Preliminary Objection Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment of Novem-
ber 16, 2009 Series C No 205 para. 450.
223 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para. 192.
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The UN Basic Principles have defined compensation as the payment for
any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the
gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case.224 The IACtHR
has determined that compensation aims at ensuring full or partial reparation
for the damage suffered, as long as the damage is financially assessable.
Compensation is thus a substitute to make up for a loss or damage that cannot
be restored as such.225
The UN Basic Principles establish the following possible harms to be eco-
nomically assessable: a) physical or mental harm; b) lost opportunities, includ-
ing employment, education and social benefits; c) material damages and loss
of earnings, including loss of earning potential; d) moral damage; e) costs
required for legal or expert assistance, medicine, medical services and psycho-
logical and social services.226 Moreover, in accordance with the ICC Appeals
Chamber all forms of harm should be “personally” suffered by the victim,
be it directly or indirectly.227
However, judicial determination of these harms and their eventual
monetary assessment may be a complex task. Accordingly, Rule 97 of the RPE
provides the Chamber with the possibility to call upon experts in order to
determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss or injury and to suggest
options concerning the appropriate types and modalities of reparations.
Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3 of this research, the case law of the IACtHR
could be of guidance for ICC when it has to determine the harm suffered and
its subsequent compensation. For example, the IACtHR has determined that
moral damage includes emotional problems (such as intrusive images and
thoughts, slowing of thought or concentration process, memory dysfunction),
mental problems (such as anxiety, fear, anguish, anger, depression), as well
as the physical reactions to these problems (aches, pains, sleep problems, heart
disease, etc.). The IACtHR has also affirmed that moral damage may be a sequel
to a physical injury, but it may also occur on its own.228 The IACtHR has also
developed the concept of “damage to a life plan”, which could be of guidance
in cases involving child victims. The IACtHR has defined this concept as a full
self-realisation of the person concerned, taking into account his or her calling
in life, particular circumstances, potentialities, ambitions, thus permitting to
set for oneself, in a reasonable manner, specific goals.229 For example a child
224 UN Basic Principles, principle 20.
225 Velásquez-Rodríguez case, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of July 21, 1989 Series C No 7
para. 26.
226 UN Basic Principles, principle 20.
227 Lubanga case ‘Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008’ (11 July 2008) ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, para. 1.
228 Blake case, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of January 22, 1999 Series C No 48.
229 Loayza-Tamayo case, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 27, 1998 Series C No
42 para. 147.
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victim of recruitment in an armed group could have his or her life plan
obstructed by lost years of schooling, unwanted pregnancies or illnesses. Thus,
compensation should not only respond to the harm directly suffered by the
crime but also to the effects that committing this crime had on the future life
of the child victim. For example, when a child victim has suffered from a crime
of sexual violence this crime may result not only in physical injuries but also
in moral damages. Furthermore, depending on whether the victim is a boy
or a girl, or depending on other socio-economic and cultural factors, there
could be distinct harms (for example particular health problems) that should
be individually addressed.
As noted above, compensation pays victims for the harms suffered, often
with money, although other means of payment (i.e. a vehicle, housing, etc)
may be foreseeable. As regards children, payment of lump sums may not be
ideal.230 Moreover, even if payments are made to child victims, they should
always be accompanied by other measures, such as rehabilitation and
reintegration programmes, which will enable the victim not only to make better
use of the sums received, but also to reintegrate into society.231
5.5.2.3 Rehabilitation
The Rome Statute foresees a third mode of reparation, which is rehabilitation.
This type of reparation aims to restore the victim’s well-being and health and
encompasses medical and psychological care as well as legal and social
services.232 Shelton has defined rehabilitation as a process towards the restora-
tion of the victim’s full wellbeing, in order to restore what was lost and to
prevent further deterioration of the victim’s health (both mental and
physical).233
Rehabilitation is particularly important for child victims, because children
will often (if not always) need psychological treatment and other healing
processes after they suffered crimes of such gravity as those under the juris-
diction of the ICC. Ideally, reparations should address the individual child
(physically and mentally), through a combination of psychosocial support,
230 Particularly former child soldiers, as such compensation could send a confusing and wrong
message to the community and other child victims that “perpetrators” are being awarded
and it may not benefit towards the reconciliation and reintegration of the individual child
victim with his or her family and community. See: ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-
Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011) 29-30.
231 In this sense, the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case concluded that reparations should secure
reconciliation, whenever possible. See: Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles
and procedures to be applied to reparations’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para.
194.
232 UN Basic Principles, principle 21.
233 D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 1999) 302-303.
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health services and education/training to make up for lost opportunities.234
In fact, Article 39 of the CRC states that there is a need for “physical and
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim”. Furthermore,
rehabilitation may very often be a necessary pre-requisite for the child victim’s
enjoyment of any restitution or compensation received. In the Lubanga case,
the expert witness on child trauma stated that when war-related psychological
problems of child victims and other civilians remain untreated, the opportunity
to initiate a substantial economic development and an increase in the standard
of living might be substantially reduced.235 As the same expert witness in
the Lubanga case stated, if no rehabilitation is provided, the cycle of violence
could affect future generations.236
Measures of restorative justice, in which child victims of recruitment could
assume responsibility for any crimes they committed as a result of their recruit-
ment, should also be taken. For example, it has been suggested that former
child soldiers could participate in other forms of accountability beyond the
purely criminal or judicial forms.237 Experiences such as those of Sierra Leone,
in which efforts were made to activate traditional mechanisms of reconciliation
that included all members of the communities affected by the armed conflict,
including formerly recruited children, could be applicable to ICC reparations
proceedings.238 Education programmes could also be beneficial to break the
cycle of historic violence.239 For example, the Paris Principles establish in
this regard that it is important to create capacity building within the commun-
ity in order to prevent crimes committed against children (particularly child
recruitment) and support their release and reintegration. The Paris Principles
emphasise that the community should be involved in planning programmes
so that the community may take care of the demobilised children and prevent
their future association with armed groups.240
However, the ICC’s mandate and particularly the limited funds available
for ICC reparations thus far may limit its ability to carry out the various tasks
involved in the rehabilitation and reintegration of child victims of international
234 ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011)
29, 31.
235 Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering, (Report of Ms. Elisabeth
Schauer following the 6 February 2009 “Instructions to the Court’s expert on child soldiers
and trauma” ICC-01/04-01/06-1729-Anx1, 25 of February 2009) 33.
236 Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering, (Report of Ms. Elisabeth
Schauer following the 6 February 2009 “Instructions to the Court’s expert on child soldiers
and trauma” ICC-01/04-01/06-1729-Anx1, 25 of February 2009) 25-27 and 34.
237 I Derlyun and others, Re-Member, Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconciliation of War-Affected
Children (Intersentia 2012) 28.
238 I Derlyun and others, Re-Member, Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconciliation of War-Affected
Children (Intersentia 2012) 69-71.
239 ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011)
34.
240 Paris Principles, principles 3.21 and 3.22.
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crimes. In this regard, the cooperation of other international and domestic
organisations (including inter-governmental and non-governmental) is essential
as clearly this goes beyond the ICC’s sole responsibility as an international
criminal jurisdiction.
5.5.3.5 Other types of reparation
Aside from the three forms of reparations identified above, there are other
types of reparations that have been applied in other international jurisdictions,
albeit not dealing with individual criminal responsibility but with State re-
sponsibility. For example, measures such as public apologies, satisfaction and
guarantee of non-repetition could also be foreseeable before the ICC, if adapted
to this particular international jurisdiction.
These measures could be beneficial as very often they do not require
numerous resources, but nevertheless have an important symbolic value for
victims. For example, in case of a public apology, the convicted person could
voluntarily decide to issue a public apology towards his/her victims. Although
ICC judges cannot order this, a voluntary public apology could be taken into
account as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes.241
In what refers to satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, this would
most likely entail the participation of a State, which assumes responsibility
for the crimes committed. This of course goes beyond the scope of the ICC’s
jurisdiction. However, States could be involved in reparations, such as the
construction of a memorial or the establishment of a day of remembrance for
the victims of a crime, insofar as States agree to do this pursuant to Article
93 of the Rome Statute.242 Again, although ICC judges cannot order this, at
least theoretically this is a possibility. Moreover, this could be a possibility
in future cases where the jurisdiction of the ICC and a regional human rights
court could coincide in a given situation.243
Particularly in what refers to crimes of child recruitment, a possible type
of reparation would be to implement a transitional justice mechanism in which
children (who often have the dual status of victim and perpetrator) come to
241 David Donat-Cattin in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Edn), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008), page 1405.
242 Symbolic reparations have been compared to “transitional objects” that children use as
vehicles for developmental changes (i.e. a blanket or a teddy bear). In the same way, it
is argued that symbolic reparations are objects that assist in bridging gaps between the
interpersonal world and the social world of victims. See for example Brandon Hamber,
‘Narrowing the Micro and Macro’ in: Pablo De Grieff (ed) The Handbook of Reparations
(Oxford University Press 2006) 570.
243 For example, in the ECCC, victims have requested that apologies made during trial be
recorded and published as a form of satisfaction. See: Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s
Reparations Mandate (May 2011) 13.
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terms with any crimes they have committed.244 As child victims, particularly
former child soldiers, could also have perpetrated crimes, the establishment
of truth commissions may be a useful tool in dealing with children who have
participated in the commission of crimes.245 As mentioned by the Special
Representative, most child victims of armed conflict will not testify as witnesses
or participate as victims in ICC proceedings. She therefore has suggested that
non-judicial mechanisms could provide immediate accountability, enable
community reconciliation, provide reparations for losses and harms suffered
and allow children to move on with their lives.246 However, such far-reaching
reparation programmes should ideally be implemented by the ICC TFV with
other international and local actors, as these would clearly go beyond the ICC’s
judicial mandate and jurisdiction and would require the local and international
expertise and resources (i.e. of the UN Special Representative on Children and
Armed Conflict and other stakeholders).
5.5.3 Principles on reparations
Although Article 75 of the Rome Statute is included in the section dealing with
“The Trial”, all paragraphs of this provision refer to “the Court” and not to
the “Trial Chamber”. Therefore, one could interpret that reparations proceed-
ings are not limited to the trial stage and that reparations are not to be
exclusively decided by the Trial Chamber. However, as Article 75 refers to
“convicted person” it is only logical to interpret that reparations under this
provision may only be ordered if the person concerned is convicted. In fact,
to implement reparation orders one could even interpret that the Appeals
Chamber must first confirm the conviction against a person.
During the first years of the ICC, there was also contention in regards to
who shall be “the Court” under Article 75 of the Rome Statute.247 Paragraph
244 The Special Representative of the UN on Children and Armed Conflict has recommended
that children are included in truth-telling, traditional healing ceremonies and reintegration
programmes. See: UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of
Armed Conflict (September 2011) 10.
245 ICTJ, Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice (August 2011)
25.
246 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children Affected by
Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict (September
2011) 20.
247 For example, the ICC’s Registry foresees the possibility of a single judge taking charge of
reparations. See: Lubanga case ‘Second Report of the Registry on Reparations’ (1 September
2011) ICC-01/04-01/06-2806 paras 152-155. This possibility is contended by the OPCV of
the ICC, which considers that this should be decided by the three judges of the Trial
Chamber. See: Lubanga case ‘Observations on issues concerning reparations’ (18 April 2012)
ICC-01/04-01/06-2863 paras 129-130. See also: Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Repara-
tions Mandate (May 2011) 47-48.
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1 of Article 75 of the Rome Statute states that the ICC must establish principles
on reparations. Many have argued that the principles should be adopted as
a court-wide instrument at the outset of the ICC’s creation.248 However, the
ICC did not adopt such general principles and in December 2011, the ASP
decided that the relevant Trial Chamber should decide about these principles
on a case-by-case basis.249
Because ICC principles are thus case-specific and not court-wide, they need
to be tailored to the particular needs of victims in a given case. The first case
before the ICC that dealt with reparations was the Lubanga case. Since this case
involves child victims, particularly former child soldiers, the principles adopted
in this case dealt with child victims. However, the general principles adopted
by the Trial Chamber, although case specific, also contain principles that are
of application for all cases before the ICC, and thus set an important precedent
for future reparations decisions in other cases.
In the Lubanga case, reparations proceedings were initiated and the Chamber
heard submissions from the parties and participants in the proceedings, but
also from organisations that requested leave to participate.250 Among the
organisations that were granted leave, UNICEF submitted its observations on
the reparations proceedings.251 On 7 August 2012, the Trial Chamber
rendered the ICC’s first-ever decision establishing principles and a preliminary
procedure for reparations before the ICC in that case.252
The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case determined that in reparations
decisions concerning children, the ICC should be guided by the CRC and the
248 Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (May 2011) 24; Victims’ Rights
Working Group, Establishing effective reparation procedures and principles for the ICC (September
2011); Octavio Amezcua-Noriega, Reparation Principles under International Law and their
Possible Application by the ICC: Some Reflections (University of Essex, Transitional Justice
Network, Reparations Unit, Briefing Paper No. 1, 2011) 2.
249 ICC Assembly of States Parties, Reparations (adopted on 20 December 2011) ICC-ASP/10/
Res.3
250 Lubanga case ‘Scheduling order concerning timetable for sentencing and reparations’ (14
March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2844; ‘Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice request for
leave to participate in reparations proceedings’ (28 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2853;
‘Request for leave to file submission on reparation issues’ (28 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-
2854; ‘Registry transmission of communications received in the context of reparations
proceedings’ (29 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2855 with public Annexes 1-3; ‘Decision
granting leave to make representations in the reparations proceedings’ (20 April 2012) ICC-
01/04-01/06-2870.
251 Lubanga case ‘Submission on the principles to be applied, and the procedure to be followed
by the Chamber with regard to reparations’ (10 May 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2878.
252 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904. This decision is currently pending before
the Appeals Chamber. See: Lubanga case, Decision on the Presiding Judge of the Appeals
Chamber in the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo filed on 6 September 2012 against
the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision establishing the principles and procedures
to be applied to reparations” (11 September 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2920.
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fundamental principle of the best interests of the child that is enshrined there-
in.253 It also concluded that reparations should be “gender-inclusive”254
and that the differentiated effect that crimes have upon girls and boys should
also be taken into account when deciding on reparations.255 The Trial Cham-
ber also directed that child victims should be informed about reparations
procedures and programmes in a manner that is comprehensible for victims
and those acting on their behalf.256 Applying Article 12 of the CRC, the Trial
Chamber also determined that the views of child victims are to be considered
when decisions are made about reparations that concern them.257 It is also
important to note that the Trial Chamber used various human rights instru-
ments as guidance to adopt these reparations proceedings, including “soft law”
instruments. For example, it referred to the UN Basic Principles, the Paris
253 The UN Guidelines, referred to by Trial Chamber I in their decision establishing the
principles on reparations, include a wide array of principles. Although the Trial Chamber
did not mention all of them, these could be included in future reparations principles: (a)
Dignity. Every child is a unique and valuable human being and as such his or her individual
dignity, special needs, interests and privacy should be respected and protected; (b) Non-
discrimination. Every child has the right to be treated fairly and equally, regardless of his
or her or the parent’s or legal guardian’s race, ethnicity, colour, gender, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability and birth
or other status; (c) Best interests of the child. While the rights of accused and convicted
offenders should be safeguarded, every child has the right to have his or her best interests
given primary consideration. This includes the right to protection and to a chance for
harmonious development: (i) Protection. Every child has the right to life and survival and
to be shielded from any form of hardship, abuse or neglect, including physical, psycho-
logical, mental and emotional abuse and neglect; (ii) Harmonious development. Every child
has the right to a chance for harmonious development and to a standard of living adequate
for physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social growth. In the case of a child who has been
traumatised, every step should be taken to enable the child to enjoy healthy development;
(d) Right to participation. Every child has, subject to national procedural law, the right
to express his or her views, opinions and beliefs freely, in his or her own words, and to
contribute especially to the decisions affecting his or her life, including those taken in any
judicial processes, and to have those views taken into consideration according to his or
her abilities, age, intellectual maturity and evolving capacity. See: UN Guidelines, para. 8.
254 In what refers to girls in particular, the Nairobi Declaration on Women’s Rights to a Remedy
and Reparation (“Nairobi Declaration”) also guided the Trial Chamber in the the adoption
of its principles. The Nairobi Declaration proclaims that reparations must drive post-conflict
transformation of socio-cultural injustices, and political and structural inequalities that share
the lives of girls. In that sense, the Nairobi Declaration foresees the use of affirmative
measures to redress inequalities that existed prior to the commitment of the crime. It also
states that reparations processes must overcome customary and religious laws and practices
that prevent girls from making decisions on their lives. See: Nairobi Declaration on Women’s
and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation (Adopted at the International Meeting on
Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation, March 2007).
255 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, paras 210 – 211.
256 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para. 214.
257 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para. 215.
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Principles, among others. The Chamber also stated that UN Reports on the
subject of reparations, as well as the jurisprudence of the regional courts of
human rights, had further provided guidance to the Chamber.258
Reparations proceedings are currently suspended due to the pending
appeal, however, once these proceedings resume, it will be up to the TFV, along
with the Registry of the ICC, to implement these general guidelines adopted
by the Trial Chamber in future reparations programmes.
5.5.4 Reparations proceedings
As stated before, orders for reparations can only be made once a Trial Chamber
has entered a conviction. To date, reparations proceedings have only started
in the Lubanga case. Although in the Lubanga case the Trial Chamber continued
hearing the reparations proceedings upon entering a conviction, some have
also referred to the possibility of having a “single judge” assigned for this
task.259 However, under Article 39(2) of the Rome Statute, three judges should
carry out the functions of the Trial Chamber.260 The Trial Chamber in the
Lubanga case nonetheless determined that other judges could replace the three
judges of the original Trial Chamber, particularly since their mandate as judges
came to an end.261 This and other matters are currently pending before the
Appeals Chamber.
Article 76 of the Rome Statute provides that the Trial Chamber can hold
a separate reparations hearing if it decides to hear sentencing separately. To
the contrary, if a Trial Chamber decides on conviction and sentencing in one
hearing, one could also interpret that reparations would also be heard in that
same hearing. In the ICC’s first trial, the judges decided that they would hold
a sentencing hearing separately.262 However, the Trial Chamber admitted
that evidence relating to reparations could be presented during the trial pur-
suant to Regulation 56 of the RoC.263 Nonetheless, in future trials it could
be logical and favourable to the expeditiousness of trials if a Trial Chamber
would hear evidence for all three aspects in one “hearing”: a) innocence or
guilt; b) sentencing; and c) reparations. Consequently, the Trial Chamber could
issue one single decision on these three aspects, pursuant to Articles 74, 75
258 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, paras 185-186.
259 Victims’ Rights Working Group, A victims’ perspective: Composition of the Chambers for
reparation proceedings at the ICC (April 2011).
260 Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (May 2011) 48.
261 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, paras 260-261.
262 Lubanga case Transcript of hearing (25 November 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-T-99-ENG 39.
263 Lubanga case, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, paras 119-122. See also Bemba case, ICC 01/05 01/08-807-
Corr, para. 28.
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and 76 of the Rome Statute.264 This in fact is foreseeable, as Regulation 56
of the RoC provides that the Trial Chamber may decide to hear evidence on
reparations during the main trial on the innocence or guilt of the accused.
The current ICC system foresees only individual applications for repara-
tions.265 However, it has been recommended that applicants be granted the
possibility to collectively request reparations.266 In fact this is only logical
because Rule 97 of the RPE foresees the possibility that the ICC may award
reparations on an individualised or collective basis. Therefore, it would be
recommendable for the ICC to develop a mechanism to request and receive
collective reparations. Another foreseeable method would be to have no
application forms at all, for example if a community-based approach is
adopted. This in fact is what the TFV suggested for reparations in the Lubanga
case, so that the communities affected by the armed conflict receive benefits
and therefore reparations processes do not ignite further stigmatisation or
rivalries.267 This approach was endorsed by the Trial Chamber, although,
as noted above, this procedure has been suspended pending the Appeals
Chamber decision on the matter.268
Article 75 of the Rome Statute foresees two manners in which the ICC could
order reparations. Firstly, the ICC could make an order directly against a
convicted person; that is a convicted person with assets or properties that could
be used for reparations. However, in cases in which the accused person is
indigent or his or her assets have been depleted by costly and long trials, such
orders could become implausible. These reparation orders also require that
reparations are paid or given directly to the victim by the Chamber (either
individually or collectively identified) or “in respect of victims”, for example
to relatives or successors.269 In fact, in the Lubanga case, the TFV suggested
that when there are limited assets, the reparations process should not become
264 See for example Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (May 2011) 46.
265 Victims can request reparations by way of a written application. Although there is a
standard application form that was created pursuant to Regulation 88 of the RoC, its use
is not compulsory. The above, according to Rule 94 of the RPE, triggers the “procedure
upon request”. Likewise, pursuant to Rule 95 of the RPE the Chamber could initiate a
“procedure on the motion of the ICC”, in which the Registrar is instructed to provide
notification of the reparations proceedings to interested victims, persons and states so they
submit a written application pursuant to Rule 94 of the RPE. In regards to this duty to notify
victims, the outreach carried out by the Registry, as analysed in the first section of this
chapter, is essential because victims will not be in a position to apply for reparations unless
they are informed of this possibility.
266 Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (May 2011) 38.
267 Lubanga case ‘Observations on Reparations in Response to the Scheduling Order of 14 March
2012’ (25 April 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2872 para. 103
268 Lubanga case ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to repara-
tions’ (7 August 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, para. 274.
269 Redress, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (May 2011) 16.
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more costly than the actual award to be granted to victims.270 Thus, re-
parations of this nature should only be ordered where there are sufficient funds
available, proportional to the cost that the reparations process would entail.
A second option is for the ICC to order that the award of reparations be
made “through the Trust Fund”. In this case the Chamber could order that
money and other property collected through fines and forfeitures against the
convicted person be transferred to the TFV so that it could then give it to the
victims accordingly.271 However, it is to be noted that the TFV is an inde-
pendent entity of the ICC and there is no direct connection between the TFV
and the organs of the ICC, and no provision in the Rome Statute empowers
the ICC to manage the TFV.272
Rule 98(2) of the RPE foresees that reparations be made through the TFV
“where at the time of making the order it is impossible or impracticable to
make individual awards directly to each victim”. As stated by the TFV, this
mandate of the TFV allows it to transform court-ordered reparations into
credible and tangible forms of redress for victims of crimes adjudicated by
the ICC. The TFV thus acts as a financial administrator, managing the resources
collected through fines or forfeiture or awards for reparations.273 In accord-
ance with Regulation 43 of the RTFV, the Board of Directors may determine
the use of resources transferred to the TFV in accordance with an order of the
ICC. Pursuant to Regulation 46 of the RTFV, resources collected through awards
for reparations may only benefit victims defined under Rule 85 of the RPE,
and, where natural persons are concerned, their families, directly or indirectly
affected by the crimes committed by the convicted person. Pursuant to the
RTFV, orders made through the TFV can be individual, collective or in relation
to an organisation.274 In accordance with the RTFV, when the ICC orders that
reparations be made through the TFV, the Secretariat will prepare a draft
implementation plan, to be approved by the Board of Directors of the TFV.
The TFV will then progressively submit to the relevant Chamber the draft plan
and any progress made in its implementation.275 It is important to note that
270 Lubanga case ‘Public Redacted Version of the ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Conf-Exp–Trust Fund
for Victims’ First Report on Reparations’ (23 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2803-Red, paras
270 and 363.
271 See also Rule 218 of the RPE that foresees that reparations of a financial nature be deposited
with the TFV.
272 T Ingadottir, ‘The Trust Fund for Victims (Article 79 of the Rome Statute)’ in: T Ingadottir
(ed), The International Criminal Court: Recommendations on Policy and Practice. Financing,
Victims, Judges and Immunities (Transnational Publishers 2003) 114.
273 TFV, ‘Trust Fund for Victims welcomes first ICC reparations decision, ready to engage’
<http://trustfundforvictims.org/news/reparations-mandate-trust-fund-victims> accessed
8 August 2013.
274 RTFV, regulations 59-75.
275 RTFV, regulations 54-58.
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the RTFV also foresees consultation with victims, experts and organisations,
in order to decide on the implementation of an award for reparations.276
However, when the convicted person is indigent, it appears that the Trial
Chamber could only make a decision establishing the harms suffered by
victims and make recommendations to the TFV. The TFV could then grant them
reparations with its own resources (TFV’s second mandate that will be analysed
below). Since the TFV is an autonomous entity with its own budget, it would
seem implausible for a Chamber to “order” the TFV to implement a reparations
order if there are no resources coming from the convicted person.277 Another
possibility for cases with an indigent convicted person would be for the
Chamber to order non-financial reparations, such as symbolic reparations (i.e.
the IACtHR has established that translation of the main parts of the judgment
into the local language of the victims is a form of reparation).278 However,
this issue is currently pending before the Appeals Chamber, which hopefully
will clarify the position of the TFV vis-à-vis other organs of the ICC, and par-
ticularly its financial autonomy.
As noted above, the TFV also has a separate mandate specified in Rule 98(5)
of the RPE where “other resources of the TFV may be used for the benefits of
victims”. The TFV currently has 34 projects under this mandate, giving assist-
ance to victims by means of physical rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation
and material support.279 These projects, however, are independent from any
judicial determination on the innocence or guilt of an individual.
Although the implementation reparations are still to be seen at the ICC,
it is important that these take into consideration the child-oriented principles
adopted by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case.
In addition to the adopted principles, other international instruments, such
as the ones mentioned by Trial Chamber I in their decision, could also be of
guidance for the implementation of reparations programmes. For example,
the UN Model Law provides specific recommendations for restorative justice
programmes, which could be applicable to ICC reparations proceedings.280
276 RTFV, regulations 69-71.
277 T Ingadottir,‘The Trust Fund for Victims (Article 79 of the Rome Statute)’ in: T Ingadottir
(ed), The International Criminal Court: Recommendations on Policy and Practice. Financing,
Victims, Judges and Immunities (Transnational Publishers 2003) 114.
278 Plan de Sánchez case, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of November 19, 2004 Series C No116,
68.
279 TFV, ‘The two roles of the TFV: Reparations and General Assistance’ <http://trustfundfor
victims.org/two-roles-tfv> accessed 8 August 2013.
280 ICC reparations proceedings could have the following characteristics: a) be a flexible
response to circumstances of the crime; b) be a response to the crime that respects the
dignity and equality of each person, builds understanding and promotes social harmony
through healing of victims, offenders and communities; c) be an approach that can be used
in conjunction with traditional justice processes and sanctions; d) be an approach that
incorporates problem-solving and addresses the underlying causes of conflict; e) be an
approach that addresses the damages and needs of victims; and f) be a response that
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Likewise, as stated by Trial Chamber I in its decision, there is a need to imple-
ment gender-specificity in reparations, as girls may have particular needs or
face gender-specific obstacles to access reparations programmes.
Moreover, reparations also need to take into consideration the time elapsed
from the commission of the crimes to the implementation of reparations.
Likewise, it should be considered that child victims could now be young
adults, so reparations foreseen for children (access to formal education) may
be unviable or futile. In this regard, the appeals procedure could be simplified
so that appeals on reparations are resolved expeditiously.281
In summary, reparations for child victims must empower and build the
capacities of children, but also of families and communities, to address the
root causes of the conflict. Reparations should thus heal and not cause harm,
either to the victim or his or her community. Hence, a community-based
approach as proposed by the TFV and adopted by Trial Chamber I in the
Lubanga case is welcomed.282
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
With regard to the participation, protection and reparations to child victims
and witnesses before the ICC, the CRC and the UN Guidelines, among other
international instruments, should complement the ICC provisions discussed
in this Chapter, as they could offer guidance for their interpretation and
application. The ICC could in fact adopt a set of guidelines so that professionals
(including judges, counsel, VWU staff, and investigators) protect children
interacting with the ICC and thus avoid their re-victimisation pursuant to
Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute. The UN Model Law (which is based on the
UN Guidelines) could be a good basis (where applicable to the ICC) to create
a child-friendly legal framework for international criminal proceedings.283
However, these guidelines should be adapted to the reality and legal frame-
work of the ICC, and would eventually have to be tailored to the particularities
of a given case before the ICC.
recognises the role of the community as of the primary forum for preventing and responding
to crime and social disorder. See: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Justice in Matters involving
Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime: Model Law and Related Commentary (April 2009), com-
mentary to Article 30.
281 The appeal on Trial Chamber I’s decision on reparations is still pending one year after it
was rendered.
282 UNGA, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General (26 August 1996) A/
51/306, para. 205. See also Paris Principles, principles 7.31 and 7.32
283 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of
Crime: Model Law and Related Commentary (April 2009). The author proposes a set of guide-
lines based on the Model Law in the last chapter of this research.
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Training is also essential, particularly because staff members involved with
child victims and witnesses may not have the adequate specialisation in
children and their rights to fulfil the ICC’s mandate pursuant to Rule 86 of
the RPE. Thus, training in relevant international instruments and standards,
in the dynamics and nature of violence against children, in investigation of
crimes involving children, and in adult-child communication skills, among
many other areas, should be given to investigators, lawyers, judges, and any
staff member or ICC official dealing with child victims and witnesses.284
Children’s interaction with the ICC should never become detrimental to
their psychological and physical well-being or cause re-victimisation. If a child
testifies as a witness, participates as a victim or receives reparations, and
pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Statute, the ICC must always put the child’s
best interests as a priority, regardless of any prosecutorial strategy or overall
mission of the ICC. Children should never be expected to adapt to judicial
proceedings. The ICC must adapt its proceedings, interpreting and applying
the law pursuant to internationally recognised children’s rights. Although the
case law and practice analysed in this research has shown that a children rights
perspective sometimes can be found in ICC proceedings, this needs to be further
developed in order to fully and comprehensively include children’s rights as
described in the CRC within the ICC proceedings in which children participate
as victims, testify as witnesses or benefit from reparations. As noted throughout
this research, this is compulsory pursuant to Articles 21(3) and 68(1) of the
Rome Statute, and Rule 86 of the RPE. The following chapter offers a number
of recommendations in order to further adapt ICC proceedings to children’s
rights standards as well as a model of guidelines to be adopted by the ICC.
284 The UN Model Law proposes a multidisciplinary training intended for all professionals
combined with a more specific training for each profession. See: UN Office on Drugs and
Crime, Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime: Model Law and Related
Commentary (April 2009), 39. Also the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on child friendly justice recommended a multi-disciplinary approach,
in which professionals working with child witnesses and victims (including lawyers,
psychologists, judges, investigators, etc.) work together to understand the child and assess
his or her legal, psychological, social, emotional, physical and cognitive situation. See:
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on Child-Friendly Justice (17 November 2010).
6 Conclusions and recommendations
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statute is undoubtedly a landmark legal instrument as regards the
participation of victims in international criminal proceedings and their right
to receive reparations.1 The Rome Statute is also pioneering in respect of
gender-perspective and children’s rights.2 Provisions such as Article 68(3) of
the Rome Statute, which opens the possibility for victims to participate in
proceedings, and Rule 86 of the RPE, which contains a general principle stating
that the ICC shall take into account the needs, among others, of child victims
and witnesses,3 were unprecedented before the adoption of the Rome Statute
in 1998. In that regard, the Rome Statute and in general the entire ICC legal
framework is more inclusive than any other international tribunal. Thus, the
ICC legal framework is comprehensive and consistent with the CRC and inter-
nationally recognised children’s rights.
The main challenge for the ICC is to interpret and apply this comprehensive
legal framework in its various country situations and in circumstances of
1 Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute enshrines the right to participation and Article 75 of the
Rome Statute provides for victims’ reparations.
2 Articles 6(b) and (e), 7(g), and 8(2)(b)(ix)(xxii)(xxvi) and 2(e)(iv)(vi)(vii) include crimes
particularly affecting children. Article 21(3) includes the principle of non-discrimination
and the compulsory application of internationally recognised human rights. Articles 36(8)(b),
42(9), 43(6) and 44(2) provide that ICC judges, the Office of the Prosecutor, Registry and
staff in general must have specialists in violence against women and children, among other
issues. Articles 54(1)(b) and 68(1) and (2) provide that the personal circumstances of victims
and witnesses, including age and gender, among other factors, should be considered during
the investigation and protective measures shall be taken in order to protect these victims
and witnesses. Rules 16-19 of the RPE provide for the functions of the Registry and parti-
cularly the VWU, vis-à-vis victims and witnesses, particularly the needs of children and
other vulnerable individuals. Rule 86 of the RPE contains the general principle that in
making any direction or order, the Court shall take into consideration the needs of victims
and witnesses, among them children and victims of sexual or gender violence and persons
with disabilities. Rule 87 of the RPE enumerates protective measures available to protect
victims and witnesses and Rule 88 refers to special measures for victims and witnesses,
including children. Rule 112(4) of the RPE also foresees the application of measures to avoid
traumatisation of witnesses, including children, persons with disabilities and victims of
sexual or gender violence. Rules 63(4) and 70-72 of the RPE contain the principles of
evidence in cases of sexual violence.
3 UN Guidelines, para. 9(a) defines “child victims and witnesses”.
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armed conflict and massive human rights violations, as is the case of most
(if not all) crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. This application and
interpretation may result in discrimination of children (de facto) in spite of the
ICC’s legal framework, which although perhaps legally faultless, may be
applied or implemented in the field and vis-à-vis child victims and witnesses
in a controversial or undesirable manner (i.e. the Lubanga case and the Trial
Chamber’s conclusions regarding the use of intermediaries and child witnesses
referred to above).4
The following conclusions and recommendations are a modest proposal
that in the view of the author may improve the interaction of the ICC with
child victims and witnesses so that their involvement is empowering but at
the same time protective of their best interests, overall well-being and security,
in accordance with the aforesaid ICC legal framework but also with inter-
nationally recognised children’s rights. The following recommendations are
based on existing international children’s rights instruments, namely the CRC,
but also other international instruments analysed in Chapter 3 of this research
as well as the UN Guidelines referred to in Chapter 5.
It is imperative to understand that the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998
and therefore was in accordance with internationally recognised human rights
at the time of its adoption. However, law, as any other social science, is in
constant change and development, and children’s rights and what we identify
as “internationally recognised human rights” is progressively changing and
developing. These final conclusions and recommendations endeavour to
interpret the Rome Statute and the RPE with internationally recognised
children’s rights law adopted to date. Moreover, where applicable and in
accordance with the Rome Statute, this Chapter will use as guidance soft law
instruments in children’s rights that have been adopted in recent years and
that could enhance and progress the ICC’s practice vis-à-vis child victims and
witnesses.
6.2 CREATING A CULTURE OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
In order to take into consideration the needs of children, the ICC should create
a culture of children’s rights throughout the entirety of its judicial proceedings,
from the initial stages of an investigation to the final phase of reparations
orders and their implementation.5 After all, Rule 86 of the RPE obliges the ICC
4 Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and Article 2 of the CRC. See also UN Guidelines, paras
8(b), 15-18; Paris Principles, principle 3.2.
5 UN Guidelines, para. 9(c) defines the “justice process” as encompassing the detection of
the crime, making of the complaint, investigation, prosecution and trial and post-trial
procedures, regardless of whether the case is handled in a national, international or regional
criminal justice system for adults or juveniles, or in a customary or informal system of
justice. See also UN Guidelines, para. 29.
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to take the needs of children into consideration in any action or decision. It
is thus fundamental to mainstream a child-sensitive perspective throughout
ICC proceedings (analysed in Chapter 5 above), involving all actors engaged
with the ICC, including judges, prosecutors, counsel, staff and also inter-
mediaries and others working in the field.6 However, a court-wide strategy
that incorporates children’s rights is not an ICC-only endeavour. The ICC exists
and works in close relationship with the ASP, as well as with local and inter-
national NGOs, inter-governmental organisations and grass-roots groups. All
these actors, along with the ICC, are required to create an international judicial
system that is inclusive and safe for child victims and witnesses and properly
addresses their needs.7
Moreover, as the international community and national and local authorities
could look at the ICC practice as a “good example” and an institution that
represents the “highest standards” of human rights, the ICC should adhere
to its obligation pursuant to Article 21(3), and thus apply and interpret the
law pursuant to internationally recognised human rights. Consequently, ICC
standards should as a minimum act pursuant to internationally recognised
children’s rights.
Recommendation 1: The ICC should sign agreements of cooperation and support with
UN specialised agencies (i.e. UNICEF and UN Women) as well as with international
and national inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations specialised in
children’s rights.
The ICC does not operate alone and should benefit from the expertise and
knowledge acquired by other actors after decades of experience with children’s
rights or in the field. An institutional agreement with children’s rights
organisations and programmes, beyond informal case-by-case cooperation,
could guarantee a long-lasting relationship between the ICC and such institu-
tions. These organisations could give their expert advice to the ICC on
children’s rights issues and could even provide the ICC with much needed
resources (including human resources specialised in certain areas of children’s
rights). Local NGOs or other organisations could also assist the ICC in its ac-
tivities (i.e. by implementing an ICC strategy on child-friendly outreach). The
UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict or even the CRC
Committee could in due course monitor the work of these local and inter-
national actors or cooperate with international and national tribunals and other
justice mechanisms, which should complement the ICC’s mandate. Either one
6 UN Guidelines, para. 9(d) defines “child-sensitive” as an approach that balances the child’s
right to protection and that takes into account the child’s individual needs and views.
7 Paris Principles, principle 3.26.
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of these two monitoring entities could eventually adopt general recommenda-
tions in this regard.8
6.3 RECOGNISING THAT CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ARE NOT OPTIONAL
Pursuant to the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21(3) of
the Rome Statute, any interpretation or application of the law which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying recognition, enjoyment or exercise
of any human right of children is prohibited. In order to avoid discrimination
against child victims and witness participating in the ICC’s judicial process,
a children’s rights perspective is necessary and consequently, the application
of the CRC is not discretionary or optional. To the contrary, it is compulsory
pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, which provides that the applica-
tion and interpretation of the law must be performed in accordance with
internationally recognised human rights and abiding to the principle of non-
discrimination. As a result, the fundamental principles of the CRC should be
guiding principles of the ICC when dealing with child victims and witnesses
of international crimes.9
Recommendation 2: Although the ICC is not a “State Party” to the CRC it should apply
these human rights standards, where relevant, in order to fulfil its mandate pursuant
to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and in light of Rule 86 of the RPE.
Whenever the applicable law of the ICC is interpreted and applied, a children’s
rights approach should take the innate bias and adult-centred nature of most
legal instruments, including the Rome Statute, the RPE and other ICC provisions,
into consideration.
For every legal provision, it is necessary to ask: how does this provision
particularly affect children? How could this provision result in the non-dis-
crimination/inclusion of children or certain groups of children (i.e. girls)?10
This simple exercise enables the practitioner (be it a judge, prosecutor or
lawyer) to disregard the discriminatory application or interpretation of a law
that, although formally non-discriminatory, could result in unfairness and
exclusion when applied under certain circumstances (i.e. on-going armed
conflict) and regarding certain groups (i.e. children).11
8 See for example: UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of
Armed Conflict (September 2011).
9 Particularly Article 2, 3, 6 and 12 of the CRC. See also the UN Guidelines, para. 8(d).
10 UN Guidelines, para 8(b).
11 Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and Article 2 of the CRC. UN Guidelines, paras 15-17.
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A children’s rights perspective is not an exclusive topic of cases dealing
with crimes in which children are a material element of the crime (i.e. child
recruitment). Most crimes (if not all) within the jurisdiction of the ICC will
ultimately have children as their victims. It is practically impossible to think
of a crime before the ICC that would not have any children as its victims, either
directly or indirectly. Consequently, a children rights perspective needs to
be incorporated in all ICC proceedings regardless of the nature of the crime
being investigated or prosecuted. For example, charges brought against accused
persons should undertake to include within the “facts and circumstances” the
crimes committed against children in a given situation. Moreover, when
reparations are granted to victims, children should be included among the
beneficiaries. Thus, from the initial steps of the OTP’s investigation to the final
stages of reparations proceedings, a child’s rights perspective could guarantee
the fight for impunity for crimes committed against children pursuant to the
Preamble of the Rome Statute.
Recommendation 3: Pursuant to Article 3 of the CRC, the best interests of the child
should be taken into consideration in all actions concerning child witnesses or victims
or any other child that could be affected by the work of the ICC.12
Although a standard procedure could be adopted by the ICC when dealing
with child victims and witnesses, the best interests of a child concerned should
be customised on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, inter alia, the
child’s views, his or her cultural and socio-economic situation, and any rights
he or she may have pursuant to the Rome Statute and the CRC. Moreover, the
concept and application of best interests of the child in a given case should
not be unilaterally decided by the ICC, but should be decided upon in consulta-
tion with the child.
6.4 ADAPTING ICC PROCEEDINGS TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE CRC
Throughout this research, ICC provisions, its case law and practice have been
analysed from a children’s rights perspective, taking into consideration the
CRC as point of departure. As a result, several recommendations are hereinafter
offered as a means to make ICC proceedings more child-friendly; that is a
judicial system inclusive of children’s rights and one that guarantees parti-
cipation of children in a safe, respectful and empowering manner and that
takes serious consideration of their views in accordance with their age and
maturity.13
12 UN Guidelines, para. 8(c). See also Paris Principles, principle 3.4. as regards the “best
interests” of former child soldiers.
13 Article 12 of the CRC and UN Guidelines, paras. 8(d) and 21.
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Recommendation 4: Pursuant to Article 12 of the CRC, the ICC should seek the views
of child witnesses and victims, in accordance with their age and maturity and should
duly inform the child about the judicial process.
A child’s ability to participate as a victim or testify as a witness should be
presumed and the burden of proof should not be imposed on the child to
demonstrate his or her capacity. Judges and counsel in ICC proceedings should
treat the child witness or victim with respect and dignity, protecting his/her
well-being, but also avoiding paternalistic or patronising conducts that may
demean the child’s capacity, based on his/her age and maturity.14
An on-going process of information-sharing and mutual dialogue between
the child concerned and the ICC is necessary to guarantee that the active
participation of children in ICC proceedings meets their needs (particularly
their safety, well-being and privacy) pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. Children
that participate as victims or witnesses before the ICC must be duly prepared
and be fully informed, in such a way and in a language they understand, about
their rights and obligations, procedures before the ICC, as well as any con-
sequences or effects that their interaction with the ICC may have upon their
situation and that of their family.15 The right to information must be
guaranteed at the outset of the child’s interaction with the ICC, for example
when a child is first approached by an ICC investigator or offered to fill-in
a victim’s application form. If applicable, the child, and his or her parents or
caregivers, must be duly informed about any unfounded expectations or
misconceptions about the ICC or the outcome of ICC proceedings.16
Children who interact with the ICC should receive feedback about the
outcome of ICC proceedings or any decision affecting them.17 A child who
has been approached by ICC investigators must be given proper information
and feedback about any decision affecting them (for example a prosecutorial
decision confirming a child as a trial witness or a decision withdrawing a child
from the trial witnesses list). The same need for feedback is required when
ICC staff or intermediaries approach a child to fill-in a victim’s application
form. The child is entitled to receive proper feedback regarding his or her
application and any judicial or administrative decision affecting them (i.e.
appointment of a common legal representative).
Recommendation 5: Child victims and witnesses should receive adequate support from
specialised staff, trained in children’s rights, children with trauma and violence against
children, including sexual violence.
14 Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute and UN Guidelines, para. 8(a) and Part V.
15 Article 13 of the CRC.
16 Article 5 of the CRC.
17 UN Guidelines, para. 30(b).
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Children’s participation before the ICC should not a re-traumatising event,18
and the ICC should support child victims and witnesses throughout ICC pro-
ceedings.19 When the ICC first approaches a child, whether directly or through
an intermediary, children should be supported so that they are not re-
traumatised or taken advantage of by adults with other interests (i.e. be it an
investigator trying to produce evidence or an intermediary trying to benefit
from the child).20 From the outset, a neutral support person from the VWU
should at all times supervise and monitor interaction of the ICC with children,
so that their rights and well-being are safeguarded and become a priority of
the ICC’s activity, pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute and Rule 86
of the RPE.21
The ICC must put in place an accountability mechanism so that children
interacting with the ICC, either directly or through intermediaries, can complain
or obtain remedies when their rights are disregarded or violated in ICC pro-
ceedings.22 Investigations pursuant to Article 70 of the Rome Statute should
be carried out whenever there is information that crimes against the admin-
istration could have been committed in which child victims or witnesses were
involved.
6.5 PRESERVING THE EVIDENCE OF CHILD WITNESSES
The results in the Lubanga trial, in which child witnesses were found unreliable
and in the end lost their victims status, prove that urgent measures must be
taken to preserve the evidence of child witnesses in ICC proceedings. If these
child witnesses would have been properly screened in the initial stages of the
investigations, perhaps some of them would have been found unreliable early
on in the investigation, and not at the end of a trial, and more than 5 years
after their initial interviews with investigators.23
Alternative mechanisms other than live testimony in court should also be
explored by the ICC in order to preserve the child’s testimony from the passing
of time. Pursuant to Article 56 of the Rome Statute or Rule 68 of the RPE, taking
adequate safeguards to secure the rights of the defence, statements of child
witnesses could be taken soon after the commission of the crimes, to be pres-
ented later in trial. Otherwise, the evidence of child witnesses (even the most
reliable and trustworthy) may not endure the prolonged judicial proceedings
18 UN Guidelines, para. 42; Paris Principles, principles 3.18 – 3.19 and 7.75.
19 UN Guidelines, paras 22-25 and 30; Paris Principles, principle 8.
20 Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute and Rules 86-88 of the RPE. See also Article 19 of the CRC.
21 Rule 17 of the RPE; UN Guidelines, para. 24.
22 Paris Principles, principle 3.17.
23 Paris Principles, principle 7.28 provides useful guidelines in relation to interviews of former
child soldiers.
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before the ICC.24 If one considers the developmental changes (both physical
and mental) that a child undergoes while ICC proceedings are on-going, it
would in reality be astonishing to “preserve” the evidence of these child
witnesses unless measures are taken to actually safeguard their testimonies
and encapsulate them from the passing of time, the loss of memory and
changes in the mind of a child or an adolescent, who very often will move
on to adult life while ICC proceedings are pending. However, as noted above,
such measures should not be prejudicial to the rights of the defence to
challenge evidence brought against the suspect or accused person.
Recommendation 6: Safeguards must be adopted to preserve the evidence given by
children, protecting it from the passing of time, growth and development, as well as
from intermediaries or third persons (including parents) with different interests, all
of which could eventually affect its reliability.
As noted above, evidence of children can be preserved by taking written
statements in lieu of in-court testimony or by adopting in-court measures to
facilitate an honest and uninhibited testimony.
Child victims or witnesses appearing before the ICC may not necessarily
understand the difference between right and wrong, telling the truth or lying.
They may also not understand the meaning of crimes against the administra-
tion of justice, such as giving false testimony. Child witnesses appearing before
the ICC must fully comprehend, in a language and manner they understand,
the rights but also the responsibilities of witnesses testifying before the ICC,
including the importance of telling the truth, the significance of the oath and
the crime of false testimony.
However, even if children do understand the meaning of truth, they may
also have fears or trauma (i.e. fears of further stigmatisation or retaliation) that
may make it difficult, or prevent them from being sincere and truthful when
the ICC approaches them. A child victim that is first approached by a stranger
and is asked to fill-in an application form may understandably lie about his
exact identity or his family, particularly since that child may have personally
already experienced a crime in which another adult(s) caused him or her harm.
Why would that child trust any adult (even if this is an ICC staff member)?
Although child victims and witnesses should not be “coached” in preparation
of their statement or testimony before the ICC or in filling-in a victim’s applica-
tion form, they should adequately be informed and screened to ensure that
the information they give to the ICC is trustworthy and eventually reliable for
criminal proceedings.25 An investigator or ICC staff member collecting applica-
tion forms or interviewing a potential witness should first and foremost gain
the trust of the child. Only then can it be expected that the child concerned
24 UN Guidelines, para. 18.
25 UN Guidelines, para. 18.
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will give a sincere and trustworthy testimony or account. Early actions from
the prosecution could avoid multiple subsequent contacts and interrogations
of the child witness that could eventually result in conflicting and contradictory
statements that ultimately undermine the child witness’ credibility.26 The
prosecution should thus take measures and judges should be keen to authorise
these measures in order to preserve the evidence of child witnesses, while at
the same time safeguarding the rights of the defence (i.e. admission of a prior
written statement instead of oral testimony, in-court measures to facilitate
testimony of child witnesses, expeditiousness of proceedings when related
to child witnesses).27
Recommendation 7: The ICC should adopt measures by which children can participate
in court proceedings in a safe and appropriate manner and in accordance with the
rights of the accused and the expeditiousness of proceedings.
Participation of children as a prosecution witness, although a possibility, is
not the only way in which children could interact with the ICC and may
sometimes be detrimental, as proven by the Lubanga case, in which children’s
interaction proved to be prejudicial for the child and ultimately for the entire
case.28 Thus, other alternatives could be foreseen in which children are not
witnesses under oath, but still communicate their views and concerns to the
judges pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute. For example, the Chamber
could hold in situ visits to the places where the child victims or witnesses
reside, in order to know the context in which crimes occurred or where the
children concerned are living. The Chamber or an official from the Chamber
could also take testimonies from child witnesses in their own country, albeit
with safeguards to guarantee the rights of the defence. Child victims could
also address the judges by way of unsworn statements, simply to express their
views and concerns, and without having to be subject to cross-examination.29
Recommendation 8: The ICC should take measures to ensure that child witnesses give
testimony in a safe and appropriate manner.
There will be instances when the viva voce testimony of a child witness is
necessary. In such instances, the competent Chamber could decide to appoint
an expert on judicial proceedings dealing with children, which would enable
26 UN Guidelines, paras 12-14.
27 UN Guidelines, paras 30-31.
28 As noted above, the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case found that all but one former child
soldier witness were unreliable.
29 Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute and Article 12 of the CRC. See also UN Guidelines, paras.
8(d) and 21.
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the Chamber to take informed judicial decisions to guarantee the child wit-
nesses’ safety and well-being pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute.30
Prior to any intervention in which the testimony of a child will be taken,
he or she should be properly informed, in a way and language that he or she
understands, about the proceedings that will take place. Children should also
be adequately informed about the importance of telling the truth and the
significance of the oath, if this is taken. Moreover, whenever children are
examined as witnesses in ICC proceedings, they should be approached in a
child-friendly, amenable environment that must be adapted to children’s needs.
Whether in a courtroom or in any room via video link or via a recorded or
written statement, measures must be taken so that the location where the child
testifies is hospitable (clothing of lawyers and judges, sight screens in case
of presence of the accused, etc.).
Court sessions in which children appear should avoid any disruptions or
distractions, unless these are due to the needs of the child (i.e. requested break
or assistance). Thus, procedures such as the Rule 98 deposition exercise made
in the Lubanga case, could be used to take the testimony of child witnesses
without interruptions due to objections from the parties. Examination or cross-
examination (if necessary) should be done in a conversation-like manner that
favours open communication between the child witness and those listening
to his or her testimony. Multiple interviews or examination of a child witness
should be avoided and efforts must be made so that evidence from child
witnesses is uninterrupted and is collected promptly, avoiding long periods
of time between interviews or examinations or changes in the person(s) con-
ducting such interviews or examinations.31
In principle, cross-examination of child witnesses by trial lawyers should
be avoided and child witnesses should give testimony by way of a written
statement or a previously recorded statement. In cases where there are manifest
contradictions, the Court could examine the child witness. However, it would
be more appropriate for judges, and not counsel, to pose any questions to the
child witness. This would also avoid multiple interruptions of testimony due
to parties’ objections. As noted above, this examination could take place in
situ, in an environment that is close and familiar to the child witness, or via
video-link. At all times child witnesses should be able to give their testimony
in their own words and not in the strenuous manner in which cross-examina-
tion is often pursued by counsel.
30 UN Guidelines, para. 14.
31 UN Guidelines, paras 30-31.
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Recommendation 9: Adequate support should be offered to children who participate
in person in ICC proceedings either as victims or witnesses.
The judicial proceedings in which child witnesses testify or participate in
person, should preferably be confidential in nature. Whenever it is possible
and not contrary to the rights of the accused person, children participating
as victims before the ICC should remain anonymous. If disclosure of the child’s
identity to the accused is necessary, measures should be taken to avoid eye
contact or direct confrontation between the accused person and the child.
Whenever a child victim or witness participates or testifies before the ICC,
support staff, such as psychologists, should be available to offer support to
the child throughout his or her interaction with the ICC. The witness pre-
paration and familiarisation process should include an informal meeting
between the child witness, and counsel, but could also include judges, in order
to build confidence and create a friendly environment of trust between the
child witness and those who will hear his or her testimony.32
6.6 PROTECTING CHILDREN AGAINST EXPLOITATION
Many child victims and witnesses of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
will be refugees, displaced, separated, unaccompanied or orphaned.33 This
situation makes them extremely vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation,
including crimes against the administration of justice.34
Recommendation 10: The ICC must take measures to protect child victims and
witnesses from exploitation by third persons that may want to take advantage of ICC
proceedings for their own benefit.
The use of intermediaries by the ICC, necessary and essential in many circum-
stances, should nevertheless be closely monitored and controlled by ICC
prosecutors, the Registry and ultimately the judiciary. The ICC should only
collaborate with reliable and trustworthy intermediaries who are knowledge-
able and have experience in children’s rights. Although this statement appears
self-evident, the Lubanga case proved that the ICC relied on untrustworthy
intermediaries.
32 Rule 17 of the RPE; UN Guidelines, paras 22-25.
33 Paris Principles, principle 5.
34 Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute and Rules 86-88 of the RPE. See also Articles 19, 32 and
36 of the CRC. For crimes against the administration of justice, see Article 70 of the Rome
Statute. See also Principles 10 and 12(b) of UNGA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law: resolution adopted by the General
Assembly (“UN Basic Principles”) (21 March 2006) A/RES/60/147.
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In instances when such specialised intermediaries are unavailable or
inexistent, intermediaries (either individuals or organisations) working with
the ICC in the field should be properly trained and informed on children’s
rights and the best practices to deal with child victims and witnesses.35 At
all times, the ICC should ensure that children interacting with the ICC are doing
so voluntarily and free of any coercion and that they have been properly
informed of their right to participate with the ICC (not their obligation) as well
as any implications of their participation. The ICC should make sure that
whenever this interaction with the ICC affects the child’s well-being or the child
is no longer interested, the ICC should respectfully withdraw the child from
any dealings with the Court in a manner that is appropriate and non-traumatic
and does not affect the privacy, interests and safety of the child and his or
her family.36
Although it is true that the ultimate goal of the ICC is to bring perpetrators
of crimes to justice, it is also essential that the ICC does not cause harm to the
victims it is intended to redress and protect, particularly if these are children.
Therefore, close presence of specialised ICC staff in the field, working along
with intermediaries but also supervising and monitoring the work they do
in the field, is essential to guarantee active children’s participation but also
their well-being and safety pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute.37
6.7 INCLUDING THE PLIGHT OF CHILDREN IN ALL ICC CASES
All crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, even if exclusively committed
against adults, will directly or indirectly have children as victims. Violence
against children is a weapon of war in many current armed conflicts. Likewise,
children are often target of systematic or generalised attacks against civilians
and genocide campaigns. In most cases brought before the ICC children will
be among the civilian victims of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes. Consequently, this dire reality should be reflected in the prosecutorial
strategy of the ICC.38
Recommendation 11: The Prosecutor should endeavour, whenever there is evidence,
to include in ICC investigations and trials charges for crimes committed exclusively
against children and crimes committed against children in wider, more general attacks
against civilians.
35 UN Guidelines, para. 42.
36 Rule 87 of the RPE; UN Guidelines, paras 26-28 and 32-34.
37 Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute and Articles 6 and 16 of the CRC. See also principle 12(b)
of the UN Basic Principles.
38 Preamble of the Rome Statute, Article 19(2) of the CRC and principles 3(b) and 4 of the
UN Basic Principles.
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The Prosecutor should avoid having adult-centred charges that solely reflect
the crimes committed against adults and harms suffered by the adult civilian
population in a given case. The Prosecutor should endeavour, when there is
sufficient evidence, to include a children’s dimension in the charges brought
by the Prosecutor against individuals, particularly in the “facts and circum-
stances” of a given case. Thus, the “facts and circumstances” of the charges,
necessary to confirm the charges against a suspect and eventually to convict
him/her in trial, should undertake to include crimes committed against
children, bearing in mind gender particularities.39
Accordingly, the Prosecutor of the ICC should make an effort to include
in any investigation: a) crimes committed against children in which children
are an element of the crime; and b) crimes committed against children in which
children suffer disproportionate effects or are disproportionately victimised
vis-à-vis other sectors of the population.
Recommendation 12: The Pre-Trial Chamber should oversee the Prosecutor’s investiga-
tion in order to guarantee that the charges brought against individuals are comprehens-
ive and inclusive.
The Pre-Trial Chamber has an important role to play as regards the manner
and content of the charges the Prosecutor brings against an individual in a
particular situation or case. For example, when the prosecution requests
authorisation to initiate an investigation under Article 15 of the Rome Statute,
the Pre-Trial Chamber could request that information regarding crimes com-
mitted against children and the effects that other crimes have on children be
considered in the investigation to be authorised. The Pre-Trial Chamber could
also instruct that the views of children are included in Article 15 representa-
tions made by victims.40 Victims’ organisations working with children’s rights
could also play an important role in providing the Pre-Trial Chamber with
Article 15 representations, which incorporate the perspective of children. This
judicial control is important so that crimes committed against children and
the effects that international crimes have on children are adequately charged
in pre-trial proceedings and ultimately prosecuted in trial proceedings and
included in reparations orders.
6.8 REACHING OUT FOR CHILDREN
Recommendation 13: The ICC should organise outreach activities that target children
in a given situation.
39 Articles 23 and 30 of the CRC; UN Guidelines, paras 10-11.
40 Article 15 of the Rome Statute and Article 12 of the CRC. See also the UN Guidelines, paras
8(d) and 21.
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As already observed above, children should be informed, in a language and
manner they understand, about their rights to participate and receive re-
parations before the ICC, but also about the risks and difficulties they may
encounter as a result of their interaction with the ICC. Child victims and
witnesses need to be informed about the possibilities but also limitations of
ICC proceedings so that they do not have unreal expectations that would lead
to frustration or even re-victimisation.41
Child victims and witnesses have the right to receive, throughout the entire
proceedings, adequate feedback about judicial decisions that are relevant to
them. The word “throughout” should encompass the initial stages of the
investigation through to the final stages of reparations. Outreach is thus
essential to communicate with children concerned who may not necessarily
be reachable through ordinary means of judicial notification.
Outreach tools must be adapted to the education level, maturity and age
of the child population. Children should not be expected to understand legal
or adult-centred concepts. Outreach activities that target children need to take
into account the means of communication and access to information that
children have in a given situation (i.e. schools, parents, radio, and internet).
Finally, though the ICC should rely on the expertise and know-how of
children’s rights agencies and organisations working in the field, it should
not delegate all its outreach activities to third parties. It is essential for the
ICC to have its own in-house specialists able to tailor outreach programmes
to children in the different situations under the ICC’s scrutiny.
6.9 GUARANTEEING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF CHILD VICTIMS
In its first ten years, ICC case law is far from homogenous and sometimes
Chambers have adopted different criteria that may send contradicting messages
to victims and persons assisting them in their participation process.
Recommendation 14: The ICC case law should become consistent as regards children’s
participation as victims in the proceedings in accordance with the CRC and other
applicable international instruments.
In relation to child victims, ICC case law should determine once and for all
whether child victims need parental consent to apply for participation. Addi-
tionally, Chambers should adopt uniform criteria in relation to the concept
of legal guardian of children acting on their behalf and the need to prove the
kinship between the child victim and the person acting on his or her behalf.
41 Articles 13 and 17 of the CRC. See also principles 11(c), 12(a) and 24 of the UN Basic
Principles; UN Guidelines, paras 19-20.
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Chambers should also adopt a uniform policy as regards the need for
victims to submit individual application forms in order to participate in
proceedings via a common legal representative. Whatever criteria is ultimately
adopted (individual application forms or collective means of participation),
the ICC should take into consideration that in ICC proceedings not only the
accused person has the right to be tried without undue delay, but also victims,
and particularly child victims, have the right to fair judicial proceedings.42
Considering the rapid developmental changes in children and adolescents,
application processes, trials and reparations mechanisms that extend too long
in time may become inadequate or even moot. Victims’ application processes
should be expedited and become more effective so that an increased number
of victims does not equate into overburdened parties and ICC organs, and
ultimately ineffective participation of individual victims. Victims’ participation
however, should not be questioned, as it is an intrinsic part of the ICC’s judicial
system, enshrined in Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. Victims’ participations
should be adapted in order to facilitate participation that is meaningful and
at the same time conscious of the ICC’s limited financial resources and the
workload of defence teams. Particularly the use of individual application forms
and consequently the case-by-case judicial analysis for each applicant should
be revisited.
The recent case law in the Kenya Situation, in which individual applications
are no longer necessary, may be a window of opportunity for victim’s par-
ticipation that is effective and not contrary to the rights of the accused and
the expeditiousness of trial proceedings. However, if the approach of Trial
Chamber V were to be followed, thus requiring application forms solely for
victims wishing to participate in person in proceedings, a reform to the RPE
and the RoC would be appropriate (particularly Rule 89 of the RPE and Regula-
tion 86 of the RoC). The current case law, although unappealed, may go
beyond what the drafters of the RPE and certainly the judges, who drafted the
RoC, had foreseen as victims’ participation at the ICC.
A collective approach of victims’ participation, and ultimately reparations,
is foreseeable in all future ICC proceedings, particularly due to the Court’s
limited resources and the difficult security situation faced by victims in the
field. However, children must be included and not be discriminated within
the wider “collective” approach. Their views and concerns should be given
due consideration,43 and, if necessary, measures of affirmative action should
be taken to include children’s views, and those of different groups of children
(i.e. girls), within the analysis of any collective approach.44
42 UN Guidelines, para. 30(c).
43 Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and Article 2 of the CRC. See also Principles 12 and 25
of the UN Basic Principles and UN Guidelines, paras 8(b) and 15-17.
44 CEDAW, article 4.
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Finally, if a collective approach is followed, common legal representatives
should have demonstrated experience and capacity to deal with child victims-
clients and they should be knowledgeable in children’s rights. If they do not
already have that expertise, counsel in the list of counsel of the ICC and any
field staff assigned to the teams of legal representatives should be trained in
children’s rights issues.45 The OPCV, which could be given a leading role in
this new collective approach of victims’ participation, should also have in-
house experts in children’s rights.
6.10 PROVIDING MEANINGFUL, ADEQUATE AND FAIR REPARATIONS FOR CHILD
VICTIMS, THEIR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES
Recommendation 15: Reparations in general, and particularly collective reparations,
should take into consideration the harms suffered by child victims as a result of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The ICC should take into consideration the socio-economic impact that crimes
within its jurisdiction have on children, their families and communities.
Reparations for crimes committed against children must take into account the
effects these crimes caused on their physical and psychological well-being,
their education and family life.46 Moreover, when crimes are committed
against children, the harms suffered by family members, including parents
and siblings, should be presumed. Likewise, when crimes are massively or
systematically committed against children, the harms suffered by the commun-
ity in general should also be taken into consideration.47
The ICC will most likely be a forum for collective rather than individual
reparations, given the generalized nature of the crimes and the fact that most
victims will not be individually identified nor will they have access to the ICC
to submit an individual application form to receive reparations. When imple-
menting collective reparations for a community or group of victims in general,
the ICC should take into consideration the particular needs of child victims
and any priorities they may have vis-à-vis the adult population. If collective
reparations concern child victims in particular, the ICC should take into account
the needs and views of the different groups of children within a community
pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE (i.e. different ethnic groups, boys and girls,
children with disabilities or any other condition that makes them a priority
group (i.e. children with HIV or child-moms)).48
45 UN Guidelines, paras 22 and 42.
46 Principle 15 of the UN Basic Principles.
47 Paris Principles, principle 7.30.
48 Article 21(3) Rome Statute, Rule 86 of the RPE and Articles 2 and 12 of the CRC. See also
article 23 of the CRC in relation to children with disabilities.
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6.11 INVOLVING STATES IN AN ICC CHILDREN’S RIGHTS STRATEGY
Recommendation 16: The ASP should elect individuals with expertise in children’s
rights and allocate funds in order to guarantee child victims and witnesses’ rights.
The ASP should elect to key positions such as judges, the Prosecutor, deputy
prosecutors, and the Board of Directors of the TFV, persons with expertise in
children’s rights, particularly violence against children. Likewise, the ASP
should monitor ICC organs’ recruitment policies so that persons with the above
expertise are appointed as staff members. Moreover, the ASP, who approves
the ICC’s annual budget, should allocate funds to the organs of the ICC so they
can fulfil their mandate to include children’s rights and gender perspective
in their work. Budget limitations or cuts should not unduly reduce the possibil-
ity of child victims to participate and receive reparations. Likewise, budget
limitations must under no circumstances affect the ICC’s duty to protect the
well being of child victims and witnesses.
6.12 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Child victims and witnesses in ICC proceedings have suffered immensely as
they have directly or indirectly undergone the indescribable horrors of armed
conflict and gross human rights violations. Judicial proceedings should redress
these most vulnerable victims in a considerate manner, but also acknowledge
the immense potential that children have in achieving peace and reconciliation,
which should be one of the ultimate goals of international justice. This task
is unquestionably difficult to achieve and sometimes the best-intended actions
might result in undesirable results that ultimately cause harm to child victims,
their families and communities. However, responsibilities should be assumed
and after ten years of experience, the ICC should adopt a court-wide policy
that protects child victims and witnesses pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Rome
Statute, while at the same time enabling their active participation in judicial
proceedings. This research is a modest contribution that hopefully will guide
ICC staff and officials to achieve the aspiration to “bring justice to victims”,
and within them, girls and boys who, notwithstanding their young age,
witnessed and survived the most serious crimes against humankind.
In the following pages a series of “guidelines” are proposed, which could
be of use for all organs of the ICC to implement a children’s rights perspective
in ICC proceedings. However, these guidelines should be subject to the principle
of legality and the rights of the accused person enshrined in the Rome Statute.
A similar comprehensive document could be adopted by an ICC judges’
plenary or as an ASP resolution. Otherwise, the suggestions and proposals
contained therein could be used as guidance when adopting ICC documents,
such as the strategy on victims’ participation or on intermediaries, in order
to transversally include a children’s rights perspective in the work of the ICC.

Guidelines on children and the International Criminal Court 243
Guidelines on children and the
International Criminal Court
These guidelines are a proposal based on the Guidelines and Model Law on
Justice Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, which were
adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in order to assist,
among others, international organisations in “designing legislation, policy,
programmes and practices that address key issues related to child victims and
witnesses of crime”.49 The proposed guidelines also take into consideration
the applicable law under the Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evid-
ence and other applicable instruments under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute,
which could be considered as “internationally recognised” children’s rights.
PREAMBLE
Taking into consideration Article 21 of the Rome Statute (“Statute”), particular-
ly paragraph 3, which states that the application and interpretation of law
“must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights”,
Taking into consideration the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”),
Taking into consideration the United Nations Guidelines on Justice in Matters
involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crimes (“UN Guidelines”),
Taking into consideration that only if the rights enshrined in the above-
mentioned instruments are guaranteed and safeguarded, will children parti-
cipate in ICC judicial proceedings in a manner that is empowering for the
children concerned, their families and their communities,
The following Guidelines on Children and the ICC (“Guidelines”) are adopted.
49 UN Guidelines and Model Law on Justice Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses
of Crime, 2009.
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DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of these Guidelines, the following definitions shall apply:
– Child victim: person under the age of 18 who is a victim of a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, regardless of his or her role in the commission of the crime
or in the prosecution of the alleged person(s) responsible. A child victim
includes a person under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of
the crime, regardless of his/her age at the time of the proceedings before
the ICC.
– Child witness: person under the age of 18 who is a witness of a crime within
the jurisdiction of the crime, regardless of his or her role in the commission
of the crime or in the prosecution of the alleged person(s) responsible. A
child witness includes a person under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the crime, regardless of his/her age at the time of the
proceedings before the ICC.
– Dual status child: person under the age of 18 who has the dual status of
victim with participatory status and witness in pre-trial or trial proceedings.
– ICC proceedings: includes the early stages where the ICC’s jurisdiction is
triggered, including Article 15 proceedings, and encompasses the investiga-
tion, pre-trial and trial stages (including sentencing and reparations pro-
cedures), together with any appeals proceedings resulting thereof.
– Child-sensitive: means an approach that gives primary consideration to a
child’s right perspective, to the child’s protection and that takes into
account a child’s individual needs and views.
GUIDELINES
1. Best interests of the child
Every child victim and witness has the right to have his or her best interests
given primary consideration, while safeguarding the rights of the accused.
2. Confidentiality
All persons working with a child victim or witness shall maintain confidential-
ity of all information that they may have acquired in the performance of their
duty.
3. Training
Judges, prosecutors and staff members of the ICC, as well as counsel and any
intermediaries working in the field, should undergo appropriate training on
issues related to child victims and witnesses.
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4. Right to be informed
A child victim or witness, and, whenever possible, his/her parents or guardian,
legal representative or other appropriate person designated to provide assist-
ance to the child, shall, from their first contact with the Court, and throughout
the entirety of his or her interaction with the Court, be promptly informed
about the following:
a. Procedures of ICC proceedings, including the role of child victims or
witnesses, the importance, timing and manner of testimony, and the ways
in which interviews will be conducted during the investigation and trial;
b. Existing support mechanisms for a child victim or witnesses, including
available protective and special measures provided for in Rules 87 and
88 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, including the possibility to have
video-conference or in situ hearings, as well as the possibility to have a
legal representative or any other person assigned to them to provide
assistance;
c. Existing mechanisms for the review of decisions affecting the child victim
or witness;
d. Relevant rights of child victims and witnesses pursuant to the Rome Statute
and other applicable law;
e. Possibilities for child victims to obtain reparations pursuant to Article 75
of the Rome Statute;
f. The progress and disposition of the specific case, including any arrest, or
relevant judicial decisions that impact the interests of the victim or witness
or the outcome of the case.
The Court shall ensure that proceedings relevant to the testimony of a child
victim or witness are conducted in a language that is simple and comprehens-
ible to the child.
5. Child victims
a. Pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, the Court should consider
the views and concerns of child victims in accordance with their age and
maturity.
b. Whenever the Chamber requests that a common legal representative is
chosen to represent a group of victims pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, the Registry shall take into consideration the
distinct interests and needs of child victims. Child victims shall be pre-
sumed indigent for the purposes of legal aid.
6. Investigation of cases involving child victims or witnesses
a. The Office of the Prosecutor should have specially trained staff able to
guide any interview of a child victim or witness so that it is carried out
with a child-sensitive approach.
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b. Repetition of interviews should be avoided to prevent re-victimisation of
the child.
c. Medical examination of child victims or witnesses should only be carried
out if deemed necessary by the Prosecutor or the competent Chamber.
d. If at any time during the investigation phase, any doubt exists as to the
physical or mental health of the child, the ICC shall ensure that a compre-
hensive medical examination is carried out on the child as soon as possible
so that the child receives proper treatment immediately.
7. Support person
a. Pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, from the
beginning of the investigation phase and during the entirety of the child’s
interaction with the Court, child victims and witnesses shall be supported
by a person with training and professional skills to communicate with and
assist children of different ages and backgrounds in order to prevent the
risk of duress or re-victimisation.
b. Continuity of the relationship between the child and the support person
shall be ensured to the greatest extent possible throughout the justice
process.
c. If the support person fails to carry out his or her duties and functions, the
competent Chamber shall designate a replacement support person, after
having taken into consideration the views of the child concerned.
8. Reliability of child witnesses
a. A child is deemed to be a capable witness and his or her testimony shall
not be presumed invalid and untrustworthy by reason of his or her age
alone.
b. A child witness may be allowed to give testimony assisted by an expert
specialised in understanding and communicating with children.
c. The weight given to the testimony of a child witness shall be in accordance
with his or her age and maturity.
d. A child witness shall not be compelled to swear under oath, for instance,
if the child is unable to understand the consequences of taking oath. In
such cases, the competent judge or Chamber may offer the child the oppor-
tunity to promise to tell the truth. This should not, in any case, affect the
reliability or trustworthiness of the child’s testimony.
9. Competency examination
A competency examination shall only be conducted if the relevant Chamber,
at the request of a party or proprio motu, determines there are compelling
reasons to do so.
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10. Child-friendly measures
a. A child witness or victim shall have the opportunity to express his or her
views and concerns on matters related to the case, his or her involvement
in the proceedings, in particular his or her safety, his or her preference
to testify or not and the manner in which the testimony is to be given, as
well as any other relevant matter affecting him or her. In every case, the
child should receive a clear explanation as to any decision taken in this
regard.
b. Waiting rooms used by child victims and witnesses shall be equipped in
a child-friendly manner and should be separate from those provided for
adult witnesses and victims and the accused person.
c. Testimony of a child witness shall be given priority in order to minimise
the waiting time during the court appearance.
d. The competent judge or Chamber shall allow the support person to accom-
pany the child throughout his or her participation in court.
e. The competent judge or Chamber shall inform the support person and the
child of the possibility to ask for a recess whenever the child needs one.
11. Protective measures for child witnesses and victims
Pursuant to Rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the competent
Chamber or judge may order protective measures, taking into account the
views of the child concerned and his or her best interests.
12. Reparations for child victims
a. The Court shall inform a child victim, his or her parents or guardian and
his or her legal representative about the reparations procedures.
b. When granting reparations, the Court shall take into consideration age
and gender-specific harms suffered by child victims, as well as any parti-
cular condition of the child pursuant to Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.
c. The views and concerns of children should be given due consideration




The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the world’s first international per-
manent court with jurisdiction to judge individuals for crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, with innovative aspects,
such as the participation of victims in judicial proceedings, as well as re-
parations to which victims of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction are entitled.
Thus, the Rome Statute goes beyond the purely retributive nature of judicial
proceedings, and includes a restorative mandate, that encompasses the possibil-
ity for victims to express their views in international criminal trials as well
as the possibility to receive reparations for the harms suffered. However, the
advances made with the adoption of the Rome Statute need to be applied to
concrete situations currently investigated by the ICC’s Prosecutor and in par-
ticular cases against accused persons.
This thesis offers an analysis and recommendations for the ICC to fulfil
its mandate, particularly vis-à-vis child victims and witnesses of crimes within
the ICC’s jurisdiction. It firstly analyses the Rome Statute and other applicable
law of the ICC, which give the ICC not only a clear penal mandate, but also
require that the ICC respects, as a minimum, the safety and well-being of
victims and witnesses, particularly those who are most vulnerable, such as
children.
However, during its first decade of existence the ICC has faced immense
challenges when implementing these legal provisions in its initial cases. The
first case before the ICC, the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga
case), involves exclusively charges of enlistment, conscription and use of
children under the age of 15 to participate actively in the hostilities. This case
faced unimaginable difficulties, which could explain why it is still ongoing
after more than seven years since Mr Lubanga’s first appearance before the
judges at The Hague. Within this complex first ICC case, children were at the
centre of ICC proceedings, and thus its achievements and failures are a vivid
example of the advances and drawbacks of the ICC’s mandate vis-à-vis children.
Unfortunately, the Lubanga case also demonstrates that the current ICC practice
may not adequately protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being,
dignity and privacy of children interacting with the ICC, either as witnesses
or victims of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 68 of the
Rome Statute. It also raises the issue of whether children should at all testify
in international trials (particularly viva voce in The Hague) and whether the
current victims’ participation system is suitable for child victims who may
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want to present their “views and concerns” to ICC judges pursuant to Article
68(3) of the Rome Statute.
However, not investigating crimes committed against children (particularly
when the Prosecutor has received information or evidence that this has
occurred) or excluding children from ICC proceedings (when this is not contrary
to their best interests) is not a legitimate course of action, since the Rome
Statute and other applicable law provide that children require special attention
by the ICC. However, these legal provisions are general and thus other applic-
able law pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome Statute offer valuable guidance
in order to give more specific substance to concepts such as the “needs of
witnesses and victims” and their “safety, physical and psychological well-being,
dignity and privacy”, and for the purpose of this research, children, as pro-
vided for in Rule 86 of the RPE. Hence, this research offers a comprehensive
study of the ICC’s legal framework from a children’s rights perspective, while
at the same time balancing these rights with the rights of the accused and the
right to a fair trial.
The main research question, which is the unifying thread of all six chapters
of the research is:
How should ICC proceedings address the needs of children in accordance with
Rule 86 of the RPE, in order to: a) protect the safety, physical and psychological
well-being, dignity and privacy of child victims and witnesses pursuant to Article
68(1) of the Rome Statute; b) guarantee that the views and concerns of child
victims are taken into consideration as provided for in Article 68(3) of the Rome
Statute; and c) provide reparations to child victims pursuant to Article 75 of the
Rome Statute?
Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to the role of children in current armed
conflicts, which sets the general context of the situation of children who will
come to the ICC either as victims or witnesses of crimes within its jurisdiction.
It first describes how violence against children has become a weapon of war
in many current armed conflicts. It then analyses the impact that crimes against
children have on their lives and those of their families and communities.
However, it goes beyond the role of children as victims of armed conflict and
analyses the complicated reality of many children that are also perpetrators
of crimes within the context of an armed conflict, particularly the situation
of child soldiers. Finally, this chapter focuses on the significant role that
children could play as participants in the peace and reconciliation process,
including their participation in international justice as well as non-judicial
mechanisms. Chapter 1 thus illustrates that child victims and witnesses are
not simply “vulnerable” individuals. Children appearing before the ICC include
children who may be perpetrators of crimes (albeit not within the ICC’s juris-
diction). Likewise, as a result of armed conflict, children appearing before the
ICC could also be more empowered, mature and independent that children
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in other situations. This analysis is important since these multifaceted aspects
of children in armed conflict should be taken into consideration when dealing
with children’s interaction with the ICC in Chapters 5 and 6 of this research.
Chapter 2 is a brief introduction to the ICC, its establishment and its main
organs. This introduction is made through a children’s rights perspective, thus
focusing on how the different organs of the ICC should work in order to fulfil
the ICC’s mandate pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. It is also an important
Chapter to introduce the organisation and structure of the ICC, particularly
since different organs and sections of the ICC are later mentioned and referred
to in Chapters 5 and 6 of this research. Although this Chapter may be super-
fluous for readers with knowledge on the ICC, it could be of value for readers
who, although knowledgeable in children’s rights, may not be acquainted to
the ICC’s structure and functioning.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relevance of other international instruments for
the interpretation and application of ICC provisions in proceedings related to
child victims and witnesses. This Chapter takes as initial point Article 21 of
the Rome Statute, and mainly paragraph 3, which requires ICC judges to inter-
pret and apply the law in accordance with internationally recognised human
rights. As regards children, the logical point of departure is the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The Chapter also refers to other sources of
law that, although not applicable law per se pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome
Statute, could serve as guidance for ICC judges when interpreting the law.
Finally, this Chapter analyses international case law that may be relevant and
applicable for child victims and witnesses before the ICC. In particular, the
jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is analysed regarding
crimes of enlistment, conscription and use of children to participate actively
in the hostilities and crimes of sexual violence. Furthermore, the case law of
the regional human right courts is studied. Of great significance is the case
law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, particularly in relation to
reparations. The analysis contained in Chapter 3 thus gives the legal basis for
the use of other international instruments in the following chapters.
Chapter 4 focuses on the substantive law of the ICC. It describes very briefly
the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Chapter then thoroughly describes crimes committed
exclusively against children but also crimes that, although committed against
the general population, have disproportionate effects on child victims. This
analysis is of significance, since children will interact with the ICC when they
are victims or witnesses of crimes within its jurisdiction. Thus, the analysis
of the elements of crimes is necessary to identify who are the child victims
and witnesses at the ICC. For example, in order to establish whether a child
is a victim within the jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to Rule 85 of the RPE,
an analysis of the elements of the relevant crimes is required. Likewise, in
order to establish the harms suffered in reparations proceedings, an analysis
of the crimes committed against children and the effects that these crimes have
upon them is fundamental. This Chapter is also important to understand the
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particular circumstances of child victims and witnesses addressing the ICC,
who may need protective or special measures as a result of the crimes (i.e.
a child witness with a post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of sexual
violence). Thus, although this Chapter analyses the substantive law of the ICC,
it ultimately has significant bearing on the procedural issues discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this research.
Chapter 5 is the pièce de résistance of this research, as it focuses on the three
manners in which children can interact with the ICC: as participating victims,
as witnesses and as beneficiaries of reparations. It analyses the existing legal
framework and practice at the ICC, but also provides examples of how other
applicable law related to children’s rights could be of use in proceedings in
which children interact with the ICC. This Chapter proposes different methods,
standards and good practices that could be adopted in ICC proceedings in order
to take into consideration the needs of child victims and witnesses pursuant
to Rule 86 of the RPE.
Chapter 6 proposes a series of recommendations that could be adopted in
order to guarantee the active participation and reparations of child victims
in ICC proceedings in accordance with international standards in children’s
rights and also pursuant to Rule 86 of the RPE. The Chapter also proposes
measures that could be taken when children appear as witnesses in pro-
ceedings before the ICC, in order to make their experience non-traumatic, but
also in order to guarantee the rights of the accused and a fair trial. The final
chapter also proposes a series of guidelines, which provide specific parameters
in order to fulfil the mandate of the ICC as provided for in Article 68 of the
Rome Statute and Rule 86 of the RPE and pursuant to international children’s
rights standards.
Samenvatting
KINDEREN EN HET INTERNATIONALE STRAFHOF
Analyse van het Statuut van Rome vanuit een kinderrechtenperspectief
Het Internationale Strafhof (ICC) is het eerste permanente internationale strafhof
ter wereld met rechtsmacht om individuele personen te berechten voor geno-
cide, misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden en agressie. Het kent
innovatieve aspecten, zoals de participatie van slachtoffers in gerechtelijke
procedures, evenals schadevergoedingen waar slachtoffers van misdaden
binnen de jurisdictie van het ICC recht op hebben. Zodoende gaat het Statuut
van Rome verder dan puur het berechten van misdrijven. Het maakt het voor
slachtoffers mogelijk om hun verhaal te doen tijdens de zitting en schade-
vergoeding te ontvangen. Niettemin moeten de vorderingen die gemaakt zijn
met de aanname van het Statuut en de oprichting van het Hof ook gerealiseerd
worden in de situaties en strafzaken die worden onderzocht door de Aanklager
van het ICC.
Dit proefschrift biedt een analyse en aanbevelingen aan het ICC om diens
mandaat na te komen, in het bijzonder ten aanzien van kindslachtoffers en
-getuigen. In de eerste plaats wordt het Statuut van Rome geanalyseerd,
hetgeen het ICC niet alleen een helder, strafrechtelijk mandaat verschaft, maar
ook eist dat het ICC de veiligheid en het welzijn van slachtoffers en getuigen
respecteert – in het bijzonder diegenen die het meest kwetsbaar zijn, zoals
kinderen. Ook worden andere voor het ICC toepasselijke wetten geanalyseerd.
Gedurende het eerste decennium van haar bestaan werd het ICC in haar
eerste zaken met grote uitdagingen geconfronteerd bij het implementeren van
de verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit het Statuut van Rome. De eerste zaak
voor het ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga-zaak), betrof uitslui-
tend beschuldigingen van indienstneming, rekrutering en gebruik van kinderen
onder de leeftijd van 15 jaar om actief deel te nemen in vijandelijkheden. Deze
zaak werd gekenmerkt door onvoorstelbare moeilijkheden, hetgeen kan verkla-
ren waarom deze zaak na meer dan zeven jaar sinds de eerste verschijning
van Lubanga voor de rechters in Den Haag, nog steeds aanhangig is. In de
Lubanga-zaak stonden kinderen centraal. Daarmee biedt deze zaak inzicht in
de voor- en nadelen van het ICC-mandaat dat jegens kinderen worden uitge-
voerd. Helaas toont de Lubanga-zaak dat in de huidige ICC-praktijk de veilig-
heid, het lichamelijke en psychologische welzijn, de waardigheid en het privé-
leven van kinderen die in aanraking komen met het ICC, hetzij als getuigen
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hetzij als slachtoffers, niet adequaat wordt beschermd. Moeten kinderen wel
worden gevraagd te getuigen in internationale strafzaken (in het bijzonder
viva voce in Den Haag)? Is het huidige participatiesysteem voor slachtoffers
wel geschikt voor kindslachtoffers die misschien hun ‘standpunten en zorgen’
aan de ICC-rechters willen voorleggen, overeenkomstig artikel 68(3) van het
Statuut van Rome?
Niettemin is het niet onderzoeken van misdaden begaan tegen kinderen
(in het bijzonder indien de Aanklager informatie of bewijsmateriaal heeft
ontvangen dat zulks is geschied) of het uitsluiten van kinderen van ICC-proce-
dures (wanneer zulks niet in strijd is met hun belangen) niet geoorloofd,
aangezien het Statuut van Rome en andere toepasselijke wetgeving erin voor-
zien dat kinderen speciale aandacht vereisen van het ICC. Maar deze wettelijke
bepalingen zijn algemeen en daarom biedt andere toepasselijke wetgeving,
overeenkomstig artikel 21 van het Statuut van Rome, een waardevolle oriëntatie
teneinde een meer specifieke inhoud te kunnen geven aan begrippen zoals
de ‘behoefte van waardigheid en hun privéleven’, en voor het doel van dit
onderzoek, kinderen zoals voorzien in regel 86 van de Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (RPE). Vandaar dat dit onderzoek een uitgebreide studie omvat naar
het juridisch kader van het ICC vanuit het perspectief van kinderrechten, terwijl
het gelijktijdig deze rechten afweegt tegen de rechten van de aangeklaagde
en het recht op een eerlijk proces.
In dit onderzoek staat de volgende probleemstelling centraal:
Hoe zou in de ICC-procedures aan de belangen van kinderen invulling moeten
worden gegeven overeenkomstig regel 86 van de RPE, teneinde: a) de veiligheid,
het lichamelijke en psychologische welzijn, de waardigheid en het privéleven van
kindslachtoffers en -getuigen te beschermen overeenkomstig artikel 68(1) van het
Statuut van Rome; b) te garanderen dat er rekening wordt gehouden met de
zienswijze van kindslachtoffers, zoals voorzien in artikel 68(3) van het Statuut
van Rome; en c) schadevergoedingen toe te kennen aan kindslachtoffers overeen-
komstig artikel 75 van het Statuut van Rome).
Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een algemene inleiding in de rol van kinderen in hedendaagse
gewapende conflicten, hetgeen de algemene context schetst van de situatie
van kinderen die naar het ICC zullen komen, hetzij als slachtoffers of als
getuigen van misdaden binnen diens jurisdictie. Eerst wordt beschreven hoe
geweld tegen kinderen een oorlogswapen is geworden in vele hedendaagse
gewapende conflicten. Vervolgens wordt het effect dat misdrijven tegen
kinderen hebben op hun leven en op dat van hun families en gemeenschappen
beschreven. In het hoofdstuk wordt niet slechts de rol van kinderen als slacht-
offers van gewapende conflicten beschreven, maar wordt ook de ingewikkelde
rol die kinderen zouden kunnen spelen als deelnemers in het vredes- en
verzoeningsproces geanalyseerd, met inbegrip van hun deelname aan inter-
nationale strafprocessen, evenals in niet-gerechtelijke mechanismen. Zodoende
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illustreert hoofdstuk 1 dat kinderslachtoffers en -getuigen niet slechts ‘kwets-
bare’ individuen zijn. Kinderen die voor het ICC komen, kunnen ook daders
zijn van misdrijven (hoewel niet binnen de ICC-jurisdictie). Eveneens, zouden
kinderen die voor het ICC komen ten gevolge van een gewapend conflict, ook
volwassener en onafhankelijker kunnen zijn dan kinderen in andere situaties.
Deze analyse is belangrijk, omdat er met deze veelzijdige aspecten van kinde-
ren in gewapende conflicten rekening moet worden gehouden bij de interactie
met kinderen bij het ICC, beschreven in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 van dit onder-
zoek.
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een korte inleiding op het ICC, diens totstandkoming en
belangrijkste organen. Dit wordt beschreven vanuit een kinderrechtenperspec-
tief en zodoende wordt aandacht besteed aan de vraag hoe de verschillende
organen van het ICC zouden moeten functioneren teneinde het mandaat van
het ICC na te komen, overeenkomstig regel 86 van het RPE. Dit hoofdstuk is
relevant omdat de organisatie en structuur van het ICC worden besproken;
de verschillende organen en secties van het ICC die later genoemd worden
in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 van dit onderzoek. Ofschoon de inhoud van dit
hoofdstuk misschien al bekend is voor lezers met kennis van het ICC, is het
waardevol voor lezers die, hoewel goed op de hoogte van kinderrechten, niet
bekend zijn met de structuur en het functioneren van het ICC.
Hoofdstuk 3 is gericht op het belang van andere internationale instrumenten
voor de interpretatie en toepassing van bepalingen van het ICC-Statuut in
procedures betreffende kinderslachtoffers en -getuigen. Dit hoofdstuk neemt
als startpunt artikel 21 van het Statuut van Rome, en in het bijzonder para-
graaf 3, welke eist dat ICC-rechters de wet interpreteren en toepassen overeen-
komstig internationaal erkende mensenrechten. Waar het kinderen betreft,
is het logische uitgangspunt het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten van
het Kind (IVRK). Dit hoofdstuk verwijst ook naar andere juridische bronnen
die, hoewel strikt genomen volgens artikel 21 van het Statuut van Rome geen
toepasselijke regelgeving, zouden kunnen dienen ter oriëntatie voor ICC-rechters
bij het interpreteren van het Statuut en de bewijs- en procedureregels (RPE).
Ten slotte wordt in dit hoofdstuk internationale strafrechtspraak geanalyseerd
die relevant en toepasbaar kan zijn voor kinderslachtoffers en -getuigen bij
het ICC. In het bijzonder wordt de jurisprudentie van het Speciale Hof voor
Sierra Leone geanalyseerd met betrekking tot de misdrijven van indienst-
neming, rekrutering en gebruik van kinderen. Bovendien wordt de jurispruden-
tie van de regionale mensenrechtengerechtshoven geanalyseerd. Van groot
belang is voorts de jurisprudentie van het Inter-Amerikaanse Gerechtshof voor
Mensenrechten specifiek met betrekking tot schadevergoedingen. De analyse
die in hoofdstuk 3 wordt gepresenteerd, verschaft daarmee de juridische basis
voor het gebruik van andere internationale instrumenten in de volgende hoofdstukken.
256 Samenvatting
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op het materiële recht van het Statuut van Rome; het
zogenaamde ‘algemeen deel’ (‘general principles’). Het beschrijft in het kort
de misdrijven waar het ICC rechtsmacht over heeft. In dit hoofdstuk wordt
de omschrijving van misdrijven exclusief gepleegd tegen kinderen nader
uitgewerkt, maar ook misdrijven die, ofschoon gepleegd tegen de gehele
bevolking, disproportionele effecten hebben op kinderslachtoffers. Deze analyse
is belangrijk, omdat kinderen met het ICC in aanraking zullen komen wanneer
zij slachtoffers of getuigen zijn van misdrijven binnen diens jurisdictie. De
analyse van delictsbestanddelen van misdrijven is noodzakelijk om te identi-
ficeren wie kinderslachtoffers (en mogelijk getuigen) zouden kunnen zijn. Ook
is een dergelijke analyse nodig om vast te stellen of een kind een slachtoffer
is binnen de ICC-jurisdictie overeenkomstig regel 85 van het RPE,. Daarnaast
is een dergelijke analyse nodig om in schadevergoedingsprocedures de geleden
schade vast te kunnen stellen. Die analyse in dit hoofdstuk is ook relevant
ten behoeve van begrip voor de specifieke omstandigheden van kinderslacht-
offers en -getuigen die zich tot het ICC richten en die beschermende of speciale
maatregelen nodig hebben als gevolg van misdrijven (bijvoorbeeld een kinder-
getuige met een post-traumatische stress-stoornis als gevolg van seksueel
geweld). Dus hoewel in dit hoofdstuk het materiële recht wordt geanalyseerd,
is dit relevant voor de procedurele aspecten die worden besproken in de hoofd-
stukken 5 en 6 van dit onderzoek.
Hoofdstuk 5 is het pièce de résistance van dit onderzoek, aangezien het zich
concentreert op de drie manieren waarop kinderen met het ICC in aanraking
kunnen komen: als slachtoffer-deelnemers aan het proces, als getuigen en als
begunstigden van schadevergoedingen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt het juridisch
kader en de praktijk van het ICC geanalyseerd. Tevens wordt aan de hand van
voorbeelden geïllustreerd hoe andere regelgeving betreffende de rechten van
kinderen gebruikt zou kunnen worden in procedures waarin kinderen in
aanraking komen met het ICC. In dit hoofdstuk worden verschillende methodes,
standaarden en best practices voorgesteld die zouden kunnen worden toegepast
in processen bij het ICC, zodat beter rekening kan worden gehouden met de
belangen van kinderslachtoffers en -getuigen overeenkomstig regel 86 van
de RPE.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een serie aanbevelingen gepresenteerd die kunnen garan-
deren dat de actieve deelname van kinderslachtoffers aan strafprocedures en
de schadevergoeding voor kinderslachtoffers, overeenkomstig internationale
kinderrechtenstandaarden verloopt. In dit hoofdstuk worden tevens maatrege-
len voorgesteld die getroffen zouden kunnen worden wanneer kinderen als
getuigen worden gehoord in ICC-procedures, zodat zij van deze ervaring niet
getraumatiseerd raken terwijl tegelijkertijd, de rechten van de verdachte en
een eerlijke en onpartijdige procedure worden gegarandeerd. Het hoofdstuk
stelt ook een serie richtlijnen voor om het mandaat van het ICC zoals voorzien
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